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Abstract	This	thesis	engages	the	concept	of	resilience	in	light	of	the	disciplines	of	social	science,	philosophy,	and	theology.	Viewing	resilience	through	these	lenses	presents	the	possibility	of	‘re-envisioning’	human	responses	to	adversity	in	ways	that	both	question	assumptions	underlying	resilience	and	corroborate	current	research.	Social	science	data	are	foundational	for	understanding	factors	significant	in	human	resilience	to	adversity,	but	may	be	further	‘thickened’	through	narrative	accounts	of	human	being.	Attention	to	the	hermeneutic	phenomenology	of	Paul	Ricoeur	provides	insight	into	both	the	‘surplus	of	meaning’	possible	through	narrative	and	human	identity	formed	in	relation	to	the	Other.	These	take	on	added	significance	when	understood	in	light	of	the	narrative	of	the	Christian	Gospel	that	discloses	meaning	through	relation	to	the	self-giving	God.	Julian	of	Norwich	serves	as	an	example	of	the	meaningfulness	of	the	Gospel	narrative,	known	through	a	personal	experience	of	Divine	love.			Thus,	the	resilient	individual	may	be	re-envisioned	through	the	transformative	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	A	renewed	understanding	of	personhood	situates	responses	to	adversity	within	the	meaningfulness	of	the	‘world’	projected	by	this	narrative.	Through	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	the	love	of	God	engenders	human	resilience	by	creating	meaning	and	connection	in	an	environment	of	eschatological	hope.			 	
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Introduction	
	
The	Semiotics	of	Tree	Rings	and	Human	Lives	The	giant	redwood	and	sequoia	trees	that	tower	over	California	are	a	sight	to	behold,	majestic	in	their	stately	grandeur.	Growing	as	tall	as	375	feet,	as	wide	as	30	feet,	and	living	for	as	many	as	3,000	years,	these	trees	boast	among	their	ranks	the	largest	living	organism	in	the	world	(Redwood	National	and	State	Parks	2014b).	If	one	were	to	take	a	cross-section	of	one	of	these	tree’s	trunk,	its	growth	would	be	evident	in	hundreds	upon	hundreds	of	concentric	circles,	each	marking	a	year	of	the	tree’s	life.	Those	rings	tell	a	story—the	narrative	of	the	tree’s	existence—through	drought,	fire,	and	disease	as	well	as	through	plenty,	health,	and	growth:	“Staying	true	to	its	name,	the	adaptations	of	Sequoia	sempervirens	(ever-living	Sequoia)	seem	to	bend	time	as	it	continues	to	prove	itself	one	of	the	earth’s	most	tenacious	survivors”	(Redwood	National	and	State	Parks	2014a).	This	tale	of	survival	is	written	in	and	through	the	waxing	and	waning	of	rings	of	growth—a	story	of	struggle	unknown	apart	from	peeling	back	the	layers	of	time.1			But,	in	meaningful	ways,	human	resilience	will	look	quite	different	than	the	resilience	of	the	stoic	sequoia.	For	one,	human	beings	are	much	more	complex—involving	biological,	psychological,	social,	and	spiritual	components—that,	invariably,	affect	resilient	adaptation.	Yet	human	beings	are	also	more	dynamic	than	the	stately	tree;	we	are	ever	changing,	adapting,	moving,	and	living.	How	might	one	‘intersect’	such	a	mutable	being?		The	‘vivisection’	required	to	examine	the	complexities	of	human	life,	I	suggest,	is	accomplished	through	narratival	means.	If	one	were	to	‘cut	away’	(metaphorically	speaking)	the	trappings	of	a	human	life,	a	story	also	would	come	to	light—told	not	by	concentric	rings	of	growth,	but	through	memories	and	ambitions,	hopes	and	fears,	wishes	and	dreams—all	interwoven	in	the	individual’s	self-identity	and	narrated	through	time.	Here	there	would	be	love,	joy,	and	happiness	as	well	as	pain,	sorrow,	and	depression;	seasons	of	thriving	and	seasons	of	regression.			
                                                1	The	wounds	of	survival—scars	and	lost	limbs—can	become	meaningful	in	the	context	of	the	tree’s	narrative	of	existence.	
11	
Through	the	course	of	this	study	a	particular	human	story	will	frame	our	discussion	of	resilience.	This	story	will	bring	to	the	forefront	certain	issues	pertaining	to	the	relationship	between	resilience	and	theology.	Her	story	is	only	one	among	many,	and	so	is	not	generalizable	to	all	contexts.2	Nonetheless,	as	a	particular	story,	her	life	narrative	may	provide	insight	into	resilient	adaptation	that	is	otherwise	unavailable.	This	is	Anh’s	story.		
If	you	met	Anh	Vu	Sawyer	today,	you	would	immediately	notice	the	spring	in	the	step	of	
this	spry	sixty-something	woman.	Her	bounding	energy	and	enthusiasm	for	life	dwarfs	
that	of	many	half	her	age.	Yet	her	jovial	demeanor	and	engaging	manner	bely	the	difficult	
circumstances	she	endured.	Or,	as	it	may	be,	are	they	a	result	of	those	experiences?	You	be	
the	judge:		
‘It	is	1975	in	Vietnam.	A	young	Vietnamese	woman	watches	as	a	helicopter	emblazoned	
with	the	American	flag	lands	on	top	of	the	U.	S.	Embassy,	just	beyond	barbwire-topped	
walls	from	where	she	sits.	She	and	her	companions—family	members	ranging	in	age	from	
7	to	70—gaze	desperately	through	the	barbwire	at	their	last	hope	of	escape	before	the	
brutal	Viet	Cong	seize	Saigon.’3	
	The	life-threatening	danger	and	extreme	adversity	that	Anh	faced	may	not	be	evident	at	first	glance.	As	it	were,	her	infectious	joy,	in	fact,	issues	from	a	depth	of	character	that	has	weathered	the	storms	of	life.	Some	would	say	that	Anh	could	be	described	as	resilient.	But	what	does	this	mean,	exactly?	Is	it	that	she	survived	the	worst	that	life	could	throw	at	her?	Or	does	it	describe	the	way	in	which	she	weathered	the	storms	of	life?	Whatever	it	is,	it	must	be	contingent.	Many	others	have	not	fared	nearly	as	well	as	her.		Thus,	for	the	human	being,	will	this	narrative	be	a	tale	of	survival,	or	of	some	other	fate?	Is	it	possible	to	thrive—like	many	giant	redwoods?	And,	if	so,	what	creates	and	sustains	
                                                2	For	additional	stories	showing	the	power	of	a	moral	life	in	the	face	of	adversity	see	
What	Really	Matters:	Living	a	Moral	Life	Amidst	Uncertainty	and	Danger	(Kleinman	2006).	3	Anh	relates	her	story	in	Song	of	Saigon:	One	Woman’s	Journey	to	Freedom	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	2003).	
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such	human	flourishing?	While	the	possibility	of	prolonged	biological	life	is	attractive	for	many,	I	suggest	that	human	well-being	is	much	more	extensive	than	physical	health—an	assessment	that	is	elucidated	through	an	evaluation	of	resilience.			
Why	Resilience?	A	recent	trend	in	Western	culture	seeks	to	assess	how	human	beings	may	thrive	in	the	midst	of	adversity—not	despite	difficulty,	but	in	and	through	it.	This	idea	of	‘bouncing	back’	links	resilient	adaptation	to	a	number	of	character	traits,	skills,	and	practices.	The	thought	is,	to	put	it	crudely,	if	we	can	distill	and	inculcate	certain	characteristics,	individuals	will	be	able	to	overcome	adversities.	A	slew	of	books	promise	to	make	the	reader	more	resilient,	and	along	with	it,	more	healthy,	happy,	and	wise.4	While	many	of	these	books	provide	helpful	insight,	they	do	not	address	several	important	questions	regarding	assumptions	underlying	resilience:	in	particular,	whether	resilience	is	always	a	good	to	be	pursued,	what	the	goal	of	resilient	adaptation	is,	and	what	suppositions	underlie	the	claim	that	resilience	and	happiness	are	synonymous.	I	contend	that	the	answers	to	these	questions	reveal	as	much	about	our	understanding	of	ourselves	as	human	beings	as	they	do	about	resilience.	Furthermore,	I	believe	that	a	theological	account	of	resilience	can	shed	light	on	the	concept	itself,	and	also	upon	the	complex	nature	of	human	existence.		In	the	prologue	to	his	book,	Creative	Suffering	(1982),5	the	renowned	physician,	Paul	Tournier,	notes	with	some	astonishment	an	article	by	Pierre	Rentchnick	(1975)	that	compiles	a	suggestive	list	of	many	of	the	significant	leaders	throughout	history	who	have	been	orphans.6	How,	this	physician	wonders,	can	those	lacking	the	most	basic	human	needs	of	a	loving	father	and	mother	go	on	to	become	some	of	the	most	powerful	
                                                4	E.g.	(Duckworth	2016;	Greitens	2015;	Wicks	2010).		5	Tournier	suggests	that	this,	his	twentieth	book	written	in	his	eighties,	is	the	culmination	of	many	years	of	personal	experience,	study,	and	listening	to	others’	experiences	(1982:1).	6	Tournier	lists,	among	many	others,	Alexander	the	Great,	Julius	Caesar,	Louis	XIV,	George	Washington,	Napoleon,	Queen	Victoria,	Hitler,	and	Stalin	(1982:2)	as	well	as	creative	individuals	such	as	Bach,	Camus,	Kipling,	Dante,	Tolstoy,	Voltaire,	and	Dostoyevsky	(1982:13).	Tournier’s	own	experiences	as	an	orphan	seem	to	shape	his	viewpoint	(1982:3).	Significant	for	this	project,	I	would	add	Paul	Ricoeur,	who	also	was	an	orphan,	to	this	list.	
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individuals	in	history	(1982:2)?	Certainly,	the	answer	is	relevant	to	gaining	insight	into	resilience.		Tournier’s	discussion	begs	another	question,	however:	In	what	sense	is	the	deprivation	of	the	orphan	the	same	or	different	than	other	forms	of	deprivation?7	Tournier	concludes	that	the	deprivation	of	an	orphan	is	but	an	intensified	form	of	the	deprivation	and	finitude	which	is	the	common	lot	of	humanity	(1982:10);	the	orphan	is	“simply	a	special	case	of	the	countless	sufferings	of	life”	(1982:12).	While	being	careful	not	to	justify	experiences	of	suffering—even	proposing	that	it	is	“especially	dangerous	and	repellant	if	[one]	suggests	that	the	relationship	is	one	of	cause	and	effect,	or	that	suffering	has	didactic	value”	(1982:20)—Tournier	nonetheless	suggests	that	there	can	be	some	benefits	associated	with	deprivation,	including	increased	creativity	(1982:14–21).	He	notes	that	it	is	“revolting”	to	consider	glorifying	suffering	or	pursuing	it	for	supposed	benefits	(1982:20),	but	he	also	suggests	that	scholars	often	do	not	address	the	“serious	question”	of	this	supposed	correlation	(1982:20–21).	This,	in	one	sense,	is	a	question	at	the	heart	of	resilience:	Can	an	individual	‘bounce	back’	from	adversity?		Tournier’s	account,	taken	as	a	whole,	creates	a	problematic	for	a	common	narrative	told	in	Western	society	today.8	Provide	all	of	the	ingredient	necessary	for	flourishing,	we	are	told,	and	the	best,	most	productive	and	well-developed	citizens	will	be	the	result.	This	narrative,	often	coinciding	with	what	is	called	‘resilience,’	is	challenged	by	Tournier’s	remarks.9	What	if	the	narrative	of	resilience	being	espoused	in	modern	Western	culture	is,	in	fact,	mistaken?	Is	this	narrative	too	simple?	Does	our	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	ultimately	flourish,	and	the	path	to	arrive	at	this	flourishing,	need	to	be	re-evaluated,	or	even	re-envisioned?		
                                                7	One	might	also	question	whether	having	power	and	flourishing	as	a	human	are	synonymous.	8	This	is	a	narrative	not	at	odds,	per	se,	with	resilience	research,	but	rather	with	many	modern	Western	conceptions	of	resilience.	9	Tournier	writes,	“Among	other	projects,	Paul	Ricoeur	and	I	were	asked	to	write	a	book	together	on	‘man	in	crisis	situations’,	because	it	is	then	that	man	reveals	what	he	is.	However,	the	departure	of	Paul	Ricoeur	for	the	Sorbonne,	summoned	by	other	concerns,	cut	our	plans	short”	(1982:38).	We	can	only	imagine	how	useful	this	work	might	have	been!	
14	
A	Problem	for	Human	Adaptation	in	Western	Society?	A	growing	number	of	professionals	are	increasingly	concerned	about	the	mental	health	and	resilience	of	individuals	in	Western	cultures,	especially	young	people	(Gray	2015;	Haidt	and	Lukianoff	2015).	This	makes	the	need	for	this	study	all	the	more	timely	and	pertinent.	For	almost	all	individuals	it	is	a	question	of	‘When?’	rather	than	‘If?’	they	will	face	adversity.	As	the	Christian	tradition	affirms,	the	experience	of	adversity	is	common	to	human	life	due	to	the	broken	nature	of	the	world.	This	brokenness	is	not	merely	theoretical,	but	rather	is	experienced	by	countless	individuals	on	a	daily	basis.	The	need	for	resilience,	then,	is	a	given	for	most	individuals.		This	experience	of	adversity,	as	understood	in	much	of	Western	society,	necessitates	adaptation	in	order	to	flourish,	yet	both	beneficial	and	maladaptive	coping	are	possible.	An	assessment	of	assumptions	underlying	resilience	and	human	flourishing	may	yield	helpful	insights.	For	instance,	we	must	examine	the	assumed	universal	positive	nature	of	resilient	adaptation	as	well	as	whether	‘resilience’	provides	an	adequate	description	of	this	phenomenon.			
A	Solution	in	Narrative	Theology?	While	much	research	assesses	resilient	adaptation	through	social	scientific	means,10	little	attention	has	been	given	to	the	ways	in	which	these	accounts	may	be	inadequate	to	describe	the	complexity	of	human	resilience.	This	study	seeks	to	address	whether	a	Christian	theological	account	of	resilience	can	provide	insight	into	human	response	to	adversity.	In	doing	so,	I	will	address	how	religion	and	spirituality	(R/S)	are	related	to	resilience	as	well	as	how	insights	from	the	disciplines	of	science	and	theology	can	be	integrated.	Most	significantly,	philosophical	and	theological	accounts	of	the	human	person	will	provide	insight	into	resilience.		Any	exploration	of	resilience	in	today’s	society	must	take	into	account	intellectual	and	societal	currents.	Due	to	the	influence	of	postmodern	thought	and	an	emphasis	upon	‘small’	stories,	individuals	in	Western	culture	largely	perceive	themselves,	and	thereby	
                                                10	Take,	for	instance,	studies	utilizing	qualitative	and	quantitative	ethnographic	studies	of	individuals	and	communities,	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI),	and	genetics.	These	studies	will	be	addressed	in	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
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resilience,	through	this	lens.	I	do	not	attempt	to	escape	from	the	particularity	of	this	human	experience,	but	rather	appeal	for	individual	narratives	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	Gospel	narrative—a	vision	of	reality	that	can	provide	meaning	and	connection	amidst	distended	human	experience.11	In	this	regard,	I	do	not	seek	to	develop	a	‘metanarrative’	regarding	resilience,	only	to	gain	insight	into	the	common	human	experience	of	adversity	and	the	possibility	of	its	redemption	through	grace.		In	light	of	these	insights,	I	contend	that	the	resilient	individual	may	be	re-envisioned	through	a	Christian	theological	vision,	enacted	through	the	transforming	narrative	of	the	Gospel	(Good	News).	I	will	not	here	advocate	the	Gospel	as	a	tool	for	the	pragmatic	promotion	of	resilience	by	clinicians	in	clinical	settings.	Certainly,	my	argument	has	substantial	practical	implications	for	inculcating	resilience,	but	I	suggest	that	these	must	be	understood	in	the	context	of	a	Christian	faith	community.	This	setting	provides	a	proper	framework	for	understanding	human	existence	and	the	significance	of	meaning-making	and	relational	connection	to	God.	In	this	project,	I	will	propose	that	these	can	provide	a	renewed	understanding	of	the	human	person.	My	argument,	then,	is	that	through	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	the	love	of	God	engenders	human	resilience	by	creating	meaning	and	connection	in	an	environment	of	eschatological	hope.	But,	before	addressing	these	subjects,	more	must	be	said	regarding	the	concept	of	resilience	itself.		
What	is	Resilience?	Human	geographer	Ben	Anderson	suggests	that		something	called	‘resilience’	appears	to	have	proliferated	across	multiple,	at	best	partially	connected,	domains	of	life.	Resilience,	whatever	it	is,	appears	now	to	be	everywhere;	the	latest	iteration	of	the	promise	of	security…offered	as	a	desperate	hope	of	survival	in	a	world	of	roiling	crises,	and	demanded	of	subjects,	populations	and	systems	(2015:60).12		
                                                11	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1984b:4).	Here	Ricoeur	draws	upon	Augustine’s	assessment	of	the	human	condition.	12	Anderson	also	notes	that	many	scholars	have	suggested	an	intertwining	of	the	resilience	concept	with	the	agenda	of	neo-liberalism.	
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Yet,	despite	the	‘proliferation’	of	this	concept,	scholars	do	not	agree	about	“what	exactly	it	is	that	has	proliferated,	how	and	why”	(Anderson	2015:60).	What	is	resilience?	We	begin	with	a	definition.		
Resilience	Defined	The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	defines	resilience	as	“The	quality	or	fact	of	being	able	to	recover	quickly	or	easily	from,	or	resist	being	affected	by,	a	misfortune,	shock,	illness,	etc.;	robustness;	adaptability”	(Anon	n.d.).			Similarly,	the	Oxford	Thesaurus	of	English	gives	these	terms	as	synonyms	for	resilience:	“1…flexibility,	pliability,	suppleness,	plasticity,	elasticity,	springiness,	spring,	give;	durability,	ability	to	last,	strength,	sturdiness,	toughness…2…strength	of	character,	strength,	toughness,	hardiness;	adaptability,	ability	to	bounce	back,	buoyancy,	flexibility”	(Waite,	Maurice	2004:805).	It	gives	as	the	opposite	of	resilience:	“1…rigidity;	fragility…2…vulnerability,	weakness”	(Waite,	Maurice	2004:805).	Throughout	this	project	we	will	assess	how	accurate	these	descriptions	may	be	for	the	phenomenon	of	human	resilience.	However,	as	can	be	seen	from	the	variety	of	synonyms,	the	word	‘resilience’	has	a	wide	base	of	meaning.	These	meanings	gain	additional	significance	when	paired	with	the	history	of	the	term.			
The	History	of	‘Resilience’	
	
Early	Roots	The	Oxford	Dictionary	of	English	Etymology	notes	that	‘resilient’	comes	from	the	verb	‘resile,’	which	is	defined	as	to	“draw	back,	shrink,	recoil”	and	is	derived	either	from	the	French,	resilir	or	the	Latin	resilire	(Onions,	C.	T.	1967:759).	This	dictionary	defines	‘resilient’	as	“returning	to	the	original	position”	and	notes	that	it	was	first	used	in	the	16th	century.	Francis	Bacon,	in	the	17th	century,	was	the	first	to	use	the	noun	‘resilience’	in	a	scientific	context	while	discussing	the	strength	of	echoes	(Alexander	2013:1260;	Onions,	C.	T.	1967:759).		
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The	Latin	resilire	is	found	in	the	writings	of	a	number	of	classical	writers	to	include	Seneca	the	Elder,	Pliny	the	Elder,	Ovid,	Cicero,	and	Livy	in	addition	to	Quintillian	and	St.	Jerome	(Alexander	2013:1260).	D.	E.	Alexander	writes	that,	in	most	cases,	resilire	was	used	“to	describe	leaping,	jumping	or	rebounding”	(2013:1260).	‘Resilience’	was	included	in	Thomas	Blount’s	1656	lexicon,	Glossographia.	In	it,	“[h]e	attributed	it	a	dual	meaning:	to	rebound	and	to	go	back	on	one’s	word”	(Alexander	2013:1262).		Then,	in	the	18th	and	19th	centuries,	the	term	was	largely	used	to	describe	emotion.	Additionally,	cognates	of	‘resilience’	found	their	way	into	use	in	German	as	well	as	a	number	of	English	texts	where	they	were	“used	in	various	ways	to	denote	the	rather	varied	concepts	of	rebounding,	elasticity	and	fickleness”	(Alexander	2013:1262–63).	During	this	early	period	of	usage,	‘resilience’	did	not	have	a	technical	use,	its	meaning	instead	being	tied	closely	to	its	roots	in	Latin.			There	is	some	dispute	regarding	the	first	known	scholarly	use	of	‘resilience’	in	an	engineering	context.	Despite	some	contentions,	it	is	clear	that	‘resilience’	was	not	used	in	this	sense	until	the	19th	century,	and	even	then	it	was	confined	to	the	description	of	the	ability	of	various	materials	to	bear	heavy	loads	(Alexander	2013:1262–63;	Anon	2014;	McAslan	2010:2).		
Modern	Usage	The	first	use	of	the	term	in	the	modern	sense	of	psychological	resilience	was	in	1857	in	Cassell’s	Illustrated	History	of	England:	“In	their	struggles	with	the	ponderous	power	of	England	[the	Scots]	discovered	an	invincible	vigour,	not	only	of	resistance,	but	of	resilience”	(Anon	2014;	Smith,	Howitt,	and	Cassell	1857:333).	Even	after	this,	the	term	was	used	rarely	in	this	way	until	recently.		In	the	20th	century,	the	term	was	introduced	as	a	descriptive	concept	into	the	field	of	ecology	by	C.	S.	Holling	who	defined	resilience	as	the	“measure	of	the	persistence	of	systems	and	of	their	ability	to	absorb	change	and	disturbance	and	still	maintain	the	same	relationships	between	populations	or	state	variables”	(1973:14).	
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Around	the	same	time,	but	independent	of	the	development	in	the	field	of	ecology,	resilience	appeared	in	the	field	of	psychology	(Masten	2014:7),13	though	it	did	not	gain	widespread	popularity	in	the	field	until	Fredrich	Flach’s	1988	work	Resilience:	
Discovering	a	New	Strength	at	Times	of	Stress	(Alexander	2013:1264).	Ann	Masten	notes	regarding	resilience	that	“[s]ocial	scientists	intrigued	with	understanding	how	some	people	escape	the	harmful	effects	of	severe	adversity,	cope	well,	bounce	back,	or	even	thrive,	eventually	settled	on	this	word	to	label	the	focus	of	their	research”	(2014:7).		Emmy	Werner	and	Ruth	Smith	were	pioneers	in	the	study	of	resilience	through	their	longitudinal	study	of	children	on	the	island	of	Kauai	(Rutter	2013:474).	They	followed	nearly	700	children	from	their	births	in	1955	to	assess	vulnerability	and	growth	through	adversity.	Their	published	findings	in	1982	and	1992	provided	much	of	the	raw	data	for	initial	resilience	research	(Werner	and	Smith	1982,	1992).	Resilience	research	has	had	close	ties	with	the	field	of	developmental	psychology	from	early	on,	especially	in	the	area	of	child	development	(Cicchetti	2013;	Luthar	2006;	Masten	2013).	Masten,	who	began	working	in	the	field	of	resilience	studies	in	1976,	argues	that	the	significant	connections	resilience	research	has	with	developmental	psychopathology	give	it	a	depth	of	understanding	how	humans	adapt	to	adversity	over	the	lifespan.14	Masten	describes	the	history	of	modern	resilience	research	in	terms	of	four	‘waves’	(Masten	2007;	Wright,	Masten,	and	Narayan	2013).	The	first	wave	was	descriptive	in	nature	and	sought	to	identify	the	characteristics	that	are	correlates	of	resilience.	The	second	wave	focused	on	finding	processes	involved	in	resilient	adaptation	while	the	third	wave	sought	to	identify	factors	significant	for	‘prevention	and	intervention’	through	experimentation	(Masten	2007:922).	The	fourth	and	current	wave	“is	characterized	by	a	focus	on	multilevel	analysis	and	the	dynamics	of	adaptation	and	change”	(Masten	2007:921).	This	new	wave	also	emphasizes	a	systems-based	conceptualization	of	resilience	that	gives	rise	to	the	possibility	of	gaining	insight	into	the	biological	underpinnings	of	resilience.		
                                                13	Cf.	(Garmezy	1971).	14	See	(Masten	2014:6–7).	Cf.	(Lerner	et	al.	2012;	Overton	2013;	Sameroff	2000).	
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In	the	20th	century,	the	study	of	human	beings’	response	to	adversity	has	often	been	tied	to	research	on	circumstances	surrounding	war.	This	was	true	of	the	foundational	understandings	developed	with	soldiers	returning	World	War	I	and	World	War	II	(Masten	2014:7–8),15	but	also	true	of	the	more	recent	study	of	resilience	and	the	conflicts	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	(Bonanno	et	al.	2012;	Cornum,	Matthews,	and	Seligman	2011;	Harvey	et	al.	2012;	United	States	and	Rand	Corporation	2011;	Zimmermann	et	al.	2014).	Additionally,	a	growing	body	of	research	has	assessed	the	resilient	responses	of	children	in	war	zones	(Theresa	S.	Betancourt	et	al.	2010;	Betancourt	and	Khan	2008;	Masten	and	Narayan	2012;	Panter-Brick	et	al.	2011;	Peltonen	et	al.	2014).		
Conclusions	Though	the	history	of	resilience	is	rich	and	diverse,	“few	scholars	seem	to	be	aware	of	the	term’s	long	and	distinguished	history,”	which	impoverishes	their	understanding	of	how	the	term	and	concept	may	be	used	today	(Alexander	2013:1258–59).	The	concept	of	resilience,	at	first	confined	to	the	realm	of	human	action	or	emotion,	moved	into	the	natural	sciences,	and	then	branched	in	a	number	of	directions,	being	utilized	in	fields	as	diverse	as	engineering	and	anthropology.			
The	Utility	of	Resilience	Adversity	is	common	to	the	human	experience.	As	certain	as	death	or	taxes,	it	could	be	said,	one	can	expect	to	face	adversity.	This	adversity	may	come	in	the	form	of	a	small	annoyance	such	as	a	traffic	jam,	or	it	may	be	more	significant	like	an	experience	of	abuse.		The	term	‘resilience’	has	come	into	vogue	in	the	last	several	decades	across	a	variety	of	domains	to	describe	the	experience	of	thriving	in	spite	of	significant	adversity	(Masten	2014:6).	In	the	past	twenty	years,	‘resilience’	has	seen	an	eight-fold	increase	in	scholarly	usage	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335)	and	has	been	used	in	many	
                                                15	Cf.	(2007:436).	
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disciplines	to	display	“how	well	complex	systems	anticipate,	adapt,	recover,	and	learn	in	the	context	of	major	threats,	surprises,	and	disasters”	(Masten	2014:7).		As	an	indicator	of	the	recent	surge	in	scholarly	work	in	the	area	of	resilience,	an	EBSCO	search	for	“resilien*”	in	the	title	of	articles	in	peer	reviewed	journals	published	between	January	2000-	November	2014	revealed	10,283	articles.	This	“irrepressible	surge	in	usage	of	the	term	resilience	within	scholarly	literature	over	the	past	two	decades”	shows	“that	resilience	is	a	‘meme’	or	conceptual	unit	capable	of	‘extraordinary	replication’”	(Panter-Brick	2014:438).16		What	is	so	attractive	about	resilience?	Certainly,	the	concept	itself,	in	various	forms,	is	as	old	as	the	human	race.	But	perhaps	the	idea	of	being	‘resilient’	speaks	to	a	particular	need	in	society	today,	or	even	to	a	longing	more	central	to	human	beings?		A	number	of	factors	are	involved	in	the	rapid	increase	in	the	usage	of	this	term,	but	some	scholars	suggest	that,	in	particular,	it	is	a	“response	to	a	generalized	contemporary	sense	of	uncertainty	and	insecurity	and	a	search	for	formulas	for	adaptation	and	survival”	(Christopherson,	Michie,	and	Tyler	2010).	Certainly,	in	the	post-9/11	world	of	political	instability	more	uncertainty	exists	than	in	many	previous	eras.		Other	scholars	suggest	that	recent	interest	in	resilience	is	due	to	a	rejection	of	the	idea	that	a	negative	outcome	necessarily	follows	adversity	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:435–36).	This	may	be	linked	to	cultural	narratives	of	autonomy	and	independence.	Indeed,	the	thought	that	individuals	may	be	able	to	overcome	negative	environmental	circumstances	to	thrive	is	indeed	a	compelling	narrative.		Thus,	many	in	the	social	sciences	see	resilience	“as	a	counter-narrative	to	discourses	of	vulnerability	and	social	suffering”	(Panter-Brick	2014:439).17	This	understanding	of	resilience	has	ideological	implications	as	well:	resilience	offers	“a	powerful	narrative,	embraced	by	the	political	discourse	of	the	left,	which	endorses	civil	society,	and	by	the	
                                                16	Here	Panter-Brick	draws	upon	terminology	from	Alastair	Ager	(2013:489).	17	Cf.	(Almedom	et	al.	2010).	
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politics	of	the	right,	which	holds	individuals	responsible	for	their	own	actions”	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335).	The	concept	holds	symbolic	power	for	several	segments	of	society,	as	well	as	significance	for	philosophical	anthropologies	more	broadly	through	conceptual	linkage	to	human	self-efficacy	and	empowerment.		Part	of	the	appeal	of	the	concept	may	lie	in	its	flexibility	and	applicability	across	domains.	The	metaphorical	nature	of	resilience	is	primary	to	understanding	the	concept	and	enables	resilience	to	be	used	across	a	variety	of	scholarly	domains	and	in	everyday	parlance.18	Researchers	note	that	resilience	has	“multiple	levels	of	meaning,	from	the	metaphorical	to	the	specific”	(Carpenter	et	al.	2001:765).	Thus,	some	consider	resilience	a	‘boundary	object’	that	enables	cross-disciplinary	communication	through	common	vocabulary.	It	is	not	just	a	term,	but	“a	way	of	thinking,	a	perspective	or	even	paradigm	for	analyzing	social-ecological	systems”	(Brand	and	Jax	2007).	Resilience,	then,	is	an	ideal	object	of	study	from	multiple	levels	of	analysis	and	diverse	disciplines.	This	is	the	thrust	of	the	current	project,	with	the	aim	of	ultimately	gaining	insight	into	human	well-being.	As	Tournier	notes,	“‘man	[sic]	in	crisis	situations’…reveals	what	he	is”	(1982:38).	19	Investigating	resilience,	then,	provides	a	window	into	human	being;	hence	a	theological	account	of	resilience	may	give	insight	into	theological	anthropology.		
Research	Assumptions	Despite	the	recent	interest	in	this	term,	still	much	needs	to	be	understood	about	the	way	that	human	beings	thrive	in	the	midst	of	adversity.	An	interdisciplinary	assessment	of	resilience	is	needed	at	the	current	juncture	of	resilience	research.	In	particular,	I	propose	that	dialogue	with	theology	can	be	beneficial	both	to	current	understandings	of	resilience	in	the	social	sciences	and	to	theological	understandings	of	human	being.		
                                                18	The	concept	is	based	upon	a	description	of	physical	phenomena	but	this	meaning	has	been	extended	to	non-physical	domains.	Anderson	suggests,	however,	that	“resilience	is	many	different	types	of	things”	rather	than	a	unitary	concept	that	can	be	utilized	across	various	disciplines	(2015:60–61).	Attention	to	the	diverse	expressions	of	resilience,	I	believe,	is	beneficial	and	I	hope	to	give	credence	to	Anderson’s	critique	through	attending	to	resilience	in	only	one	specific	domain:	human	experience.	19	I	will	attempt	to	use	gender-inclusive	language	throughout,	but,	in	the	interest	of	the	integrity	of	texts,	I	will	not	always	change	the	language	of	authors	who	wrote	in	a	time	before	the	importance	of	such	language	was	acknowledged.	
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In	this	project,	I	am	primarily	concerned	with	a	dialogue	between	the	social	sciences	and	the	discipline	of	theology	on	the	topic	of	resilience.	A	variety	of	disciplines	including	geology,	ecology,	and	physics	have	appropriated	the	resilience	concept,	but,	while	the	term’s	usage	in	these	contexts	may	be	helpful	for	an	understanding	of	the	term,	these	disciplines	will	not	be	the	primary	focus	of	this	study.		
Etic	and	Emic	Approaches	To	interrogate	the	complexity	of	resilience,	a	multi-level	approach	is	needed	that	makes	use	of	diverse	methodologies	and	disciplines.	The	complexity	of	human	experience	suggests	that	resilience	must	be	assessed	from	both	etic	(variable-centered	or	quantitative)	and	emic	(person-centered	or	qualitative)	perspectives	(Hatala	2011).			While	recently	researchers	have	undertaken	a	number	of	both	etic	and	emic	studies	of	resilience,	practitioners	within	the	field	of	psychology,	religion,	and	spirituality	have	highlighted	the	need	for	more	research	in	the	area	of	spiritual	and	religious	responses	to	trauma	(Walker	and	Aten	2012).	This	study	aims	to	begin	to	fill	that	need.	But,	rather	than	adding	to	the	body	of	empirical	research	on	resilience	and	R/S,	this	study	seeks	to	provide	a	theological	contribution	to	the	discussion	that	deepens,	complexifies,	and	clarifies	the	concept.		
Theology	and	Resilience	Any	attempt	to	theologically	address	a	‘buzz	word’	concept	must	be	done	with	caution.	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar	warns,	“A	theology	that	develops	from	catchword	principles	is	always	a	theology	that	levels	out,	mitigates	and	cheapens,	and	finally	liquidates	and	sells	out”	(1994:121).	I	will	attempt	to	avoid	the	pitfalls	von	Balthasar	points	out,	in	part,	through	acknowledging	the	mystery	that	always	remains	in	any	theological	venture	(Coakley	2016).	By	attending	to	mystery,	the	theologian	retains	an	attitude	of	wonder	resulting	in	a	posture	of	humility	(Louth	1983).20			
                                                20	Tomas	Halik	suggests:	“God	is	a	mystery—that	should	be	the	first	and	last	sentence	of	any	theology”	(2009:46).	
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The	aim	of	this	project,	then,	is	not	as	much	prescriptive	as	it	is	descriptive	and	suggestive.	This	project	is	not	as	concerned	with	creating	particular	methodologies	for	increasing	resilience	as	with	suggesting	understandings	of	the	theological	and	philosophical	underpinnings	that	promote	resilient	adaptation,	though	practical	implications	certainly	may	be	drawn	from	this	project.	Primarily,	I	will	seek	to	reframe	resilience	through	the	lens	of	Christian	theological	reflection.			Theologically,	I	take	as	a	given	the	reality	of	sin,	depravity	and	suffering	in	the	lived	experience	of	human	beings.	The	depth	of	this	depravity	is	enmeshed	at	personal,	communal,	and	structural	levels	(McFadyen	2000).	Adversity,	therefore,	should	be	regarded	as	characteristic	of	human	existence	rather	than	an	exception.21	Many	excellent	works	address	the	question	of	how	belief	in	a	good	God	and	evil	and	suffering	can	coexist.22	This	project	does	not	address	such	questions	of	theodicy;	rather	the	emphasis	of	this	work	will	be	on	how	the	reality	of	suffering	and	evil	can	be	endured	and	even	transformed.	This	emphasis	does	not	diminish	the	painful	reality	of	the	experience	of	many	individuals,	only	seeks	to	interpret	this	experience	in	light	of	what	comes	after	acknowledging	this	reality.		
‘Complexifying’	the	Paradoxical	Nature	of	Resilience	This	emphasis	will	both	complexify	and	clarify	the	concept	of	resilience	through	making	the	paradoxes	at	the	heart	of	resilience	clearer.	In	particular,	I	suggest	that	a	narrative	understanding	of	human	meaningfulness	and	a	relational	understanding	of	the	self	provide	unique	insight	into	resilience.		For	instance,	the	description	of	resilience	as	‘bouncing	back’	may	be	perfectly	adequate	in	the	physical	sciences	when	describing	materials,	but	this	understanding	is	not	as	helpful	for	describing	persons.	An	individual	can	never	be	the	person	she	was	previously	or	‘bounce	back’	to	the	same	place—life	is	always	forward	moving.	23	The	
                                                21	This	claim	in	itself	is	counter	to	most	modern	Western	conceptions	of	human	existence	that	expect	a	life	of	easy	flourishing	as	the	norm.	22	See,	for	instance,	(Castelo	2012;	Stump	2012;	Swinton	2007).	23	For	this	insight,	I	am	indebted	to	Warren	Kinghorn.	
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past	will	never	exist	again,	but	it	may	be	transformed	and	redeemed.	A	better	metaphor	for	human	resilience,	therefore,	is	needed.		Furthermore,	we	should	not	regard	resilience	as	independent	“white	knuckled”	determination;	rather,	we	ought	to	see	it	in	light	of	a	receipt	of	the	self	from	the	Other	through	relational	dependence.	Resilience,	then,	must	be	understood	as	a	result	of	giving	and	receiving,	seen	clearly	through	the	receipt	of	a	new	perspective.	Resilience	in	a	world	of	suffering	and	evil	necessitates	a	‘re-seeing’	of	that	world	through	the	lens	of	the	Gospel.	Thus,	resilience	may	be	created	and	sustained	through	gaining	a	meaningful	perspective	that	presents	the	hope	that	the	world	will	not	always	be	as	it	currently	is.		This	is	not	merely	a	new	perspective,	but	also	a	new	identity	formed	in	relation	to	the	God	of	the	Gospel.	In	essence,	the	Gospel	must	project	a	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	before	we	can	step	into	its	actuality.			This	vision	of	resilience	in	the	light	of	the	Christian	Gospel	is	both	like	and	unlike	previous	understandings	of	Christian	response	to	adversity.	Others	throughout	history	have	addressed	difficulty	in	view	of	the	Gospel,24	including	several	recent	studies	that	highlight	biblical	emphases	significant	for	resilience	(Allain-Chapman	2012;	Ford	2007;	Shooter	2012;	Stump	2012).25	In	this	study,	however,	I	seek	to	supplement	this	body	of	literature	with	assessment	of	the	theological	and	philosophical	foundations	of	resilience.26	The	emphasis	of	this	project	is	most	clearly	evident	in	its	engagement	with	science	and	focus	upon	the	narrative	theory	and	philosophical	anthropology	of	Paul	Ricoeur.	This	project,	then,	will	be	in	continuity	with	previous	efforts,	but	will	also	differ	in	its	emphases	and	methodology.				
                                                24	See	(McNeill	1951)	for	an	extensive	survey	of	this	history.	25	Many	biblical	passages	could	also	prove	significant	for	resilience:	E.g.	Prov.	24:16,	1	Cor.	1:18,	Gal.	5:11,	and	Gal.	6.	26	Craig	Stephen	Titus	(2006)	also	provides	a	very	thorough	and	helpful	engagement	of	Thomas	Aquinas’	theology	with	resilience.	I	will	dialogue	more	with	this	work	later	in	this	project.	
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Project	Overview		
Research	Methodology	At	the	heart	of	this	project	is	a	narrative	approach	that,	while	drawing	upon	empirical	research,	will	‘thicken’	these	accounts	through	a	variety	of	means.	Paul	Ricoeur's	philosophy	will	provide	the	framework	for	this	narrative	understanding	as	well	as	for	a	theological	anthropology	of	the	resilient	individual.	Narrative	accounts	will	further	our	understanding	of	the	resilient	individual.	Though	the	goal	of	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutical	philosophy	is	a	philosophical	anthropology,	the	real	import	of	his	philosophy	comes	through	the	type	of	praxis	displayed	in	these	narratives.		In	this	study,	I	will	utilize	a	variety	of	methodological	approaches	from	multiple	disciplines	in	order	to	gain	a	clearer	account	of	resilience,	focusing	on	potential	Christian	theological	understandings	of	resilience.	While	many	other	profitable	avenues	of	pursuit	are	possible,	these	are	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	project.			I	begin	by	surveying	insights	from	the	social	sciences	on	resilience,	then	critique	and	integrate	these	insights	through	Christian	theological	sources.	Each	chapter	is	intelligible	on	its	own	terms	but	moves	the	argument	forward,	disclosing	a	unique	contribution	to	a	Christian	theological	understanding	of	the	resilient	individual.	I	start	with	an	assessment	of	resilience	from	the	standpoint	of	the	social	sciences,	not	because	their	understanding	has	epistemic	primacy,	but	rather	so	that,	having	gained	an	idea	of	the	concept,	this	understanding	may	be	critiqued	and	furthered	through	engagement	with	theological	sources.	The	insights	of	science	as	well	as	of	philosophy	and	theology	are	needed	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	complex	phenomenon	of	human	resilience.	Furthermore,	narrative	provides	a	means	of	enquiry	into	human	being	that	is	intelligible	across	disciplinary	bounds.		
Overview	In	Chapter	1,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	concept	of	resilience	and	survey	modern	social	science	research	on	human	adaptation	to	adversity.	I	emphasize	studies	from	the	fields	of	psychiatry,	psychology,	and	medical	anthropology.	Further,	in	Chapter	2	I	
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utilize	research	from	these	disciplines	to	evaluate	empirical	understandings	of	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	resilience.		Moving	to	a	more	theoretical	approach,	in	Chapter	3	I	give	attention	to	the	nature	of	knowledge	assumed	by,	alternatively,	research	in	the	social	sciences	and	insight	from	the	disciplines	of	theology	and	philosophy.	I	propose	phronesis—practical	wisdom—as	a	means	of	integrating	insights	from	a	diversity	of	disciplines.	In	Chapter	4	I	utilize	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	laying	the	necessary	foundation	for	understanding	how	narrative	may	create	the	possibility	of	hope,	and	further	deepening	insight	into	human	resilience	through	portraying	the	self	as	contingently	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Other.	I	give	further	theological	significance	to	Ricoeur’s	insights	through	identifying	the	creative	capacities	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	and	through	proposing	that	the	human	being	is	constituted	through	relation	to	the	Divine	Other.		In	the	third	section,	I	illustrate	and	develop	these	themes	through	an	example.	Highlighting	the	utility	of	historical	narrative,	in	Chapter	5	I	explicate	Julian	of	Norwich’s	Revelations	of	Divine	Love	with	a	view	towards	practical	application	of	her	vision	of	the	world	as	being	significant	for	resilience.		Finally,	in	Chapter	6,	I	draw	out	the	implications	for	a	theological	understanding	of	resilience	and	assess	potential	limitations	and	cautions.			Like	the	rings	of	giant	redwood	trees,	the	shape	of	resilience	may	be	traced	through	the	narrative	of	a	human	life.	Yet	even	the	rings	of	the	tree	tell	their	story	in	differing	ways,	answering	differing	questions	depending	upon	the	method	of	enquiry—chemical	analysis	provides	a	very	different	perspective	than	visual	investigation,	for	instance.	In	the	same	way,	human	resilience	may	be	evaluated	through	various	means.	In	assessing	the	contours	of	human	life,	then,	we	begin	with	a	view	of	human	resilience	from	the	domain	of	science.
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Chapter	1:	‘Resilience’	in	the	Social	Sciences	
	
“The	night	sky	lit	up	like	lightning	as	the	flares	of	fireworks	burst	all	over	the	city	to	
celebrate	Têt.	It	was	January	31,	1968…The	ground	war	had	come	to	the	cities,	and	to	
Saigon	itself,	and	our	future—as	a	family,	and	as	a	nation—was	very	much	in	
doubt…From	then	on,	my	light	girlish	fantasies	dissolved	in	the	face	of	questions	rooted	in	
deeper,	more	disturbing	realities.	Could	we	survive?	Would	we	survive?...During	those	days	
in	Saigon…we	accepted	fear	as	a	beggar	accepts	poverty	or	a	patient	with	a	terminal	
illness	accepts	impending	death.	Fear	was	just	part	of	life.	
	
Each	night,	my	sisters	and	brothers	and	I	approached	bedtime	with	stoic	apprehension	
and	more	than	a	vague	consciousness	of	our	own	mortality…”	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	
2003:171–72,	175–76).			The	study	of	resilience	has	seen	a	number	of	significant	changes	within	the	last	several	decades.	Starting	in	the	field	of	developmental	psychology	(Windle	2011:152),	it	has	now	branched	out	into	an	incredible	array	of	scholarly	disciplines.	Yet	despite	its	considerable	growth	there	is	still	more	that	remains	to	be	said	about	and	discovered	through	this	remarkably	adaptable	topic.		While	the	primary	purpose	of	this	project	is	theological	in	nature,	in	order	to	fully	investigate	the	construct	of	resilience,	we	begin	with	an	understanding	of	the	concept	on	the	basis	of	social	science	research.	This	chapter	serves	as	an	analysis	of	resilience	from	the	standpoint	of	social	science	research	on	its	own	terms.			
Social	Science	Definitions	of	Resilience	Generally	speaking,	in	the	field	of	developmental	psychology	resilience	can	be	understood	as	“positive	adaptation	or	development	in	the	context	of	risk”	(Masten	2013:580).	Coming	to	an	agreement	about	a	scholarly	definition	of	resilience	has	proven	to	be	more	difficult,	however.		George	Bonanno	acknowledges	the	difficulty	of	scholarly	agreement	upon	a	definition	for	resilience	in	the	field	of	psychology	both	due	to	the	large	colloquial	usage	and	varied	definitions	used	by	researchers.	He	notes,	“as	a	field	we	struggle	with	these	definitions”	(Southwick	et	al.	2014).	Others	have	acknowledged	the	same	difficulties	with	defining	
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resilience	(Haskett	et	al.	2006;	Luthar,	Suniya	S.,	Cicchetti,	Dante,	and	Becker,	Bronwyn	2000;	Masten	2007)	and	some	have	gone	as	far	as	to	say	that	“both	conceptual	clarity	and	practical	relevance	[of	the	term]	are	critically	in	danger”	(Brand	and	Jax	2007:23).		Catherine	Panter-Brick	describes	resilience	as	a	term	that	makes	“intuitive	sense	but	often	elude[s]	simple	definition”	(2014:432).	Much	of	the	difficulty	with	defining	resilience	lies	in	the	metaphorical	nature	in	which	it	is	used	as	well	as	in	its	usage	across	many	disciplines	and	in	colloquial	usage.	This	project	is	concerned	primarily	with	the	concept	of	human	resilience	in	the	face	of	adversity.	As	such,	definitions	of	resilience	from	within	the	social	sciences,	especially	from	within	psychology	will	be	considered.			In	the	following	definitions,	the	development	of	the	resilience	concept	within	the	social	sciences	clearly	can	be	seen.	Differences	in	understanding	of	what	constitutes	resilience	are	also	evident	and	will	be	discussed	more	fully.		
Social	Science	Definitions	of	Resilience	“Protective	factors	which	modify,	ameliorate	or	alter	a	person’s	response	to	some	environmental	hazard	that	predisposes	to	a	maladaptive	outcome”	(Rutter	1987:316).			“The	process	of,	capacity	for,	or	outcome	of	successful	adaptation	despite	challenging	or	threatening	circumstances”	(Masten,	Best,	and	Garmezy	1990:426).			“A	dynamic	process	encompassing	positive	adaptation	within	the	context	of	significant	adversity”	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000:543).			“A	class	of	phenomena	characterized	by	good	outcomes	in	spite	of	serious	threats	to	adaptation	or	development”	(Masten	2001:228).			“The	personal	qualities	that	enables	one	to	thrive	in	the	face	of	adversity”	(Connor	and	Davidson	2003:76).		
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	“A	dynamic	process	that	is	influenced	by	neural	and	psychological	self-organisation,	as	well	as	transactions	between	the	ecological	context	and	the	developing	organism”	(Curtis	and	Cicchetti	2003:776).		“The	ability	of	adults	in	otherwise	normal	circumstances	who	are	exposed	to	an	isolated	and	potentially	highly	disruptive	event	such	as	the	death	of	a	close	relation	or	a	violent	or	a	life-threatening	situation	to	maintain	relatively	stable,	healthy	levels	of	psychological	and	physical	functioning,	as	well	as	the	capacity	for	generative	experiences	and	positive	emotions”	(Bonanno	2004:20–21).		“The	protective	factors,	processes	and	mechanisms	that	contribute	to	a	good	outcome	despite	experiences	with	stressors	shown	to	carry	significant	risks	for	developing	psychopathology”	(Hjemdal	et	al.	2006:195).		“The	ability	to	rebound	from	crisis	and	overcome	life	challenges”	(Walsh	2006:ix).		“In	the	context	of	exposure	to	significant	adversity,	resilience	is	both	the	capacity	of	individuals	to	navigate	their	way	to	the	psychological,	social,	cultural,	and	physical	resources	that	sustain	their	well-being,	and	their	capacity	individually	and	collectively	to	negotiate	for	these	resources	to	be	provided	and	experienced	in	culturally	meaningful	ways”	(Ungar	2008:225).	“An	individual’s	stability	or	quick	recovery	(or	even	growth)	under	significant	adverse	conditions”	(Leipold	and	Greve	2009:41).		“The	process	of	adapting	well	in	the	face	of	adversity,	trauma,	tragedy,	threats	or	even	significant	sources	of	threat”	(American	Psychological	Association	2010).		“The	process	of	effectively	negotiating,	adapting	to,	or	managing	significant	sources	of	stress	or	trauma.	Assets	and	resources	within	the	individual,	their	life	and	environment	facilitate	this	capacity	for	adaptation	and	‘bouncing	back’	in	the	face	of	adversity”	(Windle	2011:163).	
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	“The	process	of	harnessing	biological,	psychosocial,	structural,	and	cultural	resources	to	sustain	well-being”	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:333).		“An	interactive	phenomenon	that	is	inferred	from	findings	indicating	that	some	individuals	have	a	relatively	good	outcome	despite	having	experienced	serious	stresses	or	adversities”	(Rutter	2013:474).		“Moving	forward	and	not	turning	back”	Rachel	Yehuda	in	(Southwick	et	al.	2014).			“The	capacity	of	a	dynamic	system	to	adapt	successfully	to	disturbances	that	threaten	system	function,	viability,	or	development”	(Masten	2014:6).	
Table	1.1		Each	of	the	definitions	above	includes	several	integral	components	of	resilience:	1)	facing	significant	adversity	or	risk,	2)	using	resources	or	strengths	to	adapt	in	the	midst	of	adversity,	and	3)	a	positive	outcome.1	While	there	is	diversity	of	opinion	regarding	resilience,	these	definitions	delimit	and	help	define	the	concept.		
Development	of	Resilience	Definitions	and	Future	Directions	In	line	with	the	development	of	the	concept	of	resilience,	definitions	of	resilience	progressed	from	being	specifically	focused	on	individual	traits	to	seeing	resilience	in	terms	of	systems	and	as	contextually	dependent	(Betancourt	and	Khan	2008).	This	development	is	evident	even	within	changes	of	definition	and	emphasis	by	two	prominent	researchers	(Rutter	and	Masten)	and	is	indicative	of	Masten’s	description	of	the	fourth	wave	of	resilience	research.	These	emphases	are	also	seen	in	the	more	recent	definitions	of	resilience	listed	above.		In	addition	to	the	development	of	the	concept,	the	definitions	here	listed	indicate	the	broad	diversity	of	opinion	among	scholars	as	to	what	constitutes	resilience.	A	lack	of	
                                                1	Cf.	(Windle	2011:159).	Craig	Steven	Titus	suggests	three	similar	aspects	of	resilience:	“(1)	good	outcomes	despite	actual	risk,	(2)	resistance	to	destruction,	and	(3)	positive	construction”	(2006:7).	
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consensus	in	the	field	can	prove	difficult	for	comparing	research	findings	and	makes	clearly	defined	terms	and	presuppositions	all	the	more	necessary.		On	the	other	hand,	the	diversity	of	opinion	within	the	field	allows	for	a	breadth	and	richness	of	understanding.	This	is	true	of	the	diversity	of	usage	within	the	social	sciences	as	well	as	in	other	fields,	such	as	the	natural	sciences	(Holling	1973;	Hughes	et	al.	2005),	economics	(Pendall,	Foster,	and	Cowell	2009;	Pickett,	Cadenasso,	and	Grove	2004),	geology	(Brown	2014;	Brown	and	Westaway	2011;	Chang	et	al.	2014;	Manyena	2006),	and	sport	science	(Fletcher	and	Sarkar	2012;	Sarkar	and	Fletcher	2014).		For	instance,	within	the	definitions	listed	above,	there	are	contributions	from	developmental	psychologists,	anthropologists,	biological	psychologists,	and	psychiatrists.			A	board	of	several	prominent	resilience	researchers	assessed	the	current	state	of	research	on	resilience	and	noted	both	differences	and	similarities	in	their	understanding	of	resilience:	The	panelists	agreed	that	resilience	is	a	complex	construct	and	it	may	be	defined	differently	in	the	context	of	individuals,	families,	organizations,	societies,	and	cultures.	With	regard	to	the	determinants	of	resilience,	there	was	a	consensus	that	the	empirical	study	of	this	construct	needs	to	be	approached	from	a	multiple	level	of	analysis	perspective	that	includes	genetic,	epigenetic,	developmental,	demographic,	cultural,	economic,	and	social	variables	(Southwick	et	al.	2014).	In	recent	years,	there	has	been	a	move	away	from	seeing	the	possibility	of	a	metatheory	of	resilience2	toward	seeing	resilience	as	contextually-based.	Additionally,	the	study	of	resilience	has	moved	away	from	its	roots	in	developmental	psychopathology	to	an	understanding	that	multiple	levels	of	analysis	are	needed	to	understand	the	concept,	to	include	input	from	different	disciplines	(Cicchetti	2010;	Cicchetti	and	Blender	2006).	This	type	of	multiple-levels-analysis	allows	for	insights	that	would	not	otherwise	be	available	from	a	single	perspective	(Cicchetti	and	Valentino	2007:276).	It	also	helps	to	bridge	the	gap	between	researchers	and	clinicians	in	the	implementation	of	resilience	principles	(Cicchetti	and	Valentino	2007:272).		
                                                2	For	an	example	of	this	understanding,	see	(Richardson	2002).	
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There	has	also	been	a	move	towards	viewing	individuals	as	a	part	of	a	complex	and	dynamic	system	that	is	dependent	not	only	on	variables	of	context,	but	also	of	time	and	level	of	risk	(Tol,	Song,	and	Jordans	2013:445;	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008).	Many	of	these	conceptions	of	resilience	are	influenced	by	a	biological	understanding	of	the	concept	in	which	the	individual	both	influences	and	is	influenced	by	the	environment	(Windle	2011:155).	Von	Bertalanffy’s	general	systems	theory	(von	Bertalanffy	1968;	Masten	2014:7)	as	well	as	the	family	systems	theory	in	the	field	of	psychology	(Becvar	2007:71–72)	greatly	affected	these	understandings.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	resilience	concept	may	be	applied	to	individuals	(Mancini	and	Bonanno	2009;	Tugade	and	Fredrickson	2004),	families	(Becvar	2007;	Walsh	2006),	and	larger	entities	(Chang	et	al.	2014;	Christopherson	et	al.	2010;	Holling	2001;	Pendall	et	al.	2009;	Pickett	et	al.	2004).	The	principles	remain	the	same	though	the	context	changes.	We	must	beware	of	over-generalizing	the	concept,	however.	Catherine	Panter-Brick	notes:	“We	fall	prey	to	problematic	generalizations	because	empirical,	statistical	statements	are	readily	transformed	into	normative,	deterministic	statements	about	individuals	regardless	of	context”	(2014:432).		All	in	all,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	“resilience	has	been	frequently	redefined	and	extended	by	heuristic,	metaphorical,	or	normative	dimensions”	(Brand	and	Jax	2007:23)	which	has	proven	difficult	for	the	usefulness	of	the	concept;	however,	these	same	extensions	of	meaning	are	also	what	make	resilience	such	a	useful	concept	across	so	many	domains.		In	order	to	better	understand	resilience,	we	will	now	turn	to	the	study	of	resilience	and	its	constituent	parts.	The	themes	touched	on	above	now	need	to	be	more	fully	developed.		
The	Study	of	Resilience	
	
The	Promise	of	Resilience	The	concept	of	adapting	in	the	midst	of	adversity,	implicit	in	resilience,	is	itself	very	old;	this	term,	however,	has	not	always	been	used.	In	its	modern	understanding	the	rise	of	the	resilience	concept	is	a	part	of	a	shift	away	from	a	pathology-focused	health	model	to	
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a	focus	on	health	promotion.	Or,	in	other	words,	it	is	a	move	away	from	a	‘deficit’	way	of	thinking	about	illness	to	health	orientation	(Windle	2011:152).	Aaron	Antonovsky	was	one	of	the	pioneers	of	this	shift	of	thinking	in	the	1970’s	and	80’s	with	the	advent	of	his	salutogenesis	construct	(Antonovsky	1980,	1987).	In	many	ways,	his	concept	of	a	‘sense	of	coherence’3	in	salutogenesis	is	closely	related	to	the	concept	of	resilience	(Almedom	2005;	Windle	2011:161).	What	largely	distinguishes	the	two	constructs	is	the	focus	of	resilience	on	contexts	of	adversity.		Other	scholars	give	a	slightly	different	account	of	the	development	of	thought	in	the	psychological	community.	The	introduction	of	the	term	‘resilience’	slightly	pre-dated	but	conceptually	coincided	with	what	they	see	as	a	broader	change	in	paradigm	within	the	study	of	psychology:	a	move	away	from	“assert[ing]	that	persons	were	fundamentally	resilient”	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:436).4	Some	suggest	that	there	is	more	room	in	the	future	for	dialogue	between	resilience	studies	(largely	situated	within	developmental	psychology	and	psychiatry)	and	salutogenesis	(a	medical	sociology	concept)	or	other	disciplines	(Almedom	2005).	A	lack	of	multi-disciplinary	integration	may	be	partly	to	blame	for	the	lack	of	dialogue	up	to	the	present.		This	type	of	interdisciplinary	work	is	beginning	to	be	done,	as	Masten	(2007)	describes	regarding	the	fourth	wave	of	resilience	research.	As	such,	the	concept	of	resilience	holds	promise,	not	only	in	the	fields	of	psychiatry	and	psychology,	but	also	across	many	different	disciplines.	Some	scholars	argue	that	“the	appeal	of	resilience	is	that	it	does	cut	across	so	many	areas	of	research.	Thus,	while	such	breadth	can	be	challenging,	it	also	indicates	the	potential	for	the	concept	of	resilience	to	inform	any	number	of	research	areas”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:51).		Within	the	field	of	medical	anthropology,	there	is	also	a	recognition	of	the	potential	in	resilience:	Resilience	offers	the	promise	of	a	paradigm	shift	in	many	fields	of	research,	
                                                3	Understood	as	“a	feeling	of	confidence	that	demands	are	comprehensible,	manageable,	and	meaningful”	(Leipold	and	Greve	2009:41).	4	See	also	(Bonanno	2004:22,	25).	
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clinical	practice,	and	policy.	A	lens	on	resilience	shifts	the	focus	of	attention—from	efforts	to	appraise	risk	or	vulnerability,	towards	concerted	efforts	to	enhance	strength	or	capability.	It	also	shifts	the	focus	of	analysis—from	asking	relatively	limited	questions	regarding	health	outcomes,	such	as	what	are	the	linkages	between	risk	exposures	and	functional	deficits,	to	asking	more	complex	questions	regarding	well-being,	such	as	when,	how,	why	and	for	whom	do	resources	truly	matter	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:333).	The	advent	of	the	modern	concept	of	resilience	is	situated	within	a	broader	change	of	paradigm	in	psychology	and	in	other	social	sciences.	From	all	indications,	that	change	is	still	taking	place	and	therefore	the	outcome	is	still	in	flux.	I,	along	with	others	(Brown	2014;	Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013),	believe	that	there	are	great	opportunities	for	new	understanding	implicit	within	the	resilience	concept.	These	possibilities	have	yet	to	be	realized	fully,	however.	
Models	of	Resilience	Researchers	have	used	many	different	models	to	study	resilience	and	its	correlated	concepts.5	Masten	(2001)	describes	two	main	approaches	as	variable-focused	and	person-focused	approaches.		
Variable-focused	Approaches	Variable-focused	approaches	use	multi-variate	statistics	in	order	to	investigate	how	risk/adversity,	protective	factors,	and	resilience	outcomes	are	related	(Masten	2001:229;	Windle	2011:159).	While	these	studies	indicate	a	possible	relation	between	these	factors,	they	are	unable	to	display	causality	(Masten	2001:229).	Within	variable-focused	approaches,	there	are	three	distinct	models	that	seek	to	explain	how	protective	factors	ameliorate	the	effect	of	adversity:	compensatory,	protective,	and	challenge	models	(Bartley	et	al.	2010:102;	Fergus	and	Zimmerman	2005).		
                                                5	For	a	helpful	summary	of	models	of	resilience,	see	(Hatala	2011:29).	
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FIGURE	1.16		The	compensatory	model	shows	the	main	effects	that	risks	or	assets	have	on	situations	of	adversity	independent	of	other	variables.	The	effect	is	correlated	to	outcome	at	both	high-	and	low-risk	situations	and	is	often	studied	through	the	use	of	multiple	regression	procedures	or	structural	equation	modeling	(Masten	2001:229–30;	Windle	2011:159).	Interventions	based	on	this	model	would	focus	on	adding	additional	assets	to	increase	positive	resilience	outcomes.		
	
FIGURE	1.2		
                                                6	Figures	1.1-1.3	from	(Windle	2011:160).	
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FIGURE	1.3		The	protective	models	show	how	risk	is	related	to	the	resilience	outcome.	In	particular,	they	display	the	way	in	which	assets	or	protective	factors	mediate	risk	to	achieve	a	less	negative	outcome,	or,	alternatively,	a	positive	outcome	(Windle	2011:159).	The	interactions	of	these	factors	are	complex,	and	Luthar	(1993)	has	suggested	further	refining	this	model	into	two	categories	in	order	to	capture	the	nuances.	The	‘protective-stabilizing’	model	suggests	that	a	stable	outcome	is	possible	in	spite	of	increasing	adversity	while	the	protective	factor	is	present.	Alternatively,	the	‘protective-reactive’	model	displays	that	the	protective	factor	provides	a	better	outcome,	but	to	a	lesser	extent	when	the	risk	in	higher	(Windle	2011:161).	
	
FIGURE	1.4		
Model D - Challenge
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The	final	variable-based	model	is	the	challenge	model.	This	model	explains	the	relationship	between	a	risk	factor	and	the	resilience	outcome	on	the	basis	of	a	curvilinear	relationship	where	low	and	high	levels	of	risk	result	in	a	negative	outcome	while	moderate	risk	is	associated	with	more	positive	outcomes	(Windle	2011:161).7	This	model	expresses	the	possibility	that	moderate	levels	of	adversity	can	help	individuals	become	more	resilient,	though	further	longitudinal	studies	are	needed	to	confirm	this.		
Person-focused	Approach	The	person-focused	approach	to	resilience	seeks	to	identify	individuals	who	display	positive	or	negative	resilience	outcomes	among	a	group	facing	adversity	and	distill	the	factors	that	led	to	those	outcomes	so	they	may	be	correlated	to	risks	or	assets	(Masten	2001:232–34;	Windle	2011:161).	Individuals	are	often	classified	in	various	categories,	such	as	‘competent,’	‘resilient,’	or	‘maladaptive’	(Masten	et	al.	2004:1086),	and	groups	are	compared	against	one	another	and	against	change	over	time	to	correlate	individual	commonalities	and	differences.		The	strength	of	this	approach	is	that	it	views	the	individual	as	a	whole	entity	rather	than	abstracting	particular	characteristics	deemed	significant	for	resilient	adaptation.8	This	approach	is	often	studied	through	the	use	of	longitudinal	research	studies	that	follow	individuals	over	the	course	of	many	years	to	assess	continuity	and	change	over	multiple	points	in	time.		An	example	of	the	person-focused	approach	is	a	study	conducted	by	Buckner	et	al.	(2003)	who	studied	resilience	among	a	group	of	at	risk	youth.	The	researchers	were	able	to	categorize	youth	as	resilient	or	non-resilient	and	determine	factors	associated	with	these	outcomes.	Another	good	example	of	this	type	of	study	is	the	large	seminal	longitudinal	study	conducted	by	Werner	and	Smith	(1982,	1992,	2001).	Other	studies	utilize	both	variable-focused	and	person-focused	methodologies	in	order	to	gain	more,	and	different	types	of	data.9	
                                                7	Cf.	(Seery,	Holman,	and	Silver	2010).	8	Cf.	(Mancini	and	Bonanno	2009;	Mancini,	Bonanno,	and	Clark	2011).	9	Cf.	(Masten	et	al.	2004).	
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Conclusions	Each	of	these	models	has	strengths	and	weaknesses,	and,	while	they	may	differ	in	their	description	of	resilience,	the	diversity	of	models	provides	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	concept.	It	is	to	questions	concerning	resilience	that	we	must	turn	in	order	to	gain	a	fuller	significance	of	the	concept.		
Questions	Regarding	Resilience	As	defined	within	psychological	literature,	resilience	has	a	very	specific	meaning	and	constituent	parts.	And,	as	seen	with	the	definitions	of	the	term,	there	are	variations	even	within	this	discipline.	The	same	holds	true	for	understanding	the	constituent	parts	of	resilience.	Despite	the	diversity	of	opinion,	one	thing	remains	unchanged,	“The	central	mission	of	resilience	research	is	to	use	scholarship	to	derive	‘critical	ingredients’	for	effective	intervention”	(Luthar	and	Brown	2007:931).	Resilience	research	has	been	application-oriented	from	the	beginning.10		Much	research	has	gone	into	attempting	to	determine	these	‘critical	ingredients’	yet	still	we	are	without	a	clear	consensus	on	what	constitutes	them.11	In	the	following	section	I	will	discuss	several	of	the	most	important	debates	within	resilience	research	and	attempt,	at	the	same	time,	to	give	a	clear	understanding	of	the	constituent	parts	of	the	resilience	concept.	The	questions	I	will	address	are:		
• What	type	and	severity	of	adversity	or	risk	is	necessary	to	precipitate	resilient	behavior?	
• What	is	the	nature	of	resilience:	is	it	a	trait,	state,	or	process?	
• What	are	the	protective	and	promotive	factors	associated	with	resilience?	
                                                10	Cf.	(Werner	and	Smith	1982).	11	Windle	writes,	“For	example,	Gillespie	et	al.	state	that	self	efficacy,	hope	and	coping	are	the	defining	attributes	of	resilience.	Dyer	and	McGuiness	state	that	a	sense	of	self,	determination	and	pro-social	attitude	are	the	defining	attributes.	Whilst	these	constructs	may	be	implicated	in	resilience,	it	is	not	clear	why	these	specific	ones	were	chosen	whilst	other,	equally	possible	constructs	(e.g.	self	esteem,	competence)	were	excluded”	(2011:153).	Citing	(Dyer	and	McGuinness	1996;	Gillespie	et	al.	2007).	
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• What	constitutes	healthy	functioning?	
The	Concept	of	Resilience	Resilience	is	a	complex	concept	that	necessarily	requires	more	than	a	simple	definition.	There	are	multiple	factors	and	levels	involved	which	each	influence	the	other	(Windle	2011:164).	Thus,	our	understanding	of	resilience	must	also	involve	multi-level	analysis	from	multiple	disciplines.		The	use	of	the	resilience	concept	within	the	field	of	ecology	provides	a	helpful	example	for	understanding	psychological	resilience.	Just	as	one	small	change	in	an	ecosystem,	such	as	the	dwindling	population	of	an	endangered	species,	can	change	the	makeup	of	the	entire	system,	so	too	can	a	seemingly	small	factor	in	an	individual’s	life	change	the	entire	course	of	that	life.	The	inner	workings	of	these	systems	are	not	always	well	understood.		In	the	same	way,	the	exact	mechanisms	of	resilient	behavior	are	still	being	explored.	Much	progress	has	been	made	in	the	last	decades	toward	enabling	individuals	to	thrive	in	spite	of	adversity,	but	more	needs	to	be	done.	Research	in	the	future	must	be	multi-disciplinary	and	evidence-based.	However,	we	cannot	dismiss	that	the	humanities	may	be	able	to	shed	some	light	on	a	subject	that,	at	its	core,	is	about	human	flourishing.		As	a	part	of	our	journey	to	understand	the	concept	of	resilience,	let	us	turn	to	the	questions	central	to	resilience	research.		
Adversity,	Risk,	and	Resilience	Resilience	research	is	differentiated	from	positive	psychology,	salutogenesis,	and	related	concepts	in	that	resilience	specifically	applies	to	situations	of	significant	adversity	which	demonstrate	risk	and	have	the	threat	of	a	negative	outcome	(Masten	2001:228;	Windle	2011:164).12	There	is	not	a	consensus,	however,	on	what	level	of	
                                                12	With	regards	to	resilience,	“A	key	point	is	that	it	is	misleading	to	use	the	term	resilience	if	a	stressor,	under	normal	circumstances	with	a	majority	of	people,	would	not	ordinarily	pressure	adaptation	and	lead	to	negative	outcomes”	(Windle	2011:158).	Citing	(Roisman	2005).	
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difficulty	constitutes	adversity	in	a	resilience	context,	or	even	whether	adversity	includes	solely	a	one-time	event	(for	example,	a	trauma)	or	describes	a	more	continuous	exposure	to	stress	(such	as	a	child	growing	up	in	a	war	zone).		Adversity,	in	one	form	or	another,	seems	to	be	nearly	a	universal	human	experience.13	Resilience,	as	useful	of	a	concept	as	it	is,	only	represents	one	possible	response	to	hardship	or	extreme	stress	(Norris,	Tracy,	and	Galea	2009).	Unfortunately,	many	negative	outcomes	are	possible	as	a	result	of	different	responses	to	adversity.	How	this	adversity	is	handled	differentiates	a	resilient	response	from	a	non-resilient	response.	Rutter	suggests	that	resilience	studies	need	to	take	into	account	all	possible	responses	to	adversity,	not	only	supremely	good	outcomes	(Rutter	1999).	A	significant	volume	of	research	shows	a	connection	between	extreme	adverse	circumstances,	such	as	abuse,	and	long-term	negative	health	outcomes	(Amstadter,	Myers,	and	Kendler	2014:279;	Bruce	2006;	Mundy	and	Baum	2004).	These	possible	negative	effects	include	acute	stress	reactivity	(Heim	et	al.	2000;	Loman	and	Gunnar	2010)	and	psychopathology	(Kilpatrick	et	al.	2003;	Nelson	et	al.	2002).		In	addressing	the	issue	of	adversity,	it	is	necessary	to	point	out	that	not	all	adversity	is	the	same.	Essentially,	not	all	risks	are	equal	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008).	Clearly,	research	related	to	stress	and	risk	is	very	important	to	the	study	of	resilience,	but	“research	on	resilience	is	not	a	matter	of	relabeling	the	existing	body	of	work	on	risk	and	protective	factors”	(Panter-Brick	2014:440;	Rutter	2012).		We	must	be	able	to	develop	an	idea	of	how	resilience	and	exposure	to	trauma	or	stress	are	related	as	this	will	determine	not	only	our	understanding	of	resilience,	but	also	change	the	way	we	seek	to	inculcate	resilience	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:438).	Many	studies	in	the	area	of	stress	and	risk	studies	show	that	humans	can	and	do	thrive	despite	dire	circumstances	and	adversity.14		
                                                13	Cf.	(Bonanno	2004).	14	E.g.	(Garmezy,	Masten,	and	Tellegen	1984;	Haggerty	1996;	Kagitcibasi	et	al.	2009;	Werner	and	Smith	2001).	
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Panter-Brick	explains	the	relationship	between	risk	and	resilience:	’Risk’	and	‘resilience’	are	major	conceptual	paradigms	currently	deployed	in	the	social	and	biomedical	sciences.	They	provide	different	yet	complementary	lenses	through	which	to	understand	and	address	the	persistence	of	human	health	disparities…In	matters	of	health,	research	on	risk	often	trumps	research	on	resilience.	However,	there	is	growing	momentum	to	shift	attention	from	risk	to	resilience	in	health	research	and	practice	(2014:432).	More	research	still	needs	to	be	undertaken	in	the	study	of	resilience	as,	compared	to	risk,	the	connections	between	resilience,	health,	and	difficulty	are	less	well	known	(Panter-Brick	2014:438).	This	is	especially	true	for	understanding	the	mechanisms	of	how	risk	and	adversity	are	overcome	and/or	mediated	by	resilience	(Luthar	2006;	Masten	2007;	Masten	and	Curtis	2000;	Windle	2011:164).		
Definitions	of	Adversity	The	way	in	which	adversity	is	defined	is	especially	important	for	resilience	studies.	One	could	imagine	defining	resilience	in	a	way	that	would	consider	most	human	beings	as	resilient.15	In	this	line	of	thinking,	a	foundational	essay	in	resilience	studies	by	Ann	Masten	(2001)	entitled	“Ordinary	Magic:	Resilience	Processes	in	Development”	emphasizes	the	ordinariness	and	ubiquity	of	resilience.	On	the	other	hand,	one	could	also	conceive	of	a	definition	of	resilience	that	would	allow	for	a	very	small	percentage	of	resilient	individuals,	based	especially	upon	how	‘adversity’	and	‘normal	functioning’	are	defined.		One	review	of	resilience	research	found	a	wide	variance	in	the	percentage	of	those	considered	resilient,	ranging	from	25%	to	84%	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008).	This	vast	divergence	is	true	even	of	studies	on	the	heritability	of	resilience	because	of	differing	ways	in	which	terms	are	defined	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:275).	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	suggest	that	the	fluctuation	of	rates	of	resilient	individuals	is	due	to	a	number	of	factors	including	demographics	and	types	of	risk	as	well	as	definitions	of	outcomes	measured.	They	conclude:	Although	it	is	not	possible	to	arrive	at	a	normative	rate	of	resilience	due	to	the	substantial	variability	between	studies	on	methodology	and	measurement,	it	does	seem	clear	that	there	are	significant	differences	between	studies	based	on	their	degree	of	risk,	with	considerably	more	constraints	upon	resilience	in	the	
                                                15	Cf.	(Bonanno	2004:22).	
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context	of	multiple,	high	risks	(2008:44).	It	is	clear	within	scholarly	literature	that	“[t]he	high	functioning	of	individuals	under	conditions	of	no/low	risk	or	adversity	is	not	considered	resilience”	(Windle	2011:163).	Nevertheless,	individuals	do	experience	varying	types	and	intensities	of	adversity	for	variable	amounts	of	time	that	require	differing	levels	of	resilient	adaptation.			George	Bonanno	has	been	especially	keen	to	differentiate	between	the	types	of	trauma	experienced	by	individuals.	He	highlights	that	resilience	in	the	context	of	chronic	adversity	may	look	quite	different	than	resilience	in	the	wake	of	a	one-time	Potentially	Traumatic	Event	(PTE).	To	describe	this	difference,	he	coined	the	terms	‘emergent	resilience’	and	‘minimal-impact	resilience’	to	refer	to	these	different	adaptation	trajectories	(Bonanno	and	Diminich	2013:378).16		
	
FIGURE	1.417			
                                                16	See	also	(Masten,	Monn,	and	Supkoff	2011:109).	17	Figures	1.4	and	1.5	from	(Bonanno	and	Diminich	2013).	“Graphic	comparison	of	minimal-impact	and	emergent	resilience.	The	upper	panel	(A)	represents	minimal-impact	resilience	as	a	stable	trajectory	of	healthy	adjustment	following	an	isolated	PTE,	with	recovery	as	a	gradual	return	to	baseline.	The	lower	panel	(B)	represents	emergent	resilience	as	a	gradual	movement	toward	healthy	adjustment	following	a	period	of	struggle	with	chronically	aversive	circumstances”	(Bonanno	and	Diminich	2013:379).	
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FIGURE	1.5		In	addition	to	his	research	on	resilient	outcomes	in	the	context	of	differing	types	of	adversity,	Bonanno	has	also	done	significant	work	in	the	area	of	adult	trauma	and	resilience	(Bonanno	2004,	2005).	He	has	found	that	adversities	experienced	as	an	adult	are	“more	likely	to	be	isolated,	but	are	potentially	highly	disruptive”	(Windle	2011:155).		
Conclusions	on	Adversity	While,	as	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	have	suggested,	“it	is	not	possible	to	arrive	at	a	normative	rate	of	resilience,”	some	concrete	observations	can	still	be	made	regarding	the	relationship	between	risk,	adversity,	and	resilience.		One	perhaps	commonsensical	but	nonetheless	important	observation	is	that	negative	outcomes	are	associated	with	higher	levels	of	risk	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:51)	as	well	as	non-resilient	behaviors	(Wingo	et	al.	2010).	This	insight	can	be	an	important	corrective	to	the	tendency	to	generalize	findings	of	a	particular	study	or	to	inflate	figures.		Additionally,	research	indicates	that	there	is	a	“decreased	likelihood	of	sustained	resilience	over	time,	particularly	in	the	context	of	higher	risk”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:47).	This	finding	highlights	aspects	of	the	multi-variate	nature	of	resilience:	variation	over	the	course	of	time	and	the	difficulty	of	sustained	resilience.		
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In	line	with	the	‘challenge’	model	of	resilience,	one	conception	of	risk	and	adversity	sees	small	amounts	of	risk	as	having	an	‘inoculating’	effect	upon	an	individual,	preparing	them	to	deal	with	adversity	in	the	future	(Kim-Cohen	and	Turkewitz	2012:1298).	This	has	also	been	described	as	“the	notion	of	‘steeling	effects’”	in	Michael	Rutter’s	research	(Rutter	1999;	Windle	2011:155).	Studies	show	that	successfully	adapting	to	mild	to	moderate	stress	earlier	in	life	has	a	‘stress-inoculating	effect’	that	enables	children	to	be	more	resilient	later	in	life	(Maier	et	al.	2006;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:80).	This	is	indicative	of	a	U-shaped	response	rate	to	stress	where	individuals	exposed	to	moderate	levels	of	stress	have	better	overall	well-being	outcomes	than	either	individuals	with	histories	of	high	stress	or	no	stress	(Seery	et	al.	2013;	Seery,	Holman,	and	Silver	2010).	Resilience	is	greatly	influenced	by	early	childhood	factors	(Rutter	1999,	2000),	so	that	it	may	be	that	resilience	initiatives	should	be	targeted	towards	children.	In	fact,	Bowlby’s	attachment	theory	could	be	understood	to	undergird	resilience	wherein	secure	attachment	promotes	positive	resilience	outcomes	(Svanberg	1998).	Additionally,	this	strategy	would	be	quite	important	from	a	lifespan	viewpoint,	as	the	psychological	and	social	resources	developed	in	early	life	mediate	adaptation	to	adversity	as	an	adult	(Windle	2011:164).		On	the	other	hand,	it	could	also	be	argued	that	protection	from	risk	is	the	best	way	to	ensure	resilience	(Masten	2001:230).	Research	suggests	that	individuals	who	face	significant	adverse	experiences	in	childhood	have	more	difficulty	adjusting	in	adulthood	(Karatoreos	and	McEwen	2013).	Additionally,	one	longitudinal	study	shows	increasingly	complex	psychopathology	as	a	result	of	multiple	traumas	(Karam	et	al.	2014).	Certainly,	not	all	risk	or	adversity	can	be	prevented,	therefore	it	is	a	matter	of	best	managing	that	risk	in	addition	to	avoiding	truly	damaging	situations.	Risk	and	adversity	must	be	understood,	not	only	in	terms	of	a	single	or	sustained	event,	but	also	in	relation	to	intensity	and	time.	The	timing	of	a	trauma	(i.e.	whether	experienced	in	childhood	or	as	an	adult)	plays	a	significant	role	in	an	individual’s	ability	to	respond	in	a	resilient	manner.	Yet,	in	the	end,	it	is	the	universality	of	the	experience	of	risk	and	adversity	that,	in	part,	gives	resilience	applicability	across	diverse	domains	and	contexts.		
	 	 	
45	
The	Nature	of	Resilience	The	way	in	which	resilience	is	conceived	of	makes	a	significant	differing	in	understanding	the	construct	as	well	as	in	strategies	for	promoting	resilient	adaptation.	Historically,	a	diversity	of	opinion	regarding	this	issue	was	present	in	the	social	sciences,	however	the	development	of	a	number	of	related	concepts	has	clarified	the	boundaries	of	the	resilience	construct.		
Related	Concepts	Resilience	research	began	with	conceiving	of	resilience	as	a	stable	personality	trait	that	allows	individuals	to	cope	well	in	the	midst	of	stress	(Block	and	Block	1980;	Leipold	and	Greve	2009:41;	Masten	2007).	Resilience	research,	however,	quickly	came	to	distinguish	resilience	from	similar	concepts	of	hardiness	and	ego-resiliency.		Hardiness	is	“a	stable	personality	resource	that	consists	of	three	psychological	attributes:	commitment,	challenge,	and	control…However,	the	defining	point	which	distinguishes	hardiness	from	resilience	is	that	it	is	a	stable	personality	trait	whereas	resilience	is	viewed	as	something	dynamic	that	will	change	across	the	lifespan”	(Windle	2011:163).18	Ego-resiliency	“has	been	used	on	occasion	by	researchers	to	measure	resilience.	It	is	proposed	as	an	enduring	psychological	construct	that	characterizes	human	adaptability…in	contrast	to	resilience,	ego-resiliency	does	not	depend	on	risk	or	adversity.	Rather	it	is	a	part	of	the	process	of	dealing	with	general,	day-to-day	change”	(Windle	2011:163).19	Though	these	concepts	are	certainly	different	from	resilience,	many	of	the	conceptual	linkages	are	the	same.	Leipold	and	Greve	argue	that	these	concepts	“exemplify	the	guiding	idea	that	it	is	the	individual’s	personality	(or	parts	of	it)	that	enables	him	or	her	to	overcome	adversities”	(2009:41).	Coping,	a	concept	related	to	resilience	(Campbell-Sills,	Cohan,	and	Stein	2006),	can	be	understood	as	an	aspect	of	resilience	rather	than	having	a	fundamental	difference:	“the	
                                                18	Citing	(Kobasa	1979;	Kobasa,	Maddi,	and	Kahn	1982).	19	Citing	(Block	and	Kremen	1996).	
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difference	between	coping	and	resilience	is	mainly	a	matter	of	conceptual	hierarchy,	rather	than	an	empirical	issue”(Leipold	and	Greve	2009:41).20	More	specifically,	coping	self-efficacy,	a	predictor	of	resilience	(Benight	and	Cieslak	2011;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012a),	“refers	to	perceived	capacity	to	successfully	manage	and	recover	from	the	demands	of	a	stressful	situation”	(Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:81).21	
Varying	Conceptions	As	previously	mentioned,	Masten	(2007)	describes	the	development	of	resilience	research	as	moving	from	studying	the	characteristics	(or	traits)	associated	with	resilience	to	the	second	wave	moving	on	to	understanding	the	processes	behind	them.	Some	recent	research	views	resilience	as	a	fixed,	stable	personality	trait	(Ong	et	al.	2006;	Silk	et	al.	2007)	but	others	note	that	this	view	creates	a	dichotomy	in	which	individuals	who	do	not	possess	this	trait	are	perceived	to	have	failed	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000).	Additional	complexity	in	understanding	resilience	is	added	by	the	fact	that	it	cannot	be	directly	observed	as	a	trait	(Rutter	2007);	rather,	it	is	a	conglomeration	of	traits	leading	to	a	particular	outcome.	Others	have	argued	more	in	line	with	the	aims	of	the	second	wave	of	resilience	research	that	a	focus	on	the	process	of	adaptation	to	adversity	is	key:	Contrary	to	many	proposals,	this	entails	viewing	resilience	neither	as	a	trait	nor	as	a	process	explaining	a	phenomenon,	but	rather	as	a	phenomenon	needing	to	be	explained.	It	can	be	explained,	we	argue,	by	referring	to	coping	processes	that	resemble,	in	structural	aspects,	processes	of	developmental	regulation	(Leipold	and	Greve	2009:40).	The	idea	of	resilience	as	a	‘phenomenon’	is	insightful	in	many	ways.	It	suggests	that	the	construct	is	not	a	unitary	feature	of	human	being,	but	rather	is	descriptive	of	an	outcome	that	is	supported	by	other	processes	but	dependent	upon	any	number	of	individual	and	contextual	factors.22	
                                                20	The	difference	being	the	level	of	difficulty	experienced	by	the	individual.	21	Varying	coping	styles	have	also	been	shown	to	correlate	with	different	resilience	outcomes	(Johnsen	et	al.	2002).	22	Thus,	some	scholars	note	that	“[r]esilience	is	not	directly	measured,	but	is	inferred	from	two	component	constructs:	risk	and	positive	adaptation”	(Marriott,	Hamilton-Giachritsis,	and	Harrop	2014:18).	Cf.	(Luthar	and	Zelazo	2003).	
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Yehuda	and	Flory	are	more	open-ended	in	their	characterization	of	resilience,	but	also	take	into	account	important	dynamics:	Indeed,	resilience	can	refer	to	either	a	state	or	trait…The	trait,	process,	or	product	of	resilience	may	each	have	different	psychological	and/or	biological	underpinnings	that	may	operate	quite	differently	in	the	context	of	other	traits	or	states	(2007:438).	
Conclusions	on	the	Nature	of	Resilience	Despite	the	initial	diversity	of	opinion	concerning	whether	resilience	is	a	trait,	state,	or	process,	scholarly	opinion	currently	suggests	that	resilience	may	be	best	understood	as	a	“dynamic	process	that	fluctuates	within	and	across	development”	as	opposed	to	“the	initial	perspective	of	resilience	as	a	static	outcome	or	a	stable	characteristic”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:52).	Ann	Masten	has	recently	also	argued	that	this	question	has	finally	been	answered:	“Is	There	a	Trait	of	Resilience?	This	perennial	issue	should	be	put	to	rest.23	The	answer	is	no.	There	are	personality	(or	temperament)	dimensions	consistently	associated	with	resilience,	such	as	conscientiousness”	(2014:14).24		Certainly,	there	are	personality	traits	that	influence	resilient	responses,	but	resilience	is	perhaps	best	understood	in	terms	of	a	process	leading	to	a	particular	outcome	rather	than	as	a	trait	in	itself.25	This	understanding	allows	researchers	and	practitioners	to	focus	on	affecting	the	underlying	processes	that	affect	resilient	outcomes.	But	what	factors	contribute	to	these	processes?	Resilience	researchers	have	dubbed	these	‘protective’	and	‘promotive’	factors.		
Protective	and	Promotive	Factors	Much	research	within	resilience	studies	has	attempted	to	understand	the	resources	that	individuals	use	to	navigate	adverse	circumstances	so	as	to	produce	a	good	outcome	(Charney	2004;	Curtis	and	Cicchetti	2003;	Luthar	2006;	Masten	2007;	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008).	These	resources	have	alternatively	been	called	‘assets,’	
                                                23	Citing	(Masten	2012;	Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013;	Rutter	1987).	24	Citing	(Bonanno	2012;	Lengua	and	Wachs	2012;	Masten	2012).	25	This	debate	is	less	well-defined	in	current	literature	and	will	take	some	time	before	a	conclusion	is	reached	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335–36).	
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‘resources,’	or	‘strengths’	(Gillespie	et	al.	2007;	Richardson	2002;	Werner	1995)	but	usually	they	are	known	as	protective	(protect	from	negative	outcomes	despite	risk)	and	promotive	(promote	good	outcomes)	factors	(Masten	2013:579).	As	Gill	Windle	explains,	“they	facilitate	the	competence/capability	that	enables	resistance	to	adversity	and	underlies	the	process	of	adaptation“	(2011:157).26		These	protective	and	promotive	factors	have	been	called	“the	defining	attributes	of	resilience”	(Windle	2011:164).	They	are	important	in	that	they	enable	the	possibility	of	being	taught	or	inculcated	so	as	to	promote	resilience.	In	that	sense,	it	is	significant	that	these	factors	not	be	understood	solely	as	descriptive	terms,	but	also	as	having	a	predictive	aspect	(Hjemdal	et	al.	2006:195).			Generally	protective	factors	have	been	categorized	in	three	areas:		(1)	individual	(e.g.	psychological,	neurobiological),	(2)	social	(e.g.	family	cohesion,	parental	support)	and	(3)	community/society	(e.g.	support	systems	generated	through	social	and	political	capital,	institutional	and	economic	factors)	(Windle	2011:157).27		Some	scholars	use	the	term	‘assets’	to	refer	to	characteristics	within	an	individual,	while	they	name	external	factors	‘resources’	(Fergus	and	Zimmerman	2005).	Whether	internal	or	external,	these	factors	are	what	distinguish	resilience	from	similar	concepts.	In	the	midst	of	adversity	multiple	responses	are	possible;	the	resilient	response	is	one	that	promotes	a	good	outcome	despite	adversity.	As	Hjemdal	et	al.	note,	“Resilience	is	thus	not	the	mere	absence	of	risk,	but	rather	the	presence	of	protective	factors	or	processes	that	buffer	effects	of	adversity”	(2006:194–95).		Quite	significantly,	there	has	been	much	agreement	and	consistency	across	diverse	studies	regarding	protective	and	promotive	factors,	“suggesting	that	fundamental	adaptive	systems	support	and	protect	human	adaptation	and	development	in	the	context	of	adversity”	(Masten	2013:579;	Motti-Stefanidi,	Asendorpf,	and	Masten	2012).	Southwick	and	Charney	list	some	of	the	most	common	characteristics	associated	with	resilience:	
                                                26	Citing	(Masten,	Burt,	and	Douglas	2006).	27	Citing	(Garmezy	1991;	Werner	1995).	
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positive	emotion	and	optimism,	loving	caretakers	and	sturdy	role	models,	a	history	of	mastering	challenges,	cognitive	flexibility	including	the	ability	to	cognitively	reframe	adversity	in	a	more	positive	light,	the	ability	to	regulate	emotions,	high	coping	self-efficacy,	strong	social	support,	disciplined	focus	on	skill	development,	altruism,	commitment	to	a	valued	cause	or	purpose,	capacity	to	extract	meaning	from	adverse	situations,	support	from	religion	and	spirituality,	attention	to	health	and	good	cardiovascular	fitness,	and	the	capacity	to	rapidly	recover	from	stress	(Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:80).28	It	should	be	noted	that	this	list	includes	individual	as	well	as	social	and	community	factors.	Many	scholars	have	begun	to	see	that	inculcating	resilience	is	not	as	simple	as	increasing	protective	or	promotive	factors	at	an	individual	level.	Individuals	are	themselves	a	part	of	larger	contexts	and	systems,	to	include	families,	cultures,	and	societies,	which	all	have	a	significant	impact	on	psychological	resilience.	For	instance,	both	relational	connection	and	the	emotional	support	provided	by	that	connection	may	promote	resilient	adaptation	(Glymour	et	al.	2008).	Additionally,	some	research	shows	that	a	positive	family	environment	in	childhood	is	associated	with	resilient	behavior	as	an	adult	(Bradley	et	al.	2013).	Thus,	some	scholars	have	argued	that	“attempting	to	change	individual	protective	factors	will	most	likely	be	of	little	benefit	because	the	overall	context	will	remain	the	same”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:52).29	Nonetheless,	individual	protective	factors	do	make	a	difference	in	resilience	outcomes.	Just	as	risk	has	a	cumulative	effect	in	increasing	stress	vulnerability,	so	too	protective	factors	have	“additive	and	interactive	effects”	that	can	increase	resilience	(Karatsoreos	and	McEwen	2011;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:82).	The	new	‘wave’	in	resilience	research	emphasizes	that	“synergistic	impact	is	a	key	feature	of	resilience	models,	and	[is]	a	major	departure	from	mechanistic,	additive	models	linking	functional	outcomes	to	risk	and	protective	factors”	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335).	Thus,	resilience	is	more	than	the	sum	total	of	individual	protective	factors.	It	is	the	outcome	of	a	dynamic	interplay	of	many	“time-variant	and	context-
                                                28	Ann	Masten	gives	a	similar	list	including	“attachment	and	effective	caregiving,	learning	and	problem	solving,	mastery	motivation	and	self-efficacy,	self-regulation,	meaning-making	systems	of	belief,	and	organizations	and	cultural	practices	that	nurture	these	systems,	such	as	schools	and	religions”	(2013:579).	Similarly	Bonanno	and	Mancini	cite	“upwards	of	13	unique	and	independent	predictive	factors”	for	resilience	(2011:126).	29	Citing	(Luthar	and	Cicchetti	2000).	
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dependent	variables”	(Rutter	2012;	Tol	et	al.	2013:455)	which	include	the	presence	of	protective	factors.	The	“complexity	and	limitations	of	resilience”	are	evident,	however,	in	the	fact	that	one	cannot	simply	create	a	“shopping	list”	of	predictors	of	resilience	(Tol	et	al.	2013:449).	It	must	also	be	noted	that	these	protective	factors	are	themselves	influenced	by	stress,	with	a	potentially	negative	impact,	especially	at	a	young	age	(Loman	and	Gunnar	2010;	Masten	2007:922).	Introducing	protective	factors	into	an	individual’s	life	can	increase	resilience	responses,	though	these	interventions	are	probably	best	done	at	a	young	age	because	of	“time-limited	windows”	of	neuroplasticity	(Karatsoreos	and	McEwen	2011;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:82).	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	write	that	caution	should	be	taken	not	to	generalize	regarding	protective	factors	and	their	resilient	outcomes	because	resilient	outcomes	are	greatly	dependent	upon	variables	of	time	and	context	(2008:51),	Nonetheless,	much	can	be	said	about	the	possibility	of	protective	factors	and	their	ability	to	increase	the	probability	of	a	positive	outcome.	
The	Question	of	Healthy	Functioning	Resilience	is	characterized	by	a	good	outcome,	variously	conceived	of	as	positive	adaptation	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000)	or	absence	of	psychopathology	(Nigg	et	al.	2007).30	This	process	is	also	known	as	positive	adaptation	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000;	Rutter	1999),	and	has	sometimes	been	referred	to	as	‘flourishing.’31	Closely	linked	to	resilience	is	the	concept	of	post-traumatic	growth	(Almedom	2005;	Calhoun	and	Tedeschi	2006;	Kilmer	et	al.	2014;	Tedeschi	and	Kilmer	2005).32	Post-traumatic	growth	is	differentiated	from	resilience,	however,	in	that	it	assumes	an	outcome	of	superior	functioning	that	is	dependent	upon	the	experience	of	adversity	(Kim-Cohen	and	Turkewitz	2012:1299–1300).	
                                                30	We	must	note,	however,	that	using	well-being	as	a	measure	of	health—to	include	happiness	and	resilience—can	be	misleading	(Atkinson	2011).	31	It	has	been	argued,	however,	that	this	term	is	more	at	home	in	the	realm	of	positive	psychology	where	the	aim	is	good	outcomes	for	all	people	rather	than	just	those	facing	significant	adversity	(Luthar	2006).	32		While	related,	these	concepts	are	by	no	means	synonymous.	One	study	found	that	resilience	and	posttraumatic	growth	were	inversely	related:	(S.	Z.	Levine	et	al.	2009).	Cf.	(Dekel,	Ein-Dor,	and	Solomon	2012;	Gilpin-Jackson	2014;	Jirek	2011;	Joseph	2011;	Joseph,	Murphy,	and	Regel	2012;	Linley	and	Joseph	2011).	
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There	is	not	a	uniformity	of	opinion	as	to	what	the	outcome	of	resilience	ought	to	be	or	how	this	outcome	is	assessed,	especially	in	regards	to	whether	external	or	internal	criteria	should	be	used	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000;	Masten	2001;	Windle	2011:158).	The	goal	of	resilient	functioning	may	look	different	depending	on	the	circumstances	and	adversities	that	need	to	be	overcome	(Masten	et	al.	1999;	Masten	2001;	Yehuda	and	Flory	2007).	Yet,	there	must	be	some	means	of	differentiating	resilient	from	non-resilient	outcomes.33	Some	have	argued	that	resilience	is	characterized	by	a	lack	of	psychopathology	(Luthar	2006;	Nigg	et	al.	2007;	Windle	2011:155,	159).	This	has	been	challenged,	however:	“in	the	words	of	Almedom	and	Glandon	(2007),	defining	resilience	as	the	absence	of	a	disorder	is	akin	to	defining	health	as	the	absence	of	disease”	(Bonanno	and	Diminich	2013:381).	Additionally,	research	suggests	that	resilience	is	more	than	the	absence	of	maladaptive	changes	on	the	part	of	the	individual;	there	are	also	positive	adaptive	changes	associated	with	resilience	even	at	a	biological	level	(Feder,	Charney,	and	Collins	2011:14).	Rachel	Yehuda	argues	that	a	person	can	be	resilient	and	still	present	symptoms,	for	example,	of	Post	Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	(PTSD).	Thus,	for	Yehuda,	the	presence	of	psychopathology	does	not	necessarily	equate	to	lack	of	resilience	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007).	Windle	agrees	with	Yehuda:	Indeed,	the	presence	of	distress	AND	the	maintenance	of	competence	may	be	one	of	the	strongest	forms	of	resilience.	The	key	point	is	that	there	is	no	necessary	expectation	that	protection	from	stress	and	adversity	should	lead	to	positive	experiences	(Windle	2011:159).34		These	are	necessary	correctives	noting	that	the	healthy	functioning	is	not	solely	a	lack	of	pathology,	though	this	is	certainly	a	large	factor	in	healthy	functioning.35			In	reality,	the	question	being	asked	is	a	deeper	one	about	resilience	and	vulnerability.	Are	these	concepts	complementary	or	contrasting?	Vulnerability,	as	defined	within	the	
                                                33	While	resilience	outcomes	are	contextually-dependent	to	a	point,	there	should	be	definable	criteria	for	a	‘good	outcome’	in	assessing	resilience.	34	Citing	(Olsson	et	al.	2003;	Rutter	1999).	35	This	issue	is	taken	up	more	fully	in	(Cook	and	White	Forthcoming).	
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context	of	developmental	psychopathology,	“focuses	on	predicting	and	explaining	causes	of	psychopathology”	(Hjemdal	et	al.	2006:194).	As	such,	it	is	closely	related	to	the	concept	of	resilience	in	the	sense	that	the	protective	factors	found	within	the	resilience	concept	protect	against	vulnerability.	It	is	my	contention,	however,	that	vulnerability	and	resilience	are	not	necessarily	contrasting	concepts.36	While	this	is	a	very	important	discussion,	I	cannot	delve	into	it	more	now;	this	will	be	a	point	I	return	to	later.	
The	Goal	of	Resilience	How	is	‘competent/normal	functioning’	defined?	This	has	tremendous	implications	for	the	study	of	resilience.	In	essence,	when	we	discuss	return	to	healthy	functioning,	we	must	determine	what	constitutes	health,	or,	at	a	more	fundamental	level,	what	constitutes	human	well-being.37	Karatoreos	and	McEwen	(2013),	from	a	scientific	materialist	perspective,	view	the	goal	of	life	as	survival:	“The	primary	function	of	any	organism	is	to	survive,	reproduce,	and	ensure	that	its	genetic	material	is	successfully	transmitted	to	the	next	generation.	This	is	as	biologically	true	of	single-celled	organisms	as	it	is	of	humans.”	While	biological	survival	is	central	to	human	well-being,	it	is	not	the	totality.	A	perspective	from	outside	of	the	sciences	may	be	able	to	shed	more	light	on	the	matter.	This,	again,	is	a	question	to	which	we	must	return	later	for	further	discussion.	
Universality	of	Resilient	Functioning	Resilience	researchers,	for	the	most	part,	are	concerned	with	achieving	‘functional	outcomes’	as	evidenced	by	resilience.	Yet	some	researchers	are	concerned	that	this	emphasis	takes	away	from	the	normative	aspect	of	resilience	(Panter-Brick	2014:441–
                                                36	Cf.	(Titus	2006:14).	37	This	may	be	understood	through	relation	to	the	narrative	of	a	person’s	life.	What	is	the	goal	of	this	narrative?	Further,	does	the	goal	of	the	‘healthy’	person	differ	from	the	‘diseased’	person?	For	instance,	what	is	the	disabled	person’s	current	narrative,	and	what	is	the	desired	narrative?	Is	the	desired	narrative	one	of	tragedy	or	triumph,	victor	or	victim,	or	just	being	‘normal’?	For	an	injured	person,	though	not	necessarily	for	the	person	with	the	lifelong	disability,	a	triumph	narrative	of	resilience	through	adversity	could	be	especially	powerful.	I	leave	these	questions	unanswered,	in	part	because	they	are	particular	to	the	individual,	but	also	because	they	display	the	complexity	of	the	question	of	what	it	means	to	flourish	as	a	human.	
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42).	Both	aspects	are	important,	but	we	must	not	lose	sight	of	the	substantive	nature	of	the	resilience	concept	and	the	implications	of	a	normative	conception	of	resilience.		Conceiving	of	resilience	in	terms	of	its	normativity	raises	additional	questions.	For	instance,	should	resilience	be	understood	as	a	potentially	universal	mode	of	functioning?	Additionally,	there	is	the	question	as	to	whether	there	are	degrees	of	resilient	functioning.	In	other	words,	can	an	individual	be	resilient	across	all	domains	of	life,	or	is	resilience	domain-specific?	And,	are	there	degrees	of	resilience	whereby	someone	could	be	considered	more	resilient	than	his	counterpart?	If	so,	how	is	this	measured?		Research	seems	to	indicate	that	resilience	is	not	a	global	attribute	and	can	be	confined	to	specific	domains	within	an	individual’s	life	rather	than	extending	to	all	domains	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:47,	52).	This	is	especially	true	of	children	in	high-risk	situations,	but	may	not	hold	true	at	lower	levels	of	risk	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:50).	It	can	be	expected	that	resilient	behavior	will	fluctuate	over	time	(Luthar	2006:741)	as	studies	have	shown	that	“rates	of	positive	outcomes	differed	widely	depending	on	sample	demographics,	number	of	risks,	and	the	number	and	type	of	outcomes”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:51).	Therefore	it	may	be	best	to	view	resilience	in	terms	of	specificity:	“specific	outcomes	at	specific	time	points”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:52).		Further,	some	argue	that	we	ought	to	“define	resilience	along	a	continuum	rather	than	as	an	arbitrary	dichotomy”	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000).	In	theory,	this	is	a	good	distinction	to	make.	In	practice,	however,	it	becomes	more	difficult	to	distinguish	between	degrees	of	resilient	behavior,	especially	as	it	pertains	to	defining	terms	in	research	and	comparing	studies.	An	attempt	has	been	made	to	develop	a	‘resilience	scale’	(Connor	and	Davidson	2003)	and,	though	not	widespread,	some	studies	have	used	this	scale	as	a	means	of	defining	and	measuring	resilience	outcomes	(Campbell-Sills,	Forde,	and	Stein	2009;	Fincham	et	al.	2009;	Stein,	Campbell-Sills,	and	Gelernter	2009).		
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Future	Directions	in	Resilience	Research	Now	that	the	concept	of	resilience	has	been	broadly	outlined	and	several	important	questions	regarding	the	constituent	parts	of	resilience	have	been	addressed,	I	will	turn	to	the	current	state	of	resilience	research.	There	are	still	many	questions	regarding	resilience,	especially	pertaining	to	how	resilience	mechanisms,	in	particular	“adversities,	protective	resources,	or	interventions,”	actually	work	(Sandler	2001;	Windle	2011:165).	As	I	noted	previously,	resilience	research	is	now	in	a	time	of	increased	interdisciplinary	dialogue.	This	dialogue,	in	conjunction	with	additional	research	in	fields	such	as	and	anthropology,	genetics,	neurobiology,	and	sociology	will	greatly	enrich	resilience	research.	In	this	section	I	will	draw	on	current	resilience	research	from	these	fields	as	well	as	the	fields	of	psychology	and	psychiatry,	with	a	view	better	to	understand	human	resilience.		
Gene	and	Environment	Considerations	There	is	an	increased	awareness	that	resilience	is	affected	by	a	dynamic	array	of	various	factors,	including	factors	of	genetics	and	environment	(Kim-Cohen	and	Turkewitz	2012).	Scholars	suggest	that	an	individual’s	genetics	have	a	significant	impact	on	resilience,	just	as	they	do	in	responses	to	stress	and	trauma	(Feder,	Nestler,	and	Charney	2009:446;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:79).	As	Southwick	and	Charney	note,		 Research	in	genetics	and	epigenetics	suggests	that	putative	vulnerability	genes	or	‘risk	alleles’	operate	in	a	dynamic	interplay	with	the	environment	and	that	resilience	may	be	promoted,	in	some	cases,	by	changing	the	biological	and	or	psychosocial	environment	(2012b:80).38			The	environment,	whether	physical	or	social,	plays	an	important	part	in	individual	resilience	outcomes:	researchers	state,	“Resilience	is	not	a	constant	but	is	something	moulded	and	shaped	by	the	physical	and	social	environment”	(Bartley	et	al.	2010:101).	Three	areas	of	factors	are	noted	by	Luthar	et	al.	as	developing	resilience	in	children:	“attributes	of	the	individual	child,	attributes	of	a	child's	family,	and	characteristics	of	the	larger	social	environment”	(2000:544).39		
                                                38	Citing	(Rende	2012).	39	Citing	(Betancourt	and	Khan	2008).	
	 	 	
55	
	
Genetic	Heritability	of	Resilience	An	increasing	number	of	studies	relate	to	the	genetic	component	of	resilience.	In	these	studies,	as	with	all	resilience	studies,	defining	terms	is	a	key	component	in	undertaking	research.			In	clarifying	resilience,	one	scholar	suggests	that	“[f]rom	a	genetics	perspective,	resilience	can	be	viewed	as	the	degree	to	which	the	person	at	genetic	risk	for	maladaptation	and	psychopathology	are	not	affected”	(Windle	2011:155).40	In	regards	to	resilience	outcomes,	genetically	speaking,	resilience	could	be	viewed	as	overcoming	maladaptive	genetic	predispositions.	This	still	begs	the	question,	however,	about	the	extent	to	which	genetics,	as	opposed	to	environment,	plays	a	role	in	resilient	outcomes	and	behavior.		Research	indicates	that	changes	in	environment,	such	as	increased	social	support,	can	protect	against	depression	even	in	children	who	are	genetically	predisposed	to	depression	(Kaufman	et	al.	2006;	Rende	2012;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:80).	Even	more	significantly,	“research	shows	that	a	supportive	socio-ecological	context	is	at	least	as	an	important—if	not	more	important—determinant	of	resilience	as	intra-individual	variables,	and	should	thus	be	a	central	focus	for	interventions	promoting	resilience”	(Tol	et	al.	2013:456).	Some	intra-individual	factors	are	unchangeable,	such	as	genetic	makeup,	whereas	others	are	changeable.	The	question	of	just	how	large	of	a	role	genetics	plays	in	resilience	has	been	largely	unanswered	until	recently.41	To	measure	the	role	of	genetic	and	environmental	factors	on	resilience,	a	large	longitudinal	study	of	7500	twins	was	recently	conducted	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014).	According	to	the	researchers,	the	study	is	the	first	consideration	of	how	genes	and	the	environment	contribute	to	resilience	to	adversity,	and	“the	first	estimation	of	the	stability	of	the	resilience	phenotype	and	its	aetiology	assessed	over	time”	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:277).		
                                                40	Citing	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.,	Cicchetti,	Dante,	and	Becker,	Bronwyn	2000).	41	See,	for	example,	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:438).	
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This	study	had	significant	findings:		Resilience	was	found	to	have	a	moderate	genetic	heritability	at	each	wave	(~31%)...Incorporating	error	of	measurement	into	the	model	increased	the	estimated	heritability	for	the	latent	construct	of	resilience	(~50%)	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:275).		Hence,	this	study	showed	that,	without	adjusting	for	errors	in	measurement,	resilience	is	mildly	heritable,	roughly	as	much	as	anxiety	disorders.	Taking	into	account	adjustments	for	measurement	error,	resilience	is	described	as	moderately	heritable,	on	par	with	depression	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:278).	The	researchers	note,	“a	striking	conclusion	can	be	made:	genetic	constitution	and	enduring	environmental	influences	contribute	roughly	equally	to	the	latent	construct	of	resilience”	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:278).		As	to	the	way	in	which	genetics	create	resilient	responses,	researchers	have	conjectures	but	not	certainties:		Research	on	adults	has	also	documented	the	role	of	temperament	and	personality	in	determining	response	to	stressful	life	events.	It	is	plausible	that	shared	genetic	variance	between	resilience	and	these	personality	factors	may	be	in	play…Genetic	influences	may	also	exert	their	effects	through	a	contribution	to	known	protective	factors	for	post-stressor	response	that	are	also	moderately	heritable	(for	example	social	support)	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:279).42		In	addition	to	the	relationship	between	genetics	and	environment,	studies	have	researched	other	aspects	of	the	relationship	between	genetics	and	resilience.	One	study	looked	at	the	genetics	of	gender	differences	in	resilient	outcomes	and	found	quantitative	differences	(Boardman,	Blalock,	and	Button	2008),	while	another	study	found	only	qualitative,	not	quantitative,	gender	differences	related	to	resilience.43			
Implications	of	Gene-Environment	Considerations	As	we	consider	the	outcomes	of	resilience	studies	in	the	field	of	genetics,	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	findings	have	very	real	implications	for	the	practical	implementation	of	the	resilience	concept.	This	means	that	interventions	would	need	to	take	seriously	
                                                42	Citing	(Kendler	and	Baker	2007).	43	Cf.	(Amstadter,	Myers,	and	Kendler	2014).	Other	studies	suggest	that	these	gender	differences	are	based	on	epigenetic	activity	(Roth	2013:1287).	
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the	dynamic	role	that	environmental	factors	play	in	creating	and	sustaining	resilience	instead	of	solely	focusing	on	individual	factors	(Windle	2011:165).	Additionally,	researchers	and	clinicians	must	acknowledge	that	there	is	a	genetic	component	to	psychological	resilience,	and,	therefore,	some	individuals	will	show	more	proclivities	toward	resilience	than	others	(Nigg	et	al.	2007).	As	Michael	Ungar	notes,	however,	“development	is	less	biologically	determined	than	it	is	socially	facilitated”	(2011:4).44	The	significance	of	environmental	considerations	makes	clear	that	community	factors,	such	as	poverty,	play	a	significant	part	in	individual	resilience	outcomes.	These	community	and	social	structural	issues	need	to	be	addressed	in	order	to	bring	about	consistent	resilient	outcomes	in	adverse	situations.	A	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	report	on	resilience	makes	this	point	emphatically:	[L]evels	of	mental	distress	among	communities	need	to	be	understood	less	in	terms	of	individual	pathology	and	more	as	a	response	to	relative	deprivation	and	social	injustice,	which	erode	the	emotional,	spiritual	and	intellectual	resources	essential	to	psychological	well-being.	While	psycho-social	stress	is	not	the	only	route	through	which	disadvantage	affects	outcomes,	it	does	appear	to	be	pivotal.	Firstly,	psychobiological	studies	provide	growing	evidence	of	how	chronic	low	level	stress	‘gets	under	the	skin’	through	the	neuro-endocrine,	cardiovascular	and	immune	systems…Secondly,	both	health-damaging	behaviours	and	violence,	for	example,	may	be	survival	strategies	in	the	face	of	multiple	problems,	anger	and	despair	related	to	occupational	insecurity,	poverty,	debt,	poor	housing,	exclusion	and	other	indicators	of	low	status	(Friedli	2009:iii).		These	environmental	systems	are	complex,	making	causality	often	hard	to	delineate.	It	is	possible	that	some	factors	may	predispose	an	individual	to	circumstances	that	mediate	the	risk	inherent	in	adversity	(Windle	2011:164).	For	example,	it	is	clear	that	poverty	increases	the	likelihood	of	psychopathology	in	children,	but	it	is	not	clear	whether	this	is	specifically	due	to	poverty	itself	or	to	the	way	in	which	poverty	changes	family	dynamics	(Rutter	1999;	Windle	2011:164).		Seeing	resilience	through	the	lens	of	environment	(sometimes	called	a	“social-ecological	model	of	resilience”	(Panter-Brick	2014:441)	)	enables	practitioners	to	help	individuals	utilize	external	resources	for	successful	adaptation	in	the	midst	of	adversity.	Panter-Brick	argues:	
                                                44	Or,	perhaps,	these	factors	are	on	par	with	one	another,	given	other	research	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014).	
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In	brief,	focusing	attention	on	both	resources	and	resourcefulness	helps	to	incorporate	ecology	and	agency	in	our	understanding	of	human	pathways	to	health.	The	arrow	of	change	still	points	from	society	to	the	individual:	The	important	insight	of	a	social-ecological	model	is	that	“changing	the	odds”	in	the	environment	becomes	preferable	to	having	individuals	“beat	the	odds”	stacked	against	them	(Panter-Brick	2014:441).45	Because	resilient	outcomes	are	so	largely	affected	by	environment,	scholars	argue	for	an	understanding	of	the	concept	that	sees	it	as	complex	and	dynamic,	but	also	dependent	upon	variables	of	time	and	context	(Tol	et	al.	2013:445).	Because	of	this,	they	suggest	that	interventions	need	to	be	fitted	to	specific	situations	rather	than	thinking	that	one	model	could	be	applied	universally	with	similar	good	outcomes	across	diverse	circumstances.	Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	argue	that	understanding	the	dynamic	interaction	of	resilience	with	environment	can	give	us	a	clearer	picture	of	the	normative	dimension	of	resilience,	especially	with	regard	to	“defining	‘better-than-	expected’	outcomes”	(2013:333).	This	means,	in	part,	that	our	understanding	of	a	resilient	outcome	may	need	to	be	shaped	by	the	environment.	Adding	to	the	complexity	of	this	concept,	research	in	the	field	of	genetics	shows	that	shared	environmental	factors	have	the	potential	to	shape	outcomes	in	the	same	way	that	genetics	and	non-shared	environmental	factors	do	(Rende	2012).	Certainly,	additional	research	is	needed	to	gain	a	clearer	understanding	of	how	genetics	and	environment	interact	to	create	resilience.	
Neurobiology	and	Resilience	Related	to	genetic	considerations	are	neurobiological	understandings	of	resilience.	Recent	technological	advances,	such	as	being	able	to	take	fMRI	readings	while	a	patient	is	conscious,	have	allowed	for	significant	advances	in	understanding	the	neurobiology	of	resilience	(Karatoreos	and	McEwen	2013;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:81).			It	is	significant	that	studies	are	beginning	to	correlate	specific	alterations	in	neurobiological	functioning	with	aspects	of	resilience	(James	et	al.	2013;	Wang	et	al.	2014;	Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:445).	This	fact	means	that	researchers	are	identifying	not	
                                                45	See	also	(Ungar	2008:220–21).	
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only	how	the	brain	processes	stress	and	resilient	responses,	but	also	how	to	better	inculcate	resilience.	
Epigenetic	Markers	Several	other	key	neurobiological	concepts	are	important	for	resilience	research.	One	of	these	concepts	concerns	epigenetic	mechanisms.	This	concept	is	closely	linked	to	genetics	and	is	concerned	with	proteins	that	help	code	the	genetic	sequence	in	DNA	(Feder	et	al.	2011:13).	A	specific	genetic	coding	is	often	called	an	epigenetic	marker	or	a	biomarker	(Yehuda	et	al.	2013).		Recent	resilience	research	has	come	a	long	way	in	understanding	the	role	of	epigenetic	markers	in	resilience:	It	is	now	understood	that	changes	in	the	activity	of	genes	established	through	epigenetic	alterations	occur	as	a	consequence	of	exposure	to	environmental	adversity,	social	stress,	and	traumatic	experiences.	DNA	methylation	in	particular	has	thus	emerged	as	a	leading	candidate	biological	pathway	linking	gene–environment	interactions	to	long-term	and	even	multigenerational	trajectories	in	behavioral	development,	including	the	vulnerability	and	resilience	to	psychopathology	(Roth	2013:1279).	Researchers	have	also	shown	that	very	stressful	life	events	can	create	epigenetic	modifications	“in	genes	associated	with	the	hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal	axis	(McGowan	et	al.	2009),	which	may	be	another	mechanism	through	which	the	environmental	influences	exert	their	effect	on	resilience”	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:279).	In	the	future,	epigenetic	changes	may	be	specifically	associated	with	resilient	behavior	as	well	as	used	as	predictors	of	resilience	(Yehuda	et	al.	2013).		Showing	the	complexity	of	human	beings,	these	epigenetic	markers	both	affect	and	are	affected	by	context	and	environmental	factors	(Feder	et	al.	2011:14;	Rende	2012).	This	has	also	been	called	“genetic	sensitivity	to	the	environment”	(Rende	2012).	Positively,	some	research	has	shown	that	psychotherapy,	as	a	means	of	regulating	the	environment,	can	bring	about	favorable	epigenetic	change	in	individuals	with	PTSD	(Yehuda	et	al.	2013:12).			
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Neuroplasticity	Another	important	concept	is	that	of	brain	plasticity	or	neuroplasticity	(Cicchetti	and	Blender	2006;	Cicchetti	and	Curtis	2006;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:80).	This	concept	is	significant	for	resilience	studies	because	research	has	shown	that,	in	some	circumstances,	the	brain	can	re-enter	a	plastic	(malleable)	state	in	adulthood	in	order	to	mitigate	the	negative	effects	of	adversity	(Karatoreos	and	McEwen	2013).	Ciccheti	and	Valentino	explain	the	possibilities	of	neuroplasticity:	The	concept	of	neural	plasticity	offers	a	valuable	heuristic	for	conceptualizing	how	preventive	interventions	may	affect	brain	structure	and	functioning,	contributing	to	resilience	among	individuals	confronted	with	adversity	(Curtis	and	Cicchetti	2003).	Analogous	to	recovery	from	physical	injury	to	the	brain,	neural	plasticity	also	may	involve	recovery	from	the	damaging	effects	of	trauma	and	extreme	stress.	Adverse	environmental	experience	can	induce	physiological	changes	in	the	brain,	and	conversely,	experiences	to	ameliorate	and	safeguard	against	severe	adversity	may	similarly	produce	physiological	changes	that	are	advantageous	to	the	central	nervous	system	(2007:272–73).46		Significantly,	research	indicates	that	physical	changes	to	the	brain,	including	to	circuit	connectivity	(McEwen	and	Gianaros	2011),	can	be	precipitated	by	the	environment	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014:279;	Davidson	and	McEwen	2012).	
Allostatic	Load	A	final	neurobiological	concept	important	for	resilience	research	is	allostatic	load	(Karatsoreos	and	McEwen	2011).	The	concept	of	allostasis	was	introduced	by	Sterling	and	Eyer	in	1988	(Sterling	and	Eyer	1988)	to	describe	the	“dynamic	regulation	of	secondary	set-points	in	defense	of	homeostasis”	(Feder	et	al.	2011:1–2).	Allostasis	has	also	been	defined	as	“stability	through	change”	(Karatoreos	and	McEwen	2013:338).	Relatedly,	allostatic	load	is	the	“damage	the	body	incurs	as	a	result	of	allostasis”	(Feder	et	al.	2011:2;	McEwen	2013).		In	one	sense,	this	terminology	is	a	means	of	speaking	more	specifically	regarding	stress	and	the	effects	of	stress	on	an	individual.	Some	researchers	suggested	that	the	terminology	of	‘allostasis’	provides	a	more	positive	connotation	to	describe	‘adaptive	plasticity’	than	the	traditional	term,	‘stress’	which	has	gained	a	somewhat	negative	
                                                46	Citing	(Cicchetti	and	Tucker	1994;	Nelson	1999).	
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connotation	(Karatsoreos	and	McEwen	2011).	Interestingly,	‘stress’	was	originally	borrowed	from	the	field	of	engineering,	just	as	‘resilience’	was	(Karatsoreos	and	McEwen	2011).		
Future	Possibilities	Much	still	remains	to	be	learned	about	the	neurobiological	underpinnings	of	resilience.	For	example,	further	research	may	show	how	resilience	mediates	the	effects	of	adversity.	In	addition,	as	specific	biomarkers	associated	with	resilience	are	identified,	researchers	may	be	able	to	predict	or	track	trauma	recovery	(Yehuda	and	Flory	2007:438).		
Diverse	Social	Understandings	of	Resilience	Another	significant	shift	in	resilience	research	has	been	a	movement	to	understand	that	culture	plays	a	large	role	in	influencing	resilience.47	Some	scholars	have	noted	that	thus	far	“culture	is	perhaps	the	most	neglected	topic	in	the	study	of	risk	and	resilience”	(Feldman	and	Masalha	2007:2;	Panter-Brick	2014:432).	This	is	not	to	say	that	trans-cultural	elements	of	resilience	are	not	recognized,	only	that	the	culturally	bound	nature	of	the	concept	has	often	been	neglected.	In	fact,	one	researcher	argues	that	“[f]or	social	scientists,	the	grand	challenge	may	consist	of	developing	a	grounded	understanding	of	resilience	across	cultures”	(Panter-Brick	2014:432).	Certainly,	as	previously	discussed,	environmental	considerations,	to	include	social	context,	play	a	significant	part	in	resilient	outcomes.	For	instance,	participants	in	resilience	studies	in	different	cultural	contexts	emphasize	diverse	resilience	outcomes,	a	fact	that	may	be	lost	to	researchers	if	they	come	to	the	study	with	predetermined	outcome	indicators	already	in	mind	(Tol	et	al.	2013:449).		Some	research	has	already	attempted	to	contextualize	parts	of	the	resilience	concept	within	Korean	culture	(Kwon	2008)	as	well	as	African	culture	(Theron,	Theron,	and	Malindi	2013).	In	these	contexts,	cultural	paradigms,	such	as	the	shame/honor	
                                                47	E.g.	(Clauss-Ehlers	2008).	Michael	Ungar	was	the	first	to	develop	a	socio-ecological	model	of	resilience	(Masten	2014:12;	Ungar	2011,	2012).	
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paradigm,	are	central	cultural	narratives	with	which	the	resilience	concept	will	have	to	interface	in	order	to	be	relevant	in	these	cultures.		These	findings	must	be	taken	in	conjunction	with	research	previously	discussed	that	indicates	there	is	a	normative	dimension	to	resilience	despite	its	varied	cultural	embodiments.	Researchers	have	cautioned	that,	even	taking	into	account	the	reality	of	socio-cultural	diversity,	much	can	still	be	said	about	predictors	of	resilience	that	transcend	cultural	specificity.	Citing	qualitative	studies	that	spanned	10	countries,	Tol	et	al.	noted	that	participants	identified	similar	predictors	of	resilience,	having	in	common	factors	that	were	“a	combination	of	personal	strengths	and	supportive	contexts	(e.g.	family	and	community	supports)”		(2013:449).	There	is	still	much	to	be	said	for	a	normative	understanding	of	resilience	that	transcends,	but	gives	unique	voice	to,	distinctiveness.	
Deeper	Cultural	Understandings	An	emphasis	on	cultural	variations	brings	to	the	forefront	the	question	of	meaning,	for	individuals,	as	well	as	cultures.	Meaning,	as	defined	by	the	individual	or	culture,	has	much	more	effect	upon	risk/resilience	than	biomedical	literature	has	suggested—leading	to	difficulties	(e.g.	in	the	case	of	HIV/AIDS	in	Africa)	(Panter-Brick	2014:435).			A	culturally	sensitive	understanding	of	resilience	gives	credence	to	local	understandings	of	the	world	and	morality	when	determining	resilience	measures	and	outcomes.	Despite	the	little	attention	usually	given	to	meaning-making	in	specific	cultural	contexts,	these	factors	play	a	significant	part	in	creating	resilient	outcomes	in	those	contexts.	Meaning	is	closely	linked	to	larger	metaphysical	and	teleological	narratives	that	the	sciences	do	not	usually	address,	and	therefore	further	input	from	other	disciplines	is	needed.48		
Limitations	of	the	Resilience	Concept	As	useful	as	the	resilience	concept	has	proven	to	be	across	a	variety	of	disciplines,	it	also	has	its	limitations.	
                                                48	See	a	plea	from	social	scientists	for	the	importance	of	meaning-making	in	public	health	promotion	(Wexler,	DiFluvio,	and	Burke	2009).	
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	One	limitation	that	has	been	noted	is	the	inability	of	the	concept	to	fully	characterize	the	experience	of	those	who	face	extreme	adversity	(Tol	et	al.	2013:457).	For	example,	one	longitudinal	study	on	the	experience	of	sexual	assault	victims	showed	that	the	daily	difficulties	they	faced	were	not	mitigated	by	the	protective	factor	of	acceptance	by	the	community	(Theresa	Stichick	Betancourt	et	al.	2010).	This	is	just	one	example	out	of	many,	but	it	demonstrates	that	resilience	is	not	a	‘silver	bullet’	that	can	rectify	every	adverse	situation.		Additionally,	the	question	of	whether	there	is	a	cost	associated	with	adaptation	to	adversity,	especially	significant	adversity	is	significant.	Ann	Masten	describes	two	types	of	‘prices’	associated	with	resilience.	The	first	‘price’	is	the	‘scarring’	and	after	effects	of	facing	adversity,	even	despite	achieving	some	good	outcomes.	She	terms	this	the	“price	of	adversity	rather	than	resilience”	(2014:14).	Additionally,	she	notes	that	there	is	a	‘price’	inherent	in	fighting	for	and	achieving	resilience	in	exceptionally	adverse	circumstances	(2014:14).	Certainly,	some	studies	indicate	that	resilient	youths	from	very	high-risk	situations	have	long-term	health	issues	(Werner	and	Smith	2001)	as	well	as	high	allostatic	load	despite	good	psychosocial	adaptation	(Brody	et	al.	2013).	Resilience	does	not	come	without	a	cost,	but	too	often	researchers	do	not	acknowledge	that	cost.			Further	limitations	of	the	resilience	concept	will	be	taken	up	later,	but,	despite	any	limitations,	I	believe	that	it	is	still	a	very	useful	construct	by	which	we	can	meaningfully	engage	human	responses	to	adversity.			
Conclusions	While	resilience	research	is	still	in	its	adolescence,	interdisciplinary	dialogue	and	new	ways	of	assessing	resilience	provide	a	hopeful	future	for	the	concept.	The	way	forward	certainly	involves	multiple	systems	of	analysis	for	developing	the	best	interventions	(Masten	2011).	These	interventions	must	be	based	on	rigorous	studies	that	take	into	account	specific	time	and	context-dependent	variables	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335–36).	To	this	end,	Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	believe	that		
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[m]uch	more	interdisciplinary	work	can	be	done	to	connect,	into	a	coherent	framework,	the	neurobiology	of	resilience	with	the	culture	of	resilience,	the	functional	with	the	normative	dimensions	of	human	experience…In	our	view,	attention	to	interventions	with	synergistic	effects	across	multiple	systems,	given	careful	research	on	context-specific	and	time-sensitive	resilience	pathways,	is	one	of	the	most	exciting	foci	of	research	and	practice	in	child	development	(2013:335–36).	We	must	be	able	to	identify	critical	constructs	for	resilience	and	harness	resources	to	support	resilient	outcomes.	Additionally,	we	must	work	‘upstream’	to	target	prevention	at	community	and	systems	levels	rather	than	focusing	solely	at	the	individual	level	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:335–36).	Several	important	studies	have	shown	the	powerful	impact	of	such	family	and	social	interventions	on	resilience	outcomes	over	the	span	of	a	lifetime	(Challen,	Machin,	and	Gillham	2014;	Elliott,	Burton,	and	Hannaford	2014;	Kagitcibasi	et	al.	2009;	Werner	and	Smith	2001).		Resilience	must	be	understood	for	what	it	is:	a	very	complex	concept—a	“dynamic	process	that	varies	within	and	across	time”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:54)	that	is	a	result	of	many	variables	including	genetics	(Amstadter	et	al.	2014),	neurobiology	(Southwick	and	Charney	2012b),	environment,	and	individual	factors	(Bradley	et	al.	2013).	Because	of	this,	Michael	Rutter	argues	that	currently	resilience	research	findings	do	“not	translate	into	a	clear	programme	of	prevention	and	treatment,	but	they	do	provide	numerous	leads	on	clinical	approaches	that	focus	on	the	dynamic	view	of	what	may	be	involved	in	overcoming	seriously	adverse	experiences”	(2013:484).	These	prevention	and	treatment	applications	of	the	resilience	concept	are	what	drive	the	study	of	resilience	and	also	what	make	it	such	a	valuable	concept.	Research	gives	enough	evidence	to	begin	making	intervention	strategies	that	will	have	a	substantial	impact.		Interventions	and	applications	of	this	research	need	to	be	tailored	to	specific	contexts	rather	than	attempting	to	use	a	‘universal	model’	that	can	be	applied	blindly	across	any	context	(Panter-Brick	and	Leckman	2013:333;	Tol	et	al.	2013:457).49	This	work	can	be	aided	by	“reconceptualizing	resilience	in	narrower,	specific	terms”	(Vanderbilt-
                                                49	It	is	necessary	to	focus	on	stressors	in	the	everyday	lives	of	individuals	in	order	to	mediate	between	undue	focus,	alternatively,	on	trauma	or	psychosocial	models	(Miller	and	Rasmussen	2010).	
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Adriance	and	Shaw	2008:54)	as	well	as	by	very	clearly	defining	resilience	terminology	(Panter-Brick	2014).	Unfortunately,	the	fact	of	adversity	as	a	near-universal	human	experience	makes	the	study	of	resilience	necessary.	As	Vanderbilt-Adriance	and	Shaw	point	out,	however,	this	also	gives	resilience	studies	a	trajectory	for	the	future:	Differences	in	the	prevalence	of	resilience	across	the	highest	levels	of	risk,	as	well	as	discontinuity	across	time	and	domains,	emphasize	the	difficulty	of	‘escaping’	risk,	and	illustrate	the	need	for	both	researchers	and	policy	makers	to	target	established	protective	factors	that	have	been	reliably	shown	to	be	associated	with	positive	outcomes	in	similar	samples	(2008:54).	It	is	my	hope	that	resilience	research	will	continue	to	enable	increased	human	well-being	across	diverse	contexts.50	There	are	already	encouraging	signs	of	progress:	“There	are	efforts	to	create	common	concepts	and	tools	that	will	facilitate	building	a	more	integrated,	scalable,	multidisciplinary	science	of	resilience	to	address	issues	of	global	concern”	(Masten	2014:14).51	This	project	seeks	to	be	another	step	toward	this	goal.	
	 	
                                                50	For	a	review	of	research	demonstrating	the	possibility	of	such	psychosocial	intervention,	see	(Tol	et	al.	2011).	51	Citing	(Brown	2014;	Masten	and	Obradovic	2008;	Welsh	2014).	
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Chapter	2:	Religion,	Spirituality,	and	Resilience	
	
“’Tu	oi	Tu!	I’m	afraid,’	Diep	said,	clinging	to	me	one	night	after	a	rocket	burst	not	far	from	
our	home.	Her	sharp	nails	dug	into	my	thigh	or	arm,	whatever	flesh	she	could	reach	in	the	
darkness.	The	house	shook,	and	then	dust	from	the	ceiling	sprinkled	through	the	mosquito	
net	and	settle	on	our	skin,	reminding	us	that	death	was	only	a	few	feet	away…	
	
‘Is	your	love	real?’	I	asked	God.	‘Show	me.	Let	me	see	your	face.’	Lying	in	bed	in	the	
darkness,	I	strained	my	eyes	looking	for	him.	I	wanted	to	see	him,	to	touch	him,	to	have	
him	hold	and	comfort	me.	I	needed	to	feel	the	reality	of	God’s	love	because	what	I	feared	
most	wasn’t	death,	but	a	life	devoid	of	his	presence.	In	the	deepest	reaches	of	my	heart,	I	
knew	that	without	God	in	creation,	life	wouldn’t	make	any	sense”	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	
2003:176–78).			In	the	first	chapter	I	introduced	resilience	from	the	viewpoint	of	the	social	sciences.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	continue	with	this	strategy,	however	the	primary	focus	will	be	the	role	of	religion	and	spirituality	in	human	resilience,	again	largely	through	the	lens	of	the	social	sciences.			There	is	a	long	history	of	interaction	between	psychology	and	religion,	at	times	both	constructive	and	antagonistic	(Parsons	2010).1	Yet	the	mutual	goal	of	helping	human	beings	is	a	significant	commonality	(Paloutzian	2006).	Many	aspects	of	this	relationship	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter,	nonetheless,	Kenneth	Pargament	notes	the	powerful	way	in	which	psychology	and	religion	can	help	individuals	overcome	adversity.	Specifically,	the	psychology	of	religion	and	coping		bridges	a	deep	psychological	tradition	of	helping	people	take	care	of	what	they	can	in	times	of	stress	with	a	rich	religious	tradition	of	helping	people	accept	their	limitations	and	look	beyond	themselves	for	assistance	in	troubling	times	(1997:9).	
                                                1	Jeff	Levin	suggests,	“That	religion	might	have	something	to	say	about	mental	health,	for	good	or	bad,	has	been	a	sensitive	and	contentious	issue	within	psychiatry,	dating	to	Freud,	as	familiarity	with	the	history	of	psychiatry	attests”	(2010:103).	See	also	Don	Browning’s	insightful	summary	of	the	current	relationship	between	psychiatry	and	religion	(Browning	2010:114–15).	In	this	chapter	I	utilize	the	general	term	‘religion’	in	the	functional	sense	used	by	social	scientists	to	categorize	actions	and	dispositions	related	to	activities	such	as	religious	service	attendance	and	prayer.	Later	I	will	address	potential	problems	with	such	a	denotation,	but	I	begin	with	it	as	a	starting	point.	Here	‘religion’	includes	a	diversity	of	faiths;	later	I	will	focus	upon	the	significance	of	the	Christian	faith,	in	particular,	for	understanding	human	resilience.	
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	Recently	many	researchers	have	attempted	to	study	the	relationship	of	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	through	empirical	means,	but	religious	traditions	have	long	assisted	the	downtrodden	and	help	the	sick	(Koenig	2012).		In	this	chapter	I	will	review	current	research	on	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	as	it	relates	to	the	study	of	resilience.	But	first,	a	word	must	be	said	about	the	need	for	this	chapter.		
The	Necessity	of	this	Study	Why	is	it	important	to	study	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	resilience?	The	portrait	of	current	resilience	studies	within	the	social	sciences	in	the	last	chapter	is	an	important	foundation	for	understanding	resilience,	but	it	does	not	give	the	full	picture.	We	must	look	more	specifically	at	the	relationship	between,	and	the	importance	of,	religion	and	spirituality	in	the	study	of	human	resilience.		Studies	indicate	that	religion	is	one	of	the	primary	ways	many	individuals	deal	with	adversity.		For	example,	a	national	survey	in	the	United	States	found	that	90%	of	Americans	coped	through	religion	following	the	9/11	attacks	(Schuster	et	al.	2001).	Similarly,	Harold	Koenig	notes	that		in	certain	parts	of	the	United	States,	over	90	percent	of	medical	patients	indicate	that	religious	beliefs	and	practices	are	ways	they	cope	with	and	make	sense	of	physical	illness,	and	over	40	percent	say	that	religion	is	the	most	important	factor	that	keeps	them	going	(2013:30).2		The	importance	of	religion	for	sustaining	individuals	through	times	of	adversity	has	been	demonstrated	across	cultures	and	religions	(Abu-Raiya	et	al.	2015;	Ahmadi	2006;	Büssing,	Abu-Hassan,	et	al.	2007;	Büssing,	Ostermann,	and	Koenig	2007;	D’Souza	2002;	Rammohan,	Rao,	and	Subbakrishna	2002).	Because	of	the	centrality	of	religion	and	spirituality	to	the	human	experience,	these	factors	must	be	included	in	any	understanding	of	human	resilience.	In	a	study	addressing	resilience	from	a	theological	perspective,	such	an	understanding	is	all	the	more	important.		
                                                2	Cf.	(Ehman	et	al.	1999;	Hamilton	and	Levine	2006;	Lim	2015).	
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Some	scholars	argue	for	the	uniqueness	of	religion	and	spirituality.	For	them,	these	factors	are	categorically	different	than	other	resources	used	for	coping	(Emmons	1999;	Pargament,	Magyar-Russell,	and	Murray-Swank	2005;	Schnitker	and	Emmons	2013).	If	true,	these	claims	suggest	that	religion	and	spirituality	have	a	unique	contribution	to	make	in	human	beings’	ability	to	adapt	to	adversity	(McCrae	1999).	To	more	fully	investigate	these	claims,	the	current	social	scientific	research	concerning	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	health,	and	resilience	must	be	assessed.		
Social	Science	Research	Many	studies	indicate	associations	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience	(Agorastos,	Huber,	and	Demiralay	2014;	Koenig	and	King	2012),	suggesting	that	religion	may	promote	resilience	(Kasen	et	al.	2012).	In	particular,	some	of	these	benefits	may	be	attributed	to	the	encouragement	to	a	healthy	lifestyle	found	in	many	forms	of	R/S	(Tovar-Murray	2011).	Because	resilience	research	deals	with	the	question	of	how	individuals	return	to	a	state	of	health,	much	of	the	research	on	the	intersection	of	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	is	relevant	to	this	study.			Research	in	this	area	has	increased	significantly	in	recent	years,	bringing	with	it	a	significant	amount	of	data	regarding	this	relationship	(Koenig	et	al.	2012;	Levin	2010).	Because	of	this,	a	complete	overview	of	this	research	in	this	limited	space	is	not	feasible.	There	are,	however,	some	significant	points	that	I	will	highlight.	I	will	begin	by	addressing	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	resilience	more	generally	before	delving	into	more	specific	aspects	of	this	relationship.			
Correlations	between	Religion,	Spirituality,	Health,	and	Resilience	Recently,	many	researchers	have	attempted	to	understand	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	health,	to	include	studies	significant	for	understanding	resilience.	Harold	Koenig	compiled	a	list	of	studies	relating	to	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	from	2000-2010.	His	review	includes	more	than	twenty-one	hundred	quantitative	studies	during	this	time	period,	which	he	estimates	to	be	approximately	75%	of	the	total	available	research	(Koenig	et	al.	2012:9).	He	notes	that	the	number	of	qualitative	studies	on	the	intersection	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	is	too	numerous	to	include	in	his	
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already	massive,	more	than	1,100	page,	tome.	Tyler	VanderWeele	(2016)	provides	a	more	concise	and	critical	summary	of	the	extant	research	on	religion	and	health	that	both	takes	into	account	past	research	and	suggests	helpful	possibilities	for	future	study.		This	research	suggests	both	positive	and	negative	correlation	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	health.	As	a	meta-analysis	of	this	research	has	shown,	contradictory	results	may	merely	be	a	function	of	differing	definitions	of	key	terms	(Hackney	and	Sanders	2003).	Thus,	it	is	possible	that	R/S	can	both	enhance	and	detract	from	resilience,	as	a	function	of	human	well-being,	but	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	various	aspects	of	R/S	is	needed	in	order	to	demarcate	the	relationship	between	these	concepts.3		
Research	Findings	
	
Positive	Correlation	A	number	of	studies	indicate	a	substantial	positive	correlation	between	R/S	and	physical	health,	mental	health,	and	overall	human	well-being	(Koenig	2012).	Jeff	Levin	notes	that	research	has	shown	that	the	“weight	of	evidence,	on	average	and	across	studies,	suggests	that	religion,	however	assessed,	is	a	generally	protective	factor	for	mental	illness”	(2010:102).	Koenig	agrees	that	most	studies	examining	the	correlation	between	R/S	and	health	have	found	a	“significant	positive	association”	(2013:35).4	Some	evidence	suggests,	however,	that	this	association	is	more	significant	between	R/S	and	mental	health	than	R/S	and	physical	health.5	Such	associations	have	held	true	
                                                3	Vanderweele	et	al.	(2016)	note	that	the	cross-sectional	nature	of	most	studies	assessing	the	relationship	between	religion	and	health	does	not	provide	information	to	determine	causality	within	this	relationship.	Further	longitudinal	studies	are	needed	to	clarify	this.	Yet,	even	in	the	case	of	longitudinal	research,	such	as	Vanderweele	et	al.’s	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	religious	service	attendance	and	depression,	causality	is	not	always	clearly	defined	and	may	in	fact	move	in	both	directions.	This	indicates	that	the	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	should	be	considered	suggestive	of	a	generally	positive	relationship	between	religion	and	health	rather	than	clearly	definitive	of	this	conclusion.	4	Cf.	(Wong,	Rew,	and	Slaikeu	2006).	5	Cf.	(Johnstone	et	al.	2008).	
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across	the	domains	of	a	variety	of	types	of	disease,	as	well	as	over	the	life	span,	and	in	many	different	social	contexts	and	populations	(Levin	2009:78).		These	conclusions	are	not	without	their	critics,	however	(King	et	al.	2013;	Sloan	2008).	This	is,	in	part,	because	not	all	evidence	points	to	supremely	positive	outcomes	and	associations.	As	an	example,	one	meta-analysis	of	studies	regarding	the	relationship	between	religion	and	depression	suggested	a	mild	inverse	association,	where	positive	religiosity	only	slightly	ameliorated	depressive	symptoms	(Smith,	McCullough,	and	Poll	2003).6		Such	studies	attempt	to	show	correlation	between	R/S	and	health	through	focusing	on	measurable	outcomes	across	a	number	of	different	health-related	areas.	Yet,	many	other	studies	show	that	R/S	patients	are	less	likely	to	develop	depression	or	depressive	symptoms	(Braam	et	al.	2004;	Chen	et	al.	2007;	King	et	al.	2007;	Koenig	2007,	2013:36;	McCullough	and	Larson	1999;	Miller	et	al.	2012;	Smith	et	al.	2003),	but	if	they	do	experience	depression	they	are	able	to	recover	more	quickly	(Koenig,	George,	and	Peterson	1998).	Thus,	it	may	be	appropriate	to	say	that	religion	both	protects	individuals	from	depression	and	acts	as	an	aid	in	recovery	(Ronneberg	et	al.	2014).7	Additionally,	there	is	ample	research	to	suggest	positive	correlations	between	R/S	and	longevity	of	life,	quick	recovery	following	major	surgery,	and	lack	of	substance	abuse,	among	other	indicators	of	health	(Koenig	et	al.	2012).		Significantly,	research	indicates	that	the	positive	effects	of	religion	and	spirituality	can	be	most	clearly	seen	in	situations	of	significant	adversity	(Agorastos	et	al.	2014;	Kim	2008;	Koenig,	Larson,	and	Larson	2001).	This	makes	the	study	of	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	resilience	even	more	pertinent.		
                                                6	Some	divergence	in	study	findings—such	as	a	cross-sectional	study	that	found	a	correlation	between	religiosity	and	depression	(Lupo	and	Strous	2011)	as	opposed	to	a	similar	study	conducted	among	participants	of	another	faith	tradition	that	yielded	opposite	results	(Vasegh	and	Mohammadi	2007)—suggests	that	additional	factors	are	at	play	here,	perhaps	to	include	the	religion	of	participants.	7	As	mentioned	above,	these	findings	are	not	universal	(Smith,	McCullough,	and	Poll	2003).	The	evidence	of	the	majority	of	studies	strongly	suggests	that	religion	protects	from	and	helps	in	recovery	from	depression,	but	studies	such	as	that	by	Maselko	et	al.	(2009)	suggest	that	this	relationship	is	complex	with	no	clear	one-to-one	correlation.	
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	For	example,	studies	suggest	the	benefits	of	R/S	for	cancer	patients	(Balboni	et	al.	2007;	Holt	et	al.	2012)	as	well	as	for	preventing	suicide	(Cook	2014)	where,	among	other	factors,	religious	worship	attendance	can	act	as	an	independent	protective	factor	against	suicide	(Kleiman	and	Liu	2014;	Rasic	et	al.	2011).	Other	studies	indicate,	more	generally,	the	protective	nature	of	R/S	against	suicide	(Dervic	et	al.	2004;	Greening	and	Stoppelbein	2002;	Lester	2000;	Lubin	et	al.	2001;	Rasic	et	al.	2009;	Thompson,	Ho,	and	Kingree	2007).	Studies	also	suggest	that	R/S	provides	resources	significant	for	coping	with	severe	and/or	chronic	pain	(Büssing	et	al.	2009;	Harrison	et	al.	2005;	Keefe	et	al.	2001;	Riley	et	al.	1998;	Smith	et	al.	2009;	Wachholtz,	Pearce,	and	Koenig	2007;	Wiech	et	al.	2008).	Significantly,	research	demonstrates	that	R/S	resources	are	particularly	important	for	those	whose	difficulties	are	beyond	the	scope	of	modern	medicine	to	help	(Koenig	2002).		
Negative	Correlation		Not	all	research	has	shown	a	positive	correlation	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	health,	however.	In	particular,	several	studies	indicate	that	struggle	with	religious	beliefs,	especially	toward	the	end	of	life,	can	be	detrimental	to	health	(Fitchett	et	al.	1999;	McCann	and	Webb	2012;	Pargament	et	al.	2001;	Pirutinsky	et	al.	2011;	Webb	et	al.	2011).			Additionally,	greater	religiosity/spirituality	has,	at	times,	been	associated	with	higher	levels	of	obsessive-compulsive	traits	(Agorastos	et	al.	2014).	Some	studies	found	that	individuals	who	held	spiritual	values	as	important—such	as	the	search	for	meaning	and	understanding	adversity	in	life—had	higher	incidence	of	most	psychiatric	disorders	(Baetz	et	al.	2004,	2006).8		
                                                8	Pargament	(1997)	suggests	a	‘stress	mobilization	theory’	as	a	way	to	account	for	the	seeming	negative	outcome	associated	with	religious	coping.	Pargament	suggests	that	the	negative	outcome	is	due	to	the	cross-sectional	nature	of	such	studies	in	which	individuals	turn	to	religion	in	the	midst	of	adversity	as	a	means	of	coping.	This	creates	an	apparent	positive	correlation	between	religion	and	distress.	If	these	individuals	were	studied	in	a	longitudinal	manner,	he	suggests,	religiosity	would	be	found	to	correlate	with	reduced	distress.	Several	studies	seem	to	confirm	this	theory.	Cf.	(Hebert,	Dang,	and	Schulz	2007;	Koenig	2007;	Pargament	et	al.	1994).	
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As	with	the	positive	correlation	of	religion	and	spirituality,	these	factors	affect	various	groups	differently	(Norton	et	al.	2008).	Thus,	what	may	create	a	positive	outcome	for	one	group	may	produce	the	opposite	effect	in	another.	This	type	of	differentiation	is	evident	relating	to	gender	differences	in	more	than	one	study	(Abdel-Khalek	2014;	Cokley	et	al.	2013;	Ganga	and	Kutty	2013;	Kim	2008).	Hence,	one	must	take	into	account	the	negative	impact	that	some	aspects	of	religion	may	have	on	specific	segments	of	the	population,	such	as	those	of	different	races	or	cultural	backgrounds	(Arnette	et	al.	2007;	Cokley	et	al.	2012;	Haidt,	Koller,	and	Dias	1993;	Hickman	et	al.	2013;	Levin,	Markides,	and	Ray	1996;	E.	G.	Levine	et	al.	2009;	Lun	and	Bond	2013),9	or	sexual	orientation	(Harari,	Glenwick,	and	Cecero	2014;	Longo,	Walls,	and	Wisneski	2013).			One	scholar	argued,	however,	that	many	of	the	negative	correlations	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	health	are	a	result	of	distortions	of	these	concepts	rather	than	a	reflection	of	their	true	nature	(Levin	2009,	2010).	While	this	may	be	true	in	many	circumstances,	there	could	also	be	situations	where	a	negative	correlation	is	an	accurate	reflection	of	a	core	religious	belief.		
Conclusions	on	Correlations	While	a	majority	of	studies	on	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	health	indicate	a	positive	correlation,	these	findings	are	not	universal.10	Perhaps	R/S,	broadly	defined,	may	be	expressed	either	positively	and	negatively.	What	is	needed,	then,	is	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	R/S	that	enables	detailed	analysis	and	research.			In	fact,	some	researchers	are	beginning	to	do	this	type	of	nuanced	work.	One	group	of	researchers	found	that	spiritual	struggle	(anger	at	God)	led	to	negative	outcomes	while	positive	religious	coping	led	to	positive	outcomes	(Trevino	et	al.	2010).	Other	scholars	focus	upon	factors	involved	in	negative	spiritual	coping	(Ano	and	Pargament	2013).	
                                                9	See,	for	instance,	studies	relating	to	R/S	and	health	in	populations	of	African	Americans	(Arnette	et	al.	2007;	Boyd-Franklin	2010;	Holt	et	al.	2012;	Lewis	2008)	and	Hispanics	(Guinn	and	Vincent	2002;	Hunter-Hernández,	Costas-Muñíz,	and	Gany	2015).	10	In	fact,	some	studies	received	mixed	results.	Cf.	(Baetz	et	al.	2006;	Harris	et	al.	2008;	Trevino	et	al.	2010).	
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This	differentiation	between	aspects	of	R/S	is	important	for	a	clear	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	these	constructs	and	health	outcomes.		Something	more	needs	to	be	said	regarding	the	differences	between	religion	and	spirituality,	both	as	they	are	construed	in	popular	culture	and	in	current	research,	so	that	the	relationship	between	these	constructs	and	health	can	be	more	clearly	delineated.	While	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	study	to	fully	address	this	issue,	conceptual	clarity	necessitates	that	religion	and	spirituality	should	be	differentiated	as	both	theoretically	and	practically	distinct.		
Differences	Between	Religion	and	Spirituality	Because	certain	aspects	of	R/S	may	promote	well-being	while	others	may	detract	from	it	(Tovar-Murray	2011),	we	must	carefully	delineate	between	these	two	concepts	and	constructs	associated	with	them.	Religion	and	spirituality	are	distinct	and	should	ultimately	be	understood	as	an	independent,	though	related,	concepts.	There	are	many	reasons	for	understanding	these	as	separate	concepts,	but	one	of	the	primary	reasons	is	that	many	individuals	in	Western	society	today	would	conceive	of	religion	and	spirituality	very	differently.		Additionally,	this	distinction	is	important	for	resilience	research	more	specifically	because	some	aspects	of	spirituality	may	correlate	with	resilience	whereas	aspects	of	religion	may	not,	or	vice	versa	(Casey	2013:31).	Both	scholarly	and	colloquial	usage	of	these	terms	are	important	for	gaining	a	more	complete	understanding	of	their	similarities	and	differences	and	therefore	both	must	be	addressed.			
Scholarly	Usage	Though	scholars	have	traditionally	understood	religion	and	spirituality	as	being	interconnected,	this	understanding	does	not	necessarily	still	hold	true	(Casey	2013:23).	Importantly,	the	understanding	of	spirituality	as	separate	from	religion	is	quite	a	new	phenomenon	(Hill	et	al.	2000:57).		
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A	significant	increase	in	scholarly	interest	in	‘religion’	and	‘spirituality’	in	recent	years	has	not	led	to	a	scholarly	consensus	on	definitions	for	these	terms,	however	(Piedmont	et	al.	2009).	This	lack	of	agreement	has	led	to	less	precise	research,	an	inability	for	research	on	these	subjects	to	be	integrated	into	larger	theoretical	models	within	the	social	sciences,	and,	at	times,	contradictory	research	results	(Agorastos	et	al.	2014;	Piedmont	et	al.	2009).		Because	“spirituality	and	religion	are	complex	phenomena,	multidimensional	in	nature…any	single	definition	is	likely	to	reflect	a	limited	perspective	or	interest”	(Hill	et	al.	2000).	With	this	in	mind,	some	research	has	achieved	promising	results	through	using	multivariate	analysis	to	assess	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	and	other	concepts	within	the	field	of	psychology	(Henningsgaard	and	Arnau	2008).		Religion	can	be	described	as	the	“search	for	answers	to	existential	questions	about	life,	death,	and	other	ultimate	concerns”	(Kirkpatrick	1999:941),	or,	alternatively,	as	“a	search	for	significance	in	ways	related	to	the	sacred”	(Pargament	1997:32).	Pargament	et	al.	argue	that	religion	may	be	unique	in	human	experience:	Many	social	scientists	have	tried	to	explain	religion	by	reducing	it	to	presumably	more	basic	psychological,	social,	or	physiological	processes…there	is	something	unique	about	religion	in	and	of	itself…religion	may	be:	(a)	a	unique	form	of	motivation;	(b)	a	unique	source	of	significance;	(c)	a	unique	contributor	to	mortality	and	health;	(d)	a	unique	form	of	coping;	and	(e)	a	unique	source	of	distress	(2005:680).		Other	scholars	have	not	seen	the	same	‘uniqueness’	with	regards	to	spirituality.	For	example,	Craig	Ellison	(1983)	suggests	that	spirituality	is	both	universal	and	uniquely	expressed	in	individuals	where	it	can	provide	purpose	and	meaning.	Thus,	for	Ellison,	spirituality	is	an	aspect	of	common	human	existence	in	a	way	that	religion	is	not.	Chris	Cook	defines	spirituality	with	slightly	different	emphases:	Spirituality	is	a	distinctive,	potentially	creative	and	universal	dimension	of	human	experience	arising	both	within	the	inner	subjective	awareness	of	individuals	and	within	communities,	social	groups	and	traditions.	It	may	be	experienced	as	relationship	with	that	which	is	intimately	‘inner’,	immanent	and	personal,	within	the	self	and	others,	and/or	as	relationship	with	that	which	is	wholly	‘other’,	transcendent	and	beyond	the	self.	It	is	experienced	as	being	of	fundamental	or	ultimate	importance	and	is	thus	concerned	with	matters	of	meaning	and	purpose	in	life,	truth	and	values	(2004:548–49).	
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	Note	a	common	suggestion	of	spirituality	as	inherent	to	all	human	beings	and	thereby	differentiated	from	religiosity	(Del	Rio	and	White	2012;	Tanyi	2002).	One	scholar	has	even	suggested	that	‘Spiritual	Transcendence’	be	considered	the	sixth	major	factor	of	personality	(Piedmont	1999).	Because	of	this,	some	scholars	suggest	that	spirituality	is	better	suited	to	be	integrated	into	scientific	studies	due	to	the	possibility	of	removing	references	to	a	specific	deity	and	religious	practices—what	they	term	“spiritual	atheism”	(Ecklund	and	Long	2011).	Others	believe	that	spirituality	is	a	useful	concept	for	scientific	inquiry,	but	do	not	so	fully	remove	it	from	its	connection	with	religion	(King	and	Koenig	2009).		This	‘secularized’	understanding	of	spirituality	broadens	the	concept	from	its	traditional	moorings	within	faith	communities	but	also	adds	a	level	of	vagueness	to	the	construct	(Koenig	2008a).	More	and	more,	spirituality	is	viewed	as	being	synonymous	with	human	well-being,	making	it	difficult	for	researchers	to	differentiate	the	concepts	(Casey	2013:24).	Thus,	for	some,	spirituality	can	be	separated	from	belief	in	a	deity	or	traditional	religious	observance	or	practice,	with	some	even	suggesting	‘humanistic	spirituality’	(Elkins	et	al.	1988)	as	a	means	of	understanding	the	place	of	spirituality	in	all	people,	whether	religious	or	not	(de	Jager	Meezenbroek	et	al.	2012).			On	the	other	hand,	others	highlight	that	spirituality,	at	its	core,	includes	the	transcendent	(Cook	2013b:142)	or	the	sacred	(Pargament	1999;	Pargament	and	Mahoney	2005)	as	a	reaffirmation	that	spirituality	includes	something	‘Other’	or	‘holy’	even	if	separated	from	a	religious	tradition.11		These	understandings	will	be	important	for	our	dialogue	concerning	religion,	spirituality,	and	resilience.	While	it	is	clear	that	religion	and	spirituality	are	separate	concepts,	identifying	their	substance	and	relation	to	human	practice	has	proven	more	difficult.	Underwood	and	Teresi	suggest	that	a	spiritual	person	is	characterized	by	“awe,	joy	that	lifts	one	out	of	the	mundane,	and	a	sense	of	deep	inner	peace”	(2002:22–23).	These	attributes,	while	perhaps	having	religious	overtones,	have	no	specific	relation	to	
                                                11	For	further	discussion	of	the	need	for	distinctive	faith	rather	than	generalized	‘spirituality,’	see	(Pattison	2007:132).	
	 	 	
76	
religion.	Yet,	Underwood	and	Teresi	concede	that	“the	spiritual,	for	the	ordinary	person,	is	most	often	and	most	easily	described	in	language	that	has	religious	connotations”	(2002:22–23).		Piedmont	et	al.	suggest	an	alternative	means	of	differentiating	religiosity	and	spirituality:		Religiosity	is	concerned	with	how	one’s	experience	of	a	transcendent	being	is	shaped	by,	and	expressed	through,	a	community	or	social	organization.	Spirituality,	on	the	other	hand,	is	most	concerned	with	one’s	personal	relationships	to	larger,	transcendent	realities,	such	as	God	or	the	universe	(2009:163).			This	differentiation	between	the	individual	and	the	communal	is	increasingly	common.	Similarly,	Streib	and	Hood	(2011)	suggest	that	‘spirituality’	should	be	understood	as	privatized	religion	rather	than	a	distinct	construct.	While	such	a	division	between	the	social	and	the	personal	may	be	helpful	for	distinguishing	between	these	concepts,	it	does	not	fully	capture	all	of	their	differences.		At	a	fundamental	level,	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	religion	and	spirituality	has	theological	overtones,	but	there	are	also	very	practical	implications	for	how	religion	and	spirituality	are	defined	and	measured	in	research.		This	long-standing	debate	will	not	be	able	to	be	resolved	here,	but	some	additional	clarity	concerning	the	relationship	between	religion,	spirituality,	health,	and	resilience	will	be	very	beneficial	to	this	study.12	
The	Relationship	between	Religion	and	Spirituality	Fraser	Watts	(2014)	argues	that	spiritual	practices	may	be	related	to	religion	or	religious	traditions	in	three	ways:	1)	spiritual	practices	may	be	situated	within	tradition,	2)	spiritual	practices	may	be	contrasted	with	religion,	or	3)	the	religious	origin	of	the	spiritual	practice	can	be	ignored.			
                                                12	The	relationship	between	religion	and	spirituality	has	been	dealt	with	more	fully	by	a	number	of	scholars.	Cf.	(Hill	et	al.	2000;	Hill	and	Pargament	2003;	Pargament	and	Mahoney	2005;	Sheldrake	2013;	Zinnbauer	et	al.	1997).	
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In	particular,	within	the	third	category	of	potential	relations,	Watts	notes	that	the	practice	of	mindfulness,	drawn	from	distinctly	Buddhist	religious	observance,	has	become	an	accepted	clinical	therapy	by	secular	practitioners.		But	we	must	ask	whether	this	distinction	between	spirituality	and	religion	is	a	Western	dichotomy,	and	whether	other	cultures	have	a	similar	differentiation	(Watts	2014).	We	should	consider	that	this	distinction	is	largely	limited	to	a	Western	context,	giving	rise	to	the	possibility	of	different	cultural	understandings	of	the	relationship	between	religion	and	spirituality.13	Some	scholars	have	noted,	quite	correctly,	that	most	of	the	research	on	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	health	was	in	the	context	of	North	America	(Snider	and	McPhedran	2014).	More	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	the	limitations	of	such	research.		
Colloquial	Usage	A	common	refrain	among	many	today,	but	especially	those	of	a	younger	generation,	is	“I	am	spiritual	but	not	religious”	(Casey	2013;	King	et	al.	2006).	Streib	and	Hood	(2011)	argue	that	the	trend	toward	individuals	self-identifying	as	“spiritual	but	not	religious”	is	significant	and	should	be	taken	seriously.	In	this	broad	understanding,	spirituality	and	religion	are	seen	as	different,	though	perhaps	related.	There	is	a	sense	that	religion	is	somehow	negative,	exclusive,	and	old-fashioned	while	spirituality	is	positive,	inclusive,	and	tolerant.	While	these	ideas	may	not	be	said	outright,	they	are	implicit	in	the	understanding	of	many	in	Western	culture	today.			The	degree	to	which	these	distinctions	are	present	in	societies	outside	of	the	West	is	not	as	clear.	Additional	degrees	of	complexity	may	be	added	to	our	understanding	of	these	constructs	when	other	cultural	and	religious	contexts	are	considered.		
Non-Judeo-Christian	Religions	and	Resilience	A	majority	of	the	research	on	the	intersection	of	R/S	and	health	was	done	in	the	Judeo-Christian	context	of	the	West	(Snider	and	McPhedran	2014),	but	a	growing	body	of	research	investigates	this	relationship	in	other	religious	and	cultural	contexts.	Because	
                                                13	Cf.	(Ganga	and	Kutty	2013).	
	 	 	
78	
individuals	from	various	religions	view	what	constitutes	‘religion’	and	‘spirituality’	differently,	a	Western,	Judeo-Christian	understanding	of	these	concepts	may	not	be	accurate	in	other	contexts	(Ganga	and	Kutty	2013).	Despite	such	differences,	a	World	Health	Organization	study	indicated	that	R/S	was	significantly	positively	correlated	with	quality	of	life	for	individuals	across	18	countries	(WHOQOL	SRPB	Group	2006).		Research	also	suggests	that	individuals	of	different	faiths	respond	dissimilarly	in	the	aftermath	of	trauma.14	One	study	of	Chinese	adults	indicated	that	Christians	found	less	significance	in	material	things	following	a	trauma,	while	the	same	did	not	hold	true	for	non-Christians	(Hui	et	al.	2014).	Another	study	demonstrated	a	difference	in	the	way	R/S	affected	mental	health	outcomes	dependent	on	the	religion	of	the	individual	(Ganga	and	Kutty	2013).	Conducted	in	India,	this	study	involved	individuals	subscribing	to	the	Christian,	Hindu,	and	Muslim	faiths	and	found	significant	differences	between	genders	as	well	as	religions	in	mental	health	outcomes.	Using	multivariate	analysis,	the	research	concluded	that	“religious	differences	are	mostly	explained	by	the	behavioural	restrictions	and	opportunities	for	socialisation	that	religion	does	or	does	not	provide”	(Ganga	and	Kutty	2013:435).	This	study	found	a	positive	correlation	between	R/S	and	mental	health	for	individuals	of	the	Christian	and	Hindu	faiths,	but	a	negative	correlation	for	individuals	of	the	Muslim	faith.		Many	other	studies	within	the	context	of	the	Muslim	faith,	however,	indicate	a	positive	relationship	between	R/S	and	health	including	studies	comparing	the	impact	of	religion	within	Christian	and	Muslim	contexts	(Büssing,	Abu-Hassan,	et	al.	2007;	Miner	et	al.	2014).15			Additionally,	a	number	of	studies	in	the	context	of	Eastern	religions16	suggest	that	one	of	most	significant	contributions	that	the	study	of	Eastern	religions	has	made	to	
                                                14	Exceptions	to	this	generalization	could	be	due	to	confounding	factors,	such	as	a	small	sample	population	or	the	way	in	which	religion	was	measured.	Cf.	(Fernando	and	Ferrari	2011).	15	E.g.	(Abdel-Khalek	2011;	Aghababaei	2014;	Aghababaei	and	Tabik	2013;	Francis	et	al.	2015;	Musa	2015;	Nadi	and	Ghahremani	2014;	Nguyen	et	al.	2013).	16	E.g.	(Davidson,	Connor,	and	Lee	2005;	Eisendrath	1997;	Hui	et	al.	2014;	Wiist	et	al.	2010).	
	 	 	
79	
psychology	is	through	the	practice	of	mindfulness.17	Though	not	all	practitioners	may	know	it,	mindfulness	and	meditation	have	their	roots	in	Buddhism.	Many	secular	psychologists	and	psychiatrists	accept	the	practice	of	mindfulness	as	a	valid	therapy,	in	part	because	research	shows	the	benefits	of	mindfulness	for	reducing	stress	and	creating	positive	mental	health	outcomes	(Ando	et	al.	2009;	Chambers,	Gullone,	and	Allen	2009;	Ekman	et	al.	2005;	Follette,	Palm,	and	Pearson	2006;	Pace	et	al.	2009;	Shapiro	et	al.	2008;	Travis	et	al.	2009;	Wachholtz	and	Pargament	2005,	2008).	Significantly,	the	central	understandings	of	basic	religious	constructs,	such	as	happiness,	are	different	in	Christianity	and	Buddhism,	thereby	having	differing	effects	upon	health	(Tsai,	Miao,	and	Seppala	2007).		Yet	not	all	individuals	consider	themselves	religious,	or	even	spiritual.	What	impact,	if	any,	does	this	belief	have	on	health	outcomes?	Some	scholars	have	begun	to	research	the	role	of	R/S	and	health	for	secularists	(Hwang,	Hammer,	and	Cragun	2011)	which	will	be	a	very	necessary	effort	for	understanding	how	R/S	and	health	are	related.		More	research	will	need	to	assess	whether	Western	Judeo-Christian	conceptions	of	R/S	are	transferable	to	other	contexts.	Initial	evidence	suggests	that	these	concepts	will	have	to	be	somewhat	modified	for	relevance	in	other	religious	and	cultural	contexts.	Differing	cultural	variables	may	also	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	effect	of	R/S	on	resilience	in	each	context.			Now	that	a	distinction	has	been	made	between	religion	and	spirituality,	let	us	turn	to	current	research	regarding	more	specific	correlations	between	R/S	and	resilience.	We	can	now	say	that	specific	aspects	of	religion	and/or	spirituality	may	promote	or	detract	from	resilience	independent	of	one	another.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	outline	more	clearly	how	R/S	is	related	to	health	and	resilience.		
                                                17	E.g.	(Bingaman	2011;	Blanton	2011;	Brefczynski-Lewis	et	al.	2007;	Brewer	2014;	Farb	et	al.	2007,	2010;	Johnson	et	al.	2014;	Lutz	et	al.	2014).	
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Religion,	Health,	and	Resilience	Studies	show	that	specifically	religious	factors	correlate	to	health	and	resilience	(Contrada	et	al.	2004;	Kendler	et	al.	2003;	King	et	al.	2013;	Koenig	2007).	Koenig	notes,	“Studies	tell	us	that	religious	beliefs	and	practices	are	indeed	associated	with	better	coping,	less	depression,	and	greater	well-being,	especially	in	those	with	significant	health	problems”	(2013:98).18	Indeed,	treatment	protocols	that	support	the	religious	beliefs	of	patients	can	increase	the	speed	with	which	patients	recover	from	depression	and	anxiety	(Azhar,	Varma,	and	Dharap	1994;	Koenig	2013;	Propst	et	al.	1992;	Razali	et	al.	1998).		Religion	can	be	an	important	factor	in	supporting	health	and	resilience,	therefore,	and	is	deserving	continued	careful	study.	In	fact,		[f]or	many	patients…nothing	is	more	important	in	helping	them	cope	than	their	religious	beliefs.	These	patients	put	great	value	and	trust	in	their	beliefs	because	those	beliefs	have	helped	them	get	through	difficult	situations	in	the	past	(Koenig	2013:101).		This	is	because	religion	may	be	understood	to	most	specifically	correlate	with	positive	outcomes	related	to	subjective	well-being,	depression	and	suicide,	physical	illness,	divorce	and	marital	satisfaction,	substance	use	and	abuse	(drugs,	alcohol,	and	smoking),	and	mortality	(Adofoli	and	Ullman	2014;	Lawler-Row	and	Elliott	2009;	Matthews	et	al.	1998;	Thoresen	1999).			Religiosity	can	act	as	a	protective	factor,	aiding	maltreated	children	in	the	ability	to	cope	with	stress	(Kim	2008).	The	stress-buffering	effects	of	religion	can	hold	true	for	macro	level	societal	stressors	as	well	as	for	micro	level	stressors	(Lechner	et	al.	2013).	Conversely,	a	self-reported	decrease	in	religious	beliefs	following	a	traumatic	event	is	associated	with	increased	psychopathology	(Seirmarco	et	al.	2012).	Thus,	research	indicates	that	religion	can	aid	individuals	in	recovering	from	trauma.	In	other	words,	religion	may	be	closely	associated	with	resilience.		
                                                18	Cf.	(Koenig,	George,	and	Peterson	1998).	
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Religion	and	Resilience	Limited	research	has	specifically	assessed	the	relationship	between	religion	and	resilience.	As	has	been	noted,	however,	many	of	the	studies	correlating	R/S	with	health	are	applicable	to	the	study	of	resilience.		In	their	chapter,	‘Anchored	by	Faith:	Religion	as	a	Resilience	Factor,’	Pargament	and	Cummings	(2010)	suggest	that	“religion	has	unique	effects	on	resilience.”	They	argue	that	individuals	seek	four	distinct	benefits	in	religion:	meaning,	emotional	comfort,	social	connectedness,	and	the	sacred	(Pargament	and	Cummings	2010:195).	They	are	distinctly	against	the	ideas,	promoted	by	Freud	and	Skinner,	that	religion	is	merely	a	fictional	psychological	means	of	creating	safety	that	inhibits	competence	and	maturity.	Instead,	they	see	religion	as	supporting	self-efficacy	and	cognitive	reframing.	Additionally,	Pargament	and	Cummings	see	each	of	the	four	benefits	of	religion	as	being	a	possible	mechanism	of	how	resilience	is	supported	by	religion:	through	meaning-making,	emotional	stability,	relational	connectedness,	and	spiritual	support	and	the	resilience	of	religion	itself.19	They	also	see	religion	as	a	possible	agent	of	transformation	and	Post	Traumatic	Growth	(PTG).			Similarly,	Faigin	and	Pargament	(2010)	acknowledge	that	R/S	can	have	both	positive	and	negative	impacts	on	an	individual’s	ability	to	be	resilient.	These	authors	especially	highlight	the	importance	of	religion	for	elderly	individuals	as	a	means	of	dealing	with	adversity.		While	many	aspects	of	religion	may	affect	health	and	resilience,	some	scholars	have	hypothesized	that	benefits	from	religiosity	are	largely	due	to	the	benefits	of	self-regulation	(Aldwin	et	al.	2014;	McCullough	and	Willoughby	2009).	This	type	of	self-regulation	is	one	aspect	of	what	has	been	called	‘religious	coping.’		
                                                19	These	are	themes	to	which	I	will	return	at	a	later	point.	
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Religious	Coping20	Koenig	defines	religious	coping	as	“the	use	of	religious	beliefs	or	practices	to	reduce	the	emotional	distress	caused	by	loss	or	change”	(2013:30).21	Religious	coping	can	be	categorized	either	as	positive	or	negative.	Positive	religious	coping	involves	using	religion	as	a	resource	to	overcome	adversity	and	is	characterized	by	connectedness	to	the	Divine,	meaning-making,	sense	of	control,	and	comfort	from	relation	to	the	Divine	and	others	(Pargament,	Feuille,	and	Burdzy	2011;	Pargament,	Koenig,	and	Perez	2000).		Religious	traditions	offer	frameworks	of	meaning	built	on	symbols,	rituals,	and	liturgies	for	making	sense	of	the	painful,	threatening,	and	ultimate	experiences	of	illness	and	dying.	There	is	evidence	that	these	frameworks	are	sought	out,	that	they	may	affect	behavior	in	critical	decisions,	and	that	they	may	provide	benefits	in	the	form	of	quality	of	life	and	emotional	adjustment	(Idler	et	al.	2009:145).		Alternatively,	negative	religious	coping	is	characterized	by	using	religious	resources	in	an	unhealthy	manner,	such	as	anger	at	God	or	using	religious	activities	to	distract	from	difficulties	(King	et	al.	2013).22	Negative	religious	coping	has	also	been	termed	‘spiritual	struggle’	(McConnell	et	al.	2006).	
                                                20	Much	research	assesses	various	aspects	of	religious	coping.	Cf.	(Ai	et	al.	2007;	Ano	and	Vasconcelles	2005;	Brewster	2014;	Gerber,	Boals,	and	Schuettler	2011;	Kelley	and	Chan	2012;	Knabb	and	Grigorian-Routon	2014;	Koenig	et	al.	1992;	Krause	et	al.	2001;	Pargament	et	al.	1998;	Pargament,	Koenig,	and	Perez	2000;	Wiech	et	al.	2008).	In	a	provocative	article,	Devin	Stahl	(2013)	proposes	that	modern	assessments	of	religious	coping	do	not	measure	true	spiritual	health,	suggesting	that	individuals	such	as	Martin	Luther	and	Julian	of	Norwich	would	have	failed	such	assessments.	We	would	do	well	to	keep	his	critiques	in	mind.	21	Koenig	gives	examples	of	religious	coping:	“Patients	may	ask	God	to	heal	their	health	problems	or	to	give	them	the	strength	to	cope	with	them.	They	may	‘turn	over’	their	problems	to	God,	trusting	God	to	handle	them	so	that	they	don’t	have	to	ruminate	or	worry	about	those	problems.	They	may	believe	that	God	has	a	purpose	in	allowing	them	to	experience	pain	or	suffering,	which	gives	their	suffering	meaning	and	makes	it	more	bearable.	A	host	of	religious	beliefs	and	behaviors	like	these	may	be	mobilized	to	reduce	anxiety,	increase	hope,	or	convey	a	sense	of	control.	With	regard	to	religious	practices	that	facilitate	coping,	patients	will	pray,	meditate,	read	religious	scriptures,	worship	at	religious	services,	go	on	a	pilgrimage,	perform	religious	rituals	(light	a	candle,	receive	the	sacraments,	or	be	anointed	with	oil,	for	example),	or	rely	on	support	from	clergy	or	members	of	their	church,	synagogue,	mosque,	or	temple.	Religious	beliefs	and	practices	are	often	used	in	these	ways	to	regulate	emotion	during	times	of	illness,	change,	and	circumstances	that	are	out	of	their	personal	control”	(2013:30–31).	Emphasis	throughout	is	original	unless	otherwise	noted.		22	Pargament	has	dealt	with	the	subject	of	religious	coping	at	length	(Pargament	1997;	Pargament	et	al.	1998;	Pargament,	Feuille,	and	Burdzy	2011;	Pargament	et	al.	2000).	He	and	colleagues	note	a	more	extensive	list	of	positive	and	negative	religious	coping	
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	Positive	religious	coping	is	associated	with	psychological	health	(Pargament	2004)	and	decreased	depression	(Ahrens	et	al.	2010).	Some	studies	indicate	that	positive	religious	coping	after	a	trauma,	such	as	openness	to	change	and	taking	time	for	reflection,	is	correlated	with	Post	Traumatic	Growth	(PTG)	(Calhoun	et	al.	2000;	Chan	and	Rhodes	2013;	Gerber,	Boals,	and	Schuettler	2011;	Pargament	et	al.	1998)	while	negative	religious	coping	is	indicative	of	Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	(PTSD)	(Gerber	et	al.	2011;	Harris	et	al.	2008).23		Additionally,	studies	show	that	R/S	may	contribute	significantly	toward	helping	individuals	experience	PTG	in	the	wake	of	trauma	(Askay	and	Magyar-Russell	2009;	Currier	et	al.	2013;	Thombre,	Sherman,	and	Simonton	2010).		If	both	types	of	coping	are	fundamentally	‘religious,’	what	distinguishes	the	two?	Is	it	simply	a	matter	of	outcome,	or	are	the	methods	of	coping	fundamentally	different?	These	questions	are	at	the	heart	of	understanding	religious	coping	and	its	relation	to	health.		To	gain	a	clearer	understanding,	we	turn	to	additional	research	studies.	One	study	researched	how	clergy	who	led	multiple	rural	parishes	in	the	U.K.	used	religious	coping	methods.	This	study	found	that	the	methods	most	frequently	used	were		‘benevolent	religious	reappraisal’	(to	find	‘meaning’),	‘collaborative	religious	coping’	and	‘active	religious	surrender’	(to	gain	‘control’),	‘religious	purification/forgiveness’,	‘spiritual	connection’	and	‘marking	religious	boundaries’	(to	gain	comfort	and	closeness	to	God)	and	‘seeking	support	from	clergy	and	church	members’	and	‘religious	helping’	(to	gain	‘intimacy	with	others	and	closeness	to	God’)	(Brewster	2014).		
                                                methods:	“The	positive	pattern	consisted	of	religious	forgiveness,	seeking	spiritual	support,	collaborative	religious	coping,	spiritual	connection,	religious	purification,	and	benevolent	religious	reappraisal.	The	negative	pattern	was	defined	by	spiritual	discontent,	punishing	God	reappraisals,	interpersonal	religious	discontent,	demonic	reappraisal,	and	reappraisal	of	God's	powers”	(Pargament	et	al.	1998).	They	also	distinguish	between	four	styles	of	religious	coping:	self-directing,	deferential,	pleading,	and	collaborative	(Pargament	et	al.	1999).		23	This	conclusion	is	not	universal,	however.	One	study	of	deployed	US	soldiers	found	that	change	in	religiosity	prior	to	or	after	combat	did	not	correlate	with	PTG	(Webb	2013).	Many	explanations	for	this	are	possible,	including	that	these	soldiers	did	not	experience	significant	combat	trauma	or	that	already	religious	soldiers	were	able	to	cope	and	resolve	trauma	more	effectively	through	religious	means.	
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These	methods	could	all	be	termed	‘positive’	religious	coping	methods	since	they	move	the	individual	closer	to	personal,	spiritual,	and	social	health.	Thus,	a	positive	religious	coping	method	could	be	deemed	so	both	due	to	a	healthy	means	and	a	positive	outcome.		Alternatively,	negative	religious	coping	methods	“can	impede	the	coping	process”	and,	while	remaining	inherently	religious,	result	in	a	negative	outcome	(Brewster	2014;	Pargament	1997).24	Similar	to	positive	religious	coping,	negative	religious	coping	methods	are	negative	both	due	to	being	a	negative	means	and	having	a	negative	outcome.	While	being	termed	‘religious,’	these	coping	methods	could	be	a	true	reflection	of	core	religious	beliefs	or,	alternatively,	a	distortion	of	those	beliefs.			A	number	of	studies	show	that	R/S	coping	is	different	than	‘secular’	coping	and	achieves	different	results	(Burker	et	al.	2005;	Krause	2006;	Pargament	et	al.	1999).	Following	their	longitudinal	study	of	religious	coping	in	individuals	receiving	kidney	transplant	surgery,	Tix	and	Frazier	remark	that	“the	results	of	research	suggest	that	religious	coping	adds	a	unique	component	to	the	prediction	of	adjustment	to	stressful	life	events	that	cannot	be	accounted	for	by	other	established	predictors”	(1998:420).	Significantly,	this	study	found	religious	coping	to	be	predictive	of	future	health,	not	only	descriptive	of	current	disposition.		A	number	of	scholars	believe	that	the	positive	correlations	between	religious	commitment	and	subjective	well-being,	life	satisfaction,	and	well-being	cannot	simply	be	reduced	to	a	combination	of	non-religious	factors	such	as	social	support	(Aghababaei	2014;	Ellison	1991;	Ellison,	Gay,	and	Glass	1989).	Pargament	et	al.	(1999)	argue	that	religious	coping	is	fundamentally	different	than	non-religious	coping.	Many	scholars	do	not	support	this	claim,	but	it	warrants	further	discussion.	More	specifically,	what	aspects	of	religiosity	affect	health	and	resilience,	and	can	they	be	understood	apart	from	reference	to	religion?		
                                                24	As	an	example	of	negative	religious	coping,	Loewenthal	suggests	that	religion	can	have	negative	effects	on	individuals	through	“self-righteousness,	self-importance,	prejudice,	authoritarianism	and	cruelty,”	as	well	as	through	“guilt,	scrupulousness	and	shame”	(Loewenthal	1995:138).	
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Aspects	of	Religiosity	Much	research	has	centered	on	certain	religiously-oriented	factors—some	externally-observable	actions,	other	internal	and	self-reported—and	their	relationship	to	health	outcomes.	Whether	assessed	externally	or	internally,	religion	may	work	both	as	an	environmental	influence	upon	an	individual	and	as	a	factor	in	shaping	human	behavior	that	influences	the	environment.			Religiosity,	understood	as	an	environmental	influence,	can	have	a	substantial	influence,	even	impacting	down	to	the	level	of	genetic	expression	(Bell	2011:179).	Alternatively,	personal	religious	devotion	may	act	as	a	positive	familial	environmental	factor	that	enables	individuals	to	cope	better	with	stress	(Kendler,	Gardner,	and	Prescott	1997).		Religion	is	a	multi-faceted	concept	with	diverse	components,	a	complexity	that	makes	attempts	to	measure	the	effects	of	religiosity	on	health	more	difficult25	and	necessitates	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	concept	on	the	part	of	researchers.26	In	order	to	measure	the	effects	of	religiosity,	researchers	largely	have	focused	on	external	observable	behaviors.	In	particular,	researchers	found	that	certain	aspects	of	religiosity	act	as	protective	factors	against	pathology.	For	instance,	church	attendance	can	be	protective	against	psychiatric	disorders	(Baetz	et	al.	2004,	2006;	Ellison	et	al.	2001;	Levin	et	al.	1996;	Merrill	and	Salazar	2002;	Norton	et	al.	2008)	and	be	associated	with	lower	incidence	of	substance	use	and	sexual	behavior	among	young	people	(Kirk	and	Lewis	2013).		Prayer,	the	subject	of	many	studies,	is	associated	with	positive	religious	coping	(Grossoehme	et	al.	2010,	2011;	Koenig	and	McConnell	2001;	E.	G.	Levine	et	al.	2009;	ap	Siôn	and	Nash	2013)	as	well	as	physical	and	mental	health	(Koenig	and	McConnell	2001;	Lawler-Row	and	Elliott	2009).	Interestingly,	one	study	found	that	an	individual’s	view	of	the	God	to	whom	s/he	prayed,	rather	than	frequency	of	prayer,	was	the	most	significant	factor	in	correlating	the	health	outcome	(Bradshaw,	Ellison,	and	Flannelly	2008).	Positive	health	outcomes	were	associated	with	views	of	God	as	loving	and	
                                                25	Cf.	(Lechner	et	al.	2013).	26	Cf.	(Levin	2012,	2013)	in	which	Levin	researches	the	effects	of	religion	on	health	in	Jewish	populations.	
	 	 	
86	
personal	while	negative	health	outcomes	were	associated	with	views	of	God	as	distant	and	uninterested.27			Researchers	have	also	investigated	internal	factors	associated	with	religious	devotion.28	For	instance,	religion	is	closely	associated	with	a	sense	of	purpose	(Francis	2013;	Sillick	and	Cathcart	2014;	Van	Dyke	and	Elias	2007),	wherein	religious	beliefs	provide	a	way	of	interpreting	reality	(Koenig	2002)	as	a	means	of	making	the	world	intelligible—a	coping	method	used	by	African	slaves	in	America	(Tellis-Nayak	1982).	Additionally,	‘surrender	to	God’	as	a	means	of	religious	coping	can	reduce	stress	(Clements	and	Ermakova	2012).			Some	scholars	make	a	further	distinction	between	types	of	religiosity	that	may	be	important	for	understanding	the	relationship	between	religion,	health,	and	resilience.	This	distinction	is	between	‘intrinsic’	and	‘extrinsic’	religiosity.		
Intrinsic	and	Extrinsic	Religiosity	As	an	additional	means	of	differentiating	between	types	of	religious	behavior	and	motivation,	Gordon	Allport	made	an	important	distinction	between	what	he	termed	‘intrinsic’	and	‘extrinsic’	religious	orientation	(Allport	1950;	Allport	and	Ross	1967;	Genia	and	Shaw	1991;	Hunt	and	King	1971).	According	to	Allport	and	Ross,	an	extrinsically	motivated	person	“uses	his	religion,	whereas	the	intrinsically	motivated	lives	his”	(1967:434).29		Although	“individuals	who	use	their	religion	do	so	in	order	to	
                                                27	Not	all	studies	on	prayer	indicate	a	positive	correlation	with	mental	health,	however	(Ellison	et	al.	2001).	As	the	research	by	Bradshaw	et	al.	(2008)	shows,	this	may	be	due	to	differences	in	individual	perceptions	of	the	God	to	whom	prayer	is	directed.	28	I	will	discuss	internal	R/S	factors	briefly	here,	but	then	will	more	fully	develop	these	insights	later	in	this	chapter.	29	Social	scientists	have	tended	to	be	most	interested	in	characteristics	associated	with	extrinsic	religiosity	(worship	service	attendance,	prayer)	without	similar	regard	for	the	phenomenological	experience	of	religious	individuals	themselves,	many	of	whom	place	priority	upon	the	substantive,	rather	than	functional,	nature	of	their	religious	devotion.	An	emphasis	solely	on	descriptive	functional	characteristics	of	religion	is	shortsighted.	The	distinction	between	extrinsic	and	intrinsic	religiosity	can	be	significant	as	a	critique	of	a	simplistic	claim	to	an	association	between	religion	and	health.	The	fact	of	attendance	at	a	worship	service,	for	instance,	does	not	take	into	account	the	vast	array	of	possible	internal	dispositions,	motivations,	and	effects	upon	each	individual	present	at	a	service.	More	nuanced	assessment	of	the	effect	of	religion	upon	health	is	needed	
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gain	other	interests	such	as	security,	comfort,	sociability,	or	status”	(Pargament	et	al.	2005),	Allport	and	Ross	suggest	that	“[p]ersons	with	[an	intrinsic]	orientation	find	their	master	motive	in	religion.	Other	needs,	strong	as	they	may	be,	are	regarded	as	of	less	ultimate	significance”	(1967:434).30		Importantly,	researchers	have	attempted	to	find	ways	to	measure	degrees	of	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	motivation.31	This	has	led	to	the	possibility	of	studying	the	relationship	between	religious	motivation	and	various	associated	factors	and	outcomes.		As	could	be	anticipated,	beyond	describing	individual	motivation,	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	religious	orientation	is	also	a	differentiator	in	determining	health	outcomes	(McCullough	and	Larson	1999).	For	example,	extrinsic	religiosity	has	been	correlated	with	negative	outcomes	(King	et	al.	2013;	Smith	et	al.	2003)	while	intrinsic	religiosity,	sometimes	termed	‘personal	devotion,’	has	been	associated	with	low	levels	of	depression	(Kendler	et	al.	1997).	Furthermore,	Koenig	notes	that	“[s]trong	intrinsic	religious	beliefs	and	involvement	in	a	faith	community	predict	faster	recovery	from	depression	in	patients	with	medical	illness”	(2013:98).32	Not	all	studies	show	a	strong	differentiation	in	outcomes	based	on	motivation,	however.	For	instance,	one	study	indicates	that	both	explicit	and	implicit	expressions	of	religion	are	associated	with	purpose	in	life	and	greater	well-being	(Francis	2013).		Various	motivations	in	religiosity	are	just	one	complicating	factor	that	researchers	must	take	into	account	when	studying	the	relationship	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience.	A	common	theme	in	critiques	of	research	in	this	field	is	the	difficulty	of	measuring	these	constructs.		
                                                than	can	be	given	solely	by	factors	associated	with	extrinsic	religiosity.	Later	in	this	project,	through	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	particular	Christian	religious	practice	that	utilizes	narrative	methodology,	I	will	seek	to	bypass	difficulties	associated	with	merely	external	evaluation	of	Christian	religious	devotion.	30	See	(Ryan,	Rigby,	and	King	1993)	for	consideration	of	additional	types	of	religious	internalization.	31	Cf.	(Hoge	1972).	32	Cf.	(Koenig	et	al.	1998).	
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Difficulty	in	Determining	Methods	of	Measuring	Religiosity		Some	debate	has	centered	around	methods	for	measuring	religiosity,	including	whether	the	measurement	of	its	effect,	for	instance	upon	health,	is	possible	(Baumsteiger	and	Chenneville	2015;	Turner	2015).	Initially	researchers	used	observable	indicators	of	religiosity	such	as	worship	attendance	and	prayer	to	measure	religious	coping	(Idler	et	al.	2009;	Levin	2010;	Sherkat	and	Reed	1992).	More	recently,	however,	scholars	have	proposed	that	the	way	in	which	an	individual	uses	religious	means	to	cope	is	just	as	significant	as	the	fact	of	the	observable	indicator	(Brewster	2014;	Pargament	et	al.	2000).	Additionally,	scholars	note	problems	for	measuring	R/S	when	well-being	is	included	as	a	part	of	the	measurement	tool	itself	(King	et	al.	2013;	Koenig	2008a).	This	caution	is	especially	important	as	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	life	satisfaction	may	be	mediated	by	self-reported	health	(Zullig,	Ward,	and	Horn	2006).			Despite	religiosity	being	a	multi-faceted	and	complex	concept	(Kendler	et	al.	1997),	many	studies	in	the	past	only	used	one	variable	for	assessing	religion	such	as	religious	affiliation	(Storch	et	al.	2004).	On	the	other	hand,	understandings	and	measures	of	spirituality	too	often	have	been	conflated	with	similar	concepts	such	as	mental	well-being.	In	the	future	care	must	be	taken	to	ensure	measures	are	truly	related	to	the	concept	(Casey	2013:37).		While	it	may	be	easier	to	measure	external	religious	behaviors,	it	could	be	more	helpful	for	researchers	to	gain	insight	into	how	R/S	affects	the	internal	workings	of	psychological	functioning.	As	Jeff	Levin	notes,	Features	and	correlates	of	the	trajectory	of	inner	evolvement	toward	perceived	union	with	the	transcendent	–	a	decent	functional	definition	of	the	spiritual	process	–	seem	to	tap	dimensions	of	life	experience	more	germane	to	the	struggle	to	maintain	intrapsychic	equilibrium	than	counts	of	participation	in	congregational	events	(2010:106).		Empirically	measuring	this	type	of	internal	disposition	is	much	more	difficult,	however.	Further	investigations	will	need	to	explore	how	“attitudes,	beliefs,	states,	or	experiences”	affect	mental	health	since	little	is	currently	understood	(Levin	2010).	Due	to	current	cultural	understandings	of	religion	and	spirituality,	this	research	is	most	likely	to	take	place	within	the	realm	of	what	is	termed	‘spiritual.’	It	is	to	that	subject	which	we	will	now	turn.	
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Spirituality,	Health,	and	Resilience	Spirituality	may	be	related	to	health	and	resilience	in	ways	that	are	both	similar	and	dissimilar	to	the	way	in	which	religiosity	is	related	to	well-being.	As	has	been	noted,	the	broad	manner	that	‘spirituality’	is	used	lends	itself	to	both	possibilities	and	difficulties	in	research	(Swinton	2001a:12–13).	Additional	difficulties	are	added	by	the	complex	relationship	between	spirituality	and	mental	health	(Miller	and	Thoresen	2003).		In	conjunction	with	the	correlates	of	religion	and	resilience,	research	has	identified	specific	factors	linking	spirituality,	health,	and	resilience,	despite	spirituality	not	historically	having	received	much	attention	in	resilience	studies	(Hatala	2011:30).	Certainly,	the	concept	of	spirituality	is	broader	and	less	well	defined	than	the	concept	of	religion.	Still,	much	can	be	said	about	the	relationship	of	spirituality	and	resilience.		Studies	positively	correlate	spirituality,	independent	of	religiosity,	with	health.	Possible	benefits	of	spirituality	include	increasing	happiness	(Faribors,	Fatemeh,	and	Hamidreza	2010)	and	quality	of	life	(Brady	et	al.	1999;	Riley	et	al.	1998).	Studies	also	indicate	the	efficacy	of	spirituality	in	reducing	and	moderating	stress	(Kim	and	Seidlitz	2002;	Tuck,	Alleyne,	and	Thinganjana	2006).	Additionally,	a	study	found	that	spiritual	belief	in	the	help	of	a	higher	power	led	to	better	mental	health	outcomes	for	stroke	victims	(Johnstone	et	al.	2008).	Research	also	suggests	that	spirituality	may	aid	in	the	healing	process	of	soldiers	who	experienced	combat	trauma	(Gubkin	2016;	Rinehart	2013)	as	well	as	with	individuals	who	experience	other	types	of	trauma	(Maltby	and	Hall	2012).	One	study	even	highlights	that	the	stress-buffering	benefits	of	spirituality	transcend	the	variance	of	other	factors	such	as	personality	and	social	support	(Werdel	et	al.	2014).	Not	all	research	indicates	positive	benefits	of	spirituality	for	health,	however.	For	instance,	personal	beliefs	associated	with	spirituality	can	be	both	positively	and	negatively	correlated	with	PTSD	independent	of	treatment	(Zimmermann	et	al.	2014).	While	this	particular	study	showed	mixed	results,	other	studies	indicate	negative	correlations	between	spirituality	and	health.	King	et	al.	(2013)	found	that	individuals	
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who	have	a	spiritual	understanding	of	life	in	the	absence	of	a	religious	framework	are	more	vulnerable	to	mental	disorders.	Some	scholars	argue	that	benefits	associated	with	spirituality	are	due	to	emotional	regulation	(Aldwin	et	al.	2014;	Rosmarin	et	al.	2013).	This	is	theorized	because	the	spiritual	beliefs	that	support	emotion	regulation	in	turn	counteract	mood	and	affective	disorders	(Goldin	et	al.	2008),	enabling	emotions	to	be	fully	felt	and	not	suppressed	(Gross	2002).	While	this	may	be	one	of	the	ways	spirituality	affects	health,	there	are	certainly	many	others.	Robert	Emmons	(1999)	argues	that	spiritual	beliefs	act	as	“an	integrating	and	stabilizing	force	that	provides	a	framework	for	interpreting	life’s	challenges.”	This	suggests	that	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	resilience	is	important.		
Spirituality	and	Resilience	While	many	studies	assess	the	relationship	between	religion	and	health,	fewer	specifically	address	the	relationship	between	religion	and	resilience.	This	is	not	the	case	for	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	resilience,	however.	Perhaps	because	of	the	more	‘universal’	nature	of	spirituality,	a	number	of	studies	specifically	assess	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	resilience	in	addition	to	studies	evaluating	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	health	more	generally.		Andrew	Hatala	(2011)	suggests	a	four-factor	model	of	resilience	which	would	include,	uniquely,	a	spiritual	component.33	The	idea	that	spirituality	plays	an	important	role	in	resilience	is	supported	by	a	growing	body	of	research	(Connor,	Davidson,	and	Lee	2003;	Peres	et	al.	2007;	Yeung	and	Project	Air	Force	(U.S.)	2013).	These	studies	cite	self-efficacy,	purpose,	meaning,	and	a	number	of	other	constructs	as	vehicles	by	which	spirituality	supports	resilient	outcomes.34			
                                                33	He	suggests,	“…it	is	therefore	argued	that	there	are	four	factors	leading	to	resilience:	(a)	physical	and	biological	strengths;	(b)	psychological	resourcefulness;	(c)	interpersonal	or	emotional	skills;	and	(d)	spiritual	capabilities.	Following	a	transactional,	organizational	analytic	perspective,	resilience	becomes	the	dynamic	interaction	between	these	four	interrelated	factors”	(Hatala	2011:34).	34	These	constructs	will	be	addressed	in	more	detail	shortly.	
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In	addition	to	quantitative	studies,	qualitative	studies	have	assessed	the	role	of	spirituality	in	resilient	adaptation	among	vulnerable	populations	such	as	the	disabled	and	elderly	women	(Clarke	and	Cardman	2002).	The	findings	of	these	qualitative	studies	confirm	the	results	of	quantitative	studies	and	provide	further	insight	into	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	resilience.		One	qualitative	study	on	the	relationship	between	spirituality	and	resilience	showed	a	strong	positive	correlation	between	the	two.	More	specifically,		Three	dimensions	of	spirituality	emerged:	(a)	a	transcendental	perspective	expressed,	as	a	relationship	with	God	or	a	higher	power;	(b)	sense	of	meaning	and	(c)	connection	with	the	inner	self.	These	dimensions	fostered	resilience	by	providing:	(a)	a	sense	of	protection,	comfort	and	security,	(b)	a	sense	of	meaning,	coherence	and	optimism	and	(c)	the	opportunity	for	increased	self-awareness	and	self-efficacy	(Raftopoulos	and	Bates	2011).	This	study	highlights	some	important	aspects	of	spirituality	as	well	as	possible	mechanisms	of	action	for	spirituality’s	influence	upon	health.	Because	of	the	significance	of	spirituality	in	fostering	resilient	adaptation,	some	researchers	suggest	a	concept	of	‘spiritual	resilience’	which	is	formed	through	the	experience	of	enduring	hardship	(Clarke	and	Cardman	2002;	Manning	2014;	Yeung	and	Project	Air	Force	(U.S.)	2013).35	Based	upon	her	study	of	elderly	women,	Lydia	Manning	suggests	that	“spiritual	resilience	for	these	women	is	a	process	where	the	mechanisms	of	divine	support,	purpose,	and	gratitude,	work	together	to	create	experiences	of	enduring	hardships	over	the	life	course”	(2014:360).	Significant	for	the	study	of	resilience,	scholars	argue	that	spirituality	provides	a	unique	perspective	for	understanding	suffering	and	growth	(Werdel	et	al.	2014).	It	is	all	the	more	important,	therefore,	to	clarify	the	nature	of	spirituality	and	how	it	can	help	individuals	cope	with	adversity.		
Spiritual	Coping	Similar	to	religious	coping,	some	scholars	suggest	the	concept	of	spiritual	coping	as	a	means	of	understanding	responses	to	trauma.	As	with	religious	coping,	spiritual	coping	
                                                35	Titus	sees	special	promise	for	this	way	of	understanding	resilience.	Cf.	(Titus	2006:20–28).	
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may	be	either	positive	or	negative	with	corresponding	positive	or	negative	outcomes	(Gall	2006).	Research	indicates	that	positive	spiritual	coping	can	benefit	patients	with	conditions	as	diverse	as	chronic	pain	(Büssing	et	al.	2009;	Wachholtz	et	al.	2007)	and	cancer	(Holt	et	al.	2012)	through,	among	other	things,	connection	with	others	and	God.	Spiritual	coping	is	just	one	means	of	dealing	with	adversity,	among	many	others	(Baldacchino	et	al.	2012;	Kuo,	Arnold,	and	Rodriguez-Rubio	2014).	Because	of	the	significance	of	the	construct	for	resilience,	researchers	have	sought	to	identify	the	most	significant	aspects	of	spirituality	for	the	promotion	of	health	and	positive	resilience	outcomes.	It	is	to	these	constructs	that	we	now	turn.	
Aspects	of	Spirituality	Akin	to	the	study	of	religiosity,	scholars	developed	instruments	to	measure	spirituality	and	its	relationship	to	health.	There	are	more	than	fifteen	such	assessments	used	to	measure	spirituality	(Yeung	and	Project	Air	Force	(U.S.)	2013).36	Unlike	religiosity,	many	aspects	of	spirituality	are	more	difficult	to	measure	externally.	Therefore,	researchers	identified	certain	attributes	associated	with	spirituality	as	a	means	of	measuring	this	construct.37		While	no	consensus	exists	regarding	the	totality	of	factors	associated	with	spirituality,	there	are	a	number	of	commonalities	among	scholarly	accounts.38	This	lack	of	clarity	is	consistent	with	the	diversity	of	scholarly	opinion	about	the	definition	of	spirituality	as	well	as	the	significant	number	of	unique	assessments	for	measuring	the	construct	of	spirituality.		Scholars	have	identified	the	following	concepts	as	being	associated	with	spirituality,	even	utilizing	them	to	measure	the	effect	of	spirituality	on	health	and	resilience.	Not	all	
                                                36	Cf.	(Borneman,	Ferrell,	and	Puchalski	2010;	Pargament	et	al.	2011;	Underwood	and	Teresi	2002).	37	Some	factors	associated	with	spirituality	may	also	be	related	to	religiosity	in	certain	contexts.	38	While	these	constructs	have	been	listed	as	aspects	of	spirituality,	many	of	them	could	just	as	easily	have	been	regarded	as	religious	constructs.	For	ease	of	categorization,	primarily	external	religious	behaviors	have	been	listed	as	‘religious’	while	more	personal,	internal	constructs	have	been	categorized	as	‘spiritual.’	The	concepts,	however,	are	not	this	easily	distinguished	in	practice.		
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scholars	would	agree	that	each	of	these	constructs	is	associated	with	spirituality	and	health,	but	a	representative	sample	of	research	correlating	the	two	has	been	included.	The	significance	of	many	of	these	constructs	will	be	more	fully	developed	in	following	chapters.	
Internally-Focused	Spirituality	Constructs	Research	shows	that	a	sense	of	purpose	can	play	a	significant	role	in	positive	health	outcomes	(Aghababaei	and	Błachnio	2014;	Emmons	1999;	Francis	2013;	Schaefer	et	al.	2013;	Schnitker	and	Emmons	2013;	Sillick	and	Cathcart	2014;	Smith	et	al.	2009;	Van	Dyke	and	Elias	2007).	While	not	all	discussion	of	‘purpose’	contends	with	meanings	of	ultimate	(or	‘spiritual’)	purpose,	scholars	often	see	purpose	and	spirituality	as	related,	with	one	scholar	suggesting	the	concept	of	ultimacy	as	a	means	of	differentiating	ultimate	purpose	from	more	ordinary	conceptions	of	purpose	(Emmons	1999).		Also	associated	with	the	construct	of	spirituality,	research	indicates	that	meaning	and	meaning-making	increase	positive	health	outcomes	(Altmaier	and	Prieto	2012;	Ardelt,	Ai,	and	Eichenberger	2008;	Büssing,	Ostermann,	and	Matthiessen	2005;	Kelley	and	Chan	2012;	Murphy,	Johnson,	and	Lohan	2003;	Park	2005;	Park	and	Folkman	1997;	Silberman	2005;	Wexler,	DiFluvio,	and	Burke	2009).39	Ann	Masten	suggests	that	“meaning-making	systems	of	belief,	and	organizations	and	cultural	practices	that	nurture	these	systems,	such	as	schools	and	religions”	may	act	as	protective	factors	for	increasing	positive	resilience	outcomes	(2013:579).	Additionally,	research	has	shown	a	strong	link	between	religiosity	and	meaning	(Chamberlain	and	Zika	1988),	a	part	of	which	may	be	the	work	of	theological	and	philosophical	understandings	of	suffering	and	evil	(often	called	theodicies).	Much	could	be	said	regarding	this	subject,40	but	it	falls	largely	outside	of	the	scope	of	the	current	project.		Some	research	suggests	that	cognitive	flexibility	is	linked	meaning-making.41	Cognitive	flexibility	allows	an	individual	to	reframe	his	or	her	circumstances	and	emotional	
                                                39	Purpose	may	also	be	understood	to	play	a	significant	part	in	the	meaning-making	process	(Francis	2013:909).		40	For	example,	one	researcher	focused	on	understanding	human	meaningfulness	in	the	context	of	nursing	through	the	lens	of	Victor	Frankl	and	Paul	Tillich	(Clarke	2006).	41	E.g.	(Calhoun	et	al.	2000).	
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reactions	in	a	way	that	makes	sense	of	the	facts	in	a	new	way	(Gross	1998).	In	a	Christian	context,	this	could	mean	‘reframing’	the	apparent	paradox	of	a	good	God	and	the	experience	of	suffering	(McCann	and	Webb	2012;	Webb	et	al.	2011).	There	is	some	indication	that	religious	and	spiritual	coping	also	can	take	place	at	a	community	level,	especially	with	regards	to	the	creation	of	meaning	through	developing	a	community	narrative	(Tuval-Mashiach	and	Dekel	2014).		As	a	part	of	the	meaning-making	process,	individuals	may	create	a	narrative	to	make	sense	of	events,	but	even	this	narrative	is	substantially	influenced	by	the	belief	systems	that	are	a	part	of	interpretation	of	reality.	Froma	Walsh	argues	that	belief	systems	are	the	“heart	and	soul	of	resilience.”	She	writes:	“We	cope	with	crisis	and	adversity	by	making	meaning	of	our	experience:	linking	it	to	our	social	world,	to	our	cultural	and	spiritual	beliefs,	to	our	multigenerational	past,	and	to	our	hopes	and	dreams	for	the	future”	(2006:49).	An	individual’s	beliefs	about	the	world	have	a	substantial	impact	on	perception	of	the	world	that	are	significant	for	both	the	ability	to	be	resilient	and	health	(Tracey	2010;	Wiech	et	al.	2008).	This	is	evident	in	the	power	of	belief	to	sustain	individuals	through	difficulty	and	create	positive	health	outcomes	(Koenig	and	McConnell	2001).42			In	this	regard,	hope	is	closely	linked	to	belief	and	meaning	(Ai	et	al.	2005).	Hope	concerns	optimistic	expectation	about	the	future	and	is	correlated	with	positive	health	outcomes,	even	among	individuals	with	life-threatening	disease	(Siril	et	al.	2014).	Hope,	as	an	expression	of	belief,	is	especially	significant	in	its	relation	to	expectation.	Expectation	and	belief	can	be	significant	for	health	outcomes	even	in	non-religious	contexts	(Bingel	et	al.	2011;	Goossens	et	al.	2005;	Ploghaus	et	al.	1999).	Additionally,	hope	is	closely	related	to	the	constructs	of	purpose	(Eggerman	and	Panter-Brick	2010;	Panter-Brick	and	Eggerman	2012;	Scioli	et	al.	2011),	peace	(Anandarajah	and	Hight	2001),	and	optimism	(Koenig	2002;	Walsh	2006:26).43	
                                                42	Even	the	positive	re-interpretation	of	experience	through	humor	may	enhance	resilience	(Hatala	2011:37).	43	The	significance	of	hope	for	human	well-being	has	been	demonstrated	across	cultures	and	religions.	For	example,	a	cross-sectional	study	of	hospital	staff	in	Iran	found	linkages	between	hope,	spirituality,	and	mental	health,	concluding	that	“hope	for	future	
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Externally-Focused	Spirituality	Constructs	In	addition	to	many	factors	associated	with	spirituality	primarily	understood	as	internal	dispositions,	some	constructs	of	spirituality	are	particularly	directed	towards	external	action	while	still	maintaining	significant	associations	with	internal	dispositions.		Research	suggests	the	importance	of	self-efficacy	and	control	for	positive	health	outcomes	as	opposed	to	feelings	of	uncertainty	and	loss	of	control	associated	with	negative	health	outcomes	(Benight	and	Bandura	2004;	Benight	and	Cieslak	2011;	Jackson	and	Bergeman	2011;	Kay	et	al.	2009;	Mabe	and	Josephson	2004;	McNulty,	Livneh,	and	Wilson	2004;	Ryan	and	Francis	2012;	Watterson	and	Giesler	2012).	Significantly,	spirituality	can	provide	a	means	of	control,	both	through	direct	and	indirect	means,	thereby	increasing	feelings	of	self-efficacy.	Pargament	et	al.	link	religious	coping	methods	with	the	construct	of	control.	They	note	four	types	of	coping	methods:	“sharing	control	with	God	(collaborative),	relinquishing	control	to	God	(deferring),	exerting	control	with	God	(self-directing),	and	seeking	control	from	God	(pleading)”	(Pargament	et	al.	2005).44	Furthermore,	they	found	that	“[c]ollaborative	religious	coping	methods	were	especially	linked	to	positive	religious	outcomes	and	greater	coping	efficacy”	(Pargament	et	al.	2005).45	It	may	also	be	helpful	to	understand	other	constructs	of	spirituality,	such	as	gratitude	or	a	sense	of	belonging,	as	mediated	means	of	situating	control	within	the	context	of	relationship	to	God.			Also	associated	with	spirituality,	a	sense	of	belonging—in	a	religious	context,	within	a	church,	mosque,	etc.—can	be	a	predictor	for	resilience	(Nuttman-Shwartz	2012;	Pargament	2008;	Webb	et	al.	2011).	Some	scholars	argue	that	this	correlation	is	due,	at	least	in	part,	to	the	social	support	received	within	the	context	of	the	church	(Harris	et	al.	2014;	Koenig	2002;	Krause	et	al.	2001;	Paranjape	and	Kaslow	2010;	Pargament	et	al.	1998).	Another	scholar	suggests	that	the	concept	of	‘social	capital’	is	a	mediator	
                                                is	positively	and	significantly	correlated	with	existential	well-being	and	motivation,	devotion,	and	coping	components”	(Nadi	and	Ghahremani	2014:15–16).	44	Cf.	(Pargament	et	al.	1999).	I	suggest	that	these	divisions	may	be	analogically	applied	to	spirituality,	though	the	object	of	spiritual	devotion	may	not	be	viewed	as	God.	45	Cf.	(Molock	2006).	
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between	health	and	religion	(Yeary	et	al.	2012),	yet	many	researchers	agree	that	the	association	of	church	attendance	with	health	cannot	simply	be	reduced	to	a	function	of	social	support	(Koenig	2007;	Lawler-Row	and	Elliott	2009).		Additionally,	studies	demonstrate	that	the	constructs	of	forgiveness	(Sandage	and	Jankowski	2010;	Schultz	et	al.	2014;	Schultz,	Tallman,	and	Altmaier	2010)	and	healing	(Danesh	2008)	are	associated	with	positive	health	outcomes.	Both	actions	and	emotional	states	associated	with	altruism,	empathy,	and	compassion	have	significant	effects	upon	positive	health	outcomes	(Krause	and	Hayward	2014;	Pace	et	al.	2009;	Rushton,	Chrisjohn,	and	Fekken	1981;	Saslow	et	al.	2013;	Schwartz	et	al.	2003).	This	increase	in	health	could	be	considered	an	outworking	of	the	positive	regard	shown	for	others.		A	positive	sense	of	self	is	also	closely	linked	to	attachment	and	feelings	of	closeness	to	others	and	to	God.	Many	studies	show	the	powerful	relationship	between	attachment	and	well-being	(Belavich	and	Pargament	2002;	Bradshaw	et	al.	2008;	Cicirelli	2004;	Hernandez,	Salerno,	and	Bottoms	2010;	Kelley	and	Chan	2012;	Kirkpatrick	1998,	2012;	Kumari	and	Pirta	2009;	Maltby	and	Hall	2012;	Prout,	Cecero,	and	Dragatsi	2012;	Schottenbauer	et	al.	2006;	Vaillant	2012).	In	terms	of	relationship	to	the	Divine,	research	indicates	that	beliefs	about	God	have	significant	implications	in	regards	to	both	an	individual’s	attachment	and	health	(Brewster	2014).		Scholars	generally	have	found	that	morality	and	religion	can	act	as	protective	factors	in	the	promotion	of	resilience	(Drescher	et	al.	2011;	Litz	et	al.	2009;	Luthar	2006:779),46	but	Kurt	Webb	argues	that	the	relationship	between	religious	beliefs	and	response	to	difficulty	is	somewhat	ambiguous	(2013:6–7).	While	those	who	experience	trauma	seek	to	find	meaning	for	their	traumatic	experiences	(Fontana	and	Rosenheck	2004)—many	through	the	framework	of	religious	beliefs	in	which	these	experiences	can	be	understood	(Overcash	et	al.	1996)—there	is	also	some	indication	that,	in	certain	circumstances,	traumatic	experiences	can	weaken	religious	faith	(Fontana	and	
                                                46	Pargament	and	Cummings	(2010)	note	the	resilience	of	religion	itself.	In	essence,	they	are	referencing	the	ability	of	individuals	to	hold	on	to	their	religious	beliefs	despite	great	opposition	to	these	beliefs.	
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Rosenheck	2004).47	Potentially	significant	in	this	regard,	the	capacity	for	endurance	is	associated	with	both	spirituality	and	health	(Manning	2014;	Watson	2008).		We	will	return	to	many	of	the	concepts	just	discussed	in	future	chapters	as	we	seek	to	understand	more	clearly	how	theology	and	resilience	are	related.	More	research	is	needed	to	delineate	the	most	significant	constructs	associated	with	spirituality	as	well	as	the	relationship	of	these	constructs	to	well-being	and	resilience.	Additionally,	more	factors	may	be	posited	to	explain	the	association	between	spirituality	and	health,	such	as	humility	and	authenticity.		
Studies	Situated	within	Resilience	Research	Some	resilience	research,	while	not	particularly	aimed	at	answering	questions	regarding	R/S,	has	nonetheless	displayed	findings	that	are	significant	to	researchers	of	R/S.		A	number	of	the	protective	factors	demonstrated	to	promote	resilience	have	moral	and/or	religious	grounding.	These	protective	factors	include	elements	with	specifically	traditional	religious	moorings,	such	as	support	from	meaning-making	religious	beliefs,	social	support	from	the	religious	community,	and	self-regulation.	Additional	factors	with	R/S	associations	may	include	purpose,	self-efficacy,	altruism,	strong	role	models,	healthy	lifestyle	choices,	a	positive	viewpoint,	and	cognitive	reframing	of	adverse	circumstances.	One	could	argue	that	many	of	the	foundational	protective	and	promotive	factors	within	resilience	research	have	a	religious	or	spiritual	basis.48		Protective	factors	related	to	R/S	can	be	found	both	in	individual	and	social	categories	of	protective	factors.	While	much	of	this	chapter	has	focused	on	the	relationship	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience	on	an	individual	level,	these	concepts	can	also	be	applied	in	a	larger	system	context,	such	as	families.	Scholars	have	researched	the	relationship	
                                                47	This	finding	is	not	universal	(Falsetti,	Resick,	and	Davis	2003),	but	does	indicate	that	adversity	can	act	as	a	catalyst	spurring	an	individual	either	toward	growth	or	away	from	it.	48	Cf.	(Bonanno	and	Mancini	2011:136;	Masten	2013:579;	Southwick	and	Charney	2012b:80,	2012a).	
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between	families	and	spirituality	(Baumhover	and	Hughes	2009;	Tanyi	2006),	children	and	spirituality	(Mabe	and	Josephson	2004),	and	families	and	resilience	(Black	and	Lobo	2008).	Froma	Walsh	suggests	that	family	belief	systems	are	key	to	family	resilience,	but	highlights	especially	the	ability	to	find	meaning	in	adversity,	maintain	a	positive	outlook,	and	use	spirituality	to	cope	with	difficulty	(2006:26).		
Cautions	and	Limitations		Significant	possibilities	exist	for	better	understanding	the	role	that	R/S	plays	in	aiding	individuals	to	cope	with	adversity,	however,	there	are	also	important	cautions	and	limitations	in	this	relationship.		While	there	is	a	substantial	amount	of	research	on	the	relationship	between	R/S,	resilience,	and	health,	less	has	been	done	to	develop	a	framework	within	which	to	understand	these	relationships.	Jeff	Levin	argues	that	more	is	needed	than	merely	the	collection	of	data:	Until	now,	most	scientific	effort	has	been	devoted	to	accumulating	empirical	evidence.	Less	effort	has	gone	to	stepping	back	and	asking,	‘But	what	does	this	mean?’	Data	alone	do	not	increase	understanding	of	a	topic	without	theoretical	models	that	help	us	make	sense	of	said	data…Identifying	perspectives	to	explain	and	interpret	findings	on	religion	and	mental	health	is	thus	important	and	timely,	especially	as	supportive	findings	have	been	misinterpreted	–	on	both	sides	of	the	issue	(2010:102–3).		Although	this	chapter	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	social	science	research	related	to	religion,	spirituality,	and	resilience,	the	larger	issue	of	a	theoretical	framework	within	which	to	understand	this	research	will	be	addressed	more	fully	in	later	chapters.	The	way	in	which	research	is	interpreted	is	especially	significant	since	“[t]he	same	body	of	research	can	lead	to	quite	different	conclusions,	depending	on	the	qualitative	or	meta-analytic	strategy	used	to	distill	findings”	(Miller	and	Thoresen	2003:30).		Similarly,	a	fundamental	theological	questioning	of	the	place	of	dialogue	between	R/S	and	health	has	been	asked	by	Joel	Shuman	and	Keith	Meador	(2002).	Through	the	lens	of	Christian	theology,	these	scholars	argue	that	religion	should	not	be	used	in	a	utilitarian	manner	towards	the	goal	of	health.	Such	a	use,	they	argue,	distorts	the	true	
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nature	and	goal	of	Christianity.	These	warnings	are	very	warranted,	and	their	claims	will	be	addressed	more	fully	later.			Furthermore,	some	scholars	have	criticized	attempts	to	correlate	religion,	spirituality	and	health	at	all	(Poole	et	al.	2008;	Sloan	2008;	Sloan	and	Bagiella	2002;	Sloan,	Bagiella,	and	Powell	1999).	These	objections	center	on	shortcomings	regarding	the	research	methodology	used	in	many	of	these	studies	as	well	as	questions	concerning	whether	the	concepts	of	religion	and	spirituality	are	merely	‘baptizing’	extant	personality	traits	(Piedmont	et	al.	2009:164).	One	scholar	has	gone	so	far	as	to	say	that	“‘religious’	phenomena	may	simply	parasitize	existing	evolved	mechanisms	or	represent	by-products	of	them”	(Buss	2002:203).		Levin	(2010)	agrees	that	many	studies	concerning	R/S	are	methodologically	sub-par,	but	he	still	sees	these	constructs	as	having	a	meaningful	place	in	understanding	human	motivation	and	actions	beyond	what	is	understood	through	the	constructs	of	personality.49	Levin	warns	that	most	studies	on	the	relationship	between	religion	and	health	are	not	“richly	nuanced”	but	instead	rely	on	cross-sectional	samples	of	convenience,	mostly	confined	to	American	Christians.	Further,	for	the	most	part,	they	measure	only	the	preventative	effects	of	R/S,	not	the	therapeutic.	Thus,	Levin	cautions,	we	must	not	extrapolate	beyond	the	bounds	of	the	particular	situations	the	evidence	corroborates	(2010:106–7).		We	would	do	well	to	take	Levin’s	concerns	seriously.	R/S	is	not	a	panacea	for	all	human	ills,	and	thus	care	should	be	taken	to	evaluate	and	apply	research	wisely.	Further	research	in	this	field	must	be	methodologically	sound	as	well	as	contextually	aware.	Many	of	these	methodological	issues	revolve	around	the	question	of	how	R/S	and	health	are	related.	Much	research	indicates	that	R/S	are	positively	correlated	to	health	and	resilience	but	the	exact	nature	of	this	relationship	is	unclear.	Are	the	concepts	merely	associated	with	one	another	or	is	there	a	causal	relationship?			
                                                49	Significantly,	Levin	singles	out	the	research	done	by	Koenig	and	colleagues	as	being	of	excellent	quality	methodologically.	
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Association	or	Causation?	The	exact	mechanisms	of	how	R/S	is	related	to	health,	and	thereby	resilience,	is	not	well	known	(Levin	2010).	Furthermore,	“association	does	not	imply	causation”	(Casey	2013:22).	Thus,	some	question	remains	as	to	whether	R/S	is	simply	associated	with	health,	or	whether	it	has	a	causal	relationship.50	These	questions,	on	the	basis	of	research	methodology	and	logical	contingency,	are	valid	and	deserve	to	be	addressed.		Studies	that	are	cross-sectional	in	nature	cannot	speak	to	the	causative	or	predictive	aspects	of	the	relationship	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience.	This	relationship	is	very	complex	and	cannot	always	be	clearly	demarcated.	As	some	researchers	have	suggested,	“[f]or	some	individuals,	religious	faith	may	enhance	the	ability	to	cope	with	negative	life	events,	whereas	for	others,	negative	life	events	may	result	in	greater	religious	faith”	(Agorastos	et	al.	2014:94).51	This	suggests	that,	at	times,	negative	health	outcomes	may	be	the	result	of	negative	R/S	coping	methods,	but,	in	other	situations	individuals	could	use	R/S	coping	mechanisms	to	overcome	adversity	successfully.	The	first	situation	could	be	attributed	to	negative	religious	coping	while	the	second	would	be	characterized	by	positive	religious	coping.	Research	suggests	that	if	more	individuals	used	positive	R/S	coping	methods	to	adapt	to	situations	of	adversity	we	could	expect	more	and	better	resilience	outcomes.		Although	attempts	have	been	made	to	explain	the	relationship	between	R/S	and	health	(George,	Ellison,	and	Larson	2002),	such	attempts	do	not	always	capture	the	complexity	of	the	relationship.	Patricia	Casey	(2011)	provides	a	helpful	description	of	four	ways	that	R/S	and	health	may	be	related:	While	it	is	recognised	that	there	is	an	association	between	mental	health	and	religion,	it	is	unclear	if	this	is	a	causal	one.	It	may	be	that	those	who	are	mentally	well	are	better	able	to	attend	religious	services,	rather	than	religious	practice	itself	predisposing	to	better	mental	health.	A	second	relevant	question	is	whether	this	benefit	comes	simply	from	the	support	and	friendship	that	religious	attendance	is	likely	to	generate…A	further	possibility	is	that	the	benefits	may	accrue	from	the	lifestyle	that	those	with	S/R	interests	may	lead.	The	benefits	of	moderation	in	using	substances,	the	physical	benefits	of	prayer/mediation	and	the	associated	limits	on	risk	taking	may	be	the	main	contributors.	Fourthly,	the	
                                                50	E.g.	(Joiner,	Perez,	and	Walker	2002).	51	Cf.	(Connor,	Davidson,	and	Lee	2003).	
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possibility	that	these	benefits	are	linked	to	hope,	meaning	and	purpose	generated	by,	in	particular,	religious	activity	should	also	be	considered.		A	number	of	Casey’s	suggestions	have	already	been	addressed,	but	more	needs	to	be	said	regarding	the	fourth	possibility	she	lists—that	the	constructs	associated	with	R/S	may	be	the	means	of	enhancing	health.	
Mechanisms	of	Action	While	much	research	indicates	that	religious	behavior	can	be	associated	with	human	well-being,	some	scholars	suggest	that	constructs	related	to	R/S	are	the	possible	mechanisms	of	imparting	health	(Casey	2011;	Levin	2009).	Pargament	has	explicitly	rejected	this	line	of	thinking,	arguing	that	“[r]eligion	may	be	a	unique	aspect	of	human	functioning”	and	the	effects	of	religion	cannot	be	reduced	to	“presumably	more	basic	psychological,	social,	or	physical	processes”	(Pargament	et	al.	2005:680).	Nonetheless,	differences	do	exist	between	mechanisms	of	coping	in	religion	and	in	spirituality	(Aldwin	et	al.	2014).		It	is	clear	that	certain	psychological,	social,	and	physical	processes	are	associated	with	R/S.	For	instance,	researchers	can	now	use	fMRI	technology	to	understand	the	brain	functions	associated	with	religious	belief	(Harris	et	al.	2009;	Wiech	et	al.	2008).	Researchers	suggest	that	“religious	thinking	is	more	associated	with	brain	regions	that	govern	emotion,	self-representation,	and	cognitive	conflict,	while	thinking	about	ordinary	facts	is	more	reliant	upon	memory	retrieval	networks”	(Harris	et	al.	2009).			Belief	and	expectation	may	manipulate	brain	functioning,	including	physical	brain	structure	(Eippert,	Bingel,	et	al.	2009;	Eippert,	Finsterbusch,	et	al.	2009).	‘Psyching’	yourself	up	for	pain	relief,	as	a	type	of	conditioning	and	learned	expectation,	has	very	real	effects	(Tracey	et	al.	2002;	Tracey	2010),	with	negative	expectation	of	treatment	effectiveness	even	overriding	the	effects	of	a	powerful	drug	(Bingel	et	al.	2011).	This	takes	place	in	the	reappraisal/reinterpretation	area	of	the	brain,	and	is	not	merely	a	distraction	like	placebo,	which	takes	place	in	the	brainstem.		The	influence	of	a	perceived	belief	of	threat	is	significant.	Anxiety	actually	increases	the	experience	of	pain	(Ploghaus	et	al.	1999),	but	if	an	individual	believes	he	can	control	his	
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pain,	he	experiences	less	pain,	indicating	a	difference	in	people	who	have	an	internal	locus	of	control	versus	an	external	locus	(Wiech	et	al.	2006).	The	example	of	pain	shows	that	human	existence	cannot	be	fully	described	or	explained	from	a	scientific	perspective—for	instance,	the	way	religious	meaning	changes	and	affects	biological	systems.	Changes	in	a	person’s	value/belief	system	have	physical	consequences	wherein	even	some	pain	can	be	reframed	and	reappraised.	Thus,	some	‘mechanisms’	of	belief	perhaps	can	capture	what	it	looks	like	to	believe,	but	for	many	there	is	maybe	something	else	that	is	not	reducible	in	religion	(Tracey	2015).		Thus,	evidence	suggests	that	R/S	utilizes	neural	pathways	common	to	other	processes	which	may	themselves	be	the	mechanisms	by	which	R/S	exerts	influence	on	health	and	resilience.	But	what	drives	these	mechanisms?		Some	suggest	that	religious	coping	can	be	understood	as	an	indirect	form	of	control	and	seeking	consolation	(Grossoehme	et	al.	2011;	Koenig	2002).52	Similarly,	any	of	the	constructs	associated	with	R/S	discussed	above	could	be	seen,	in	a	reductionist	manner,	as	a	means	by	which	R/S	can	promote	positive	health	outcomes.	While	this	may	be	helpful	on	one	level,	on	another	level	R/S	must	be	seen	as	unique	constructs,	not	simply	an	amalgamation	of	other	factors.		Yet,	as	Kirkpatrick	suggests,	‘religion’	“refers	to	such	a	diverse	and	multifaceted	constellation	of	beliefs	and	behaviors	that	it	is	highly	unlikely	to	be	the	product	of	a	unitary	adaptation	with	a	single	identifiable	function”	(1999:926).	This	lends	itself	to	the	conclusion	that	the	complexity	of	the	R/S	constructs	makes	it	difficult,	though	not	impossible,	to	conclusively	understand	the	inner	workings	of	the	relationship	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience.53		
                                                52	Religion	may	affect	health	through:	being	a	coping	behavior,	a	social	force,	and	a	method	of	behavioral	control,	as	well	as	through	being	a	prosocial	agent	(altruism)	(Koenig	2008b:54,	65).	53	As	I	will	further	explore,	a	narrative	approach	to	human	being	may	provide	a	more	comprehensive	account	of	this	relationship.	
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Conclusion	Religion	and	spirituality	can	play	a	significant	role	in	enabling	individuals	to	cope	with	adversity.	Yet,	as	has	been	shown,	these	correlations	are,	in	some	cases,	positive	and,	in	other	cases,	negative.	Additionally,	whether	previously	acknowledged	or	not,	many	central	aspects	of	resilience	have	religious	and	spiritual	roots.			This	does	not	mean	that	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	R/S,	health,	and	resilience	is	always	clear.	Gaps	in	our	understanding	of	this	relationship	still	exist.	As	Jeff	Levin	(2010)	notes,	most	studies	on	R/S	and	health	focus	on	prevention	rather	than	healing.	Additionally,	research	indicates	that,	while	R/S	may	increase	health	and	protect	against	disease,	it	does	not	guarantee	health.	Thus,	it	must	be	acknowledged	that,	in	most	cases,	R/S	is	not	the	most	significant	factor	in	promoting	health.	Finally,	as	Levin	acknowledges,	“epidemiologic	or	social	or	behavioral	research	methods	cannot	tell	us	anything	about	the	possibility	of	a	‘supernatural’	influence	on	health	or	the	human	body	or	mind”	(2010:108).	Other	means	are	necessary	to	gain	such	knowledge.		Significant	possibilities	exist	for	enhancing	well-being	and	promoting	resilience	through	religion	and	spirituality.	A	theological	and	philosophical	framework	is	needed,	however,	in	which	social	science	research	is	to	be	interpreted	and	rightly	appropriated.	As	I	have	noted,	great	care	must	be	taken	to	ensure	that	R/S	is	not	used	as	merely	as	a	means	to	an	end,	no	matter	how	beneficial.	In	this	regard,	more	theological	reflection	should	be	undertaken	on	this	very	important	matter,	with	efforts	in	the	next	chapter	seeking	to	aid	in	this	work.		Now	that	the	groundwork	of	social	science	research	on	resilience	has	been	laid,	let	us	turn	to	further	dialogue	with	Christian	theology	on	the	topic	of	resilience.	
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Chapter	3:	On	the	Edge	of	Mystery—Resilience	
Reframed		
“We	spent	so	much	of	our	spare	time	worrying	that,	for	a	respite,	I	found	my	spirit	
yearning	to	be	in	God’s	presence.	Something	inside	of	me—beyond	my	will,	beyond	my	
conscious	mind—craved	a	constant	connection…	
	
The	longer	I	prayed,	the	more	I	was	buoyed	by	an	unwavering	sense	of	assurance.	Nothing	
in	our	circumstances	had	changed…Yet	a	stillness	welled	up	inside	of	me,	a	gentle	calm	
that	made	me	feel	as	if	I	were	a	paper	flower,	a	bougainvillea,	floating	down	a	meandering	
stream.	Like	that	paper	flower,	I	was	being	carried	along	by	a	force	that	was	not	of	my	
own	strength	to	a	destination	not	of	my	own	choosing.	And	as	I	bobbed	along	on	the	
sparkling	water,	I	remained	vibrant	and	intact—with	bright	fuchsia	petals	that	sent	a	
message	of	joy	and	hope”	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	2003:9–10).			In	the	first	two	chapters	I	gave	an	account	of	the	role	that	religion	and	spirituality	(R/S)	play	in	enabling	individuals	to	be	resilient.	Social	science	research	suggests	that	R/S	can	have	a	substantial	effect	on	the	ability	of	individuals	to	respond	resiliently	to	adversity.	This	research	provides	very	useful	information	regarding	human	adaptation	to	adversity,	but	it	does	not	provide	the	entire	picture.	Something	of	a	mystery	remains	in	human	experience—an	enigma	surrounding	human	being	that	escapes	the	ability	of	scientific	analysis	to	capture	fully.	We	must	give	attention,	therefore,	to	the	theological	and	philosophical	foundations	that	lie	behind	religious	and	spiritual	responses	to	difficulty.		In	this	chapter	I	seek	to	show	that	secular	materialism’s	notion	of	reason	as	the	sole	arbiter	of	truth	both	is	shortsighted	and	may	foster	negative	resilience	outcomes	through	its	limited	vision.1	I	will	draw	upon	sources	from	a	diversity	of	disciplines	including	the	social	sciences,	philosophy,	and	theology.	Up	to	this	point,	I	have	assessed	
                                                1	We	are	greatly	indebted	to	the	sciences	for	providing	insight	into	human	resilience.	This	is	not,	however,	the	only	avenue	of	insight	into	resilience.	The	secular	‘narrative’	of	resilience,	itself	limited	by	epistemic	assumptions,	may	take	different	forms.	At	a	cultural	level,	it	may	be	posited	to	contain	the	belief	that	life	should	be	without	difficulty.	This	is	in	conflict	both	with	resilience	research	and	Christian	theology.	The	more	fundamental	disagreement	with	theology	at	the	heart	of	resilience	research	is	not	about	the	means	of	inculcating	resilience	(where	research	and	theology	agree),	but	about	the	telos	of	resilience.	
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the	construct	of	resilience	largely	through	the	use	of	social	scientific	research.	As	Jeff	Levin	(2010)	notes,	however,	such	empirical	data	is	of	little	use	if	it	is	not	integrated	into	a	theoretical	framework.	Providing	such	a	metaphysical	grounding	is	largely	beyond	the	scope	of	the	social	sciences	but	is	necessary	for	any	meaningful	application	of	their	research	findings.	What	is	to	be	done,	then,	with	research	findings	on	human	resilience	and	the	role	of	religion	and	spirituality	in	adapting	to	adversity?	How	is	this	research	to	be	integrated	into	larger	understandings	of	the	world	and	practically	implemented?	correspondingly		It	is	my	contention	that	the	discipline	of	theology	can	provide	a	framework	within	which	R/S	and	its	effect	upon	resilience	and	human	well-being	can	be	understood.2	In	part,	this	is	because	a	social	scientific	conception	of	resilience	may	limit	understanding	of	individuals’	ability	to	respond	resiliently	to	adversity.3	Dialogue	between	theology	and	the	social	sciences	on	this	subject	will	provide	additional	insight	as	well	as	practical	application.	The	results	of	this	dialogue,	however,	may	be	surprising	for	both	parties.			Additional	questions	must	be	answered,	however,	in	order	to	enter	into	this	dialogue:	Should	the	resilience	concept	as	understood	through	the	social	sciences	be	accepted	
                                                2	I	understand	theology	to	be	the	study	of	the	triune	God	that	has	continuing	practical	implications	for	the	community	of	God	(the	Church).	No	monolithic	understanding	of	‘Christian	theology’	exists,	however.	Clearly,	varying	accounts	of	what	constitutes	‘Christian	theology’	may	lead	to	diverse	implications	for	a	theological	understanding	of	resilience.	While	many	emphases	could	be	drawn	out	in	assessing	human	resilience,	I	have	attempted	to	highlight	Christian	theological	doctrines	that	would	be	embraced	by	all	Christians	who	hold	to	the	canonical	Scriptures	and	historic	Christian	creeds:	principally	the	Life,	Death,	and	Resurrection	of	Jesus	Christ.	My	perspective	as	an	Anglican	minister	certainly	may	be	apparent	at	times,	but	I	have	hoped	both	to	maintain	the	distinctive	voice	of	each	theologian	with	whom	I	engage	and	to	provide	a	broadly	‘ecumenical’	Christian	theological	assessment	of	resilience.	3	This	limitation	has	not	as	much	to	do	with	the	methodologies	of	the	social	sciences	as	it	does	with	the	assumptions	underlying	those	methodologies.	The	assumptions	underlying	much	social	scientific	enquiry,	by	excepting	the	possibility	of	supernatural	influence,	create	a	correspondingly	incomplete	view	of	the	world.	As	became	clear	in	chapter	2,	R/S	may	exert	considerable	influence	upon	resilience	outcomes;	therefore	any	‘thick’	understanding	of	such	influence	must	not	only	take	these	factors	into	account,	but	also	give	credence	to	the	testimony	of	many	individuals	who	claim	to	have	been	influenced,	in	various	ways,	by	the	supernatural.	With	this	in	mind,	the	methodologies	of	the	social	sciences,	whether	emic	or	etic,	can	be	compatible	with	R/S	worldviews	when	naturalist	materialistic	assumptions	are	excised.	
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uncritically	and	in	totality?		Can	a	truly	Christian	perspective	on	resilience	be	compatible	with	social	science?	As	already	indicated,	much	research	suggests	that	R/S	can	be	beneficial	to	health	and	well-being.	But	are	the	aims	of	social	science	research	and	the	Christian	faith	the	same?	Moreover,	is	it	appropriate	to	use	religion	as	the	means	to	the	temporal	end	of	human	flourishing?	In	order	to	understand	these	and	other	significant	questions	raised	by	the	intersection	of	theology	and	social	science	research	on	the	topic	of	resilience,	we	must	gain	a	fuller	account	of	the	nature	of	human	existence	and	its	ultimate	telos	(goal).		
Why	a	Social	Science	Perspective	is	Incomplete	In	Children	of	Crisis,	his	landmark	study	of	African	American	children	in	the	American	South	during	the	turbulent	1960’s,	Harvard	psychiatrist	Robert	Coles	suggests:	It	must	be	clear	by	now	that	the	closer	we	look	at	human	behavior,	the	more	nonpsychiatric	influences	must	be	summoned	to	‘explain’	what	turns	out	to	be	a	rather	complicated	and	not	always	obvious	connection	between	the	life	of	the	mind	and	the	life	of	the	world.	Those	two	lives,	be	it	remembered,	are	but	convenient	abstractions	to	aid	our	thinking	about	an	intensely	shared	continuity	that	actually	exists	(1967:364–65).		The	social	sciences	are	limited	in	scope.	They	are	an	attempt	to	investigate	the	nature	of	social	reality	(Bryman	2012:409),	and	in	so	doing	to	understand	the	world.	The	social	reality	studied	by	social	scientists	is	one	part	of	the	‘intensely	shared	continuity’	described	by	Coles—but	it	is	only	one	aspect.	As	Coles	suggests,	additional	means	of	enquiry	are	needed	to	understand	the	complex	nature	of	human	existence.		In	this	effort	we	must	note	that	social	scientific	enquiry,	or	any	other	method	of	enquiry	for	that	matter,	is	not	value-neutral	(Cook	2013a:9).	Each	is	part	of	a	context	and	has	a	history.	John	Milbank	goes	so	far	as	to	argue	that	supposed	“‘scientific’	social	theories	are	themselves	theologies	or	anti-theologies	in	disguise”	and	the	assumptions	upon	which	they	rest	are	themselves	questionable	(1990:3).4	Though	some	may	claim	impartiality	for	scientific	enquiry,	it	is	just	as	subject	to	biases	as	any	other	
                                                4	While	such	an	assessment	is	helpful,	in	one	respect,	it	may	also	be	too	dichotomous	in	its	characterization.	See	also	(von	Balthasar	1994:61)	for	discussion	of	the	competing	assumptions	between	Christian	theology	and	philosophical	systems	and	(Prickett	2002:50)	for	discussion	of	the	necessarily	mediated	nature	of	human	knowledge.	
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methodology:	social	science	research	methods	are	not	neutral,	but	rather	are	intricately	tied	to	the	social	scientist’s	view	of	reality	(Bryman	2012:19).			Social	scientific	research	is	not,	per	se,	associated	with	one	particular	theoretical	basis	or	methodology.	The	philosophies	of	instrumentalism,	naturalism,	and	constructive	empiricism	and	their	emphasis	on	observable	phenomena	are	often	associated	with	scientific	enquiry	but	do	not	form	the	sum	total	of	all	philosophies	of	science	(Segal	2006:320).	Thus,	there	is	room	for	the	social	sciences	to	move	beyond	merely	physical	phenomena	to	intangibles	such	as	beliefs	or	emotion.	Many	schools	of	thought	within	the	social	sciences,	however,	do	not	accord	the	same	value	to	these	phenomena.	In	Milbank’s	assessment,	for	Max	Weber,	“religion,	art,	traditional	organic	communities	–	do	not	for	this	view	really	belong	to	the	realm	of	the	factual	at	all;	instead	they	belong	to	the	‘irreal’	realm	of	valuation,	and	they	exist	primarily	as	hidden,	subjective	forces”	(1990:84).	In	this	valuation,	many	scholars	merely	relegate	religion	to	the	“Kantian	sublime”	(Milbank	1990:104).		Particular	theoretical	frameworks,	such	as	philosophies	of	science,	are	apparent	in	social	science	research	methodology.	Though	not	specifically	tied	together,	quantitative	enquiry	often	has	a	bent	towards	naturalism	(Bryman	2012:50).	Alternatively,	qualitative	research	is	more	aligned	with	constructionism	and	a	phenomenological	epistemology	(Bryman	2012:36).5		A	simplistic	account	would	contend	that	quantitative	social	science	research	can	provide	raw	data	regarding	the	nature	of	reality	(as	perceived	through	the	instrumentality	of	method),	and	qualitative	research	can	provide	a	richer	account	of	this	reality	(Bryman	2012:408).6	Yet,	each	of	these	methodologies	is	limited	by	its	underlying	materialistic	naturalist	assumptions	that	place	the	human	being	as	the	subject,	object,	and	starting	point	of	enquiry,	and	therefore	do	not	allow	room	for	input	
                                                5	Bryman	notes,	however,	that	these	“connections	are	not	deterministic”	(2012:614).	6	Even	given	this	distinction,	Bryman	argues	that	the	line	drawn	between	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	and	their	associated	epistemological	and	ontological	assumptions	is	not	always	as	defined	as	is	often	suggested	(2012:614ff).	
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from	outside	of	this	closed	system.7	This	is	problematic.	As	physicist	and	theologian	John	Polkinghorne	notes,	“Science	by	itself	is	not	enough	even	to	describe	the	pursuit	of	science	itself”	(1996:2).	To	gain	a	fuller	account	of	reality,	one	must	allow	for	input	from	sources	outside	of	the	sciences	as	well	as	input	from	outside	the	hegemony	of	human	knowledge.		
Questions	of	Epistemology8	In	many	ways,	the	inability	of	the	social	sciences	fully	to	explain	human	experience	has	its	basis	in	questions	of	epistemology.9	While	this	is	a	much	larger	issue	than	I	can	address	here,	essentially,	most	modern	epistemologies	are	concerned	primarily	with	‘knowledge	that,’	or	propositional	knowledge.10	Such	epistemologies	leave	no	room	for	non-propositional	knowledge	that	is	not	reducible	to	‘knowledge	that’	such	as	relational	knowledge	of	persons	(Stump	2012:51).	Stump	summarizes	what	is	at	stake	here:	“Theories	of	knowledge	that	ignore	or	fail	to	account	for	whole	varieties	of	knowledge	are	correspondingly	incomplete”	(2012:59).		Beyond	this,	some	scholars	believe	that	differing	ways	of	viewing	the	world	have	a	biological	as	well	as	psychological	basis.	Neurologist	Iain	McGilchrist	suggests	that	the	different	ways	the	hemispheres	of	the	brain	process	information	not	only	represent,	but	also	determine	two	ways	of	knowing	the	world.11	This	distinction	is	primarily	between	focused	attention	(left	hemisphere)	and	open	attention	(right	hemisphere),	or,	in	other	
                                                7	This	claim,	while	somewhat	reductionist	in	regards	to	social	scientific	enquiry,	nonetheless	is	based	upon	the	naturalistic	assumptions	inherent	in	much	of	such	research.	Cf.	(Titus	2006:77).	These	same	emphases	are	apparent	in	approaches	to	resilience	(Aranda	et	al.	2012:549).	8	Interestingly,	concern	with	questions	of	epistemology	falls	very	much	in	the	so-termed	‘left-brain’	and	‘Dominican’	categories	suggested	by	McGilchrist	(2010)	and	Stump	(2012),	respectively.	9	See	(Green	1998:10–27)	for	a	history	of	theological	epistemology	from	the	standpoint	of	Green’s	assertion	that	imagination	and	religion	are	inextricably	linked.	10	Charles	Taylor	convincingly	argues	that	modern	epistemology	acts	as	a	‘closed	world	system’	that	excludes	the	possibility	of	input	from	the	transcendent	(Taylor	2007:59–65).	11	Indeed,	it	is	reductionist	to	imply	that	particular	brain	functions	are	confined	to	a	particular	part	of	the	brain,	yet,	according	to	McGilchrist,	still,	there	are	“pervasive	and	consistent	differences	between	the	hemispheres,	existing	at	many	levels”	such	that	it	is	possible	to	speak	broadly	of	such	a	divide	(2010:32–33).			
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words,	between	the	self	and	what	transcends	the	self	(McGilchrist	2010:25).	The	left	hemisphere	is	more	adept	at	focused	attention,	the	type	of	problem	solving	that	is	so	important	to	scientists	(McGilchrist	2010:25).	He	explains	the	differences	between	the	hemispheres	in	this	way:	[E]ach	hemisphere	attends	to	the	world	in	a	different	way—and	the	ways	are	consistent…[T]he	right	hemisphere	sees	things	whole,	and	in	their	context,	where	the	left	hemisphere	sees	things	abstracted	from	context,	and	broken	into	parts,	from	which	it	then	reconstructs	a	‘whole’:	something	very	different.	And	it	also	turns	out	that	the	capacities	that	help	us,	as	humans,	form	bonds	with	others…are	largely	right-hemisphere	functions	(McGilchrist	2010:27–28).		The	difference	between	the	hemispheres	extends	beyond	how	they	process	information:		These	two	aspects	of	the	world	are	not	symmetrically	opposed.	They	are	not	equivalent,	for	example,	to	the	‘subjective’	and	‘objective’	points	of	view…These	are	not	different	ways	of	thinking	about	the	world:	they	are	different	ways	of	
being	in	the	world	(McGilchrist	2010:31).		Essentially,	McGilchrist	explains,	“the	brain	is—in	fact	it	has	to	be—a	metaphor	of	the	world”	(2010:9).	Therefore,	these	“different	ways	of	being	in	the	world”	have	significant	implications	for	conscious	lived	experience	as	embodied	human	beings.	This	is	especially	true	when	an	entire	culture	prizes	one	way	of	knowing	over	another.	With	McGilchrist	I	believe	that	the	myopic	view	of	the	world	promoted	in	Western	secular	society	is	a	significant	factor	in	diminishing	the	capability	of	its	members	to	be	resilient	(2010:6).	Others	have	also	suggested	a	dichotomy	of	epistemologies	in	Western	thinking.	In	a	similar	vein	to	McGilchrist,	Eleonore	Stump	explores	the	differences	between	analytical	and	intuitive	ways	of	knowing	(corresponding	to	McGilchrist’s	right	and	left-hemisphere	thinking	patterns)	through	the	typologies	of	the	Christian	historical	figures	of	St.	Francis	of	Assisi	and	St.	Dominic,	respectively	(2012:39ff).	As	an	analytical	philosopher,	Stump	notes	many	of	these	same	difficulties	in	the	abstraction	of	intuition	from	analytical	thinking:	In	case	the	thing	being	characterized	is	not	amenable	to	crisp	definition	and	precision,	then,	paradoxically,	the	vague	but	intuitive	Franciscan	approach	will	be	more	accurate	than	the	Dominican	approach,	whose	search	for	an	unavailable	accuracy	will	result	in	carefully	patterned	mischaracterization	(2012:41).		Thus,	it	is	possible	that	the	highly	prized	scientific	analytical	way	of	understanding	the	world	is	not	always	the	most	accurate	or	helpful	method	of	enquiry.	This	would	
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especially	be	the	case	for	investigations	regarding	persons,	rather	than	things	(Stump	2012:47).	Yet,	Stump	is	careful	to	note,	it	is	best	to	see	these	“approaches	not	as	competitors	but	as	allies,	each	with	something	to	contribute	to	and	correct	in	the	other”	(2012:62).	Perhaps	left-brained,	‘Dominican,’	ways	of	perceiving	the	world	have	held	sway	too	long,	to	the	detriment	of	individuals	in	Western	society.	There	is	a	place,	then,	for	a	re-emphasis	of	right-brained,	‘Franciscan,’	understandings	of	reality,	of	which	religion	may	play	a	large	part.12			
Religion	as	a	‘Thicker’	Account	of	the	World	Both	McGilchrist	and	Stump	point	to	two	very	different	ways	of	processing	information	and	experiences.	McGilchrist	suggests	that	religion	is	particularly	important	for	‘right-brained,’	empathetic,	‘thicker’	types	of	knowing	(2010:6).	While	a	more	analytical	approach	is	prized	in	society	today,	the	contextualized	framework	afforded	by	the	arts	and	religion	can	provide,	among	other	things,	meaning	to	human	experience.	A	worldview	that	is	based	solely	on	naturalistic	assumptions—that	does	not	accept	what	cannot	be	analytically	understood—does	not	allow	for	this	other	significant	way	of	knowing.13			Furthermore,	a	theological	viewpoint	has	the	capacity	to	see	the	world	more	fully	than	the	diminutive	view	of	naturalistic	secularism	(McFadyen	2000:6ff;	Watts	2002:9).	As	Polkinghorne	argues,	the	discernment	of	value,	the	existence	of	beauty,	and	moral	and	ethical	imperatives	all	point	to	a	reality	that	exceeds	the	physical	domain.14	Therefore,	“theistic	belief	is	more	comprehensive	and	fully	explanatory	than	atheism	can	manage	to	be”	(Polkinghorne	2006:66).	Similarly,	John	Swinton	suggests	that	there	is	a	need	to	
                                                12	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	not	distinctly	left-brained,	‘Dominican,’	elements	to	religion—certainly	they	are	manifold!—only	to	argue	that	Christianity,	at	its	core,	has	to	do	with	issues	of	the	heart,	most	notably,	love.	E.g.	Matthew	22:35-40;	1	Corinthians	13:1-13.	13	Alvin	Plantinga	suggests	that	naturalism	is	a	‘quasi-religion’	which	offers	an	alternative	‘master	narrative’	to	theistic	religion,	one	which	also	seeks	to	answer	“deep	and	important	human	questions”	(2011:311).	Because	of	this,	these	worldviews	are	fundamentally	at	odds	with	one	another.	14	Additionally,	Stump	argues	that	“knowledge	of	the	ultimate	foundation	of	reality,	knowledge	of	morality,	and	knowledge	of	the	good	life	are	all	best	understood	as	knowledge	of	persons”	as	opposed	to	analytical	knowledge	(2012:47).	I	will	return	to	this	appeal	to	personal	knowledge	in	the	following	chapter.		
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expand	the	empiricist	viewpoint	to	include	views	of	the	world	that	include	the	spiritual	(2001:13).15	This	is	because	a	worldview	that	only	allows	for	‘mechanical	causality’	necessarily	excludes	any	non-mechanical	causality,	and	in	the	end	this	must	lead	to	a	solely	mechanistic	understanding	of	the	world	(Lukacs	2014).			Thus,	while	we	may	distinguish	between	an	empirical	(‘thin’)	description	and	the	examination	of	the	meaning	behind	an	event	(a	‘thick	description’)16—as	the	distinction	between	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	methods	has	already	alluded	to—such	a	distinction	would	be	rejected	by	some	scholars.17	It	may	be	helpful	not	just	to	speak	of	religion	as	providing	a	‘thicker’	account	of	reality,	but	as	actually	a	different	way	of	
being	in	the	world.18	This	new	way	of	being	in	the	world	finds	its	basis	in	that	which	is	
extra	nos,	the	Divine	Word.		
The	‘In-Breaking’	of	Divine	Reality	If	religion	is	what	it	claims	to	be—an	‘in-breaking’	of	the	divine	into	the	world—then	it	does	not	just	provide	a	‘thicker’	account	of	human	action,	it	provides	information	about	human	experience	that	cannot	be	obtained	through	natural	means.19	Coles	relates:	“Since	hate,	indifference	and	timidity	are	psychological	qualities,	[the	psychiatrist]	expects	psychological	explanations	usually	to	account	for	their	origins.	Sometimes	they	can;	but	very	often	they	cannot”	(1967:376).	Coles	suggests	there	are	constructs	beyond	
                                                15	Some	scholars	suggest	turning	to	spirituality	in	general	for	universal	principles	or	‘virtues’	that	can	be	applied	across	religious	boundaries	(Cf.	(Gill	2006:8,	210)).	While	many	useful	insights	for	resilience	research	may	be	gained	in	that	way,	this	study	will	confine	itself	to	studying	the	particularity	of	the	Christian	tradition.	16	See	Geertz’s	seminal	work,	‘Thick	Description:	Toward	an	Interpretive	Theory	of	Culture’	(1973).	Significantly,	Segal	notes	that	Geertz	“does	not	pit	an	interpretive	approach	against	a	scientific	one”	(2006:19).	17	Robert	Segal	chides	those	he	terms	‘religionists’	for	attempting	to	categorize	the	social	sciences	as	merely	“functional,	reductive,	and	explanatory”	while	religious	accounts	of	the	same	phenomena	are	considered	“substantive,	non-reductive,	and	interpretive”	(2006:313).	He	concludes	that,	because	of	what	he	sees	as	the	priority	of	the	epistemological	primacy	of	social	scientific	enquiry,	religion	and	the	social	sciences	are	essentially	incompatible	if	they	are	to	remain	true	to	themselves	(Segal	2006:317).	18	Cf.	(McGilchrist	2010:31).	19	Here,	in	part,	I	am	arguing	against	an	‘epistemological	flattening’	of	accounts	of	reality	that	expresses	all	action—to	include	religious	experience—solely	in	terms	of	human	action.	See	(Root	2014)	for	more	on	this	subject.	
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the	reach	of	social	scientific	inquiry	that	nonetheless	affect	what	is	studied	by	the	social	sciences.	These	‘beyond	the	reach’	constructs	most	certainly	include	realms	understood	through	theological	enquiry.		But	for	many,	any	attempt	to	study	supernatural	effects	falls	outside	the	bounds	of	social	science	since,	“it	is	not	possible	to	state	a	valid	theological	process	that	might	mediate	any	‘effects’	that	might	occur”	(Paloutzian	2006:248).	This	assertion	falls	in	line	with	the	underlying	assumptions	of	naturalism	that	undergird	scientific	enquiry	and	exclude	the	possibility	of	supernatural	influence.20	Such	a	worldview	is	an	overarching	ontological	assessment	of	reality	(Leidenhag	2014)	that	has	become	the	predominant	paradigm	within	the	social	sciences	as	well	as	within	broader	academia	(Slife,	Starks,	and	Primosch	2014).21	Yet	the	‘secularity’	that	divides	the	‘natural’	from	the	‘supernatural’	and	denigrates	the	latter	is	unknown	to	“the	whole	of	human	history	outside	the	modern	West”	(Taylor	2007:57).22	As	Milbank	bluntly	puts	it:	“Once,	there	was	no	‘secular’…The	secular	as	a	domain	had	to	be	instituted	or	imagined,	both	in	theory	and	in	practice”	(1990:9).23	Still,	there	are	attempts	to	‘normalize’	or	‘naturalize’	such	a	viewpoint	that	scholars	“cannot	see…as	one,	historically	constructed,	understanding	of	human	agency	among	others”	(Taylor	2007:57,	69).	In	the	end,	this	
                                                20	There	are,	for	instance,	many	“lingering	positivist	and	materialist	assumptions”	in	resilience	research	(Titus	2006:81).	21	Andrew	Hatala	summarizes	the	developments	that	“relegated	illness	and	healing	primarily	to	a	physiological	framework	with	limited	attention	to	social,	moral	or	political	dimensions”	(2013:257).	22	Charles	Taylor	continues,	“This	kind	of	clear	demarcation	was	foreign	to	any	other	civilization	in	history.	There	have	always	been	distinctions	between,	for	instance,	the	sacred	and	the	profane,	higher	beings	and	worldly	beings,	and	so	forth,	but	in	the	‘enchanted’	worlds	that	humans	have	inhabited	in	earlier	times,	these	two	kinds	of	reality	were	inextricably	woven…The	natural/supernatural	distinction	implies	a	great	sorting	out,	in	which	the	‘natural’	becomes	a	level	which	can	be	described	and	understood	on	its	own.	This	is	the	precondition	for	going	the	further	step,	and	declaring	this	the	only	reality”	(2007:59).	23	Alastair	McGrath	agrees:	“Allegedly	neutral,	transcendent	or	‘objective’	disciplines—such	as	the	social	sciences—are	in	reality	no	more	than	narrated	interpretations	of	
reality	which	possess	no	privileged	status	permitting	them	to	judge	or	police	others”	(2002:118–19).	
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‘closed’	paradigm	leaves	a	disenchanted	reality	in	which	only	what	can	be	rationally	explained	exists.24		Since	the	a	priori	assumptions	and	methodologies	of	these	social	scientists	are	grounded	in	a	naturalistic	understanding	of	the	world,	they	are	limited	to	discoveries	and	accounts	of	reality—to	include	resilience—consistent	with	these	frameworks.25	But	naturalism	does	not	have	a	monopoly	on	truth.	If,	as	Taylor	suggests,	‘natural’	and	‘supernatural’	phenomena	are	not	divided,	but	instead	are	woven	throughout	the	fabric	of	existence,	this	will	have	significant	implications	for	conceptions	of	resilience.	In	such	a	case,	the	‘in-breaking’	of	divine	reality	into	the	world	is	not	a	side	issue	for	resilience,	but	may	get	at	the	heart	of	what	enables	humans	to	respond	resiliently.26		
Science:	Moving	Beyond	Naturalism	Some	accounts	of	science	have	moved	beyond	strictly	modern	naturalistic	assumptions.	Thomas	Kuhn’s	The	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions	(1962)	provided	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	rationality	in	which	some	scientists	“no	longer	presuppose	a	qualitative	distinction	between	scientific	and	non-scientific	rationality”	(Clayton	2007:99).27	Utilizing	similar	reasoning,	many	religious	scholars	have	embraced	postmodernism	because	of	its	rejection	of	‘modern’	and	‘scientific’	understandings	of	the	world	(Segal	2006:322).	Such	attempts	to	move	beyond	modernity	have	both	potential	possibilities	and	downfalls,	however.28		
                                                24	For	an	assessment	of	the	meta-narrative	that	science	attempts	to	tell	of	the	world,	see	(Harrison	2015:180–97).	25	See	(Slife	and	Richardson	2014;	Slife,	Starks,	and	Primosch	2014)	for	more	on	the	questioning	of	the	presumption	of	naturalism	in	the	social	sciences.	Thomas	Nagel’s	(2012)	critique	of	naturalism	is	especially	significant.	26	Titus,	likewise	suggests	that	in	order	to	understand	resilience	properly	“we	need	a	basis	of	philosophy	of	nature,	philosophical	anthropology,	ethical	theory,	and	prudent	reflection	in	order	for	normative	science	to	interpret	and	integrate	descriptive	observations”	(2006:98).	He	utilizes	Aquinas’	virtue	theory	to	provide	this	added	perspective.	27	I	will	soon	address	Kuhn’s	theory	more	fully.		28	I	will	address	Paul	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	language,	in	particular,	more	fully	in	the	next	chapter.	As	momentous	as	Kuhn’s	model	was,	it	failed	to	see	the	unity	of	rational	thought	as	continuity	across	paradigms.	
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The	postmodern	assessment	of	reality	acknowledges	that,	because	our	knowledge	and	ability	to	know	as	human	beings	is	necessarily	limited,	imagination	and	humility	are	needed	in	the	pursuit	of	truth	rather	than	simple	deductions	of	logical	truth	via	a	mechanistic	model	(Lukacs	2014).29	While	different	ways	of	knowing	exist,	as	McGilchrist	and	Stump	note,	epistemologies	are	not	strictly	divided	between	the	scientific	and	the	religious.	Since	Kuhn’s	seminal	work,	philosophers	of	science	have	begun	to	acknowledge	that	the	scientific	endeavor	includes	many	non-rational	elements,	such	as	the	imagination	(Green	1998:44–45).	Others,	like	Michael	Polanyi,	have	recognized	scientists’	need	for	community	and	intuition	in	their	scientific	endeavor	(Mitchell	2006:15).		Moreover,	philosophers	are	beginning	to	suggest	that	the	differences	between	science	and	religion	may	not	be	as	great	as	was	once	suggested	(Green	1998:44).	Alvin	Plantinga	argues	that	the	primary	conflict	lies	between	naturalism	and	theism,	not	science	and	religion:	“there	is	superficial	conflict	but	deep	concord	between	theistic	religion	and	science,	but	superficial	concord	and	deep	conflict	between	naturalism	and	science”	(2011:265).30	One	could	say	that	it	is	not	science	itself	whose	account	of	reality	must	be	reassessed,	but	rather	certain	naturalist	and	modernist	interpretations	of	science.		Thus,	for	those	who	subscribe	to	this	revised	view	of	science,	the	distinctions	I	have	drawn	may	not	be	as	defined	as	for	scientists	of	a	more	naturalist	orientation.	Whereas	“the	boundary	between	science	and	religion	represented	the	fundamental	boundary	of	the	modern	period,”	the	destruction	and	transgressing	of	boundaries	defines	postmodernism	(Clayton	2007:93).	Such	an	understanding	gives	rise	to	the	possibility	of	constructive	dialogue	between	religion	and	science.31	Clayton	notes	a	new	phase	of	the	religion/science	dialogue:	“recognition	of	common	properties”	(2007:98).	This	understanding	of	science	may	give	credence	to	the	inclusion	of	divine	action	in	social	
                                                29	For	an	account	of	the	nature	of	human	knowledge	with	which	I	have	much	affinity,	see	(Smith	2009).	30	Peter	Harrison	(2015)	provides	a	very	insightful	extended	treatment	of	the	history	of	the	relationship	between	science	and	religion,	concluding,	much	the	same	as	Plantinga,	that	interpretations	of	these	disciplines	are	in	conflict,	not	the	disciplines	themselves.	31	For	an	account	of	this	relationship	amenable	to	my	own,	see	(Murphy	2006).	
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scientific	understandings	of	resilience.	Still,	there	remain	important	divisions	between	the	two	fields.	For	many	within	these	communities	of	thought	the	generalizations	of	epistemological	division	remain	true,	which	precludes	any	attempt	at	a	meaningful	dialogue	between	religion	and	science.	Some	remain	entrenched	in	understandings	that	divide	into	questions	of:	‘How?’	(science)	and	‘Why?’	(religion)	(Clayton	2007:98).32		
Science,	Theology,	and	Social	Science	Methodology	Despite	the	appearance	of	an	epistemological	and	methodological	divide	between	science	and	religion,	I	contend	that	this	distinction	is	not	as	great	as	it	is	often	made	out	to	be.33	In	fact,	the	shared	pursuit	of	truth,	mediated	by	human	experience,	unifies	these	disciplines.			Human	knowledge	is	particular	and	situated	within	the	contingency	of	human	experience.	Thus,	the	very	act	of	understanding	involves	interpretation.	Hans	Frei	posits:	“I	do	not	think	that	the	concept	‘fact’	is	theory-neutral.”	He	further	contends	that	this	term	is	“not	privileged,	theory-neutral,	trans-cultural,	an	ingredient	in	the	structure	of	the	human	mind	and	of	reality	always	and	everywhere”	(1993b:211).	In	agreement	with	Frei,	Paul	Ricoeur	suggests:	“we	find	ourselves	forced	to	re-work	our	conventional	concept	of	truth,	that	is	to	say,	to	cease	to	limit	this	concept	to	logical	coherence	and	empirical	verification	alone”	(1991a:12).	The	‘scientific’	conception	of	truth	as	extending	only	to	what	is	empirically	verifiable	is	too	limited	to	encompass	the	complexity	of	human	existence.	Humans	experience	things	that	are	not	empirically	verifiable;	further,	even	those	things	that	can	be	scientifically	validated	are	not	fully	understood	solely	through	this	means	of	enquiry.34	
                                                32	Against	this	view,	citing	Kuhn,	Green	suggests	that	there	is	no	epistemological	dichotomy	between	religion	and	science.	Rather,	both	are	varied	expressions	of	the	imagination	(1998:45).	While	this	viewpoint	could	be	helpful,	it	does	not	seem	to	represent	the	self-understanding	of	large	portions	of	the	scientific	community.	33	This	is	a	much	larger	topic	than	can	be	fully	considered	in	this	short	space.	However,	the	compatibility	of	scientific	and	theological	epistemologies	and	methodologies	is	important	for	this	project	as	a	whole.	For	a	more	fully	developed	argument	of	this	thesis	utilizing	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	see	(White	2017)	or,	for	a	book-length	treatment,	see	(Reynhout	2013).	34	Gerard	Loughlin	suggests	that	science	matches	scientific	theory	against	data	that	is	“always	already	theory-laden”	rather	than	against	reality	itself.	Thus,	“[s]cience	matches	theory-stories	against	observation-narratives.”	Loughlin	continues,	“Whatever	the	case	
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	While	it	is	the	case	that	the	natural	sciences	can	assess	a	reality	that	is	‘out	there,’	the	social	sciences	must	contend	with	subjects	who	are	also	interpreters:	the	social	sciences,	it	appears,	remain	distinct	from	the	natural	sciences:	while	the	latter	are	characterized	by	a	‘single	hermeneutic’—an	interpreting	agent	explaining	a	non-interpreting	world—the	social	sciences	are	characterized	by	a	‘double	hermeneutic’—an	interpreting	agent	now	attempts	to	explain	the	actions	of	‘objects	of	study’	who	are	themselves	also	subjects	involved	in	constructing	their	own	interpretations	of	the	world	and	of	the	experimenters	themselves.	As	Anthony	Giddens	(1976:158)	notes,	the	social	scientist	faces	‘a	pre-interpreted	world	where	the	creation	and	reproduction	of	meaning-frames	is	a	very	condition	of	that	which	it	seeks	to	analyze’”	(Clayton	2007:95–96).35			I	suggest	that	this	common	interpretive	framework	for	reality—and,	significantly,	meaning—is	what	makes	dialogue	between	science	and	theology	possible.	Further,	similar	methodologies	may	be	used	in	both	disciplines.	Just	as	theologians	exegete	texts,	social	scientists	like	Clifford	Geertz,	utilizing	Paul	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutical	philosophy,	seek	to	‘exegete’	culture,	including	religion	(Segal	2006:318–19).36		The	contingent	nature	of	human	knowledge,	however,	does	not	necessitate	the	impossibility	of	knowledge	altogether.37	Rather,	it	suggests	the	impossibility	of	perfect	knowledge.	Whereas	modernity	demanded	impossible	perfection	and	purity,38	Smith	proposes	the	beauty	of	imperfect,	situated,	and	particular	human	life,	as	providing	a	counter-narrative	that	provides	freedom,	individual	expression	and	dignity	(2009:20–21).	This	is,	he	argues,	the	logic	of	the	Gospel	that	is	most	evident	in	the	Incarnation—an	embracing	of	contingency	and	particularity	(2009:35).	Each	of	these	ways	of	
                                                with	science,	Christian	truth	has	never	been	a	matter	of	matching	stories	against	reality.	It	has	always	been	a	matter	of	matching	reality-stories	against	the	truth:	Jesus	Christ”	(1999:23).	I	will	more	fully	address	the	use	of	narrative	to	understand	reality	in	the	following	chapter.	35	Cf.	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:486).	36	Cf.	(Milbank	1990:121,	127).	In	the	next	chapter,	more	will	be	said	on	the	basis	for	such	an	interpretive	‘move.’	37	This,	what	James	K.	A.	Smith	calls	“timid	postmodernism,”	posits	the	impossibility	of	universal	knowledge	(2009:8–9).	38	Interestingly,	Derrida’s	“timid	postmodernity”	has	the	same	demand	for	perfection.	
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thinking,	Smith	proposes,	is	based	upon	a	fundamentally	different	logic	or	system	of	meaning.39		But,	if	human	knowledge	is	always	particular,	what	means	of	communicating	truth	beyond	particular	circumstance	exists?	Metaphor,	as	a	method	of	communication,	can	be	understood	as	a	model	of	understanding	in	both	theology	and	science	that	enables	this	possibility	(Soskice	1985:99).	40	Soskice	argues,	however,	that	“if	there	is	to	be	any	valuable	comparison	of	models	in	science	and	religion	it	must	be	one	with	realist	assumptions”	(1985:107).41	In	this	regard,	“models	and	metaphorical	theory	terms	may,	in	both	the	scientific	and	religious	cases,	be	reality	depicting	without	pretending	to	be	directly	descriptive”	(Soskice	1985:145).42		Metaphor,	then	may	be	reality-depicting	while	still	allowing	for	the	contingency	of	human	experience.	Kuhn’s	theory,	which	proposes	the	history	of	science	to	be	composed	of	various	epochs	(‘paradigms’)	of	thinking,	makes	use	of	this	type	of	metaphorical	thinking.	This	theory	is	important	not	for	a	claim	to	non-foundationalism—for	it	could	be	said	that	Kuhn	replaces	one	epistemological	foundation	with	another—but	rather	because	it	displays	the	modern	emphasis	on	reason	as	one	epistemological	paradigm	among	many	possibilities.	To	use	Smith’s	terminology,	each	epistemological	approach	is	a	‘logic’	for	discerning	truth	in	the	world.			The	logic	of	an	epistemology	based	on	the	scientific	method,	stunted	by	a	secular	naturalistic	worldview,	presents	one	way	of	being-in-the-world,	but	this	is	a	diminished	world	incapable	of	fully	describing	human	experience.	Recent	understandings	of	the	scientific	endeavor	as	containing	metaphoric	and	imaginative	elements,	however,	make	
                                                39	This	is	what,	Smith	notes,	John	Milbank	terms	a	‘mythos’	and	conforms	to	Kuhn’s	‘paradigm’	(2009:10).	40	The	issue	of	whether	and	how	metaphors	can	be	used	in	science	and	theology	is	much	larger	than	I	can	deal	with	in	this	space.	Let	it	suffice	to	say	that	a	supposedly	‘non-scientific’	mode	of	discourse	such	as	metaphor	may	in	fact	be	at	the	core	of	scientific	enquiry.	Kuhn’s	‘paradigms’	are	instructive	in	this	regard.	Cf.	(Green	1998:50).	41	I	will	address	this	‘critical	realist’	viewpoint	at	a	later	point.	42	Beyond	being	beneficial	for	understanding	the	nature	of	knowledge	in	both	science	and	religion,	metaphorical	thinking	may	also	be	useful	as	a	method	of	enquiry	in	both	disciplines.	I	will	address	this	more	fully	in	the	next	chapter.	
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a	‘thicker’	notion	of	human	being	as	well	as	dialogue	with	the	humanities	more	conceivable.		Thus,	scholars	should	see	science	and	theology	as	complementary	rather	than	in	opposition	to	one	another.	In	practice,	because	of	the	difficulty	of	empirically	measuring	internal	spiritual	dispositions	(Levin	2010),	other	means	of	investigation,	such	as	narrative	methodologies	and	techniques	more	at	home	in	the	humanities,	are	appropriate	for	this	study.		
Maintaining	Differences	and	Opening	Dialogue	In	the	end,	despite	having	accounts	of	reality	that	may	be	regarded	as	compatible	with	one	another,	many	of	the	underlying	assumptions,	epistemologies,	and	goals	of	science	and	religion	are	different.	Not	all	these	differences	are	problematic,	however.	Though	some	claim	that	divine	action	is	not	a	proper	object	of	study	for	the	social	sciences,	this	does	not	mean	that	such	action	does	not	exist	or	is	not	important.	Further	enquiry,	therefore,	is	required—and	perhaps	enquiry	of	a	different	nature.	I	suggest	that	the	social	sciences	would	benefit	from	dialogue	with	disciplines	such	as	theology	that	approach	the	world	from	a	different	standpoint.43			The	common	pursuit	of	truth	unites	science	and	theology,44	but	each	pursue	this	goal	differently.	Take,	for	example,	the	case	of	understanding	responses	to	death:	Science	and	religion	both	attempt	to	mitigate	the	pain	[of	death]	in	their	different	ways.	Science	provides	us	with	information	and	gives	us	a	means	to	change	what	can	be	physically	changed.	Religion	helps	us	to	deal	with	what	cannot	be	changed	and	with	what	can	be	alleviated	only	by	changing	the	human	heart	(Rudd	2006:400).		While	this	understanding	displays	a	bit	of	a	modernist	dichotomy,	it	also	shows	that	these	ways	of	viewing	the	world	are	not	incompatible,	only	that	they	describe	the	world	
                                                43	Don	Browning	also	suggests	that	science	can	learn	from	theological	understandings	of	the	world	(2010:5).	I	am	not	here	advocating	for	the	assimilation	of	theology	into	the	social	sciences	nor	vice	versa.	I	am	suggesting	that	dialogue	between	the	two	disciplines	may	be	mutually	beneficial.	Questions	of	methodology	will	be	addressed	more	fully	later	in	the	chapter.	44	According	to	Plantinga,	Albert	Einstein	describes	a	proper	scientist	as	a	“real	seeker	after	truth”	(2011:267).	
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through	different	means.	To	be	sure,	in	some	versions	of	each	worldview—what	Ian	Barbour	(1997)	terms	‘scientific	materialism’	and	‘Biblical	literalism’—anything	outside	a	certain	epistemology	is	deemed	false	a	priori.	While	I	take	some	issue	with	Barbour’s	choice	of	terminology,	his	point	remains	clear:	some	worldviews	remain	incompatible	with	one	another.	This	does	not	have	to	be	the	case	for	Christianity	and	science,	however,	and	has	not	been	the	case	for	much	of	the	history	of	dialogue	between	the	two	(Hauerwas	1986:65–69).45	Polkinghorne	notes:	Christian	theology	has	always	resisted	a	Manichaean	opposition	between	God	and	the	world,	believing	that	the	universe	is	God’s	creation	and	that,	in	the	Incarnation	of	the	Word	made	flesh,	the	One	by	whom	all	things	were	made	became	a	participant	in	the	history	of	the	world	(John	1:	3,	14).	As	a	consequence,	Christian	thinking	at	its	best	has	always	sought	to	be	in	a	positive	relationship	to	all	forms	of	human	knowledge,	including	science,	without	allowing	itself	to	become	distorted	by	an	improper	submission	to	the	restricted	protocols	of	purely	secular	argument…neither	science	nor	theology	should	make	the	mistake	of	supposing	that	it	can	answer	the	other’s	proper	questions.	Nevertheless,	there	has	to	be	a	consonance	between	the	answers	that	each	gives,	if	it	is	indeed	the	case	that	there	is	a	fundamental	unity	of	knowledge	about	the	one	world	of	created	reality	(2006:57).		The	unity	of	the	created	order	provides	the	possibility	for	dialogue	across	the	spectrum	of	disciplines.	One	discipline,	by	itself,	cannot	give	a	complete	view	of	the	multifaceted	nature	of	reality.	Thus,	social	science—or	any	other	discipline	for	that	matter—needs	outside	input	to	provide	a	more	complete	picture	of	reality.	The	aims	of	the	social	sciences	by	themselves	are	too	small	to	capture	the	totality	of	human	experience.			Therefore,	we	must	maintain	differences	between	the	disciplines	while	at	the	same	time	acknowledging	commonalities	that	enable	informed	dialogue.	While	Polkinghorne	suggests	that	the	unified	nature	of	reality	presents	the	possibility	for	shared	discovery,	I	contend	that	it	is	not	merely	the	created	order	itself,	but	the	triune	Creator,	through	creative,	revelatory,	and	sustaining	action,	who	provides	the	key	for	understanding	the	unified	nature	of	reality.		
                                                45	Interestingly,	Plantinga	argues	that	it	was	particularly	the	Christian	understanding	of	the	world	as	knowable	and	governed	by	universal	laws	that	allowed	empirical	science	to	flourish	in	the	West,	a	development	found	nowhere	else	in	the	world.	“This,”	he	says,	“is	no	accident:	there	is	deep	concord	between	science	and	theistic	belief”	(2011:266).	
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Towards	Knowledge	of	the	Divine	Knowledge	of	reality	is	therefore	personal	knowledge	and	existence	is	relational	at	heart	(Stump	2012:47).46	For	the	Christian,	therefore,	to	live	a	life	of	faithful	witness	in	the	world	requires	wisdom,	which	must	certainly	include	an	impassioned	commitment	to	the	triune	God.	Robert	Song	suggests	that	the	social	sciences	have	a	role	to	play	in	this	venture:	Only	as	Christians	begin	to	comprehend	some	of	the	broader	social	and	cultural	dynamics	which	are	liable	to	shape	them	as	inhabitants	of	the	modern	world	will	they	also	be	able	to	discern	more	fully	in	the	light	of	Christ	what	virtues	and	practices	are	required	of	them	if	they	are	to	be	truthful	witnesses.	Part	of	this	understanding	—	though	only	ever	a	part	—	can	be	drawn	from	engagement	with	the	work	of	social	scientists,	both	at	a	detailed	empirical	level	and	at	the	grander	level	of	social	and	cultural	theory	(2007:402).	Thus,	the	social	sciences	can	provide	valuable	insights	into	the	nature	of	social	reality,	but	their	insights,	including	about	the	effects	of	R/S	upon	health	and	well-being,	are	only	partial.	While	the	understanding	provided	by	the	past	two	chapters	are	important	in	their	own	regard,	the	Christian	must	journey	on	to	theological	enquiry	and	the	plumbing	of	depths	of	knowledge	to	which	no	social	scientific	method	can	reach.	In	so	doing,	one	may	return	with	insights	into	the	nature	of	reality	and	human	existence	that	could	not	be	gained	otherwise.		
Example:	Resilience	and	the	Limits	of	Social	Science		
Worldview,	Beliefs,	and	Resilience	Outcomes	When	faced	with	the	insufficiency	of	a	naturalistic	social	science	worldview	to	describe	human	resilience,	where	does	one	turn?	Some	social	scientists	have	begun	to	appreciate	the	“value-laden	dimensions	of	resilience”	(Panter-Brick	2014:443)	and	their	effect	upon	resilience	outcomes,	even	without	reference	to	the	supernatural.	This	area	has	been	left	untouched	for	far	too	long	by	resilience	researchers.	It	also	presents	an	interesting	predicament.	Research	indicates	that	an	individual’s	beliefs	and	worldview	affect	resilience	outcomes	(Bonanno	and	Mancini	2011:127),	yet	the	social	scientist	has	
                                                46	For	a	discussion	of	why	personhood	is	integral	to	human	being,	see	(Spaemann	1996).	
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no	way	of	assessing	the	normativity	of	beliefs	or	cultural	practices	within	a	naturalistic	framework,	only	the	ability	to	acknowledge	that	they	exist.	Slife	et	al.	(2014)	have	examined	the	difficulty	this	poses	to	an	anthropologist	studying	and	attempting	to	describe	a	non-naturalistic	culture.	Yet,	referencing	Arthur	Kleinman’s	book	(2006),	Panter-Brick	notes	the	significance	of	morality	and	values	in	aiding	individuals	to	cope	through	difficulty:	“As	Kleinman	beautifully	argued,	‘what	really	matters’	is	the	moral	dimension	of	human	experiences	where	people	live	a	life	of	great	uncertainty	and	danger”	(2014:442).	But	a	naturalistic	worldview	has	little	basis	on	which	to	make	sense	of	the	meaning	or	value	of	morality	in	the	first	place	(Polkinghorne	2006:65–66).	Still,	the	‘value-laden	dimensions	of	resilience’	may	contain	moral	or	cultural	components	that	are	significant	for	culturally	sensitive	resilience	interventions.	As	Panter-Brick	argues:	“We	see	that	a	critical	analysis	of	normative	values	in	cultural,	political,	and	historical	contexts	is	essential	to	guard	oneself	against	superficial	views	of	resilience”	(2014:443).	For	example,	research	by	Panter-Brick	on	HIV/AIDS	in	Africa	highlighted	the	need	for	resilience	studies	to	incorporate	beliefs	about	the	supernatural	into	their	framework	for	research.	Scholars	realized	that	individuals’	morality	and	religious	beliefs	affected	the	spread	of	HIV/AIDS	in	ways	that	were	unexpected.	As	Panter-Brick	summarizes:	“In	short,	understanding	the	risks	of	HIV/AIDS	has	necessitated	an	understanding	of	cosmology	as	well	as	sexual	practice”	(2014:435).	Thus,	R/S,	as	understood	individually	and	culturally,	has	more	impact	upon	resilience	than	has	often	been	acknowledged.	The	lack	of	this	understanding	has	led	to	difficulties	in	research	within	the	social	sciences	(for	instance,	in	the	study	of	HIV/AIDS)	(Panter-Brick	2014:435).	While	culture—including	the	morals	and	values	within	a	culture—can	have	a	significant	effect	on	resilience	outcomes,	there	must	be	some	means	of	identifying	a	transcultural	moral	framework	that	moves	beyond	utilitarianism.	Without	such	a	framework,	understandings	of	R/S	will	remain	at	the	level	of	description	rather	than	pre-emptively	identifying	factors	inherent	to	R/S	that	promote	resilience.			Many	social	scientific	accounts	of	resilience	seek	epistemologically	to	“flatten”	experiences	to	the	naturalistic	level	solely	of	scientifically-verifiable	human	experience.	Such	an	understanding,	however,	does	not	do	justice	to	the	objects	of	study—whether	
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individuals	or	cultures	and	their	beliefs—nor	does	it	fully	explain	the	experiences	of	individuals,	many	who	claim	to	have	had	experiences	of	a	transcendent	reality.	
Towards	a	Holistic	Approach	A	more	holistic	approach	to	resilience,	therefore,	is	necessary	in	order	to	fully	describe	the	phenomena	at	work	in	human	adaptation	to	adversity.	This	description	must	move	beyond	a	purely	naturalistic	understanding	of	the	world.	But,	if,	as	has	been	suggested,	a	naturalistic	understanding	of	resilience	is	insufficient	for	describing	the	ability	of	individuals	to	adapt	to	adversity,	what	are	the	characteristics	of	an	alternative	understanding	of	the	concept?	Furthermore,	what	place	do	religion	and	spirituality	play	in	this	‘reframed’	understanding?	Certainly,	an	account	of	resilience	that	includes	religious	and	spiritual	understandings	is	more	fully	explanatory	than	one	that	withholds	such	factors.		The	spiritual	has	been	sidelined	in	most	modern	psychological	studies	of	resilience	due	to	the	current	prevailing	biopsychosocial	paradigm	of	health	psychology	(Hatala	2013:258).	But,	against	this	common	paradigm,	Andrew	Hatala	(2011)	suggests	that	a	more	holistic	perspective	is	needed	to	capture	the	intricacies	of	the	human	person:	a	biopsychosocial-spiritual	understanding	of	the	human	person.	Similarly,	McEntee	et	al.	(2013)	argue	that	current	models	of	human	flourishing	do	not	take	into	account	the	influence	of	spirituality.	This	omission	is	a	significant	misstep,	as	much	research	indicates	that	religion	and	spirituality	do	indeed	play	a	large	role	in	health	and	flourishing.47			The	call	from	some	social	scientists	for	a	spiritual	component	to	social	scientific	understanding	of	human	beings	is	not	without	precedent.	Sociologist	Hans	Mol	noted	that	“religion	defines	man	and	his	place	in	the	universe”	(1976:x).	His	experiences	in	a	Nazi	prison	camp	in	World	War	II	led	him	to	believe	that	mere	intellectualism	did	not	provide	a	significant	enough	basis	for	survival	in	that	environment	(Mol	1976:xiii).	
                                                47	See	Chapter	2.	
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Similarly,	Victor	Frankl’s	experience	of	imprisonment	in	a	concentration	camp	showed	him	the	power	of	transcendent	meaning	making	systems	of	belief	(Frankl	1964).48			
‘Natural’	Resilience	and	‘Christian’	Resilience49	I	have	suggested	that	the	social	sciences	alone	cannot	provide	an	adequate	framework	to	capture	the	profundity	of	human	beings’	ability	to	adapt	to	and	thrive	despite	adversity.	Furthermore,	it	seems	that	many	assumptions	held	within	the	Western	world,	and	the	scientific	naturalism	that	undergirds	it,	limit	exploration	of	the	world.	In	so	doing,	these	assumptions	reduce	individuals’	ability	to	adapt	resiliently.	What	now	must	be	made	clearer	is	the	different	trajectory	and	telos	(ultimate	goal)	of	resilience	for	the	social	sciences	and	Christian	theology.			The	differences	between	theological	and	social	science	accounts	of	reality	often	play	themselves	out	in	assumptions	regarding	resilience;	for	example,	in	the	question	regarding	the	goal	of	resilience.	This	question	is	essential	to	understanding	the	construct	since	resilience	is	incoherent	as	a	concept	without	reference	to	a	goal	(telos).	The	very	term	connotes	within	it	a	movement	toward,	and	a	direction	of	that	movement.50	But	what	is	the	object	of	that	movement?	And	is	this	telos	the	same	for	social	scientific	understandings	of	resilience	as	well	as	for	theological	understandings?		Here,	then,	the	difficulty	inherent	in	this	concept	is	apparent.	If	the	goal	of	resilience	is	a	good	outcome	(Rutter	2013:474),	a	further	question	must	be	asked:	Whose	good?	Is	the	goal	the	good	of	society,	the	good	of	the	individual,	or	some	other	good?	What	is	one	to	
                                                48	It	is	suggestive	that	these	calls	for	understanding	human	nature	as	containing	a	spiritual	component	came	from	those	who	experienced	significant	adversity	in	life.	49	‘Natural’	resilience	could	also	be	termed	‘mundane’	(of	this	earth),	‘finite,’	or	‘temporal’	resilience.	‘Christian’	resilience,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	‘holy’	or	‘sanctified’	resilience	as	such.	Rather	it	is	a	conception	of	the	construct	through	the	lens	of	the	Christian	Story	for	the	people	of	God.	I	am	by	no	means	trying	to	provide	the	Christian	understanding	of	resilience,	only	a	Christian	way	of	understanding	the	concept.	Others,	coming	from	different	Christian	traditions	and	utilizing	theological	resources	from	these	traditions,	may	evaluate	resilience	quite	differently	than	I	do.	50	For	example,	a	resilient	object	returns	to	its	original	shape	after	being	misshapen	and	a	resilient	tree	springs	back	to	its	initial	position	following	the	winds	of	a	storm.	
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do	when	these	goods	come	into	conflict	with	one	another?51	For	instance,	the	resilience	concept	has	recently	been	critiqued	as	being	merely	a	tool	of	society	to	produce	better	workers	or	members	of	society	(Anderson	2015).	Thus,	some	see	the	goal	of	human	resilience	as	societal	flourishing.	Alternatively,	for	the	psychologist,	the	telos	of	resilience	usually	lies	in	the	good	outcome	of	individual	‘positive	adaptation’	(Luthar,	Suniya	S.	et	al.	2000;	Rutter	1999)	or	lack	of	psychopathology	(Nigg	et	al.	2007).	Thus,	for	the	psychologist,	individual	flourishing	is	paramount.			It	seems	that	many	scholars	within	the	social	sciences	have	been	content	to	carry	on	research	using	the	same	assumptions	made	by	most	researchers	within	the	field	and	fail	to	question	the	underlying	telos	of	resilience.	Though	some	ecologists	queried	regarding	the	goal	of	resilience:	‘Resilience	of	what	to	what?’	(Carpenter	et	al.	2001),	these	scholars	were	working	in	the	realm	of	natural	science,	not	social	science.	In	the	social	sciences	these	questions	have	only	recently	begun	to	be	addressed.	Take,	for	instance,	the	comments	by	Ann	Masten:	Defining	positive	adaptation	involves	implicit	or	explicit	value	judgments	or	criteria	about	desirable	adaptation.52	Such	judgments	are	influenced	by	cultures	of	science,	as	well	as	sociocultural	and	historical	context.	Evolutionary	biologists	may	be	concerned	with	reproductive	fitness	of	the	population,	while	child	psychologists	may	be	focused	on	individual	competence	in	age-salient	developmental	tasks.	Global	research	on	competence	and	resilience	indicates	both	commonalities	and	variation	in	these	criteria.53	Research	in	more	diverse	societies	highlights	the	variation	in	interpreted	meaning	of	similar	experiences	and	the	profound	role	of	culture	in	shaping	exposures,	responses,	and	expectations	of	children	in	adversity54	(2014:13).	By	way	of	example,	the	significance	of	differing	ways	of	defining	the	goal	of	resilience	is	apparent	in	the	telos	neurologists	Karatoreos	and	McEwen	subscribe	to	resilience:		The	primary	function	of	any	organism	is	to	survive,	reproduce,	and	ensure	that	its	genetic	material	is	successfully	transmitted	to	the	next	generation.	This	is	as	biologically	true	of	single-celled	organisms	as	it	is	of	humans	(2013:337).	
                                                51	See	(Evison	1990)	for	discussion	of	these	issues	in	relation	to	the	discipline	of	psychology.	52	See	(Masten	2001).	53	Citing	(McCormick,	Kuo,	and	Masten	2011;	Ungar	2012).	54	Citing	(Eggerman	and	Panter-Brick	2010;	Masten	and	Narayan	2012;	Ungar,	Ghazinour,	and	Richter	2013).	
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This	belief,	embedded	within	a	naturalistic	worldview,	will	have	a	significant	effect	upon	these	scientists’	understanding	of	resilience.	Given	the	impact	that	worldview	has	on	resilience	outcomes,	it	would	not	be	difficult	to	say	that	the	telos	of	resilience	they	envision	would	affect	not	only	the	way	in	which	they	personally	adapt	to	adversity,	but	also	their	assessment	of	the	methods	others	use	to	adapt.	Essentially,	the	assumed	telos	of	resilience	has	an	enormous	impact	on	one’s	conception	of	the	construct,	potentially	leading	to	vastly	different	outcomes.		
‘Christian’	Resilience	Because	the	goals	of	naturalistic	social	science	research	and	theology	are	different,	it	is	no	surprise	that	persons	influenced	by	these	ways	of	thinking	would	have	differing	understandings	of	resilience.	For	the	Christian,	the	reality	of	the	divine	necessarily	breaks	in	upon	understanding	of	the	telos	of	human	being,	and	thereby	human	resilience.	The	goal	of	the	Christian	life,	and	therefore	the	goal	of	resilience	for	the	Christian,	is	the	glorification	of	God	through	the	furthering	of	the	Kingdom	of	God.55	Thus,	resilience,	for	the	Christian,	must	be	understood	through	the	paradigm	of	the	Kingdom	of	Heaven.	As	opposed	to	an	approach	directed	by	social	science	assumptions,	John	Swinton	and	Harriet	Mowat	argue	that,	for	the	Christian,	“there	is	an	end	or	telos	that	transcends	all	particular	forms	of	action.	This	telos	constitutes	the	primary	purpose	and	meaning	of	human	life	and	the	eschatological	horizon	of	the	practical-theological	enterprise”	(2006:257).		The	paradigm	of	the	Kingdom	of	God	offers	a	different	telos	and	therefore	a	different	way	of	being-in-the-world.	I	suggest	that,	for	the	Christian,	because	of	this	a	distinction	needs	to	be	made	between	what	I	am	terming	‘natural’	resilience	and	‘Christian’	resilience.56	In	many	senses	and	in	many	applications,	‘natural’	and	‘Christian’	resilience	would	appear	to	be	the	same.	But	in	very	significant	instances,	these	constructs	may	differ	greatly.			
                                                55	E.g.	Matthew	6:33.	56	Craig	Steven	Titus	similarly	distinguishes	between	resilience	and	‘spiritual’	resilience	(2006:97).	
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Throughout	the	rest	of	this	project	I	will	attempt	to	draw	out	some	of	the	distinctions	between	these	views	of	resilience	while,	through	theological	reflection,	also	bringing	to	light	implications	for	a	‘natural’	and	‘Christian’	understanding	of	resilience.	At	the	same	time,	social	scientific	conceptions	of	resilience	will	critically	assess	theological	understandings	of	the	construct.			
‘Kinds’	of	Resilience:	Consonance	through	Creation	Though	I	am	emphasizing	the	distinction	between	‘natural’	and	‘Christian’	resilience,	there	is	also	a	significant	sense	in	which	‘natural’	resilience	cannot	be	separated	from	‘Christian’	resilience.	Because	God	is	the	Creator,	the	maker	of	resilient	bodies,	spirits,	and	systems,	any	‘natural’	resilience	inherent	in	the	created	order	is	a	result	of	God’s	sustaining	hand,	and	therefore	both	‘natural’	and	‘Christian’	resilience	are	ultimately	attributable	to	divine	goodness.	Since	the	object	of	social	science’s	study	is	the	created	order,	including	societal	constructs	shaped	by	human	involvement	in	creation,	a	robust	doctrine	of	creation	does	not	allow	‘natural’	resilience	fully	to	be	bifurcated	from	‘Christian’	resilience.			Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	in	Ethics	(1992/1993),	provides	insights	that	may	elucidate	our	discussion.	Bonhoeffer’s	distinction	between	penultimate	(vorletzte)	and	ultimate	(letzte)	goods	and,	similarly,	between	natural	life	(das	natürliche	Leben)	and	the	life	imparted	through	justification	(Rechtfertigung)	in	Christ	can	prove	useful	for	the	discussion	at	hand.	Rather	than	setting	each	dyad	(penultimate/ultimate,	nature/grace)	in	opposition,	Bonhoeffer	acknowledges	a	place	for	each:	“the	Christian	life	means	neither	a	destruction	nor	a	sanctioning	of	the	penultimate…The	penultimate	is	swallowed	up	in	the	ultimate,	and	yet	it	is	still	necessary	and	it	retains	its	right	so	long	as	the	earth	continues”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:110,	118).	The	ultimate—that	which	pertains	salvation	in	Christ—takes	precedence	over	all	else	for	Bonhoeffer.	The	penultimate—that	which	is	necessary	for	life	in	this	world	and	provides	the	conditions	needed	for,	yet	is	not	itself	the	ultimate—has	an	important,	though	not	final	place	for	the	Christian.	In	regards	to	resilience,	the	penultimate	could	be	understood	to	correspond	to	‘natural’	resilience	while	the	ultimate,	being	dependent	upon	the	gracious	salvific	work	of	God	in	Christ,	is	akin	to	‘Christian’	resilience.			
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For	Bonhoeffer,	the	penultimate	is	also	the	natural:	“that	which,	after	the	Fall,	is	directed	towards	the	coming	of	Christ”	(1993:121).	The	natural,	then,	has	an	important,	though	secondary	place	in	the	world.	It	preserves,	enables,	and	directs	towards	the	ultimate,	yet	also	“implies	an	element	of	independence	and	self-development.”	In	Bonhoeffer’s	thought,	“[t]hrough	the	Fall	the	‘creature’	becomes	‘nature’.	The	direct	dependence	of	the	creature	on	God	is	replaced	by	the	relative	freedom	of	natural	life”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:121).	The	Fall	subjected	creation	to	the	‘freedom’	to	be	independent	of	God,	but	thereby	also	separated	creation	from	the	fullness	of	life	found	in	God:	the	ultimate	telos	of	creation.	This	relative	freedom	of	the	natural	world	could	lead	some	to	regard	it	independently	from	God,	but,	for	Bonhoeffer,	this	would	be	a	misstep.	Instead,	“[t]he	natural	is	the	form	of	life	preserved	by	God	for	the	fallen	world	and	directed	towards	justification,	redemption	and	renewal	through	Christ”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:122).		Natural	life,	though	not	reliant	upon	the	creature’s	direct	dependence	upon	God,	is	still	‘preserved	by	God,’	and	thus	has	inherent	life-sustaining	capabilities.	Bonhoeffer	recognizes	in	nature	something	akin	to	what	might	be	termed	‘resilience’:	The	natural	is	the	safeguarding	of	life	against	the	unnatural.	It	is	in	the	last	analysis	life	itself	that	tends	towards	the	natural	and	keeps	turning	against	the	unnatural	and	bringing	about	its	downfall.	This,	in	the	last	analysis,	is	what	underlies	the	maintenance	and	recovery	of	physical	and	mental	health.	Life	is	its	own	physician,	whether	it	be	the	life	of	an	individual	or	the	life	of	a	community;	it	wards	off	the	unnatural	because	the	unnatural	is	a	destroyer	of	life;	only	when	life	itself	is	no	longer	able	to	offer	the	necessary	resistance	do	the	destructive	forces	of	the	unnatural	carry	off	the	victory…the	natural	endures	and	prevails	by	its	own	inherent	strength;	for	life	itself	is	on	the	side	of	the	natural	(1993:124).57	The	natural,	then,	has	an	intrinsic	resilience	within	it.	While	being	itself	penultimate	to	God’s	final	telos	for	the	world,	this	strength	nonetheless	is	attributable	to	the	sustaining	work	of	God.	This	alone,	for	Bonhoeffer,	provides	impetus	for	hope:	
                                                57	For	Bonhoeffer,	the	“unnatural	is	that	which,	after	the	Fall,	closes	its	doors	against	the	coming	of	Christ”	(1993:121).	Here,	natural	life,	however,	is	not	itself	the	ultimate	telos:	“Life	which	posits	itself	as	an	absolute,	as	an	end	in	itself,	is	its	own	destroyer…Life	in	itself,	in	the	strict	sense	of	the	word,	is	a	void,	a	plunge	into	the	abyss;	it	is	movement	without	end	and	without	purpose,	movement	into	nothing…God	desires	life,	and	He	gives	life	a	form	in	which	it	can	live,	because	if	it	is	left	to	itself	it	can	only	destroy	itself”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:125).	
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In	this	context	there	is	a	solid	basis	for	that	optimistic	view	of	human	history	which	confines	itself	within	the	limits	of	the	fallen	world…We	are	referring	here	to	an	entirely	immanent	optimism,	one	which	is	entirely	rooted	in	the	natural…It	remains	a	hope	which	is	not	altogether	without	foundation,	but	which	is	purely	immanent	and	is	therefore	never	certain	(1993:125).	Hope	based	upon	the	natural	is	‘within	the	limits	of	the	fallen	world’;	for	a	more	robust	hope,	one	founded	upon	the	ultimate,	more	is	needed.	Further,	additional	the	relationship	between	the	penultimate	and	ultimate	needs	to	be	more	clearly	delineated.			For	both	of	these	concerns,	Bonhoeffer	suggests	one	answer.	He	regards	ultimate	hope	as	well	as	the	reconciliation	of	the	divide	between	the	ultimate	and	penultimate	as	being	found	only	in	Jesus	Christ	(1993:108).58	Indeed,	Jesus	Christ	is	true	reality,	in	whom	God	and	humanity	are	reconciled	(Bonhoeffer	1993:106).	The	unity	of	human	and	divine	in	the	body	of	Jesus	Christ—by	being	the	point	of	convergence	of	penultimate	and	ultimate,	nature	and	grace—enables	the	reconciliation	of	these	dyads	in	the	being	of	the	One	who	comprises	reality	(Bonhoeffer	1993:186).	Thus,	“[i]t	is	in	relation	to	Christ	that	the	fallen	world	becomes	intelligible	as	the	world	which	is	preserved	and	sustained	by	God	for	the	coming	of	Christ”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:116).	In	Bonhoeffer’s	thinking,	the	whole	of	the	world	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	Jesus	Christ,	in	whom	both	the	reality	of	God	and	the	reality	of	the	world	are	revealed	(Bonhoeffer	1993:167).	Bonhoeffer	is	very	clear	on	this	point	and	its	significance	for	all	human	knowledge	acquisition:		The	world,	like	all	created	things,	is	created	through	Christ	and	with	Christ	as	its	end,	and	consists	in	Christ	alone	(John	1.10;	Col.	1.16).	To	speak	of	the	world	without	speaking	of	Christ	is	empty	and	abstract.	The	world	is	relative	to	Christ,	no	matter	whether	it	knows	it	or	not	(1993:179).	Thus,	the	unity	of	the	created	order	in	Christ	means	that	social	scientific	and	theological	quests	for	truth	do	not	have	to	be	at	odds	with	one	another;	rather	the	objects	of	their	study	and	the	quests	themselves	are	united	in	the	domain	of	God’s	sustaining	love	in	Christ.	Creation	itself,	through	the	continuing	work	of	the	sustaining	Redeemer,	enables	a	unified	quest	for	knowledge	wherein	nature	prepares	the	way	for	Christ.	Indeed,	
                                                58	Bonhoeffer	writes:	“The	ultimate	has	become	real	in	the	cross,	as	the	judgement	upon	all	that	is	penultimate,	yet	also	as	mercy	towards	that	penultimate	which	bows	before	the	judgement	of	the	ultimate”	(1993:109).	
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All	things	appear	distorted	if	they	are	not	seen	and	recognized	in	God.	All	so-called	data,	all	laws	and	standards,	are	mere	abstractions	so	long	as	there	is	no	belief	in	God	as	the	ultimate	reality…Any	perception	or	apprehension	of	things	or	laws	without	Him	is	now	abstraction,	detachment	from	the	origin	and	goal	(Bonhoeffer	1993:162).	The	relation	of	the	world	to	its	telos	in	God	provides	the	proper	perspective	from	which	sense	can	be	made	of	the	world	and	all	that	is	in	it.	For	Bonhoeffer,	the	world	is	a	sphere	unified	in	Christ	and	any	attempt	to	divide	it	into	separate	domains	is	to	do	violence	to	this	reality.	The	division	of	the	world	into	two	spheres—the	sacred	and	profane—is	problematic	because,	indeed,	there	is	no	reality	“outside	the	reality	that	is	in	Christ”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:169):		There	are	not	two	realities,	but	only	one	reality,	and	that	is	the	reality	of	God,	which	has	become	manifest	in	Christ	in	the	reality	of	the	world…The	reality	of	Christ	comprises	the	reality	of	the	world	within	itself.	The	world	has	no	reality	of	its	own,	independently	of	the	revelation	of	God	in	Christ	(Bonhoeffer	1993:169-170).	Any	attempt	to	denote	a	reality	outside	the	reality	of	Christ,	with	an	alternative	way	of	coming	to	know	truth,	is	to	take	away	from	the	centrality	of	God	as	the	Creator	and	Sustainer	of	the	world.	Resilience—whether	‘natural’	or	‘Christian,’	and	whether	investigated	using	the	methods	of	social	science	or	theology—must	finally	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	God	who	creates	and	sustains	life.	Such	a	claim	is	radical	in	the	face	of	the	modern	materialistic	assumptions	of	much	science,	but	it	nonetheless	undergirds	a	historic	Christian	vision	of	the	world.	The	coherence	provided	by	such	a	vision	enables	continuity	of	insight	across	diverse	domains	of	enquiry	into	the	world,	including	the	nature	of	human	resilient	adaptation	to	adversity.		To	add	to	the	social	scientific	account	of	resilience,	then,	we	turn	to	dialogue	with	Christian	theological	sources	that	attest	to	“the	reality	of	God,	the	Creator,	Reconciler	and	Redeemer”	(Bonhoeffer	1993:161).		
Possibilities	in	Christian	Theology	I	believe	that,	beyond	the	contributions	of	religion	and	spirituality	in	general	to	resilience,	the	Christian	faith,	in	particular,	has	significant	explanatory	power	for	this	concept.	It	is	in	the	particularity	of	the	Christian	faith	that	it	has	potential	for	insight	
	 	 	
130	
into	resilience.	Therefore,	it	should	not	be	reduced	to	the	‘lowest	common	denominator’	with	other	religions	so	as	to	make	it	more	palatable	for	secular	consumption.59	The	Christian	theologian,	speaking	from	within	the	Church,	has	answers	to	offer	the	world	that	can	be	found	in	no	other	place.			Despite	these	possibilities,	it	is	clear	that	there	are	also	very	real	differences	between	the	social	science	conception	of	‘natural’	resilience	and	this	theologian’s	idea	of	‘Christian’	resilience.	As	displayed	by	Karatoreos	and	McEwen’s	proposed	goal	of	resilience,	‘natural’	resilience	could	be	characterized	by	the	adage	‘survival	at	any	cost.’	As	opposed	to	this,	‘Christian’	resilience	must	be	primarily	concerned	with	the	goals	of	the	Kingdom	of	Heaven:	loving	God	and	loving	others.60		Thus,	Christian	theology	and	theological	ways	of	viewing	the	world	are	not	‘at	home’	in	a	naturalist	way	of	viewing	the	world.	This	presents	both	unique	possibilities	and	unique	challenges	(Hauerwas	1985:39–40).	For	instance,	the	naturalistic	presuppositions	inherent	in	many	social	science	accounts	of	the	world	do	not	allow	for	insight	to	be	garnered	from	sources	attesting	to	non-scientifically-verifiable	phenomena.	At	best,	certain	anthropological	insights	from	the	theological	undertaking	may	be	appropriated	to	garnish	ideas	already	firmly	fixed	in	naturalistic	presuppositions.	Any	true	integration	of	theological	insights	into	the	social	sciences	would	require	the	acknowledgement	of	the	possibility	of	divine	influence.61		As	I	detailed	in	the	last	chapter,	religion	(generally	conceived)	may	increase	resilience	through,	among	other	things:	providing	a	positive	worldview,	meaning	and	purpose,	psychological	integration,	hope	and	motivation,	personal	empowerment,	a	sense	of	control,	role	models	for	suffering,	guidance	for	decision-making,	answers	to	ultimate	questions,	and	social	support	(Koenig	2006:38–42).	Christianity,	as	a	particular	religion,	should	be	understood	to	increase	resilience	outcomes	in	ways	similar	to	those	listed	here.	But	theological	reflection	is	needed	not	only	to	understand	how	these	‘benefits’	
                                                59	Cf.	(Hauerwas	1985:23–25)	and	(Vanhoozer	2007:32).	60	E.g.	Matthew	22:36-40.	61	Though	many	social	scientists	remain	firmly	planted	in	naturalist	assumptions,	others	maintain	alternative	viewpoints.	
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are	adopted,	but	also	whether	these	‘benefits’	are	the	appropriate	aim	of	the	Christian	faith	in	the	first	place.	In	the	process	of	such	theological	reflection,	we	will	uncover	additional	insights	and	understandings	that	may	both	confirm	and	challenge	social	science	research.62			Resilience,	for	the	Christian,	must	be	understood	through	the	lens	of	the	Christian	Story.63	From	the	perspective	of	this	study,	the	Christian	faith	is	not	an	addendum	to	the	study	of	resilience;	nor	is	it	interchangeable	with	other	faiths	or	reducible	to	spirituality	or	components	thereof.64	I	contend	that	the	Christian	faith	can	provide	an	account	of	what	lies	at	the	heart	of	human	resilience.			
Sources	of	Theological	Insight	The	Judeo-Christian	tradition	is	replete	with	texts	encouraging	resilience	as	well	as	stories	of	those	who	have	been	resilient	through	their	faith.65	Christian	resilience,	however,	must	be	understood	primarily	through	the	life,	death,	resurrection,	and	ascension	of	Jesus	Christ.66	These	are	the	paradigmatic	events	of	the	Christian	story	and	thereby,	for	the	Christian,	become	symbols	of	the	Christian	life	and	the	means	of	participating	in	God.	In	this	way,	they	not	only	are	viewed	as	historical	realities,	but	also	as	representations	of	and	the	means	by	which	life	comes	to	the	Christian:	through	dying	and	rebirth.	This	understanding	is	central	to	a	Christian	conception	of	resilience,	yet	‘Christian’	resilience	cannot	be	equated	with	these	events.		
                                                62	Indeed,	the	impact	of	the	Christian	faith	can	only	be	partially	measured	by	the	social	sciences.	The	changes	brought	about	by	participation	in	the	Kingdom	of	God	(such	as	salvation)	cannot	be	measured	by	the	modern	social	scientist.	Cf.	(Cook	2012:228).		63	This	will	be	the	focus	of	the	next	chapter.	64	See	Michael	Jensen’s	helpful	discussion	(2012:25–26).	Significantly,	in	terms	that	will	prove	important	in	the	following	chapter,	for	the	Christian,	identity	cannot	be	moved	to	the	sidelines	or	otherwise	explained	away	by	non-religious	factors	(Jensen	2012:184).	65	By	way	of	example,	Isaiah	40:28-31	and	Hebrews	11	are	two	such	texts.	66	Andrew	Root	suggests	the	“death-to-life,	life-out-of-death	paradigm”	of	the	theologia	
crucis	as	the	unifying	theme	of	Christian	practical	theology	(Root	2014:83).	I	will	further	develop	this	theme	in	the	next	chapter.	
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Several	authors	have	written	specifically	on	the	intersection	of	resilience	and	Christian	theology.67	The	most	significant	of	these	works	is	Resilience	and	the	Virtue	of	Fortitude:	
Aquinas	in	Dialogue	with	the	Psychosocial	Sciences	by	Craig	Steven	Titus	(2006).	This	book	evaluates	social	science	resilience	research	in	light	of	Thomas	Aquinas’	virtue	theory,	and	in	particular	the	virtue	of	fortitude,	and	provides	a	thorough	and	compelling	analysis.	Also	important	is	M.	Jan	Holton’s	Building	the	Resilient	Community	(2011)	which	focuses	on	lessons	learned	about	resilient	faith	communities	garnered	through	her	work	with	the	‘Lost	Boys’	of	Sudan.		Other	works	have	been	undertaken	such	as	Resilient	Pastors:	The	Role	of	Adversity	in	
Healing	and	Growth	(Allain-Chapman	2012),	Resilient	Ministry:	What	Pastors	Told	us	
about	Surviving	and	Thriving	(Burns,	Chapman,	and	Guthrie	2013),	and	The	Resilient	
Pastor:	Ten	Principles	for	Developing	Pastoral	Resilience	(Searby	2015).	These	books	focus	mostly	on	the	application	of	resilience	principles	to	pastors	and	are	therefore	more	practice-oriented	than	theoretical.	Additionally,	several	articles	have	explored	the	theme	of	resilience	from	a	theological	perspective.	Jim	Dekker	(2011)	suggests	that	theology	might	help	reveal	what	God	is	doing	through	situations	of	adversity	in	the	lives	of	youth.	Carrie	Doehring	(2015)	posits	that	resilience	primarily	consists	of	spiritually	integrating	moral	dilemmas.68	David	Bosworth	(2011)	suggests	the	biblical	King	David	as	a	model	of	resilience,	and,	more	generally,	Siang-Yang	Tan	(2013)	attempts	to	survey	resilience	and	post	traumatic	growth	from	the	perspective	of	a	Christian	psychologist.	In	similar	fashion,	scholars	have	written	on	the	intersection	of	theology	and	concepts	closely	related	to	resilience,	such	as	post	traumatic	growth	(Yun	2011),69	trauma	(Beste	2007;	Desmond	2012;	McGowan	2009;	Rambo	2010b),	and	hope	(Breitbart	and	Heller	
                                                67	Others	do	not	specifically	address	the	concept	of	resilience,	but	use	the	term	in	a	theological	manner.	For	instance,	Cardinal	Avery	Dulles	wrote	The	Resilient	Church:	The	
Necessity	and	Limits	of	Adaptation	(1977)	to	address	issues	that	the	Roman	Catholic	church	was	facing	following	the	Second	Vatican	Council.	Dulles	encourages	Roman	Catholics	toward	embracing	a	church	that	is	rooted	in	history	and	tradition	yet	that	is	adaptive	as	to	the	means	of	furthering	the	Kingdom	of	God	on	this	earth.	68	While	this	certainly	can	be	a	significant	portion	of	resilient	adaptation,	I	do	not	believe	that	it	encompasses	the	entirety	of	the	concept.	69	Joanna	Collicutt	McGrath	(2006)	fascinatingly	suggests	the	concept	of	post-traumatic	growth	as	a	means	of	describing	the	growth	of	the	early	church.	
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2003;	Kwan	2010).	Though	these	studies	do	not	specifically	address	resilience,	their	insights	will	be	beneficial	and	have	implications	for	the	current	study.		To	date	there	has	been	little	comprehensive	theological	evaluation	of	resilience,	the	assumptions	undergirding	the	concept,	or	the	possibilities	for	constructive	dialogue	between	the	social	sciences	and	theology	on	this	subject.	This	project	aims	to	further	a	broader	discussion	toward	that	end.	For	this	effort,	I	will	enter	into	a	dialogue	with	philosophers,	theologians—medieval	and	modern—and	biblical	texts.70	I	will	aim	to	integrate	theological	insight	with	social	science	and	philosophical	perspectives	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	more	complete	understanding	of	resilience.	To	appreciate	further	the	possibility	of	a	theological	assessment	of	resilience,	I	must	also	address	the	challenges	that	such	a	view	presents.			
Challenges	Accorded	by	a	Christian	Understanding	of	Resilience	While	the	Christian	faith	presents	many	possibilities	for	enhancing	understandings	of	resilience,	it	also	poses	several	significant	challenges	to	social	scientific	understandings	of	resilience.	Of	primary	importance	is	the	way	in	which	the	death,	resurrection,	and	ascension	of	Jesus	Christ	challenge	‘secular’	conceptions	of	resilience.	Because	Jesus	Christ	died	an	early	death	without	ever	producing	physical	progeny,	in	many	senses	he	could	represent	the	antithesis	of	resilience,	as	defined	by	secular	naturalists.71	Furthermore,	his	teachings	promote	seemingly	non-resilient	behavior,	such	as	willfully	forsaking	claim	to	one’s	life.72	From	a	naturalistic	worldview	the	life	and	teachings	of	Jesus	do	not	make	sense—and	rightly	so.	A	different	perspective	is	needed	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	radical	reshaping	of	the	world	in	Christ.	
                                                70	In	so	doing,	I	will	not	be	attempting	a	‘biblical	theology’	of	resilience	of	the	type	described	by	David	Kelsey	(1975:24).	Rather,	primarily	in	chapter	6,	I	will	be	drawing	on	scripture	as	insight	into	the	transformative	purposes	of	God	for	this	world,	past,	present,	and	future.	In	this	way,	my	use	of	scripture	would	fall	more	in	line,	though	not	fully,	with	what	Kelsey	terms	‘rendering	as	an	agent’	(1975:39)	in	which	scripture	is	conceived	of	as	the	agent	whereby	humanity	can	encounter	God.	I	differ	from	Kelsey’s	construal	of	this	position	in	that	I	would	maintain	that	scripture	retains	an	inherent,	communally	affirmed,	as	well	as	functional	authority.	A	position	closer	to	my	own	is	that	advocated	by	Stephen	Fowl	(1998:6–9).	71	E.g.	(Karatoreos	and	McEwen	2013).	72	E.g.	Matthew	10:38-39;	Matthew	16:24-26;	Mark	8:34-35;	Luke	9:23-25;	Luke	14:26-27.	
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	These	tensions	are	exacerbated	in	the	case	of	understanding	resilient	adaptation	because	Christians	are	exhorted	to	follow	the	example	of	Christ	and	view	the	world	through	the	paradigmatic	events	of	Christ’s	life.73	This	raises	several	important	questions:	Since	Christians	follow	a	Savior	who	was	crucified,	could	the	pursuit	of	life	and	flourishing,	as	conceived	of	in	worldly	terms,	be	at	odds	with	it	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002:102–5)?	Moreover,	what	does	it	mean	to	follow	a	God	who,	even	in	heaven,	maintains	the	scars	of	his	suffering	and	looks	like	a	Lamb	who	was	slain	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002:117)?74	What	implications	does	this	have	for	understanding	suffering	and	resilience?	Finally,	given	that	self-sacrifice	is	the	norm	for	the	Christian,	one	could	ask	whether	resilience	(secularly	construed)	is	even	a	proper	goal	for	the	Christian?75	As	von	Balthasar	suggests,	the	teachings	of	Christ	do	“…not	mean	that	every	single	Christian	must	suffer	bloody	[bodily]	martyrdom,	but	he	must	consider	the	entire	case	as	the	external	representation	of	the	inner	reality	out	of	which	he	lives”	(1994:22).	Could	it	be	that	the	Christian	narrative	reshapes	how	individuals	understand	human	well-being,	and	therefore	resilience?	If	there	is	such	a	thing	as	‘Christian	resilience,’	then,	what	does	it	look	like?			I	will	address	these	questions	over	the	course	of	the	coming	chapters	in	order	to	give	a	more	adequate	account	of	a	Christian	understanding	of	resilience.	These	reflections	may	also	provide	a	critique	of	social	scientific	views	of	the	concept	in	a	way	that	can	mutually	enrich	both	disciplines.	Rather	than	weakening	the	concept	of	resilience,	I	believe	that	such	reflection	will	strengthen	and	enrich	understandings	of	how	humans	adapt	to	difficulty.	What	must	be	assessed	now,	however,	is	how	insights	about	resilience	can	be	integrated	across	disciplines.		
                                                73	E.g.	Romans	6:4-11;	1	Corinthians	15:1-32;	Galatians	2:20;	Colossians	1:24.	74	Revelation	5:6.	75	See	(Jensen	2012:3–7,	99).	
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Integration:	Questions	of	Methodology		
Insights	from	the	Social	Sciences	The	integration	of	insight	across	the	disciplines	of	theology	and	the	social	sciences	is	not	as	straightforward	as	it	might	seem	at	first	glance.	Some	would	argue	that	such	a	dialogue	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable.76	Others	suggest	that	it	is	possible,	but	differ	about	how	it	should	be	accomplished.77	For	this	study,	I	draw	upon	Paul	Ricoeur,	who	suggests	the	possibility	of	“a	genuine	interconnection	of	science	and	religion,	on	the	edge	of	mystery”	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi)	where	each	discipline	has	a	voice	that	is	“at	once	distinct	and	complementary”	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi).		Beginning,	as	in	this	study,	with	research	from	the	social	sciences	has	provided	insight	into	resilient	adaptation	to	adversity.	However,	the	identification	of	ways	individuals	respond	resiliently	to	adversity	does	not	mean	that	we	can	proceed	from	there	to	understanding	the	material	causes	of	this	adaptation.	In	this	dialogue,	social	scientific	understandings	of	resilience	are	beneficial	because	they	provide	one	means	of	describing	human	life,	particularly	at	one	locus	of	possible	human	interaction	with	the	divine:	adversity.	The	social	sciences,	rightly	construed,	can	provide	much	insight	into	human	adaption	to	adversity.	This	insight	must	be	understood	as	one	set	of	insights	into	the	world	rather	than	as	fully	explanatory	itself.	Thus,	social	science	research	should	be	placed	in	relation	to	a	theological	understanding	of	the	nature	of	reality.	What	now	must	be	attended	to	more	closely	is	the	role	of	divine	action	in	human	response	to	adversity.		
	
Practical	Theology	and	Divine	Action	Practical	theology	as	a	discipline	attempts	to	explore	the	relationship	between	divine	and	human	action	in	the	world.	Swinton	and	Mowat	define	practical	theology	as	“critical,	theological	reflection	on	the	practices	of	the	Church	as	they	interact	with	the	
                                                76	E.g.	(Segal	2006).	77	See,	for	instance,	Stephen	Pattison’s	‘critical	conversation’	model	based	on	Paul	Tillich’s	critical	correlation	model	(2000),	Deborah	van	Deusen	Hunsinger’s	‘Chalcedonian’	model	(1995),	and	Andrew	Root’s	‘Christopraxis’	model	(2014).	
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practices	of	the	world,	with	a	view	to	ensuring	and	enabling	faithful	participation	in	God’s	redemptive	practices	in,	to	and	for	the	world”	(2006:6).	The	relationship	between	divine	and	human	action	is	fundamental	to	practical	theology	and	has	significant	implications	for	a	theological	understanding	of	resilience.		Some	believe,	however,	that	practical	theology	has	become	too	focused	on	human	action	to	the	detriment	of	attention	to	divine	action.	Andrew	Root	suggests	that		Practical	theology	has	been	able	to	create	rich	projects	on	human	action	in	relation	to	church	life,	society,	and	pastoral	practice.	But	these	fruitful	articulations	have	not	always	sailed	practical	theology	into	the	deep	waters	of	exploring	divine	action,	therefore	missing,	in	my	mind,	the	generative	and	problematic	nature	of	practical	theology…[D]ivine	action,	if	we	are	to	contend	that	it	is	real—that	is,	a	reality—is	a	transcendent	mystery	(2014:ix).78		Attention	to	divine	action	does	not	diminish	the	realm	of	human	action.	Indeed,	it	brings	more	clarity	to	it.79	Rightly	conceived,	all	Christian	theology	is	practical	and	has	‘real	world’	implications.	Thus,	relevance	to	human	lived	experience	proceeds	from	the	being	of	God	which	expresses	itself	through	action,	rather	than	from	a	human	starting	point.80	It	is	the	task	of	the	Church—and	therefore	also	of	the	theologian—to	“speak	about	God,	and…to	take	on	the	further	task	of	criticizing	and	revising	its	speech	about	God,	asking	what	Christian	utterance	can	and	should	say	today”	(White	2009:112).81	This	task	can	only	be	accomplished	because	God	continues	to	be	at	work	in	this	world	shaping	lives	and	advancing	the	Kingdom	of	God.82		Thus,	I	contend	that	divine	action	is	not	only	possible,	but	also	has	very	real	implications	for	the	daily	lived	experience	of	those	facing	adversity.	That	is	to	say,	
                                                78	Similar	cautions	regarding	the	loss	of	the	centrality	of	divine	action	in	practical	theology	have	been	given	by	Stephen	Pattison	(2007:245,	257).	79	Root	suggests	that	attention	to	transcendence	and	divine	action	is	immensely	practical	since	divine	action	results	in	“distinct	experiences	with	God	that	[individuals]	believe	are	concrete,	lived,	and	real.	These	very	experiences	direct	their	lives	in	formative	ways…These	experiences	are	bound	in	a	reality	that	they	claim	is	beyond	them,	a	reality	that	transcends	them,	but	which	is	nevertheless	real	to	them	and	real	in	the	most	practical	way”	(Root	2014:x).	80	Cf.	(Bonhoeffer	1996:84–85)	and	(Root	2014:93).	81	Citing	(Barth	1936:3,	16).	82	Root	calls	this	‘Christopraxis,’	“the	continued	ministering	presence	of	Christ”	(2014:xii).	
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divine	action	meets	human	experience	in	a	way	significant	for	resilience.	Such	a	‘superempirical’	viewpoint	starts	from	“the	possibility	that	the	transcendent	referent	of	human	spirituality	is	real	rather	than	simply	functionally	present”	(Swinton	2001:84).83	While	it	certainly	is	possible	that	some	so-called	‘encounters’	with	the	divine	are	figments	of	the	imagination,	a	total	dismissal	of	the	possibility	of	divine	action	calls	into	question	the	experiences	of	many	as	well	as	the	entire	Christian	understanding	of	the	world.	On	the	other	hand,	allowing	for	the	possibility	of	divine	action	gives	credence	to	the	testimony	of	many	who	claim	to	have	experienced	God	and	to	have	been	changed.84		Christian	resilience,	if	it	is	to	be	truly	Christian	in	any	sense,	must	include	a	conception	of	divine	action.	Because	of	this,	we	must	also	allow	for	an	understanding	of	how	divine	and	human	action	relate	in	the	context	of	human	resilience.	While	this	relation	is	ultimately	mysterious,	some	observations	can	be	made	about	it.	Examination	of	different	manifestations	of	this	relationship	will	be	the	subjects	of	future	chapters.		
Methodologies	of	Integration85	Such	an	undertaking,	however,	must	be	done	with	‘fear	and	trepidation.’86	We	provide	“human	epistemological	‘best	accounts’	of	an	ontological	reality	of	divine	action,	of	how	the	eternal	breaks	into	time	and	does	so	in	concrete,	lived	experience”	(Root	2014:59).87	Our	‘best	accounts’	are	by	nature	fallible	and	must	be	embraced	with	humility,	acknowledging	our	limitations	as	human	beings.	Because	of	our	fallible	understanding,	insights	taken	from	the	social	sciences	certainly	can	and	should	critique	
                                                83	Indeed,	belief	in	God	as	a	reality	as	opposed	to	belief	in	God	as	a	myth	makes	a	difference	in	health	outcomes	(Testoni	et	al.	2016).	84	See,	for	instance,	those	interviewed	by	Root	(2014:35ff)	and	Susan	Shooter	(2012).	85	I	would	agree	with	Fraser	Watts’	assessment	that	“there	is	no	radical	incompatibility”	between	theology	and	psychology	(2002:7)	as	well	as	Tillich’s	assertion	that	“[t]here	is	no	conflict	between	faith	in	its	true	nature	and	reason	in	its	true	nature”	(1957:80).	But,	as	Watts	notes,	the	disciplines	are	quite	heterogeneous.	Therefore,	I	would	suggest	that	a	social	science	account	that	is	rooted	in	naturalistic	assumptions	may	provide	insight	but	cannot	be	fully	integrated	with	a	theological	account	of	the	world	at	a	fundamental	level.	One	should	also	keep	in	mind	the	cautions	given	by	van	Deusen	Hunsinger	on	the	‘asymmetrical’	relationship	between	the	disciplines	due	to	the	radical	alterity	of	God’s	being	(1995:xi–xii).	86	What	F.	LeRon	Shults	call	“apophatic	humility”	(2006:498).	87	Thus,	for	Root,	ontology	takes	precedence	over	epistemology	(2014:15).	
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theological	understandings	of	scripture	and	tradition.	These	critiques,	however,	remain	at	the	level	of	hermeneutics,	not	fundamental	content.88	Of	primary	importance,	the	radical	in-breaking	of	Jesus	Christ	as	revealed	in	the	narrative	of	scripture,	provides	the	basis	for	the	faith	of	the	people	of	God.		Thus,	both	theological	and	social	scientific	understandings	can	be	brought	into	question,	though	the	primacy	of	revelation	as	a	norm	is	held.	Questions	of	hermeneutics,	textual	interpretation,	and	theological	understandings	are	open	to	criticism,	but	not	the	ultimate	reality	of	the	in-breaking	revelation	of	God.	The	fact	of	revelation	makes	it	primary;	notwithstanding	the	necessity	of	interpretive	frameworks,	which	are	fallible	and	in	need	of	critical	judgment.	Experience,	reason,	and	tradition	are	needed	in	this	task.89	What	is	clear	is	that	the	assumptions	inherent	in	naturalistic	social	science	theory	at	odds	with	prima	facie	theological	truths,	such	as	the	possibility	of	divine	action,	are	to	be	rejected.90		While	others	doing	similar	research	on	the	intersection	of	theology	and	psychology	have	used	a	mutually	critical	correlation	methodology,	such	as	those	proposed	by	David	Tracy	(1975),	Don	Browning	(2010)	and	Stephen	Pattison	(2000),91	I	will	take	a	different	path.	Referring	to	the	integration	of	Christian	ethics	and	moral	psychology,	Don	Browning	summarizes	the	mutually	critical	correlation	methodology:	“Christian	ethics	must	critique	these	psychologies	at	the	same	time	that	it	learns	from	them”	(2006:3).	With	Swinton	and	Mowat	(2006:77–97)	I	acknowledge	many	of	the	benefits	of	such	a	methodological	model,	but	also	recognize	the	danger	in	giving	the	same	priority	to	human	knowledge	as	to	revelatory	knowledge.	As	Swinton	and	Mowat	ask,	“Can	the	social	sciences	really	challenge	theology	at	a	fundamental	level”	(2006:83)?	If	so,	this	would	seem	to	give	epistemological	priority	to	the	social	sciences.	Alternatively,	
                                                88	See	Root’s	critique	of	the	revised	critical	correlation	method	(Root	2014:273–76).	89	Wesley’s	quadrilateral	may	provide	insight	here.	Cf.	(Thorsen	2005).	90	Don	Browning	suggests	that	“contemporary	moral	psychology	can	contribute	to	
Christian	ethics,	but	only	when	it	does	its	research	with	competent	pre-scientific	or	pre-
empirical	understandings	of	morality”	(2006:2).	He	continues:	“moral	psychology	must	build	its	empirical	work	on	pre-empirical	philosophical	and	even	theological	assumptions”	which	is	possible	because	“Western	philosophy	and	theology	have	been	investigating	human	behavior	for	centuries”	(2006:6).	91	E.g.	(Doehring	2010;	Hogue	2010;	Miller-McLemore	2010).	
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building	on	Deborah	van	Deusen	Hunsinger’s	‘Chalcedonian’	model	of	integration	(1995),92	they	propose	a	model	which	maintains	critical	dialogue	but	also	the	primacy	of	the	Divine	Word.	Their	model	makes	needed	changes	to	Hunsinger’s	‘Chalcedonian’	model	by	suggesting	the	core	principles	of	hospitality,	conversion,	and	critical	faithfulness	for	interdisciplinary	dialogue	(Swinton	and	Mowat	2006:91–94).	Finally,	any	model	of	integration	that	is	adopted	must	both	respect	and	preserve	distinctions	between	disciplines	while	also	synthesizing	insights	garnered	from	multiple	disciplines	(Hunsinger	1995:69,	75).	Such	distinctions	are	necessary	to	ensure	disciplinary	boundaries	and	to	provide	proper	rules	for	interdisciplinary	dialogue.		Within	the	interdisciplinary	field	that	studies	the	intersection	of	theology	and	psychology,	several	models	for	integration	have	been	proposed.	Fraser	Watt’s	suggestion	of	psychology	and	theology	as	‘complementary	perspectives’	is	helpful	in	this	regard	(2002:8–10).	Additionally,	Crystal	Park	and	Raymond	Paloutzian	(2005)	suggest	that	the	disciplines	of	psychology	and	the	study	of	religion	may	be	integrated	with	the	social	sciences	using	two	key	models:	a	multilevel	interdisciplinary	paradigm93	and	religion	as	meaning-making	model.94	Titus	uses	Stephen	Pope’s	critical	appropriation	model	for	interdisciplinary	insight.	This	model	allows	each	discipline	to	sharpen	the	other,	yet	also	provides	the	possibility	for	them	to	be	synthesized	(Titus	2006:93).95		
                                                92	Van	Deusen	Hunsinger	bases	her	model	on	Karl	Barth’s	theology	(1995:62–66).	93	This	model	“recognizes	the	value	of	data	at	multiple	levels	of	analysis	while	making	nonreductive	assumptions	concerning	the	value	of	spiritual	and	religious	phenomena”	(Emmons	and	Paloutzian	2003:395).	Similarly,	Hatala	suggests	a	methodology	he	calls	“multilevel	integrative	analysis”	which	attempts	to	“dismantle	conceptual	borders	between	nature	and	nurture,	biology	and	psychology,	or	science	and	spirituality”	(2013:259).	94	E.g.	(Park	2005;	Park	and	Folkman	1997;	Silberman	2005).	95	Titus	notes,	“Even	if	these	scientific	methods	focus	on	different	specific	domains	of	human	action,	we	need	an	overarching	perspective	that	integrates	and	synthesizes	the	others…Within	such	a	critical	appropriation	perspective,	the	next	question	involves	how	a	theological	approach	elevates	and	completes	psychosocial	observations,	information,	and	explanations”	(2006:93–94).	
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Phronesis	and	Interdisciplinary	Dialogue	Dialogue	between	disciplines	(such	as	this	study	attempts),	is	not	superfluous,	rather	it	is	a	necessity	for	properly	understanding	the	world.96	As	Root	notes,	“[r]eality	itself	pushes	us	into	and	out	of	such	interdisciplinary	conversation”	(2014:284).	This	dialogue	cannot	be	accomplished	without	a	preliminary	set	of	‘ground	rules,’	however.	These	rules	help	to	dictate	the	terms	and	shape	of	the	conversation.	John	Milbank	suggests	“the	possibility	of	theology	as	a	meta	discourse”	by	which	other	disciplines	can	be	understood	(1990:1).97		For	Milbank,	any	attempt	to	synthesize	Christian	theology	with	‘secular	reason’	is	fraught	with	danger	in	which	Christianity	“may	be	perversely	compromising	with	what,	on	its	own	terms,	is	either	deviancy	or	falsehood”	(1990:23).	Here	the	lure	of	power	and	the	complicity	of	some	within	the	Church	in	supporting	worldly	power	structures	and	presuppositions	based	in	human	understanding	stand	as	warnings	to	those	who	would	do	likewise.	Alasdair	MacIntyre	suggests,	“the	secular	world	must	accept	Christianity	on	its	own	terms	and	not	on	the	terms	of	a	secularized	universe”	(1981:130).	As	opposed	to	worldly	power	structures	and	belief	systems	that	prioritize	human	power	and	rationality,	Milbank	proposes	the	idea	“of	theology	as	itself	a	social	science,	and	the	queen	of	the	sciences	for	the	inhabitants	of	the	altera	civitas,	on	pilgrimage	through	this	temporary	world”	(1990:380).	98	In	this	view,	theological	accounts	of	the	world	stand	as	
                                                96	Green	writes,	“The	uniqueness	of	the	revelation	to	which	Christians	bear	witness	is	best	served,	not	by	trying	to	immunize	it	against	criticism	by	isolating	it	conceptually,	but	rather	by	freely	exploring	its	manifold	relations	with	other	human	phenomena”	(1998:40).	97	As	I	suggested	earlier	in	this	chapter,	this	is	in	opposition	to	using	the	meta-narrative	of	naturalism	as	a	basis	for	enquiry	regarding	the	nature	of	the	world.	In	this	regard,	Alister	McGrath	suggests	that	ontology	of	the	created	order	allows	“the	Christian	narrative	to	be	seen	as	a	meta-discourse	which	intentionally	seeks	to	embrace	all	human	life	and	activity”	(2002:110).	Yet,	we	must	be	careful	to	distinguish	between	a	naturalist	epistemology,	which	is	a	necessary	aspect	of	the	scientific	method,	and	a	naturalist	ontology.	98	While	these	assertions	are	helpful	in	suggesting	the	primacy	of	the	Divine	Word,	they	must	not	be	seen	as	precluding	the	possibility	of	mutual	dialogue	between	disciplines,	something	that	Milbank	may	tend	towards.	Alastair	McGrath	shares	these	critiques	of	Milbank	(McGrath	2002:119).	These	views	must	be	tempered	by	an	attention	to	the	fallibility	of	human	knowledge—a	point	I	will	highlight	through	engagement	with	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy.	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	especially	suited,	Boyd	Blundell	argues,	to	
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the	basis	for	understanding	all	aspects	of	life.	Such	a	perspective	is	founded	in	the	historical	specificity	of	the	Christian	faith	and	the	divine	in-breaking	into	the	world	of	Jesus	Christ.	This	is	understood,	Stump	argues,	through	the	biblical	narratives	that	together	constitute	a	meta-narrative—a	story	within	which	all	experiences	of	life,	including	suffering,	and	God	can	coexist	(2012:22).			Yet	founding	accounts	of	reality	in	the	Christian	faith	does	not	remove	the	Christian	to	esoteric	realms	of	indifference.	Instead,	all	other	aspects	of	the	world	begin	to	fit	into	their	proper	place	as	a	result	of	this	primary	move.99	Kevin	Vanhoozer	suggests	that	various	disciplines	should	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	“distinct	activities	and	‘mission’	statements.”	For	Vanhoozer	(dealing	specifically	with	the	fields	of	philosophy	and	theology),	these	disciplines	pursue	two	distinct	yet	variously	related	missions,	each	concerned	with,	among	other	things,	clarifying,	providing	guidance	and	truth-telling—in	short,	with	the	search	for	wisdom	and	understanding…What	we	have	here	are	two	distinct	yet	related	discourses:	the	philosopher	(and	genius)	says	how	the	world	goes;	the	theologian	(and	apostle)	says	how	the	Word	goes.	The	discourses	are	related	because	each	ultimately	pertains	to	understanding	the	real	world	in	which	humans	dwell	and	seek	to	live	well,	yet	they	are	also	distinct:	the	one	works	with	universal	human	experience,	the	other	binds	itself	to	the	authority	of	the	canonical	Scriptures	that	attest	Christ	(2007:35).100		Christian	theology	must	be	defined	by	and	grounded	in	scripture,	which	provides	the	narrative	of	God’s	action	in	this	world,	yet	be	informed	by	accounts	of	reality	provided	by	other	sources.	Such	an	approach	is	grounded	in	the	community	of	the	ecclesia	and	finds	expression	through	Christian	praxis.	This	praxis	could	also	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	phronesis,	practical	wisdom.101	Integration	between	
                                                enable	the	engagement	of	theology	with	other	disciplines	in	an	era	where	theology	is	no	longer	regarded	as	“the	queen	of	the	sciences”	(2011:127).	99	Thus,	C.S.	Lewis’	statement,	“I	believe	in	Christianity	as	I	believe	that	the	Sun	has	risen,	not	only	because	I	see	it,	but	because	by	it	I	see	everything	else”	(1962:165).	Significantly,	Lewis’	statement	is	the	summation	of	comments	regarding	the	integration	of	theological	and	scientific	truth.	100	Vanhoozer	draws	upon	Kierkegaard	for	the	examples	of	the	genius	and	apostle.	Vanhoozer	sets	up	a	dichotomy	between	these	archetypes	or,	in	other	words,	between	the	recipient	of	natural	knowledge	and	the	recipient	of	revelation	(2007:34).	101	See	(Walton	2014)	on	the	use	of	phronesis	in	practical	theology.	Care	must	be	taken,	Martha	Nussbaum	suggests,	to	note	the	limits	of	phronesis,	especially	in	relation	to	tragedy	(2002:265).	
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scientific	and	religious	understanding	lies	in	“experience”	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi),	that	is,	phronetic	application	within	the	person.	Thus,	science	and	theology	can	be	integrated	in	the	person	who	acts	with	practical	wisdom.		
Christian	Phronesis	I	suggest	that	a	Christian	conception	of	phronesis,	practical	wisdom,	can	act	as	a	unifying	concept	in	the	pursuit	of	truth	through	both	theology	and	the	social	sciences.102	Wisdom	from	each	discipline	provides	both	insight	into	the	nature	of	reality	as	well	as	practical	implications	for	real	life.	The	common	pursuit	of	truth	does	not	ensure	lack	of	conflict,	however.	Where	there	is	disagreement	it	becomes	necessary	to	assert	the	primacy	of	theology’s	meta-narrative	in	this	dialogue;	from	epistemological	presuppositions	to	practical	application,	wisdom	is	required	in	the	pursuit	and	integration	of	truth	across	disciplines.		This	emphasis	on	Christian	phronesis	is	not	unlike	David	Ford’s	suggestion	of	Christian	wisdom	as	an	overarching	hermeneutical	principle	for	theology	(2007).103	Indeed	his	claim	of	“theology	as	wisdom”	has	much	in	common	with	Vanhoozer’s	conception	of	
phronesis	wherein	the	practical	wisdom	of	Christian	phronesis	gains	insight	not	only	from	theological	sources,	but	from	all	of	reality	and	the	disciplines	that	attest	to	it	(Vanhoozer	2007:50).			This	understanding	allows	disciplines	to	complement	rather	than	detract	from	one	another	in	their	pursuit	of	truth	(Vanhoozer	2007:52–53).	Yet	the	theologian	and	scientist	go	about	the	task	of	coming	to	know	differently;	the	theologian	speaking	on	the	basis	of	God’s	revelation	in	Jesus	Christ,	and	the	scientist	and	philosopher	“by	reflecting	on	the	whole	of	human	experience	and	seek[ing]	to	reach	transcendence	‘from	below’”	(Vanhoozer	2007:52).	
                                                102	Here	I	am	advocating	an	approach	similar	to	Jeremy	Begbie’s	method	for	integrating	insight	from	music	and	theology.	He	suggests,	that	“when	music	advances	theology…it	does	so	first	and	foremost	by	enacting	theological	wisdom”	(2000:5).	103	Significantly,	Stump	notes	that	“insight	or	intuitiveness…and	wisdom…are	the	main	excellences”	of	‘Franciscan’	knowledge	(2012:56).	This	is	akin	to	Anselm’s	fides	
quaerens	intellectum	(faith	seeking	understanding),	which	has	been	re-appropriated	by	Shults	(2006),	among	others.	
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	In	the	same	way,	I	would	argue,	the	concept	of	Christian	phronesis	provides	a	way	forward	for	interdisciplinary	dialogue	which	affirms	the	priority	of	revelatory	insight	yet	also	highly	values	insight	from	other	sources,	such	as	the	social	sciences.104	This	understanding	also	characterizes	wisdom	as	both	communal	and	practical.	Furthermore,	it	begins	to	transcend	the	modern/postmodern	and	analytic/Continental	philosophy	divides	(Vanhoozer	2007:44)	and	can	include	both	‘Dominican’	and	‘Franciscan’	types	of	knowledge.	Christian	phronesis	has	as	its	telos	the	ultimate	flourishing	found	in	the	eschatological	reality	of	the	Kingdom	of	God.	It	works	towards	“the	salus	of	the	individual;	the	shalom	of	the	community;	the	glorification	of	the	shema	or	name	of	God”	(Vanhoozer	2007:46).	These	goods	constitute	the	proper	telos	of	Christian	phronesis	and	of	Christian	resilience.		As	with	Milbank’s	use	of	theology	as	a	meta-discourse,	the	‘ground	rules’	of	interdisciplinary	dialogue	are	framed	by	the	in-breaking	of	God	into	the	world.	This	is	not	an	appeal	to	‘doctrine’	in	an	abstract	sense—Vanhoozer	contends	that	Christian	doctrine	in	itself	is	a	form	of	phronesis—rather	this	is	an	appeal	to	a	Person:	“Jesus	is	the	clue	to	transcending	boundaries	between	philosophy	[and,	I	would	add,	science]	and	theology	because	it	is	through	an	examination	of	his	life	that	we	come	to	understand	the	drama	of	universal	history	and	the	being-in-act	of	God”	(Vanhoozer	2007:50).	Thus,	Jesus	Christ	makes	interdisciplinary	dialogue	possible:	“for	in	him	all	things	in	heaven	and	on	earth	were	created…all	things	have	been	created	through	him	and	for	him.	He	himself	is	before	all	things,	and	in	him	all	things	hold	together.”105		
Phronesis	is,	at	its	core,	about	practical	application.106	That	is	to	say	that	a	philosophy	or	worldview	cannot	be	abstracted	from	the	practical	living	out	of	its	principles	(Hadot	1995).	This	was	just	as	true	for	the	ancient	philosophers	as	it	is	for	modern	scientists—
                                                104	Vanhoozer	suggests	that	this	discussion	must	be	understood	“in	terms	not	of	faith	versus	reason	but	of	rival	forms	of	phronesis”	(2007:44).	Browning	also	suggests	
phronesis	(what	he	calls	‘practical	reason’)	as	a	means	of	integrating	insights	across	disciplines.	His	use	of	the	concept,	however,	falls	within	his	mutually	critical	correlation	methodological	framework.	Cf.	(Browning	2006:17–22).	105	Colossians	1:16-17,	NRSV.	106	Shults	suggests	a	“soteriological	passion”	inherent	in	transformative	Christian	wisdom	(2006:499).	
	 	 	
144	
what	an	individual	believes	has	significant	impact	on	everyday	life,	including	resilience	to	adversity.			
Conclusions	on	Interdisciplinary	Dialogue	Mikael	Leidenhag	suggests	that	a	recent	trend	among	theologians	has	been	“to	naturalize	and	reinterpret	the	task	of	theology	and	the	nature	and	function	of	religious	language.”	Yet	this	pragmatic,	naturalist	understanding	is	not	helpful	for	the	task	of	theology	(Leidenhag	2014).	Similarly,	both	Coles	(1990),	as	a	psychiatrist,	and	Milbank	(1990:101),	as	a	theologian,	offer	significant	and	insightful	critiques	of	theologians	who	adopt	sociological	assumptions	as	starting	points	for	their	theology.			As	I	have	claimed,	if	one	begins	with	the	assumptions	of	social	science,	one	will	be	locked	into	methodologies	and	conclusions	limited	by	this	outlook	–	a	worldview	some	claim	as	ahistorical	and	empirical	but	that	in	actuality	is	closely	linked	to	the	philosophical	developments	of	the	Western	world	(Harrison	2015).	Alternatively,	Milbank	suggests	theology	as	a	meta-discourse	within	which	productive	dialogue	can	take	place.107	Additionally,	in	lieu	of	a	hermeneutic	of	suspicion,	Milbank	advocates	“a	‘meta-suspicion’	which	casts	doubt	on	the	possibility	of	suspicion	itself”	(1990:102).108	As	we	will	see	with	Ricoeur,	such	a	reaction	against	the	nihilism	of	‘hermeneutics	of	suspicion’	is	justified;	this	approach	would	require	a	re-ordering	of	many	current	Western	philosophical	assumptions	but	may	be	necessary	for	further	fruitful	enquiry.		In	the	end,	the	complexity	of	human	existence	is	a	mystery.	It	may	take	an	alternative	to	scientific	naturalism	to	lay	hold	of	it.	Finally,	the	theologian	has	something	to	say	about	reality	which	neither	the	philosopher	nor	the	scientist	can.	As	Shakespeare	noted,		
                                                107	In	Milbank’s	view,	science	plays	an	important,	though	secondary	role:	“there	can	be	no	‘science’	of	the	entire	social	system	in	its	every	aspect.	Nevertheless,	science	can	comprehend	the	points	at	which	all	the	sub-systems	function	in	relation	to	each	other,	the	supposed	level	of	‘society’	itself”	(Milbank	1990:109).	108	Milbank	continues:	“Religions,	characteristically,	involve	‘eccentric’	customs,	attachments	to	particular	times	and	places,	constant	repetition	of	the	singular.	It	is	the	spurious	claim	of	sociology	to	be	able	to	master,	through	a	superior	metadiscourse,	this	eccentricity,	singularity	and	repetition”	(1990:104).	
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‘There	are	more	things	in	heaven	and	earth…/Than	are	dreamt	of	in	your	philosophy’	(Hamlet	Act	I,	scene	V).		
Questions	and	Cautions		
Religion/Spirituality	as	Operationalized	Therapy	Despite	the	possibilities	for	understanding	resilience	through	the	lens	of	Christian	theology,	we	must	also	note	the	cautions	and	limitations	present	when	we	consider	the	suitability	of	theological	dialogue	with	the	social	sciences.	For	instance,	we	must	consider	the	appropriateness	of	using	or	encouraging	religion	as	a	means	of	increasing	health	(Knapp,	Lemoncelli,	and	VandeCreek	2010).109	Should	R/S	be	understood	simply	as	a	tool	at	the	disposal	of	the	practitioner?	Some	researchers	have	attempted	to	operationalize	constructs	related	to	R/S	in	this	way	with	a	demonstrated	positive	correlation	to	health	and	increased	attendance	in	the	context	of	growing	churches	(Ellsworth	and	Ellsworth	2009,	2010).		At	many	levels,	however,	it	is	theologically	problematic	to	utilize	R/S	for	purposes	external	to	the	constructs	themselves.	Richard	Sloan,	a	critic	of	the	attempt	to	incorporate	R/S	into	healthcare,	suggests	that	we	must	consider	the	moral	and	ethical	implications	of	asking	people	to	change	their	deeply	held	religious	beliefs	for	the	sake	of	faith	(2008:258).	Significantly,	this	is	very	similar	to	the	critique	given	by	theologians	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002).	At	the	same	time,	we	must	acknowledge	that	R/S	has	important	implications	for	human	well-being.	Alasdair	MacIntyre	(1981)	and	Stanley	Hauerwas	(1986)	suggest	that	a	theological	view	of	human	nature	provides	much	needed	insight	into	medical	practice,	especially	in	regards	to	medical	ethics.	Swinton	(2000)	suggests	that	the	medical	model	is	incomplete	for	explaining	the	phenomenon	of	mental	illness	and	providing	care	for	those	suffering	from	it.	Could	there	be	a	way	forward	that	embraces	the	possibilities	of	faith	in	medical	practice	yet	also	safeguards	that	use	against	distortion?		Wendy	Cadge	(2013)	argues	that	this	is	not	simple	a	question	of	whether	we	should	use	R/S	in	the	promotion	of	health,	but	how	it	is	already	being	used	by	healthcare	professionals.	Thus,	these	questions	are	not	about	theoretical	situations,	but	about	how	
                                                109	Many	of	these	cautions	have	been	addressed	more	fully	in	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002).	
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to	best	equip	and	guide	those	who	are	already	doing	this	kind	of	work.	In	this	regard,	these	are	not	just	questions	of	‘What	works	to	promote	health?’	but	also	‘Why?’	and,	more	importantly,	‘With	what	implications?’	110	We	cannot	mistake	the	goal	of	the	Kingdom	of	God	as	ultimately	being	the	promotion	of	finite	individual	human	well-being,	humanly	understood.	Certainly,	the	greatest	good	for	humankind	is	the	advent	of	the	Kingdom	of	God,	but	temporal	individual	human	well-being	may	be	a	byproduct	rather	than	the	main	telos	of	the	Kingdom.111		
Simplicity	Versus	Complexity	As	I	argued	in	the	last	chapter,	the	preponderance	of	evidence	suggests	that	R/S	can	play	an	important	role	in	promoting	resilient	outcomes	in	adverse	circumstances.	Yet	this	does	not	give	the	entire	picture.112	The	simple	claim,	‘Religion/spirituality	helps	to	reduce	depression’113	does	not	give	full	credence	to	the	experience	of	thousands	of	Christians	who	currently	struggle	with	depression	despite	a	strong	faith.114	Nor	does	it	give	full	voice	to	scripture,115	or	the	experience	of	saints	throughout	the	ages.116	We	must	give	voice	to	those	within	our	faith	communities	who	deal	with	depression	and	hear	their	pain	without	trying	to	provide	a	‘quick	fix’	(Swinton	2001:93–96,	112–34).		
                                                110	Swinton	and	Mowat	provide	helpful	insight	on	this	matter:	“The	key	thing	in	this	understanding	is	not	that	the	practice	brings	particular	benefits	to	individuals	or	communities	(although	it	may	do).	The	important	thing	is	that	the	practice	bears	faithful	witness	to	the	God	from	whom	the	practice	emerges,	and	whom	it	reflects,	and	that	it	enables	individuals	and	communities	to	participate	faithfully	in	Christ’s	redemptive	mission.	Thus	the	efficacy	of	the	practice	(the	good	to	which	it	is	aimed),	is	not	defined	pragmatically	by	its	ability	to	fulfil	particular	human	needs	(although	it	will	include	that),	but	by	whether	or	not	it	participates	faithfully	in	the	divine	redemptive	mission”	(2006:22).	111	See	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002).	112	The	tendency	to	simplify	rather	than	recognize	the	complexity	of	resilience	must	be	resisted:	“We	can	therefore	neither	equate	the	resilience	perspective	with	statistical	psychosocial	research	on	resilience	nor	all	research	findings	with	reductionistic	or	deterministic	approaches.	Complementary	efforts	in	resilience	research	seek	to	remain	more	open	to	spiritual-religious	experience,	attempting	to	provide	‘thicker’	accounts	of	human	experience”	(Titus	2006:82).	113	For	which	there	is	some	evidence;	see	Chapter	2.	114	E.g.	(Greene-McCreight	2006).	115	E.g.	The	Psalms	of	Lament.	116	E.g.	St.	John	of	the	Cross.	
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What	can	be	said,	then?	Does	R/S	promote	resilience?	Does	it	lead	to	health?	The	answers	to	these	questions	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	simple	‘yes’	or	‘no’	answer.	The	answer	is	much	more	complex	and	will	involve	a	deeper	exploration	of	the	nature	of	human	experience.	I	believe	that	Christian	theology	may	prove	explanatory	for	experiences	of	adversity	and	for	resilience	to	adversity.	This	source	of	meaning,	however,	cannot	be	reduced	to	simple	truisms.	The	way	God	works	in	this	world	is	mysterious	and	wonderful—including	the	way	in	which	suffering	can	be	endured	and	even	transformed.	What	we	must	avoid,	therefore,	is	a	simplistic	and	generalized	assessment	of	the	role	of	R/S	in	resilience	that	reduces	religious	input	to	‘belief’	that	encourages	a	person	and	helps	him	or	her	get	on	well	in	life.	Instead,	Christian	theological	understandings	of	resilience	must	be	deeply	rooted	in	the	knowledge	that	all	of	life	is	grounded	in	and	comes	through	Jesus	Christ.	Furthermore,	this	understanding	must	be	specifically	related	to	the	historical	events	of	his	Incarnation,	Death,	Resurrection,	and	Ascension.	Anything	less	cannot	truly	be	considered	Christian	theology.	
Resilience	Reframed	Resilience,	then,	must	be	‘reframed’	in	order	to	understand	it	coherently	from	a	Christian	theological	perspective.	This	does	not	mean	that	social	scientific	understandings	of	resilience	should	be	jettisoned,	only	that	their	limitations	should	be	acknowledged.	At	the	same	time,	the	challenges	presented	by	incorporating	insights	from	Christian	theology	into	a	concept	that	is	at	home	in	the	social	sciences	are	marked.	The	difficulty	of	this	dialogue	does	not	discount	the	potential	insights	to	be	gained	through	it,	however.		How,	then,	can	resilience	be	‘reframed’	so	as	to	incorporate	insights	from	Christian	theology?	Following	Stump,	I	suggest	that	we	must	pay	closer	attention	to	forms	of	knowledge	other	than	analytic	knowledge.	This	may	also	include	new	ways	of	approaching	knowledge	and	new	understandings	of	human	personhood.	While	these	approaches	may	not	describe	the	totality	of	what	it	means	to	be	human,	in	many	cases	it	can	provide	clarity	of	a	different	sort	than	analytical	exploration	(Stump	2012:41).			
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This	journey	will	include	evaluation	of	experiences	of	the	transcendent	that	give	insight	into	the	true	nature	of	reality	(Underhill	1912:142)	but	are	unavailable	to	many	social	scientists	due	to	their	insistence	upon	naturalistic	presuppositions.	In	order	to	understand	effects	upon	resilience	outcomes,	more	must	be	said	about	personhood	and	the	identity	of	the	Christian,	especially	relating	to	the	use	of	narrative	to	create	meaning	and	construct	identity.	
Conclusion	I	contend	that	much	can	be	gained	by	putting	the	social	scientific	concept	of	resilience	in	dialogue	with	Christian	theology.	In	order	to	do	this,	however,	we	must	forge	a	way	for	integrating	insights	from	both	disciplines.	This	means	that	we	must	clarify	assumptions	and	methodologies	so	as	to	provide	the	best	account	of	the	resilience	concept.	I	believe	that	an	interdisciplinary	approach	based	on	Christian	phronesis,	practical	wisdom,	and	expressed	through	narrative	can	best	take	into	account	the	multiple	disciplines	needed	to	arrive	at	a	richer	description	of	resilience.117	This	perspective	is	needed	as	an	alternative	to	the	reductive	naturalistic	assumptions	inherent	in	much	current	resilience	research.	Finally,	although	this	thesis	is	not	directed	towards	creating	specific	protocols	for	strengthening	resilience,	some	specific	practicalities	will	emerge	through	putting	the	concept	in	dialogue	with	Christian	theology.		Is	a	Christian	conception	of	resilience	compatible	with	a	social	scientific	understanding	of	the	concept	that	is	grounded	in	naturalistic	materialism?	Yes	and	no.	In	the	sense	that	‘natural’	resilience	is	an	expression	of	the	goodness	of	the	created	order:	yes.	To	the	extent	that	participation	in	Christ	increases	finite	human	flourishing,	it	may	also	have	relevance	for	the	study	of	resilience.	On	the	other	hand,	the	goals	of	‘Christian’	resilience	and	‘natural’	resilience	are	different.	To	the	extent	that	penultimate	temporal	flourishing	supplants	or	diminishes	ultimate	human	flourishing	in	the	Kingdom	of	God,	then	it	is	to	be	rejected,	even	if	it	could	be	supposed	to	contribute	to	human	flourishing.	How	are	we	to	navigate	these	intricacies?	I	believe	that	further	theological	reflection	on	
                                                117	As	with	any	methodology,	there	are	strengths	and	weaknesses.	The	potential	limitations	and	complications	associated	with	this	method	will	be	addressed	more	fully	in	the	next	chapter.	
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the	topic	of	resilience	provides	the	best	way	forward,	with	particular	attention	to	the	disclosure	of	meaning	through	narrative	and	the	relational	connection	inherent	in	narratival	conceptions	of	human	identity.			 	
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Chapter	4:	Paul	Ricoeur	on	Narrative	and	Personhood	
	
“It	was	the	spring	of	1975,	and	my	country	was	on	the	cusp	of	an	historic	political	
cataclysm…All	around	me,	people	were	tense	and	anxious…I	was	beyond	tears.	Beyond	
fear.	Yet	I	wasn’t	ready	to	surrender	to	some	futile	fate.	I	was	consumed	by	a	sense	of	
urgency…	
	
Thousands	of	people	were	surging	against	a	wide	metal	gate,	trying	to	get	inside	the	
embassy	compound…Before	we	knew	what	was	happening,	we	were	swept	up	in	the	frenzy	
…We…scrambled	up	the	gate	and	onto	the	platform,	oblivious	to	the	barbed	wire	that	was	
stripping	the	clothes	from	our	backs	and	puncturing	our	skin…we	turned	our	backs	on	the	
frenzied	mob	and	hurled	ourselves	onto	the	grass	inside	the	American	Embassy	
compound…Despite	our	desperate	situation,	I	felt	a	strange	calm.	I	wasn’t	the	least	bit	
nervous…With	each	passing	minute,	I	felt	more	and	more	certain	that	God	was	about	to	
act.	
	
Suddenly,	in	the	midst	of	the	crowd	and	the	confusion	and	the	darkness,	I	saw	everything	
around	me	with	luminous	clarity.	It	was	as	if	I	had	tunnel	vision,	where	objects	appeared	
larger	than	life	and	seconds	seemed	to	last	forever…It	was	then	that	I	noticed	the	other	
gate…no	one	was	lined	up	behind	it…The	plan	was	risky—perhaps	crazy—but	something	
prompted	me	to	take	a	chance…Everything	was	happening	so	fast—we	just	kept	
running…we	scrambled	up	the	iron	steps	and	onto	the	embassy	roof.	
	
There,	in	front	of	my	eyes,	was	a	flying	machine…As	the	chopper	pulled	away	from	the	
embassy	roof,	I	couldn’t	resist	the	temptation	to	look	outside…Outside	it	was	raining	fire.	
Bright,	burning	bullet	tracers,	from	rifles	ben	on	bringing	down	our	chopper,	crisscrossed	
the	night	sky.	The	streaks	were	so	close	I	could	almost	touch	them…But	I	knew	I	was	safe”	
(Sawyer	and	Proctor	2003:5–6,	8–9,	14–17).	
		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	suggested	the	naturalist	ontological	framework	undergirding	much	social	science	research	is	not	entirely	adequate	for	understanding	the	complexity	of	human	resilience	to	adversity.	In	this	chapter	I	seek	to	lay	an	alternative	philosophical	and	theological	foundation	for	understanding	resilience,	primarily	through	reflection	on	the	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur.	Two	aspects	of	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	in	particular	are	especially	relevant	for	understanding	resilience:	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutic	phenomenology—which	suggests	the	power	of	language	to	create	new	ways	of	being-in-the-world—and	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology—which	proposes	that	knowledge	of	the	self	is	possible	through	relation	to	the	Other.	First,	a	few	words	must	be	said	about	the	utility	of	narrative	for	understanding	the	world.	
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Narrative		
Dissection	versus	Narration	To	a	degree,	the	scientist—including	the	social	scientist—must	create	distance	between	herself	and	the	object	of	study	in	order	to	better	understand	it.1	However,	such	abstraction	puts	the	social	scientist	above	and	removed	from	what	is	being	studied.2		This	‘abstraction’3	can	be	quite	helpful,	as	shown	in	the	case	of	identifying	significant	contributing	factors	to	resilience.	There	is	also	a	sense,	however,	in	which	abstraction	is	not	beneficial.	In	such	a	case,	the	sum	of	the	parts	is	not	greater	than	the	whole.4	While	abstracting	and	dissecting	the	resilient	person	to	determine	effective	causes	of	resilience	is	valuable,	in	the	end	the	resilient	person	must	be	considered	as	a	whole	rather	than	a	set	of	abstracted	parts,	as	in	the	case	of	determining	particular	characteristics	correlated	with	resilience.	That	is	to	say,	it	is	the	person	(or	the	community,	organism,	etc.)	working	together	as	an	entirety	that	functions	resiliently,	not	only	one	part.5	Hence	the	resilient	individual	should	be	considered	as	a	person	qua	person.	Further,	an	individual’s	resilience	is	perhaps	best	understood	as	a	story:	this	happened,	which	led	her	to	do	thus	and	so,	with	the	result	of	her	current	situation.	In	significant	ways,	understanding	a	person’s	response	to	trauma	may	be	best	accomplished	through	narrative.6	As	R.	Ruard	Ganzevoort	notes,	through	narrative:		
                                                1	Milbank	argues	that	“to	ascribe	meaning	is	the	same	as	giving	a	narrative	account	of	antecedents,	and	a	description	in	terms	of	final	goal	and	purpose”	(1990:249).	2	The	use	of	narrative	and	other	qualitative	methodologies	seeks	to	bridge	the	gap	between	subject	and	object.	3	This	is	the	term	that	Stephen	Crites	(1971:308)	also	uses.	4	Similarly,	Ricoeur	suggests	that	“on	the	one	hand,	alienating	distanciation	is	the	attitude	that	renders	possible	the	objectification	that	reigns	in	the	human	sciences;	but	on	the	other	hand,	this	distanciation,	which	is	the	condition	of	the	scientific	status	of	the	sciences,	is	at	the	same	time	the	fall	that	destroys	the	fundamental	and	primordial	relation	whereby	we	belong	to	and	participate	in	the	historical	reality	that	we	claim	to	construct	as	an	object”	(1991c:75).	5	While	his	ascription	of	mind	functions	to	particular	parts	of	the	brain	is	potentially	problematic,	McGilchrist	does	assess	this	correctly.	He	writes	that	“[i]ndividuals	are,	after	all,	Gestalt	wholes:	that	face,	that	voice,	that	gait,	that	sheer	‘quiddity’	of	the	person	or	thing,	defying	analysis	into	parts”	(2010:51).	6	The	use	of	narrative	for	understanding	religious	coping	responses	is	quite	well	established.	E.g.	(Ganzevoort	1998b,	1998c).	
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we	directly	access	the	person’s	process	of	attributing	meaning	to	events	and	of	construing	a	meaningful	framework	for	dealing	with	his	or	her	life	experiences.	Instead	of	trying	to	isolate	and	objectify	factors,	we	acknowledge	the	fact	that	spirituality	and	coping	are	personal	constructions	of	meaning…[Additionally]	the	narrative	approach	facilitates	a	hermeneutical	interpretation	of	the	interactions	between	the	person’s	meaning	system	and	the	framework	offered	by	the	spiritual	tradition	in	which	(s)he	might	be	positioned	(2009).		The	’thicker’	account	of	human	being	through	narrative	also	highlights	the	difference	between	knowing	a	person	and	knowing	information.7	As	we	explored	in	the	last	chapter,	modernity	could	be	said	to	be	obsessed	with	the	rational	pursuit	of	analytical	knowledge	to	the	exclusion	of	other	forms	of	knowledge—with	damaging	results.8	This	dysfunction	extends	beyond	merely	scientific	ways	of	thinking	about	the	world	to	include	detached	philosophical	enquiry.	For	Evelyn	Underhill,	this	type	of	thinking	is		stultified	by	the	exclusive	intellectualism	of	its	own	methods:	by	its	fatal	trust	in	the	squirrel-work	of	the	industrious	brain	instead	of	the	piercing	vision	of	the	desirous	heart.	It	interests	him,	but	does	not	involve	him	in	its	processes:	does	not	catch	him	up	to	the	new	and	more	real	life	which	it	describes	(1912:15).9	Thus,	a	more	holistic	method	of	enquiry	is	needed	to	delve	into	questions	of	human	existence	and	flourishing.	Through	narratives	of	concrete	experience	the	complexity	of	life	can	begin	to	be	grasped.	Narrative	gets	at	the	‘heart’	of	resilience	because	resilience	cannot	be	reduced	to	possessing	a	set	of	abstract	attributes.	Rather,	resilience	is	about	the	experience	of	adversity	and	the	adaptive	response	of	the	whole	person	to	that	adversity.	This	most	certainly	includes	‘intangibles’	such	as	belief	and	emotion	that	are	not	easily	‘dissected.’		
                                                7	Stump	also	makes	the	distinction	between	knowledge	about	persons	and	knowing	a	person	(Stump	2012:53–56).	See	below	for	more	on	this	subject.	8	This	too,	McGilchrist	correctly	assesses.	See	his	comments	(2010:6)	as	well	as	my	further	assessment	later	in	this	chapter.	Gerard	Loughlin	describes	modernity	as	“the	idea	that	humanity	is	the	maker	of	its	own	destiny,	of	progress	toward	technological	and	social	utopia”	(1999:6)	and	the	quest	of	modernity	as	“the	telling	of	a	master	story	with	scientific	rigour”	(1999:8).	9	It	was	not	customary	for	writers	in	previous	eras	to	use	gender	inclusive	language.	For	the	sake	of	the	integrity	of	the	text,	I	will	not	alter	it.	In	my	own	usage,	I	will	alternate	between	gendered	pronouns.		
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Possibilities	in	Narrative	Understandings	of	Resilience	Researchers	of	resilience	have	found	narrative	to	be	a	particularly	useful	form	of	enquiry	into	the	way	individuals	successfully	navigate	adverse	circumstances.10	Narrative	has	proven	useful	to	occupational	therapists	in	enabling	their	patients	to	move	beyond	trauma	(Mattingly	1998)	and	in	projecting	a	narrative	of	recovery	that	is	more	likely	to	be	actualized	(Goldstein,	Kielhofner,	and	Paul-Ward	2004;	Johnston	et	al.	1999;	Price	et	al.	2012).	Narrative	based	approaches	to	therapy	have	been	used	successfully	with	children	orphaned	by	HIV/AIDS	in	Africa	(Mwenisongole	2010)	and	veterans	of	war	(Stepakoff	2007).	Similarly,	the	narrative	coherence	of	one’s	life	story	has	been	shown	to	be	positively	correlated	with	posttraumatic	growth	in	young	adults	(Jirek	2011).		Others	have	also	found	narrative	helpful	as	a	means	of	healing	and	resolving	traumatic	experiences	(Hautamäki	and	Coleman	2001;	Niederhoffer	and	Pennebaker	2005;	Walton	2002).	One	study	showed	that	deliberate	rumination	and	reflection	on	traumatic	experiences	is	significantly	correlated	with	Post	Traumatic	Growth	(Stockton,	Hunt,	and	Joseph	2011).11	It	could	be	suggested	that	rumination	and	reflection	are	integral	aspects	of	the	narrative	processing	of	traumatic	events	and	therefore	could	be	associated	with	the	process	of	PTG.		Michael	Ungar	is	among	the	social	science	resilience	researchers	who	suggest	the	utility	of	narrative	for	understanding	resilient	responses	to	adversity.	He	proposes	building	‘narratives	of	resilience’	as	a	means	of	helping	youths	become	more	resilient	(2004:196).	Because	individuals	face	adversity	within	the	context	of	life	experiences	which	may	be	hermeneutically	interpreted,	narrative	can	be	a	useful	tool	for	understanding	and	successfully	navigating	adversity.12	These	benefits	hold	true	across	
                                                10	The	following	examples	represent	attempts	within	the	social	sciences	to	use	narrative	approaches	for	both	understanding	and	enriching	human	experience.	Such	attempts	begin	to	move	beyond	the	problems	associated	with	modern	secular	scientific	assumptions	that	were	noted	in	the	previous	chapter.	For	a	further	exploration	of	the	role	narrative	may	play	in	clinical	practice	that	takes	into	account	spirituality,	see	(Cook,	Powell,	and	Sims	2016).	11	See	also	(Bosson,	Kelley,	and	Jones	2012).	12	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	(to	be	addressed	shortly)	provides	an	explanation	for	why	this	may	be	the	case.	
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varied	cultural	contexts.	In	many	cultures,	storytelling	is	a	highly	valued	norm	and	a	common	form	of	corporate	coping	and	healing.	This	norm	may	well	make	discussing	difficult	experiences	more	acceptable,	even	bringing	to	light	disparities	in	power	dynamics	and	empowering	those	who	are	marginalized	(Ganzevoort	2012:218,	222).		
The	Need	for	Narrative	Understandings	Narrative	can	provide	a	needed	corrective	to	reductive	tendencies	within	analytic	ways	of	thinking.	Stump,	herself	an	analytic	philosopher,	argues	that	“what	is	missing	in	analytic	philosophy	can	be	gotten	from	narratives”	(2012:38).	Furthermore,	she	suggests	that	“there	are	things	we	can	know	that	are	philosophically	significant,	but	that	are	difficult	or	impossible	to	know	and	express	apart	from	stories”	(2012:40).	In	many	disciplines,	even	within	the	social	sciences	where	narrative	and	qualitative	methodologies	are	widely	used,	it	is	still	necessary	to	reemphasize	the	use	of	narrative	as	a	foundational	epistemological	philosophy	and	way	of	understanding	the	world,	not	merely	a	methodology.	As	Milbank	notes,	“the	selection	of	the	right	stories	told	the	right	way	becomes	the	most	central	concern	of	philosophy”	(2015:225).		Here	we	must	clarify	that	‘narrative’	itself	should	be	understood	broadly,	as	only	one	aspect	of	semantic	expression	out	of	many	that	share	common	features.	To	this	end,	we	will	use	the	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur	to	explore	how	metaphor,	and	language	itself,	mediates	experience.	I	will	focus	in	this	chapter	on	how	a	narrative	approach	to	human	experience	and	personhood	can	be	beneficial	for	conceptions	of	resilience.	Because	of	the	benefits	of	using	narrative	for	understanding	positive	adaptation	to	adversity,	it	may	provide	insight	into	resilience.13	First	an	overview	of	the	use	of	narrative	in	recent	theology	is	needed.		
Narrative	and	Theology	Many	within	the	discipline	of	theology	have	recently	appropriated	narrative	as	a	methodological	and	epistemological	framework.	This	may	be,	in	part,	due	to	an	acknowledgement	that	the	Christian	scriptures	are	themselves	comprised	of	many	texts	
                                                13	Others	have	suggested	the	importance	of	narrative	in	religious	coping.	See,	for	instance,	(Ganzevoort	1998b,	1998c;	Kleinman	2006;	Stump	2012).	
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in	the	narrative	genre,	but	also	because	scripture	as	a	whole	can	be	construed	in	terms	of	narrative:	the	narrative	of	Divine	Salvation	History	(Loughlin	1999:8).	In	this	vein,	Rowan	Williams	notes,	“Theology…tells	the	story	of	how	the	world	becomes	inhabited	by	God,	‘how	God	transforms	flesh…by	creating	living	relationships	with	himself’”	(2007:3).	Such	an	emphasis	on	theology	as	a	narrative	discipline	has	not	always	been	the	case,	however.			In	various	eras	of	Christian	history	an	emphasis	on	correct	dogma	was	paramount,	which	served	as	a	necessary	corrective	to	denials	of	seminal	Christian	doctrine.	In	the	West,	approximately	the	past	50	years	have	seen	an	increased	acknowledgement	of	the	personal	nature	of	Christian	formation.	Coupled	with	developments	in	Western	philosophical	thought,	this	brought	the	need	for	narrative	and	phenomenological	accounts	of	Christian	experience	to	the	forefront	of	scholarly	thought.14	This	‘narrative	turn’	took	place	across	a	variety	of	disciplines	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	and	was	precipitated,	in	large	part,	by	the	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur	(Ganzevoort	2012:215).		Ganzevoort	suggests	several	benefits	for	the	use	of	narrative	in	theology:	[N]arrativity	underscores	the	parallels	of	written	texts	and	meaningful	human	action…[thus]	a	narrative	perspective	can	serve	as	a	meta-theoretical	framework.	It	may	help	us	understand	the	connection	between	theology	and	social	sciences	and	the	discussion	of	contesting	approaches	within	both	worlds…	[and	therefore]	a	narrative	perspective	has	a	strong	potential	for	interdisciplinary	communication	and	research.	Third,	taking	a	narrative	turn	involves	a	hermeneutical	stance,	in	which	the	individual	biography	and	religious	construction	are	valued	over	general	descriptions	and	statistical	averages.	From	a	theological	point	of	view,	this	is	called	for	if	we	want	to	do	justice	to	voices	of	the	oppressed	and	the	unheard…[thus]	a	narrative	approach	has	the	advantage	of	proximity	to	the	object	of	investigation	(1998a:24).		Clearly	then,	a	narrative	methodology	affords	significant	benefits	in	a	study	such	as	this.	In	part,	this	is	because	“concrete	and	specific	narratives	of	real	people,”	such	as	we	will	
                                                14	Scholars	have	taken	the	insights	of	narrative	theology	in	a	number	of	different	directions,	with	some	emphasizing	the	constructivist	dimensions	of	narrative	and	others	seeing	it	primarily	as	explanatory	of	traditional	Christian	dogma	(Ganzevoort	2012:218–19).	But	Alan	Jacobs	(2003)	criticizes	some	narrative	theologians	for	being	more	concerned	with	the	narrative	structure	of	religious	traditions	than	the	narrative	structure	of	human	lives.	
	 	 	
156	
encounter	later,	can	challenge	hegemonic	understandings	of	the	world	(Ganzevoort	2014:15).		Semiotic	communication,	including	narrative,	may	be	beneficial	at	an	even	more	fundamental	level	for	theology.	Garrett	Green	argues	that	narratives	can	be	a	means	knowing	God	in	the	world	(1998:126ff).	Janet	Soskice	goes	beyond	this	to	suggest	that	metaphor,	as	a	particular	form	of	language,	is	necessary	to	enable	speaking	about	God	at	all.15	The	one	who	would	attempt	to	speak	of	God	without	the	use	of	metaphor,	she	argues,	must	realize	that	“attacks	on	the	meaningfulness	of	his	metaphorical	language	are,	in	fact,	attacks	on	any	of	his	attempts	to	speak	of	a	transcendent	God.”	This	is	because	metaphor	is	the	“principle	means”	by	which	we	speak	about	God	due	to	the	infinite	qualitative	difference	between	God	and	humanity	(Soskice	1985:x).	Thus,	in	significant	ways,	our	knowledge	of	God	is	mediated	by	semiotic	means,	including,	for	Ricoeur,	language.		It	follows,	then,	that	a	robust	understanding	of	language	can	better	enable	us	to	speak	about	God	and	actuate	faith	in	meaningful	ways.			
Recent	Use	of	Narrative	and	Theology	The	marriage	of	narrative	and	theology	is	not	new.	Narrative	has	been	used	theologically	in	various	capacities,	whether	explicitly	acknowledged	or	not,	for	millennia	(Ganzevoort	2012:214;	Graham,	Walton,	and	Ward	2005:78–80;	Loughlin	1999:x).16	Some	questioned	the	‘staying	power’	of	such	a	union	more	than	25	years	ago	(Hauerwas	and	Jones	1989:1),	yet	theologians	continue	to	find	narrative	a	powerful	means	of	theological	enquiry	given	current	societal,	intellectual,	and	cultural	trends,	and,	more	primarily,	given	the	narrative	nature	of	the	Christian	Gospel.17	This	topic	has	been	widely	written	upon	and	debated	for	many	years,	so	I	will	merely	provide	a	broad	
                                                15	I	will	address	the	connection	between	metaphor	and	narrative	later	in	this	chapter	through	the	lens	of	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy.	16	Loughlin	includes	Augustine	and	Aquinas	among	those	whose	theology	is	“narrativist	in	character”	(1999:x).	Ganzevoort	adds	Bonaventure	to	this	list	(2012:215).	17	E.g.	(Loughlin	1999;	Stump	2012).	While	the	Christian	Gospel	may	be	expressed	propositionally,	it	is	founded	in	the	narrative	accounts	of	Christ’s	life.	
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survey	of	the	subject,	focusing	particularly	upon	the	narrative	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur.		In	a	highly	influential	and	controversial	1971	article,	philosopher	Stephen	Crites	suggested	that	‘story’	is	integral	to	who	human	beings	are	and	the	way	in	which	they	experience	the	world.	18	For	Crites,	“the	fact	that	people	speak	some	language	is	no	historical	accident.	It	is	a	necessary	mark	of	being	human…[and	therefore]	the	formal	quality	of	experience	through	time	is	inherently	narrative”	(1971:291).	Such	a	thesis	has	significant	implications	for	how	human	beings	and	their	experiences	are	understood.	In	regard	to	religion,	Crites	suggests	that	‘sacred	stories’	have	deep	significance	attached	to	them:	people	“awaken	to	a	sacred	story,	and	their	most	significant	mundane	stories	are	told	in	the	effort,	never	fully	successful,	to	articulate	it”	(1971:296).	While	not	writing	as	a	theologian	himself,	much	of	Crites’	argument	was	deemed	significant	by	many	‘narrative	theologians.’	Thus,	Crites’	thesis,	“stories	give	qualitative	substance	to	the	form	of	experience	because	it	is	itself	an	incipient	story”	(1971:297),	takes	on	added	significance	in	a	theological	context.19		All	human	experience	is	shaped	by	narrativity	and	narratival	form	and,	for	Crites,	the	meaningfulness	of	human	experience	is	intricately	tied	to	one’s	perception	of	the	meta-story	(Crites	1971:307).	In	his	thinking,	a	significant	aspect	of	the	narrative	quality	of	experience	is	the	narratival	structure	of	memory.	In	his	thinking,	memory	gives	experience	coherence	by	making	one	aware	of	the	succession	of	moments	and	being	able	to	“abstract	coherent	unities	from	this	succession”	rather	than	seeing	events	as	disconnected	and	unrelated,	leaving	one	“locked	in	a	bare,	momentary	present”	(1971:298).			Crites’	article	presents	theologians	and	philosophers	substantial	possibilities	for	understanding	human	experience,	suggesting	a	connection	between	personal,	sacred,	and	cultural	narratives	(Graham	et	al.	2005:63).	Alternately,	Hans	Frei	suggests	that	the	
                                                18	The	extent	to	which	Crites	drew	from	Ricoeur	and	similar	philosophers	is	unclear.	19	Crites	recognized	the	limitations	of	his	argument,	particularly	that	his	argument	is	circular,	yet	concludes	that	“in	the	end	it	has	only	the	explanatory	power	of	this	particular	circle	to	commend	it”	(1971:297).	
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basis	for	all	theology	is	the	particular	story	of	the	Bible:	“For	Frei,	the	scriptural	story	comes	first	and	last;	we	have	no	need	of	anything	more”	(Loughlin	1999:67).	Thus,	while	still	utilizing	narrative,	Frei	suggests	the	primacy	of	understanding	the	Christian	faith	as	a	story	(Frei	1993a:43).	With	Karl	Barth,	Frei	opposes	much	modern	theology	“in	advocating	a	diametrically	opposed	theology,	one	that	seeks	to	fit	the	world	into	the	story	of	God	rather	than	God	into	the	story	of	the	world”	(Loughlin	1999:34).		Frei	indicates	that	“narrative	is	not	an	accidental	form	for	the	expression	of	Christian	faith	in	Jesus	Christ.”	Rather,	“faith	in	the	person	of	Jesus”	necessitates	belief	that	“his	identity	as	God’s	Christ	is	given	in	his	life,	death	and	resurrection,	and	that	can	be	given	to	us	only	in	story”	(Loughlin	1999:67).20	For	Frei,	“Jesus	is	his	story”	(Frei	1993a:42).	Frei’s	reading	presupposes	the	possibility	of	what	he	calls	‘realistic	narrative’—the	ability	to	read	the	text	without	reference	to	any	prior	literary	theory	or	philosophical	category	(1974:13).	Kevin	Vanhoozer	challenges	him	on	this	point,	arguing	that	some	prior	understanding	of	how	‘realistic	narrative’	is	generally	construed	is	necessary	(1990:164).21		Thus,	two	‘camps’	within	narrative	theology	have	emerged;22	one	which	takes	as	its	starting	point	human	experience—what	Vanhoozer	calls	‘mediating’	theology—and	one	which	takes	scripture	alone	as	its	starting	point—which	Vanhoozer	terms	‘Anselmian’	theology.	As	we	shall	see,	Vanhoozer	suggests	Paul	Ricoeur’s	narrative	philosophy	as	a	possible	mediation	between	these	two	poles.23	Similarly,	Loughlin	distinguishes	
                                                20	See	(Frei	1993a:35,	43).	21	I	largely	agree	with	Vanhoozer’s	assessment	of	Frei,	although	Loughlin’s	use	of	Erich	Auerbach	and	his	idea	of	“a	unique	narrative	form,	suited	to	a	unique	subject”	as	a	way	of	coherently	explaining	Frei’s	‘realistic	narrative’	is	insightful	(1999:73).	Also	insightful	is	Frei’s	later	dismissal	of	‘realistic	narrative’	as	a	non-prior	category	of	discourse	and	subsequent	embracing	of	the	communal	reading	of	the	Church	as	norm	for	interpreting	scripture	(Frei	1993b:16–17;	Loughlin	1999:78–79).	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	such	a	method	still	requires	the	use	of	a	prior	category	of	understanding.	Frei’s	attempt	in	all	of	this	is	to	ensure	the	priority	of	biblical	authority.	He	does	this	in	part	through	divorcing	it	from	any	appeal	to	human	meaningfulness	(1974:128–30).	This,	to	me,	seems	unnecessary.	Why,	for	instance,	should	it	not	be	the	case	that	the	biblical	text	is	all	the	more	humanly	meaningful	because	of	its	authority,	not	despite	it?	22	Cf.	(Duffy	2009:12).	23	Thus,	Ricoeur’s	own	assessment	of	how	his	philosophy	can	mediate	between	these	two	positions,	a	benefit	of	which,	he	suggests	is	due	to	his	philosophical	hermeneutics:	
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between	‘textualists’—such	as	Mark	Taylor	and	Don	Cupitt—and	‘narrativists’—such	as	George	Lindbeck	and	John	Milbank—primarily	based	upon	narrativists’	concern,	with	not	only	the	fact	of	a	story	being	told,	but	also	what	story	is	being	told	(1999:18).24	Thus,	he	suggests	that	Lindbeck	and	Milbank	are	orthodox	Christian	theologians	because	they	see	the	subject	matter	of	the	Christian	story	as	being	of	primary	importance	for	narrative	theology.		I	have	much	affinity	with	Loughlin’s	position	and	the	claim	that	all	of	theology	must	be	grounded	specifically	in	the	Christian	story	and	scriptures	rather	than	beginning	from	human	experience.25	I	would	suggest,	however,	that	such	distinction	could	place	a	strict	dichotomy	between	theological	and	philosophical	assumptions	that	is,	ultimately,	not	possible.	At	some	level,	philosophical	assumptions	will	always	be	present	in	theology.	Rather	than	viewing	this	as	a	problem	to	escape,	this	can	be	seen	as	a	function	of	the	nature	of	enquiry	into	truth	in	this	world.	Of	course,	we	must	also	address	issues	raised	by	the	conjunction	of	theology	and	philosophy,	in	this	case	particularly	issues	with	the	ideology	of	narrative	theology.		
Difficulties	with	Narrative	Theology	Narrative	theology	has	been	associated	with	constructivist	views	of	reality.	As	I	have	shown	above,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	However,	certain	emphases	within	a	narrative	and	hermeneutical	epistemology	are	able	to	provide	a	balance	to	a	naïve	foundationalist	view	of	reality.	While	narrativist	understandings	of	the	contextual	nature	of	reality	can	be	helpful,	as	a	Christian	theologian	intent	upon	the	primacy	of	the	Divine	Word,	I	must	also	acknowledge	that	God	is	prior	to	and	outside	of	language.	As	Loughlin	notes,	“one	of	the	things	that	we	know	in	language	is	that	there	are	things	outside	language.	Though	words	are	used	to	talk	about	things,	we	can	use	them	to	talk	about	things	other	than	
                                                “This	specific	manner	of	responding	to	the	first	task	of	hermeneutics	offers	the	signal	advantage,	in	my	opinion,	of	preserving	the	dialogue	between	philosophy	and	the	human	sciences,	a	dialogue	that	is	interrupted	by	the	two	counterfeit	forms	of	understanding	and	explanation	I	reject”	(Ricoeur	1991a:18–19).	Frei	was	critical	of	Ricoeur,	but	whether	his	assessment	of	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	was	justified	is	another	matter	(Frei	1993b:16).	24	Loughlin	suggests:	“this	is	the	central	problematic	that	narrativist	theology	poses	to	the	Church…do	we	start	from	the	Word	or	the	world?”	(1999:83).	25	See	Loughlin’s	very	helpful	comments	(1999:79).		
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words”	(1999:23).	Of	primary	importance,	then,	is	the	ability	to	speak	about	the	Triune	God	as	the	real	referent	of	our	language.		I	contend	that	a	purely	postmodern26	non-foundationalist	perspective,	in	addition	to	being	problematic	for	Christian	theology,	does	not	adequately	address	the	challenges	of	human	resilience	to	adversity,27	nor	is	it	capable	of	creating	and	sustaining	the	meaning	necessary	to	navigate	significant	distress.		Scholars	have	both	affirmed	and	criticized	recent	narrative	theology.	One	Evangelical	scholar	suggests	both	of	these	responses	are	necessary	when	addressing	narrative	theology	(Fackre	2001).	Another	scholar	emphasizes	the	limits	of	the	use	of	narrative	in	theology	(Griffiths	2001).	One	of	the	most	significant	critiques	of	narrative	theology	comes	from	Francesca	Murphy	and	concerns	the	denial	of	realism.	She	suggests	narrative	must	be	used	carefully	in	theology;	its	use	does	not	necessarily	equate	to	a	denigration	of	realism,	but	it	can	too	quickly	take	center	stage.	Her	thesis	is	that	an	emphasis	upon	the	methodology	of	narrative	in	narrative	theology	“slides	into	the	place	of	content	or	subject	matter”	with	the	result	being	that	“God	is	a	story”	(2007:1).28	She	seeks	to	relate	several	modern	narrative	theologians	to	the	theology	of	Thomas	Aquinas	and	Karl	Barth.	Interestingly,	however,	she	notes,		My	aim	is	not	to	show	that	narrative	theologies	are	in	or	out	of	line	with	Thomas’	or	Barth’s	writings	but	that,	far	from	bending	theology	back	to	the	shape	of	biblical	revelation,	they	intensify	the	angular	rationalism	to	which	contemporary	theology	is	culturally	prone	(2007:6).29		
                                                26	Jean-François	Lyotard	suggests	that	“postmodernism	is	what	happens	when	master	stories	lose	their	appeal	and	become	incredible”	(1984:xxiv).	As	cited	in	(Loughlin	1999:9).	27	Loughlin	notes	that	in	postmodernism	“[w]e	have	to	make	up	our	own	individual,	little	stories.	We	have	to	be	our	own	story-tellers,	our	own	little	masters.	And	this	is	something	good,	something	to	be	happy	about;	or	so	the	story	goes”	(1999:9).	Further,	he	suggests	that	“[t]he	chief	problem	with	textualist	theology	is	that	it	is	not	textualist	enough.	It	tells	us	that	there	are	only	stories,	but	it	tends	to	obscure	the	fact	that	in	that	case,	textualism	also	is	only	a	story;	and	it	tends	to	obscure	the	fact	that	it	is	a	nihilist	and	not	a	Christian	story”	(1999:17).	This	issue	will	be	further	addressed	in	the	discussion	of	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy.	28	Murphy,	at	the	same	time,	acknowledges	that	many	narrative	theologians	would	be	at	odds	with	her	way	of	characterizing	narrative	theology	(2007:17).	29	Murphy	argues	that	narrative	theology,	despite	its	efforts,	remains	foundationalist	in	nature	(2007:36,	63,	80).	
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	While	I	admire	Murphy’s	commitment	to	preserving	the	real	referent	of	Christian	theology,	I	do	not	think	that	she	succeeds	in	correctly	assessing	narrative	theology	as	a	whole.			Interestingly,	Murphy	does	not	address	Ricoeur	in	God	is	Not	a	Story	(2007)	despite	his	significant	impact	upon	understandings	of	narrative	and	narrative	theology.30	I	contend,	she	misconstrues	narrative	theology	itself,	in	part	by	failing	to	address	Ricoeur,	but	also	more	generally.31	This	may	be	seen	in	her	characterization	of	narrative	theology:	“Narrative	theologies	conceive	the	Trinity	in	a	modalistic	way	because,	without	plenal,	self-giving	truth,	one	must	have	a	modalistic	notion	of	the	person—the	person	as	a	self-begetting,	autonomous	substrate	which	only	appears	to	engage	with	others”	(Murphy	2007:307–8).	This	is	not	only	fundamentally	untrue	of	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	the	person,	but	also	misconstrues	Ricoeur’s	narrative	theory.		There	are	other	dangers	associated	with	narrative	theology.	Ganzevoort	suggests	“narrative	approaches	run	the	risk	of	becoming	too	cerebral,	verbal,	and	cognitive.”	Thus,	narrative	approaches	should	seek	to	“include	rituals,	practices,	and	physical	and	emotional	movements”	in	order	to	counterbalance	an	epistemology	“which	may	give	undue	preference	to	verbal	knowledge”	(2012:222).	It	is	my	hope,	with	emphasis	on	imaginative	reasoning	found	in	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	we	will	bypass	this	danger	and	embrace	all	aspects	of	the	human	person.		Despite	the	difficulties	with	a	narrativist	approach,	I	believe	there	is	much	utility	in	this	way	of	understanding	the	world,	and	thereby	also	for	understanding	resilience.32	For	these	reasons,	narrative	will	be	woven	into	the	fabric	of	the	argument	throughout	this	
                                                30	Ricoeur	is	only	mentioned	in	passing	and	in	relation	to	another	scholar’s	use	of	him	(Murphy	2007:149).	31	Ricoeur’s	thinking	is	different	in	significant	ways	than	Murphy’s	portrayal	of	the	theologians	she	addresses.	This	is	evident	in	contentions	regarding	language	(2007:23,	34,	80),	personhood	(2007:27,	30),	and	time	(2007:329).	32	I	am	not	suggesting	that	all	theology	should	be	narrative	in	method,	only	that	such	a	method	may	provide	a	necessary	counter-balance	to	some	current	tendencies	in	modern	Western	culture.	Additionally,	I	will	not	address	all	aspects	of	narrative	theology,	only	those	relating	to	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy.	
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thesis,	both	as	illustrations	and	as	a	means	of	forwarding	the	argument	itself.	Since	adversity	is	intensely	personal,	an	investigation	into	how	adversity	is	overcome	will	require	use	of	personalizing	(rather	than	analytical	and	detached)	methodology.	Thus,	narrative	is	central	to	understanding	resilience.	This	is,	in	part,	because	the	construct	of	resilience	is	a	metaphorical	concept.	While	its	use	in	the	physical	sciences	lies	firmly	within	the	bounds	of	physical	properties	of	material,	its	use	beyond	that	context	constitutes	a	metaphorical	extension	of	meaning.33		In	this	way,	it	is	my	contention	that	narrative	can	be	a	means	of	deeper	knowledge	of	God	and	of	the	world.	Purely	analytical	exploration	will	not	garner	the	insights	needed	to	gain	a	full	understanding	of	the	intensely	‘lived	experience’	of	adversity	and	resilience	in	the	midst	of	that	adversity.	Therefore,	narrative	can	provide	a	‘thicker’	account	of	human	experience	than	detached	scientific	enquiry.	Further	study	in	the	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur	may	thus	provide	insight	into	the	possibilities	of	narrative	for	understanding	human	resilience	to	adversity.34		
Paul	Ricoeur’s	Narrative	Philosophy		
Why	Ricoeur?	I	believe	that	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	significant	for	understanding	human	resilience	for	several	reasons:	(1)	the	primacy	of	language	and	narrative	in	his	philosophy,	(2)	his	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	narrative	and	time,	(3)	his	conception	of	the	creation	of	meaning	through	‘emplotment,’	(4)	the	forward-looking	and	hopeful	nature	of	his	philosophy,	(5)	the	application	his	philosophy	finds	in	phronesis,	and	(6)	his	narrative	conception	of	human	personhood.			
                                                33	See	the	history	of	the	resilience	concept	in	the	introduction.	34	There	are	certainly	many	philosophers	and	theologians	with	whom	I	could	dialogue	on	these	points.	Rather	than	surveying	a	number	of	scholars	on	these	topics	I	have	chosen	to	delve	into	Ricoeur’s	thought	for	several	reasons:	1)	focusing	on	one	scholar	instead	of	many	facilitates	clarity	of	thought	and	argument,	2)	Ricoeur	addresses	at	length	both	conceptions	of	narrative	and	personhood,	3)	he	has	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	utility	of	language,	4)	his	philosophy	is	centered	on	the	power	of	hope,	5)	his	philosophy	has	strong	connections	to	the	Christian	faith.	
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Ricoeur’s	Life	Paul	Ricoeur	was	born	in	Valence,	France	in	1913.	His	mother	died	when	he	was	an	infant	and	his	father	was	killed	in	World	War	I	less	than	two	years	later.	He	was	raised	by	his	grandparents	and	educated	as	an	‘orphan	of	the	state.’	He	studied	philosophy	at	the	University	of	Rennes	and	the	Sorbonne	prior	to	teaching	philosophy,	a	career	interrupted	by	the	outbreak	of	World	War	II,	in	which	he	served	as	a	French	Army	officer	and	spent	a	five-year	stint	as	a	prisoner	of	war	in	a	German	POW	camp.35	He	went	on	to	hold	professorships	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	and	had	a	long	and	successful	career	until	his	death	in	2005	(Reagan	1996:4–51;	Wolin	2005).	Ricoeur	wrote	widely	in	the	field	of	philosophy.	His	‘hermeneutical	phenomenology’36	has	been	important	in	shaping	much	philosophical	and	theological	thought,37	though	he	sought	to	address	particular	situations	through	particular	texts	rather	than	creating	a	system	of	thought	(Vanhoozer	1990:279).	While	the	significant	corpus	of	his	work38	will	not	allow	me	to	address	all	aspects	of	Ricoeur’s	thought,	I	will	focus	primarily	on	his	philosophical	understandings	of	narrative	and	personhood.39		
Ricoeur’s	Philosophy40	Ricoeur’s	work	marks	an	attempt	to	move	beyond	the	‘hermeneutics	of	suspicion’	advocated	by	Marx,	Nietzsche,	and	Freud	(Capps	1984:26–27).41	As	opposed	to	Sartre,	
                                                35	It	may	be	that	Ricoeur’s	life	experiences	of	adversity	precipitated	many	of	his	philosophical	emphases,	making	him	an	especially	useful	conversation	partner	for	the	topic	of	resilience.	Cf.	(Duffy	2009:17;	Reagan	1996:2,	126),.	36	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1991a:12).	37	For	instance	in	the	discipline	of	theology,	Ricoeur	has	had	a	significant	influence	in	philosophical	theology	(Fodor	1995;	Stiver	2001,	2012;	Vanhoozer	2007:43–45),	practical	theology	(Browning	2002,	2010:17–25),	and	biblical	studies	(LaCocque	and	Ricoeur	1998;	Ricoeur	and	Mudge	1981;	Vanhoozer	1990).	38	Ricoeur	wrote	more	than	30	books	and	more	than	500	articles	in	his	lifetime	(Ricoeur	1994:611–735;	Wolin	2005).	39	In	so	doing,	my	focus	will	be	on	how	Ricoeur’s	narrative	philosophy	affects	our	understanding	of	human	action	rather	than	its	specific	implications	for	the	interpretation	of	texts.	Cf.	(Capps	1984:33–37).	40	Ricoeur	wrote	in	both	French	and	English.	In	assessing	Ricoeur’s	French	works	I	will	primarily	use	English	translations	since	most	of	his	work	has	been	translated	into	English	and	is	widely	available.	Where	beneficial,	I	will	clarify	Ricoeur’s	thought	by	referencing	the	original	French.	41	Within	the	constraints	of	the	current	project	I	will	be	unable	to	fully	address	Ricoeur’s	critiques	of	these	scholars.	
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Ricoeur	asserts	the	meaningfulness	of	history	and	the	desire	to	exist	are	connected	with	faith.42	Ricoeur	suggests	“[b]eyond	the	wastelands	of	critical	thought,	we	seek	to	be	challenged	anew”	(1962:193)	and	he	pursues	this	aim	through	attention	to	the	role	language	and	texts	play	in	mediating	human	experience.	Narrative,	for	Ricoeur,	is	fundamental	to	meaningful	human	existence,	suggesting	substantial	implications	for	human	resilience.	He	remarks:	We	tell	stories	because	in	the	last	analysis	human	lives	need	and	merit	being	narrated.	This	remark	takes	on	its	full	force	when	we	refer	to	the	necessity	to	save	the	history	of	the	defeated	and	the	lost.	The	whole	history	of	suffering	cries	out	for	vengeance	and	calls	for	narrative	(1984b:75).43		Thus,	for	Ricoeur,	narrative	has	a	significant	place	in	the	quest	to	understanding	resilience	and	human	adaptation	to	adversity.	Indeed,	it	is	“the	privileged	means	by	which	we	reconfigure	our	confused,	unformed	and	mute	temporal	existence”	(Ricoeur	1984b:xi).		
Philosophical	Tenets		
The	Mediation	of	Language	To	understand	the	possibilities	afforded	by	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	we	must	explore	his	claims	more	generally	in	regards	to	language.	For	Ricoeur,	“it	is	language	that	is	the	primary	condition	of	all	human	experience”		(1991a:16).	Thus,	there	is	no	unmediated	
cogito—Descartes’	‘I	think	therefore	I	am’—whereby	one	can	gain	immediate	access	to	being	(Ricoeur	1981c:106).	Instead,	language	mediates	human	experience	and	being,	or,	as	Vanhoozer	puts	it,	“[i]n	Ricoeur’s	work,	telling	mediates	being	and	time”	(1991:43).44	The	text	is	the	medium	through	which	language	is	interpreted;	hence,	the	significance	of	hermeneutics	in	Ricoeur’s	philosophy.		
                                                42	The	connection	between	the	Christian	faith	and	meaningfulness	is	not	strong	for	much	of	Ricoeur’s	career,	though	there	are	glimpses	of	it	in	his	early	work	and,	to	some	extent,	in	his	later	work.	More	will	be	said	on	Ricoeur’s	intellectual	journey	later	in	this	chapter.	43	See	also	Ricoeur’s	essay,	“Toward	a	narrative	theology:	Its	necessity,	its	resources,	its	difficulties”	(1995g).	44	I	will	return	to	the	significance	of	this	assessment.	
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At	the	same	time,	Ricoeur	regards	language	as	polysemic	(having	multiple	meanings).	As	Donald	Capps	suggests,	for	Ricoeur	“a	text	may	have	meaning	in	relation	to	the	immediate	situation	and	at	the	same	time	mean	something	more	than	this”	(1984:20).	In	this	way	the	polysemic	nature	of	language	creates	the	possibility	of	language	disclosing	a	new	‘world’	(Ricoeur	1991c:86).	While,	Ricoeur	argues,	language	on	the	whole	has	world-disclosing	capabilities,	the	particular	form	of	language	known	as	metaphor	has	the	same	ability	on	a	smaller	scale.45	For	Ricoeur,	metaphor	shatters	and	reshapes	our	experience	of	reality	through	the	dynamic	power	of	language.	Hence,	Ricoeur’s	refrain,	“‘Symbol	invites	thought’	(Le	symbol	donne	à	penser)”	(1962:193).	Poetic	language	gives	rise	to	the	possibility	of	more	than	is	subjectively	experienced,	and	ultimately	this	becomes	a	new	way	of	seeing,	as	well	as	a	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	(Kearney	2004:53).			This	new	‘world’	is	possible	because	“language	is	oriented	beyond	itself.	It	says	something	about	something”	(Ricoeur	1984b:78).	Language	traditionally	is	held	to	refer	to	a	reality	outside	itself;	a	referent.	“Ricoeur	insists	that	to	speak	of	possibility	is	to	refer	to	an	integral	aspect	of	being:	to	what	might	be	or	to	what	is	not	yet”	(Vanhoozer	1990:8).	Thus,	poetic	discourse	“does	not	directly	augment	our	knowledge	of	objects”	but	rather	creates	a	new	understanding	of	the	“referential	function”	of	language:	one	that	has	a	referent	in	the	possible,	thereby	freeing	language	to	have	a	‘surplus	of	meaning’	(Ricoeur	1981c:101).	It	is	this	‘surplus	of	meaning’	that	will	be	significant	for	Ricoeur’s	assessment	of	hope	and	possibility.		Yet	the	power	of	language,	for	Ricoeur,	lies	not	only	in	disclosing	new	ways	of	being,	but	also	in	imaginatively	creating	new	ways	of	being-in-the-world	through	narrative.46	Thus,	philosopher	Richard	Kearney	can	speak	of	the	“ontological	paradox	of	creation-as-
discovery”	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	(2004:53).	Ricoeur	expresses	this	paradox	succinctly:	“Through	the	recovery	of	the	capacity	of	language	to	create	and	recreate,	we	discover	reality	itself	in	the	process	of	being	created…Language	in	the	making	celebrates	reality	in	the	making”	(1982).	For	Ricoeur,	narrative	has	the	power	not	only	to	interpret,	but	
                                                45	See	(Ricoeur	1973:106,	1991d:53).	46	This	power	is	made	possible	through	the	imaginative	creation	of	new	structural	schema	for	making	the	world	intelligible	(Ricoeur	1984b:ix).	
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also	to	configure.	Vanhoozer	has	called	“Ricoeur’s	great	discovery	about	narrative,	its	configurative	dimension”	(1991:39).	This	creative	power	does	not	merely	remain	in	the	realm	of	potentiality,	but	finds	actuation	in	reshaping	a	reader’s	outlook	on	the	world.	Hence,	“metaphorical	and	narrative	statements,	taken	in	hand	by	reading,	aim	at	refiguring	reality,	in	the	twofold	sense	of	uncovering	the	concealed	dimensions	of	human	experience	and	of	transforming	our	vision	of	the	world”	(Ricoeur	1995b:47).47	The	configurative	nature	of	narrative	will	prove	important	in	our	assessment	of	the	role	of	narrative	in	resilience.		In	order	for	communication	to	take	place	through	the	text	there	must	be	some	means	by	which	narrativity	can	be	understood	and	ordered.	For	Ricoeur,	the	‘notion	of	plot’	provides	the	means	by	which	narrativity	can	“mark,	organize,	and	clarify	temporal	experience”	(1991a:3).	Ricoeur	develops	this	idea,	which	he	calls	‘emplotment’	(mise	en	
intrigue),	to	emphasize	the	significance	of	the	placement	of	events	within	a	narrative	structure.48		The	‘world	of	the	text,’	for	Ricoeur,	indicates	“that	what	is	finally	to	be	understood	in	a	text	is	not	the	author	or	his	presumed	intention,…	but	rather	the	sort	of	world	intended	beyond	the	text	as	its	reference”	(1981c:100).	This	‘world’	can	interact	with	the	‘world’	of	the	reader,	thereby	disclosing	new	potentialities	for	lived	experience.	The	meaning	of	the	text	does	not	devolve	into	random	arbitrariness,	nor	is	it	dogmatically	defined,	according	to	Ricoeur	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:211).	Instead,	the	dialogical	relationship	between	text	and	reader	creates	the	possibility	of	meaning.	In	this	way,	for	Ricoeur,	“[n]arrative…is	the	sole	means	by	which	human	being-in-time	is	made	
intelligible”	(Vanhoozer	1986:5).		It	must	be	noted	that,	for	Ricoeur,	the	text	itself	serves	to	provide	the	proper	distance	needed	to	make	meaning	intelligible	through	the	differentiation	of	‘distanciation’	(Ricoeur	1991c).	This	feature	of	Ricoeur’s	thought	sets	him	apart	from	those,	such	as	
                                                47	Ricoeur	also	notes	the	guiding	principle	of	his	Time	and	Narrative:	“l’œvre	en	toute	
configuration	narrative	s’achève	dans	une	refiguration	de	l’expérience	temporelle”	(1985:9),	‘the	work	in	any	narrative	configuration	finishes	in	a	refiguration	of	temporal	experience.’	48	More	will	be	said	about	this	subject	shortly.	
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Husserl	and	Gadamer,	who	suggest	strictly	subjective	phenomenological	accounts	of	human	experience.	‘Distanciation’	provides	Ricoeur	with	the	means	to	move	beyond	the	tyranny	of	the	ego	and	its	all-encompassing	priority.49		
Narrative	and	Time	Ricoeur	purposefully	encompasses	the	diverse	types	of	narrative,	to	include	historical	and	fictional,	as	well	as	narratives	using	mediums	other	than	language	(Ricoeur	1991a:2).50	He	does	this	by	appealing	to	their	common	reference	point	of	time:	My	basic	hypothesis…is	the	following:	the	common	feature	of	human	experience,	that	which	is	marked,	organized,	and	clarified	by	the	act	of	storytelling	in	all	its	forms,	is	its	temporal	character.	Everything	that	is	recounted	occurs	in	time,	takes	time,	unfolds	temporally	and	what	unfolds	in	time	can	be	recounted…By	treating	the	temporal	quality	of	experience	as	the	common	reference	of	both	history	and	fiction,	I	make	of	fiction,	history,	and	time	one	single	problem	(Ricoeur	1991a:2).		Time	is	the	feature	that	holds	together	disparate	types	of	narrative,	including	the	narrative	of	human	existence.	Through	story-telling,	the	experience	of	natural	chronological	time	can	be	changed	into	human	time	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:463).	For	Ricoeur,	what	is	at	stake	in	discussions	of	narrative	is	the	very	meaningfulness	and	“temporal	character	of	human	experience”	(Ricoeur	1984b:3).	In	Ricoeur’s	account	of	‘emplotment,’	time	provides	the	means	by	which	events	within	a	narrative	are	made	meaningful.		
‘Emplotment’	and	the	Creation	of	Meaning		For	Ricoeur	the	‘emplotment’	of	events	in	one’s	life	within	a	greater	on-going	narrative	can	create	meaning.51	Ricoeur	draws	upon	Aristotle’s	Poetics	for	his	idea	of	the	
                                                49	I	will	address	these	issues	more	fully	later	in	this	chapter.	50	In	this	regard,	music	could	be	said	to	have	a	‘narrative’	structure.	Music	itself,	like	story,	is	only	intelligible	as	a	series	of	connected	‘events’	(notes)	across	time	through	a	certain	patterned	existence	that	not	only	gives	individual	notes	added	significance,	but	also	creates	a	melody.	51	Notice	Ricoeur’s	own	conception	of	‘meaning’:	“I	am	here	giving	the	word	‘meaning’	a	very	large	acceptation	which	covers	all	the	aspects	and	levels	of	the	intentional	exteriorization	which	makes	the	inscription	of	discourse	possible”	(1973:94).	
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‘emplotment’	of	events	within	the	structure	of	a	narrative	(1984b:31–51,	1991a:3).52	In	this	understanding,	a	life	experience	is	not	an	isolated	event,	but	is	given	‘sense’	through	a	narrative	that	includes	past,	present,	and	future.	Inasmuch	as	events	are	temporally	‘emplotted’	within	a	narrative—that	is,	placed	in	relation	to	other	narratival	elements	in	a	plot—they	become	meaningful	within	the	context	of	that	narrative.	In	this	way,	for	Ricoeur,	narrative	“is	that	work	which	renders	experience	significant,	humanly	meaningful.	Without	the	work	of	narrative,	experience	would	be	only	successive	occurrence,	one	thing	after	another.	Through	the	work	of	narrative	it	is	given	structure	and	form”	(Loughlin	1999:139).53	Narrative	can	make	individual	events	meaningful	through	emplotment	within	a	larger	narrative	unfolded	through	the	medium	of	time.	Alternatively,	if	the	understood	narrative	emplotment	changes,	the	meaningfulness	of	events	within	that	narrative	also	changes.54		Ricoeur	posits	that	“the	plot	transforms	the	events	into	a	story”	(1984b:66).55	The	plot	is	what	gives	coherence	to	events	as	they	are	experienced	in	the	present,	as	the	past	is	remembered,	and	as	the	future	is	anticipated.	By	‘emplotting’	events	within	a	narrative	one	is	already	in	the	process	of	giving	external	meaning	to	those	events.56	As	previously	noted,	for	Ricoeur,	this	process	involves	not	only	discovering	meaning,	but	also	creating	it.		Beyond	creating	meaning,	‘emplotment’	also	serves	to	unify	and	integrate	diverse	elements	of	a	narrative.	Reagan	notes	in	particular	the	significance	of	the	integration	of	“diversity,	variability,	and	discontinuity	into	the	permanence	in	time”	(2002:15).	
                                                52	In	Time	and	Narrative,	Volume	I,	Ricoeur	forms	a	dialectic	between	an	Aristotelian	emphasis	on	creating	order	out	of	disorder	through	mythos	(plot)	and	Augustinian	acceptance	of	unfulfilled	desire	(1984b:4).	This	dichotomy	serves	as	the	basis	for	Ricoeur’s	development	of	his	idea	of	‘emplotment.’	53	See	also	(Capps	1984:14;	Ricoeur	1991a:4).	54	This	creates	the	possibility	of	a	‘counter-narrative’	in	which	a	broken	narrative	may	be	restored.	There	is	a	danger,	however,	of	imposing	a	new	oppressive	meta-narrative	rather	than	enabling	an	individual	to	develop	her	own	restorative	narrative.	55	Ricoeur	argues	that	“[w]ith	narrative,	the	semantic	innovation	lies	in	the	inventing	of	another	work	of	synthesis—a	plot.	By	means	of	the	plot,	goals,	causes,	and	chance	are	brought	together	within	the	temporal	unity	of	a	whole	and	complete	action.	It	is	this	synthesis	of	the	heterogeneous	that	brings	narrative	close	to	metaphor.	In	both	cases,	the	new	thing—the	as	yet	unsaid	the	unwritten—springs	up	in	language”	(1984b:ix).	56	As	Ricoeur	suggests,	“to	narrate	is	already	to	explain”	(1984b:178).	
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Through	‘emplotment’	once	unintelligible	and	even	opposing	elements	can	be	reconciled	into	a	coherent	whole.	Ricoeur	details	the	three	ways	that	plot	synthesizes.	It	brings	together	diverse	events	into	a	unified	story:	“In	short,	emplotment	is	the	operation	that	draws	a	configuration	out	of	a	simple	succession.”	Additionally,	plot	synthesizes	heterogeneous	factors	such	as	“agents,	goals,	means,	interactions,	circumstances,	unexpected	results.”	Thirdly,	emplotment	synthesizes	the	temporal	aspects	of	narrative	(1984b:65).	Emplotment	is	the	means	by	which	abstract	and	diverse	aspects	of	a	narrative	are	made	coherent,	generating	the	possibility	of	meaning.		Loughlin	concludes,	emplotment	“is	the	means	by	which	life	is	rendered	humanly	significant”	(1999:142).57	The	creation	of	meaning	for	human	beings	through	narrative	is	one	of	the	most	substantial	of	Ricoeur’s	projects.58	This	ambitious	claim	is	possible	because,	for	Ricoeur,	meaning	can	transcend	particular	contexts	and	have	‘durable’	and	even	‘omnitemporal’	relevance	in	new	situations	(Ricoeur	1973:102–3).	This	feature	makes	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	particularly	promising	for	understanding	human	resilience.		
Orientation	toward	the	Future	and	Possibility	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	future	and	possibility-oriented.	It	is	characterized	by	a	“passion	for	the	possible”	(Vanhoozer	1990:6)	59	that	is	expressed	through	the	“notion	of	
narrative	hope”	(Vanhoozer	1990:8).60	The	mediation	of	the	text	actuates	hope:	the	text	“frees	us	from	the	visibility	and	limitation	of	situations	by	opening	up	a	world	for	us,	that	is,	new	dimensions	of	our	being-in-the-world”	(Ricoeur	1973:96).			Thus,	the	text	and	reader	have	a	dialogical	relationship.	Ricoeur	suggests	that	the	text	‘interprets’	the	reader	in	addition	to	the	reader	interpreting	the	text.	That	is,	the	reader’s	understanding	of	the	world	can	be	shaped	and	changed	through	the	act	of	
                                                57	Ricoeur	himself	notes,	“Time	becomes	human	to	the	extent	that	it	is	articulated	through	a	narrative	mode,	and	narrative	attains	its	full	meaning	when	it	becomes	a	condition	of	temporal	existence”	(1984b:52).	58	Some	have	suggested	that	Ricoeur’s	early	life,	especially	the	losses	of	his	mother	and	father	at	a	young	age,	informed	his	subsequent	philosophy	and	search	for	meaning	(Graham,	Walton,	and	Ward	2005:64).	59	This	is	a	phrase	that	Ricoeur	borrows	from	Kierkegaard.	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1981a:160).	60	E.g.	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:490).	
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reading.	This	presents	opportunity	for	the	world	of	the	text	to	speak	to	the	‘world’	of	the	reader	and	thereby	open	up	new	ways	of	seeing	and	being	in	the	world	that	could	not	have	been	comprehended	prior	to	this	encounter.	The	text	“enlarges	the	reader’s	situation	into	a	world	that	also	transcends	his	or	her	own	immediate	situation”	(Capps	1984:17).	The	possibilities	that	such	a	claim	presents	for	our	understanding	of	means	of	inculcating	resilience	are	substantial.		
Poetics	and	Human	Possibility	Vanhoozer	describes	Ricoeur	as	a	“philosopher	of	hope”	(1990:6)	because,	for	Ricoeur,	hermeneutics	unlocks	new	possibilities	through	its	ability	to	create	new	meanings	out	of	given	meanings	(Kearney	2004:39).	Ricoeur	focuses	on	poetic	language	as	best	displaying	the	‘surplus	of	meaning’	possible	through	language.	Within	poetic	language,	Ricoeur	suggests	metaphor	and	narrative	as	the	supreme	examples	of	semantic	‘passion	for	the	possible’:	“Metaphors	offer	different	ways	of	seeing	the	world;	narratives	present	different	ways	of	seeing	human	being	in	the	world”	(Vanhoozer	1990:8).		Referring	to	the	‘hermeneutics	of	suspicion’	that	dominated	the	modern	age,	Ricoeur	suggests,	“The	same	age	develops	the	possibility	of	emptying	language	and	the	possibility	of	filling	it	anew.	It	is	therefore	no	yearning	for	a	sunken	Atlantis	that	urges	us	on,	but	the	hope	of	a	re-creation	of	language”	(1962:193).	Thus,	it	is	hope	that	drives	Ricoeur	onward	in	his	philosophical	endeavor—hope	in	the	possibility	of	human	being	accessed	through	the	mediation	of	language—to	include	the	texts	that	record	human	existence	(Vanhoozer	1990:7).		Ricoeur	desired	to	find	a	place	for	meaning	in	a	world	that,	in	many	ways,	had	lost	the	hope	of	this	possibility.61	For	Ricoeur,	this	hope	lay	in	the	potential	provided	by	the	narrative	construction	of	language	and	the	‘surplus	of	meaning’	provided	by	poetic	discourse.	These	means,	however,	are	inextricably	tied	to	time.	Ricoeur	goes	to	great	
                                                61	Certainly,	Ricoeur’s	personal	experience	of	loss	in	two	World	Wars	could	have	led	him	down	the	same	path	of	nihilism	and	hopelessness,	a	situation	he	described	as	“the	latent	defeatism	of	a	public	opinion	weary	of	war	and	in	search	of	alibis	for	its	flight	from	the	problems	of	the	modern	world”	(1965:95).	In	contrast,	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutical	turn	came	as	a	means	of	critiquing	the	critical	spirit	of	the	modern	age	(Lowe	1981:394).	
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lengths	to	show	how	time	and	the	related	concept	of	memory	serve	to	create	the	possibility	of	meaning.	Following	Ricoeur,	Kearney	suggests	that	“without	the	backward	look	a	culture	is	deprived	of	its	memory,	without	the	forward	look	it	is	deprived	of	its	
dreams”	(2004:87),	or,	as	Ronald	Kuipers	puts	it,	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	contribution	is	“turning	memory	into	eschatology”	(2011:3).	Ricoeur	proposes	that	narrative	is	a	‘working	out’	or	a	‘working	through’	of	what	is	remembered	through	the	‘configurative’	process	of	emplotment	and	the	subsequent	‘refiguration’	of	life	which	is	effected	through	this	narration	(Kearney	2004:160).	Here	Ricoeur	builds	on	Augustine’s	account	of	time	and	memory	in	his	Confessions:	“by	entrusting	to	memory	the	fate	of	things	past,	and	to	expectation	that	of	things	to	come,	we	can	include	memory	and	expectation	in	an	extended	and	dialectical	present”	(1984b:11).62	The	coherence	of	past,	present,	and	future	on	the	continuum	of	time	enables	narrative	to	mediate	human	being,	and	thereby	create	meaning.			In	contrast	to	Heidegger,	Ricoeur	suggests	that	human	being	is	oriented	towards	life	rather	than	death	(Vanhoozer	1990:19–37).	For	Ricoeur,	human	existence	centers	around	the	positive	impulse	to	be,	which	is	more	primary	to	the	self	than	fear,	and	which	consists	of	substance	instead	of	nothingness	(Vanhoozer	1990:6).	Thus	“the	‘central	intuition’	of	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	that	human	existence	is	meaningful.	There	is	a	‘surplus	of	meaning’	over	meaninglessness”	(Vanhoozer	1990:6).	Furthermore,	for	Ricoeur,	human	being	is	itself	potentiality—it	is	always	oriented	towards	possible	ways	of	being-in-the-world.	This	‘surplus	of	being’	is	integral	to	human	existence	and	is	the	basis	for	hope—there	is	more	than	‘what	is,’	there	is	also	“what	might	be”	(Vanhoozer	1990:7).63	
                                                62	Significantly,	Janet	Soskice	suggests	that,	“as	one	who	finds	himself	before	texts	and	finds	himself	to	be	first	a	listener	to	texts	who	then	turns	to	their	applicatio,	Ricoeur	is	following	the	steps	of	one	of	the	earliest	and	best	students	of	Christian	philosophy,	Saint	Augustine”	(2004:79).		63	Here	Vanhoozer	ties	Ricoeur’s	thought	to	Aquinas:	“This	understanding	of	hope	is	similar	to	that	of	Thomas	Aquinas.	According	to	Aquinas,	there	is	hope	only	where	the	subject	intends	something	which	is	(a)	good	(b)	in	the	future	(c)	attainable	only	with	difficulty	(d)	possible”	(1990:15).	Referencing		(Aquinas	1965),	vol.	XXI,	1a2ae,	Q.	40,	Arts.	1-8.	Similarly,	David	Ford	suggests	that	Aquinas’	and	Ricoeur’s	thought	are	compatible	“not	least	through	[their]	use	of	wisdom	as	an	integrating	concept	and	[their]	contemplative	focus	on	God	for	God’s	sake”	(2007:214),	noting	that	Matthew	Levering		(2004)	draws	a	similar	comparison.	Ford	suggests	that	Ricoeur	primarily	uses	
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Story	and	Human	Possibility	The	possibilities	inherent	in	human	being	exceed	the	ability	of	normal	human	communication	systems	to	convey.	In	Ricoeur’s	thinking,	narrative	and	poetic	language	are	essential	because	there	is	always	more	to	reality	than	can	be	described	in	a	conceptual	system.	Story	is	able	to	capture	what	is	lost	in	a	conceptual	description	(Vanhoozer	1990:285)	because	it	is,	itself,	a	form	of	metaphor	that	falls	in	the	category	of	‘poetic	discourse.’64	Thus,	Ricoeur	seeks	to	add	to	his	theory	of	metaphor	a	psychological	understanding	of	imagination	in	which	‘seeing-as’	corresponds	to	a	semantic	notion	of	‘saying’	(Kearney	2004:52).65	‘Seeing-as’	can	thus	become	“the	revealer	of	a	‘being-as’	on	the	deepest	ontological	level”	(Ricoeur	1984b:xi)	which	is	possible	because	metaphor	“introduces	the	spark	of	imagination	into	a	‘thinking	more’	(penser	plus)”	(Kearney	2004:52).66		The	realm	of	the	poetic	encompasses	both	“metaphorical	utterance	and	narrative	discourse”	(Ricoeur	1984b:xi).	For	Ricoeur,	the	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	projected	through	story	has	the	potential	for	real	praxis:	the	“world	of	the	text	that	intervenes	in	the	world	of	action	in	order	to	give	it	a	new	configuration	or,	as	we	might	say,	in	order	to	transfigure	it”	(1991a:10).		Ricoeur	suggests	that	“[f]iction	and	poetry	intend	being,	not	under	the	modality	of	being-given,	but	under	the	modality	of	power-to-be”	(1991c:86).	Further,	“[b]eing-affected	in	the	fictive	mode	is	therefore	incorporated	into	the	self’s	being-affected	in	the	‘real’	mode”	(Ricoeur	1992b:330).	This,	to	some	extent,	is	the	function	of	literature:	The	role	of	most	of	our	literature	is,	it	seems,	to	destroy	the	world…the	abolition	of	a	first-order	reference,	an	abolition	effected	by	fiction	and	poetry,	is	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	freeing	of	a	second-order	reference,	which	reaches	the	world…at	the	level	that	Husserl	designated	by	the	expression	
                                                
wisdom	in	his	philosophical	and	theological	undertakings	to	mediate	between	and	balance	disparate	elements	(2007:217).		64	The	sentence	and	story	are	simply	larger	forms	of	the	metaphor	but	work	following	the	same	rules.	65	This	speaks	to	Ricoeur’s	regard	for	the	imagination	as	a	faculty	of	seeing	and	even	creating	new	ways	of	being-in-the-world.	See	(Ricoeur	1978a:207–8).	66	Citing	(Ricoeur	1978a:303).	
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Lebenswelt	[life-world]	and	Heidegger	by	the	expression	being-in-the-world	(Ricoeur	1991c:85–86).		Poetic	language’s	semantic	referent	is	not	the	first-order	reference	of	scientific	discourse,	but	rather	a	referent	truer	to	reality	whose	description	in	language	is	possible	by	being	freed	from	the	constraints	of	this	type	of	referent.67	The	ability	of	story	to	accomplish	greater	clarity	in	description	through	releasing	claim	to	realistic	description	is	an	irony	and	paradox	that	is	not	lost	to	Ricoeur.68		To	capture	what	lies	at	the	heart	of	resilience,	more	is	needed	than	abstracted	scientific	enquiry	into	the	human	being.	An	epistemological	approach	that	provides	insight	into	potential	interior	motivation	of	the	human	self	is	needed.	As	I	have	suggested,	narrative	is	a	useful	tool	for	gaining	such	insight.	Yet,	the	necessary	correlation	between	the	correspondence	of	a	narrative	and	the	reality	of	historical	action	within	historical	discourse	delimits	the	possibilities	of	potential	‘worlds’	projected	by	the	text.	Instead,	a	narrative	not	tied	to	what	has	happened,	but	rather	to	what	might	happen	enables	a	further	understanding	of	human	being.	The	genre	of	narrative	presents	exactly	this	opportunity.	For	Ricoeur,	“it	is	within	an	interpretation	that	a	second-level	reference,	which	is	properly	the	metaphorical	reference,	is	set	free	by	means	of	the	suspension	of	
                                                67	For	Ricoeur,	“metaphor	is	a	way	of	redescribing	the	world	and…therefore,	poetic	language	has	a	referent.	In	short,	if	a	metaphor	destroys	the	possibility	of	a	literal	meaning,	it	also	destroys	the	possibility	of	a	referent	for	the	sentence.	But	this	opens	up	the	possibility	that	metaphorical	meaning	creates	a	new	referent,	a	new	world	of	the	text”	(Reagan	1996:43)	citing	(Ricoeur	1978a:216–56).	68	Ricoeur	suggests	that	“the	most	extreme	paradox	is	that	when	language	most	enters	into	fiction—e.g.,	when	a	poet	forges	the	plot	of	a	tragedy—it	most	speaks	truth	because	it	redescribes	reality	so	well	known	that	it	is	taken	for	granted”	(1981c:101–2).	Vanhoozer	suggests:	“In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	both	poet	and	historian	are	at	the	service	of	the	believer.	We	need	both	visions	and	visible	testimonies	in	order	to	renew	our	imaginations.	The	poet	creates	visions	of	worlds	replete	with	meaning	and	possibilities;	the	historian	discovers	actual	testimonies	to	the	transforming	power	of	these	visions”	(1990:280).	In	the	next	chapter,	the	example	of	Julian	of	Norwich	will	be	both	historical	and	visionary.	History	and	fiction,	through	connecting	us	to	memory	and	hope,	make	us	aware	of	and	connect	us	to	the	possibility	found	uniquely	in	human	being	(Vanhoozer	1990:281).	In	many	ways,	this	understanding	mirrors	David	Kelsey’s	conception	of	remembering	redemption	(history)	and	anticipating	redemption	(fiction),	which,	for	Kelsey,	are	both	functions	of	the	imagination	(2005:97).	See	also	an	essay	by	Chinua	Achebe	entitled	‘The	Truth	of	Fiction’	(1989),	what	Titus	has	called	‘imaginative	proximity’	(Titus	2006:184–85),	and	(Stump	2012:36).	
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the	first-level	reference”	(1978a:221).	This	is	possible	because	of	the	distance	between	symbol	(language)	and	referent.		Poetic	language	figures	significantly	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	precisely	because	of	its	ability	to	display	potentiality.	As	such,	poetic	language	is	par	excellence	that	which	effects	what	Aristotle…called	the	
mimēsis	of	reality.	For	tragedy	imitates	reality	only	because	it	re-creates	it	by	means	of	a	muthos,	a	‘fable,’	that	reaches	the	profoundest	essence	of	reality	(Ricoeur	1991c:86).		This	reality	is	accessed,	however,	not	merely	through	detached	philosophical	enquiry,	but	through	the	praxis	of	human	action	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi).		
Ricoeur	and	Phronesis	Ricoeur	suggests	that	narrative	has	phronesis	as	its	goal	rather	than	primarily	being	oriented	towards	itself.69	His	is	“a	philosophy	with	an	essential	practical	orientation”	(Agís	Villaverde	2012:10).70	As	Loughlin	notes,	it	is	“[t]hrough	story	we	learn	about	the	possibilities	of	human	action,	fulfillment	and	happiness”	(1999:145),71	but	Ricoeur	further	articulates	that	narrative	must	find	its	end	in	action	rather	than	mere	speculation.		Ricoeur	understands	texts	and	human	action	to	have	an	analogous	nature	in	which	actions	function	like	texts	and	therefore	may	also	be	interpreted	and	practically	applied	(Ricoeur	1973).72	He	proposes	that,	in	the	same	way	that	texts	can	have	meaning,	human	actions	have	meaning	and	‘systems	of	meaning.’	Thus,	for	Ricoeur,	narrative	is	a	
                                                69	Ricoeur	writes,	“What	counts	here	is	the	way	in	which	everyday	praxis	orders	the	present	of	the	future,	the	present	of	the	past,	and	the	present	of	the	present	in	terms	of	one	another.	For	it	is	this	practical	articulation	that	constitutes	the	most	elementary	inductor	of	narrative”	(1984b:60).	70	Cf.	(Stiver	2001:209–10).	71	Cf.	Ricoeur’s	discussion	of	the	role	of	mimesis	in	praxis	and	the	close	links	between	ethics	and	poetics	(Ricoeur	1984b:45–47;	241).	See	also	Heather	Walton’s	suggestion	for	poesis	to	enlarge	our	vision	of	phronesis	(2012,	2014).	72	For	instance,	Ricoeur	writes:	“If,	in	fact,	human	action	can	be	narrated,	it	is	because	it	is	always	already	articulated	by	signs,	rules,	and	norms.	It	is	always	already	symbolically	mediated”	(1984b:57).	Here	Ricoeur	finds	affinity	with	anthropologists	such	as	Clifford	Geertz	(1973).	See	also	(Capps	1984:19,	33–37).	
	 	 	
175	
“hinge…for	understanding	human	action”	(van	den	Hengel	2004:130)	wherein	the	interpretation	of	texts	as	well	as	actions,	moves	towards	appropriation	and	making	truth	‘one’s	own’	(Ricoeur	1973:114).			This	emphasis,	evident	in	Ricoeur’s	earlier	works,73	became	more	prominent	in	his	later	work,	particularly	in	regard	to	the	praxis	of	ethical	action.	When	asked	why	he	added	a	section	on	ethics	to	the	Gifford	Lectures	he	gave	late	in	his	career,	he	replied:	“I	always	felt	that	there	was	a	missing	link	in	my	exploration	of	the	anthropological	problem,	since	I	may	say	that	my	philosophy	is	a	philosophical	anthropology.	So	it	needed	this	expansion	in	the	ethical	direction”	(Reagan	1996:118).	He	continued,	“to	narrate	action	is	to	provide	paradigms	for	action…So	the	narrative	here	is	taken	as	a	transition	between	description	and	prescription”	(Reagan	1996:119).	Thus,	utilizing	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	human	action,	narrative	is	able	to	provide	a	means	for	understanding	resilience,	but	also	a	paradigm	for	practical	application.		
Personhood	Lastly,	I	suggest	Ricoeur’s	narrative	philosophy	shapes	understanding	of	personhood	in	ways	that	have	significant	implications	for	resilience.	Shortly	I	will	turn	to	an	account	of	Ricoeur’s	thought	on	personhood,	but	first	a	‘detour’	is	needed	in	order	to	explore	Ricoeur’s	relationship	to	theological	realism	and	its	implications	for	resilience.		
Situating	Ricoeur		
Ricoeur	as	a	‘Mediating	Thinker’	Ricoeur	has	been	called	a	‘mediating	thinker’	(Lowe	1981:389;	Vanhoozer	1990:5)—an	apt	description	for	a	philosopher	whose	writing	spans	multiple	disciplines	and	also	mediates	between	varying	methodologies	of	interpretation	(Vanhoozer	1986:1).	Yet	this	dialectic	has	a	surprising	benefit:	his	thought	resists	“all	forms	of	methodological	
                                                73	E.g.	“Already	in	1956	in	an	article	entitled	‘Négativité	et	affirmation	originaire’	Ricoeur	identifies	the	Other,	the	radically	other,	as	the	reason	for	a	practical	orientation	for	his	philosophy”	(van	den	Hengel	2004:130)	citing	(Ricoeur	1956:119).	The	significance	of	the	Other	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	will	be	addressed	more	fully	later	in	this	chapter.	
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reductionism”	(Vanhoozer	1986:3).74	In	reality,	Ricoeur’s	'field-encompassing'	method	necessarily	draws	upon	several	different	disciplines	in	order	to	provide	an	adequate	account	of	narrative	(Vanhoozer	1986:3).		Alternatively,	Ricoeur	could	be	said	to	mediate	between	a	different	dialectic:	that	of	suspicion	and	hope	(White	1991).	Ricoeur,	at	one	level,	follows	in	the	footsteps	of	Husserl,	Heidegger,	and	Gadamer	in	advocating	a	hermeneutical	phenomenology.	Yet,	he	diverges	from	these	philosophies	by	insisting	‘distanciation’	and	objectivity	are	necessary	aspects	of	the	search	for	truth.	Thus,	Ricoeur	advocates	a	‘critical	hermeneutics’	or	a	‘hermeneutical	realism’	(Browning	2010:22)	that	provides	substance	for	hope	while	leaving	room	for	doubt.	In	this	regard,	Ricoeur	imitates	the	attitude	of	Augustine	of	Hippo	whose	prayerful	meditation	in	Confessions	he	approvingly	quotes,	“These	are	tentative	theories,	Father,	not	downright	assertions”	(1961:XI,	17).75	Charles	Reagan	suggests	that	“[f]or	Ricoeur,	the	task	of	philosophy	is	to	avoid	the	skepticism	that	doubts	everything	while	at	the	same	time	abandoning	the	ideal	of	total	certainty”	(2002:8).		This	must	lead	us	to	address	the	question	of	‘reality’	in	Ricoeur’s	thought.	This,	too,	is	a	place	of	mediation	for	Ricoeur.	Vanhoozer	asks,	“Is	reality	of	our	own	making	or	is	it	there,	silent,	waiting	to	be	discovered?	Here	too	Ricoeur	wishes	to	mediate:	idealism	and	realism	need	not	be	construed	as	opposites,	for…the	imagination,	through	its	inventions	and	creations,	discovers	the	real”	(1990:11).	Because	of	the	complexity	and	significance	of	this	issue	I	will	explore	in	more	detail.		
Critiques:	Ricoeur	and	Realism	For	some,	Ricoeur’s	‘mediating’	philosophy	is	problematic	in	that	it	is	not	connected	with	either	a	firm	realism	or	idealism.	Vanhoozer	notes,	“[t]he	substantive	problem	in	
                                                74	Vanhoozer	suggests	that	“Ricoeur	wishes	to	combine	the	resources	of	the	literary	critical	and	structural	approaches	for	determining	meaning	while	at	the	same	time	preserving	the	extra-linguistic	reference	of	the	text	or	its	claim	to	truth”	(1986:3).	75	As	cited	in	(Ricoeur	1984b:9).	Soskice	notes,	“When	we	ask,	‘how	can	we	name	God?’	the	discourse	of	philosophy	meets	the	discourse	of	prayer…This	‘address	to	the	other’	by	these	mystics	is	more	than	a	pious	preamble—it	is	a	recognition	that	the	possibility	of	speaking	of	God	comes	from	God”	(2004:80).		
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Ricoeur	as	we	have	presented	it	may	be	focused	in	one	pointed	question:	is	the	Christian	possibility	'real'	or	'ideal'?”	(1986:311).	I	believe	that	Vanhoozer	is	right	in	his	final	assessment	that	Ricoeur	does	not	provide	a	definitive	answer.	Ricoeur’s	tendency	to	mediate,	which	serves	him	so	well	in	reconciling	‘seemingly	irreconcilable’	methodologies	and	philosophical	positions,	may	be	a	weakness	when	it	keeps	him	from	“appropriately”	mediating	realism	and	idealism	(Vanhoozer	1986:i).	In	fact,	this	mediation	between	realism	and	idealism	is	central	to	his	hermeneutical	‘detour.’	For	Ricoeur,	“no	form	of	theology	can	claim	a	sacred	status	or	an	extra-hermeneutical	prerogative	or	a	direct	road	to	God	without	accepting	the	detours	through	the	linguistic	condition	which	all	humans	nolens	volens	share”	(Jeanrod	2004:53).	In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	the	hermeneutical	process	always	mediates	access	to	‘reality.’76	Even	knowledge	of	God	is	limited	by	our	ability	to	speak	of	God.77	Ricoeur	proposes	an	“ontological	vehemence”	regarding	the	referent	of	language,	suggesting	that	“language	expresses	being,	even	if	this	ontological	aim	is	as	though	postponed,	deferred	by	the	prior	denial	of	the	literal	referentiality	of	ordinary	language”	(1992b:301).		The	hermeneutical	detour	is	not	the	only	aspect	of	Ricoeur’s	thought	that	affects	his	assessment	of	the	realism/idealism	divide.	Ricoeur	also	redefines	truth	and	reality	itself	“in	terms	of	actuality	and	possibility”	(Vanhoozer	1986:10).	This	emphasis	is	seen	in	his	‘passion	for	the	possible’	that	finds	expression	in	the	‘surplus	of	meaning’	of	poetic	discourse	and	moves	beyond	the	immediate	referential	ability	of	the	text.	It	also	finds	its	expression	in	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	the	person	as	a	capable	agent	(soon	to	be	addressed).	In	this	way,	Ricoeur	attempts	to	move	beyond	and	redefine	traditional	philosophical	claims	to	realism	or	idealism	by	describing	the	realm	of	the	possible	as	an	actuality	between	the	real	and	ideal.		While	there	is	much	potential	in	this	understanding,	perhaps	Ricoeur	does	not	fully	escape	the	dichotomy	he	seeks	to	avoid.	Ricoeur	does	declaim	the	“impossibility	of	
                                                76	Here,	however,	it	is	important	not	to	confuse	“notions	of	truth	and	reference	in	theological	language	with	notions	of	meaning	and	use”	(Wallace	1990:106).	For	more	on	the	relation	between	world	of	text	and	real	world,	see	(Reagan	1996:107).	77	A	similar	sentiment	is	echoed	by	some	theologians	of	the	via	negativa,	though	the	conclusions	these	theologians	reach	is	different	from	that	of	Ricoeur,	for	reasons	I	will	discuss	shortly.	
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absolute	knowledge”	(Ricoeur	and	Mudge	1981:152)78	and	“warn[s]	us	again	against	any	attempt	to	establish	an	epistemological—or	ontological—foundation	in	the	manner	of	Descartes	or	Husserl”	(Reagan	2002:27).79	He	is	not	as	concerned	with	questions	of	ontological	reality	as	he	is	with	philosophical	anthropology	and	the	telos	of	meaning	for	human	existence	(Lowe	1981:400).80	Peter	Kenny	suggests	that	“it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	Ricoeur’s	thought	is	not	based	on	radical	suspicion,	but	rather	on	the	assumption	of	the	positive	givenness	of	meaning”	(2004:99).		Ricoeur,	indeed,	does	emphasize	the	gift	of	meaning	over	and	against	a	hermeneutic	of	suspicion.	This	creates	tension	with	apophatic	understandings	of	reality,	yet	this	emphasis	is	consistent,	in	my	opinion,	with	Christian	theology.	Such	claims	fit	squarely	within	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	the	hermeneutic	nature	of	reality	and	human	experience.	Narrative	theologians	claim	the	system	from	which	reality	derives	its	meaning	is	the	narrative	of	God’s	story.	Defining	the	limits	of	this	system	of	meaning,	however,	is	important.		Ricoeur	acknowledges	the	limits	of	hermeneutical	constructivism:	“if	it	is	true	that	there	is	always	more	than	one	way	of	construing	a	text,	it	is	not	true	that	all	interpretations	are	equal…	The	text	is	a	limited	field	of	possible	constructions”	(1973:108).	Ricoeur’s	non-foundationalism	is	not	a	‘free-for-all’	that	allows	for	any	truth	claim.	Still,	he	suggests	that	a	text	may	have	more	than	one	possible	meaning.	How,	then,	is	truth	to	be	known	for	Ricoeur?	How	is	the	‘vicious	hermeneutical	circle’	overcome?	Ricoeur	proposes	a	process	of	dialogue	whereby	a	form	of	validation	can	be	achieved	in	which	“[i]t	is	always	possible	to	argue	for	or	against	an	interpretation,	to	confront	interpretations,	to	arbitrate	between	them,	and	to	seek	for	an	agreement,	even	if	this	agreement	remains	beyond	our	reach”	(Ricoeur	1973:108).81		
                                                78	Additionally,	Ricoeur	contends	that	the	hermeneutical	nature	of	human	knowledge	means	that	“knowledge	cannot	become	total.	It	is	condemned	to	remain	partial,	fragmentary,	insular	knowledge”	(1991b:268).	79	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1992b:299).	80	For	more	on	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	ontology	being	based	in	action	see	(van	den	Hengel	2004:130–31).	81	For	more	on	how	Ricoeur	suggests	choosing	between	conflicting	interpretations	see	(Reagan	1996:104).	
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This	dialectical	process	seeks	to	leave	room	for	mystery	and	the	finitude	of	human	knowledge.	In	this	way,	Ricoeur’s	non-foundationalism	is	closely	connected	to	the	‘passion	for	the	possible’	displayed	in	an	inherent	bent	towards	the	utopian.	Yet,	not	all	utopian	visions	are	beneficial,82	so	how	is	one	to	determine	the	validity	of	an	idealist	vision?	For	Ricoeur	“the	social	imaginary	is	liberating	to	the	degree	that	its	utopian	forward	look	critically	reappropriates	its	archeological	backward	look,	in	such	a	way	that	history	itself	may	be	creatively	transformed”	(Kearney	2004:87).83			At	first	it	seems	Ricoeur	stays	firmly	within	the	bounds	of	reason	as	the	authority	regarding	truth.	However,	he	seeks	to	reinterpret	the	way	‘reason’	assesses	the	logos	of	Christ	through	“a	more	complete	and	more	perfect	activation	of	reason”	(Ricoeur	1981a:157).84	This	reinterpretation	begins	by	being	‘alogical’	precisely	because	the	‘excess	of	meaning’	Ricoeur	is	trying	to	capture	exceeds	the	capability	of	humans	to	comprehend.85	This	excess	finds	its	basis	in	the	Resurrection	of	Christ	as	the	reason	for	hope.	He	suggests	that	the	“Resurrection	surprises	by	being	in	excess	in	comparison	to	the	reality	forsaken	by	God”	(1981a:165)—creating	a	new	logic	of	surplus	based	in	the	Resurrection	(1981a:166).86	Does	such	an	interpretation	move	beyond	the	difficulties	Ricoeur	is	trying	to	avoid?	For	Ricoeur,		the	hermeneutical	circle	becomes	vicious	if	there	are	no	objective	and	explanatory	procedures	in	the	hermeneutical	process.	Without	these	it	is	essentially	intuitive	and	thus	becomes	a	vicious	circle	because	it	traps	us	as	readers	in	our	own	subjectivity	(Capps	1984:26).87		
                                                82	I	contend	that	the	basis	of	the	Gospel	narrative	in	reality,	far	from	being	a	side	issue,	is	integral	to	the	possibility	of	meaning	and	connection	that	support	resilient	adaptation.	These	are	real	rather	than	imagined	connections.	83	Regarding	the	critical	appropriation	of	utopian	vision,	see	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:485).	84	Cf.	(Mudge	and	Ricoeur	1981:32).	85	In	this	regard,	Ricoeur’s	early	work	follows	Kant	and	has	close	affinities	with	Karl	Barth’s	theology	in	recognizing	the	limits	of	reason	(Kenny	2004:96).	Yet,	even	later	in	his	career,	he	railed	against	the	‘hubris’	of	thinking	that	reason	alone	can	provide	answers	to	the	significant	questions	of	life	(Junker-Kenny	2004a:179)	citing	(Ricoeur	1996:298).	See	also	(Ricoeur	1981a:165).	86	Here	Ricoeur	acknowledges	his	debt	to	Jürgen	Moltmann.	Cf.	(Vanhoozer	1990:282).	87	This	process	also	introduces	‘critical	distance’	into	the	engagement	between	text	and	reader.	This,	for	Ricoeur,	is	price	worth	paying	for	the	‘world-disclosive’	power	that	such	reading	provides	(Capps	1984:26).	
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One	possibility	for	escaping	this	‘vicious	circle’	is	“to	identify	the	structure	of	the	text’s	system	of	meanings”	(Capps	1984:26),	with	Ricoeur’s	logic	of	the	Resurrection	perhaps	functioning	as	a	system	of	meaning.	Some	scholars,	however,	do	not	see	a	need	to	appeal	to	a	meta-narrative	as	a	way	of	escaping	this	vicious	cycle.88	Ricoeur’s	own	way	for	moving	beyond	this	impasse	is	an	appeal	to	‘testimony.’89		
Possibilities:	An	Alternative	to	Realism	or	Idealism	Janet	Soskice	suggests	that,	for	Ricoeur,	“[t]he	only	world	which	is	of	importance	is	the	‘world’	entered	into	and	shattered	by	the	parable,	a	pre-eminently	existential	world.	By	implication,	questions	of	reference	are	unimportant”	(1985:98).90	In	Ricoeur’s	thinking,	the	ability	of	the	text	to	disclose	meaning	and	new	ways	of	being-in-the-world	dwarfs	any	other	concerns.	Similarly,	Soskice	suggests	that	for	many	thinkers	the	power	of	an	idealist	interpretive	model	lies	in	its	ability	to	describe	the	emotive	or	affective	power	of	language.	But,	she	suggests,	“[t]his	is	not	so	far	from	the	empiricist	position	as	might	at	first	be	thought…Both	the	Christian	empiricist	and	the	Christian	idealist	must	see	the	theist’s	models	at	best	as	useful	fictions”	(Soskice	1985:147).	This	is	because,	in	any	case,	the	ability	of	humans	to	speak	about	God	lies	in	metaphorical	second	or	third-order	referents	rather	than	in	direct	description	(Soskice	1985:148).91		For	Ricoeur,	there	is	another	possibility	besides	a	positivist	ontology	of	substance	(Ricoeur	1981c:101)—there	is	also	an	ontology	of	reference	(van	den	Hengel	2004:128–29).92	This	‘ontology	of	reference’	opens	up	the	realm	of	the	possible	as	a	reality	and	an	alternative	to	realism	or	idealism.	While	the	poetic,	for	Ricoeur,	is	able	to	disclose	the	realm	of	the	possible,	it	is	only	‘testimony’	that	is	capable	of	giving	
                                                88	Cf.	Peter	Kemp’s	argument	as	discussed	in	(Kearney	2004:172–73).	89	Ricoeur’s	assessment	of	the	place	of	‘testimony’	in	the	search	for	the	absolute	comes	close	to	anchoring	his	philosophy	in	a	realism.	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1981c:111–12).	For	the	significance	of	testimony	to	the	biblical	witness	and	Christian	theology	in	Ricoeur’s	thought,	see	(Ford	2009:172–73).	This	insight	will	prove	significant	as	we	turn	to	Julian	of	Norwich’s	‘testimony’	in	the	next	chapter.	90	Vanhoozer	notes	the	ability	of	language	to	display	possibilities	of	existence:	to	create	schemas	which	function	as	models	for	seeing	parts	of	the	world	that	cannot	be	described	literally	(1986:217).	91	For	Soskice,	God	is	the	real	referent	of	theological	speech,	but	community	and	tradition	are	needed	to	properly	discern	affirmations	about	God.	92	Citing	(Ricoeur	1978a).	
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ontological	‘proof’	of	its	existence:	“Instead	of	any	claim	to	absolute	truth,	[Ricoeur]	reminds	us	that	attestation	is	a	level	of	belief	and	confidence	based	on	‘testimony’”	(Reagan	2002:27).	Thus,	“the	mode	of	Christian	life	is	a	wager	and	a	destiny”	(Ricoeur	1995f:263).	In	Ricoeur’s	thought	the	reality	of	contingency	necessitates	the	activation	of	faith.	While	Ricoeur	maintains	that	a	‘leap’	of	faith	is	necessary	for	the	Christian,	I	suggest	that	this	‘leap’	is	not	divorced	from	the	realm	of	the	real.			
Assessment	Vanhoozer	addresses	at	length	whether	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	compatible	with	theological	realism.	Ultimately,	Vanhoozer	worries	about	what	he	sees	as	confusion	about	the	priority	of	theology	and	philosophy	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	(1990:276).93		Yet,	Vanhoozer	suggests	Ricoeur	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	other	modern	theologians	by	claiming	that:	it	is	the	world	of	text	that	transforms,	not	the	word	of	address;	it	is	a	
world	that	is	revealed;	and	the	world	of	the	text,	such	as	Gospels,	is	a	possible	world	(Vanhoozer	1986:217–18).	Vanhoozer	concludes,	“In	sum,	the	world	of	the	Gospel	narratives	for	Ricoeur	is	an	imaginative	world,	a	revealed	world,	a	possible	world”	(1986:218).94	He	continues,	“It	is	our	opinion	that	the	weaknesses	of	Ricoeur's	hermeneutic	philosophy	are	not	fatal;	rather,	their	cure	is	implicit	in	Ricoeur's	own	thought”	(1986:307).95			Vanhoozer’s	assessment	carries	an	additional	warning:	“But	in	celebrating	metaphor	and	narrative	as	forms	of	creative	discourse,	the	degree	to	which	language	discovers	the	real	is	accordingly	diminished”	(1986:308).	Rightly	so,	there	must	be	a	balance	between	
                                                93	On	these	tensions	in	Ricoeur	see	also	(Graham	et	al.	2005:67)	and	(Williams	1986).	Interestingly,	James	Fodor	accuses	Ricoeur	of	“residual	positivism”	(1995:209).	Cf.	(Stiver	2001:212).	94	Vanhoozer	references	(Ricoeur	1978b:237).	95	Vanhoozer	suggests	that	Ricoeur	should	be	more	careful	in	distinguishing	criteria	for	locating	the	referent	of	possible	hope	in	reality	as	opposed	to	‘utopias.’	His	‘passion	for	the	possible’	perhaps	led	him	to	a	weighted	focus	in	his	dialectic	philosophy	that	is	problematic	for	Christian	realism.	However,	Vanhoozer	continues,	“I	do	not	believe	that	this	weakness	in	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutic	philosophy	is	a	fatal	one;	indeed,	there	are	indications	that	Ricoeur’s	performance	of	his	mediation	does	not	live	up	to	his	prescriptions”	(1990:278–79).	
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Ricoeur’s	insight	into	the	creation	of	meaning	and	the	anchoring	of	meaning	in	reality.	This	has	very	real	implications	for	resilience	and	whether	the	hope	of	resilience	amidst	adversity	is	based	in	a	clever	ruse	or	in	reality.	Are	the	possibilities	for	human	resilience	idealist,	realist,	or	something	else	altogether?			I	believe	the	reality	of	the	referent	of	language	and	meaning	is	necessary	to	anchor	and	sustain	language	itself.	In	the	end,	Christianity	must	be	seen	not	just	as	a	‘cipher’	for	human	experience	and	possibility,	but	as	rooted	within	reality	itself—something	to	which	Ricoeur	aspired,	but	may	not	have	realized	(Vanhoozer	1990:282).			Ricoeur	is	happy	to	remain	in	a	place	of	mediation	that	is,	for	him,	a	place	of	faith.	While	I	do	not	think	this	is	ultimately	a	tenable	position,	I	believe	it	is	compatible	with	a	theological	realism.	Let	us	now	explore	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology	which,	for	me,	presents	the	possibility	of	becoming	a	theological	anthropology.		
Ricoeur	and	Personhood	In	addressing	personhood	in	relation	to	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	special	emphasis	will	be	given	to	a	foundational	understanding	of	Ricoeur’s	account	of	personhood	and	its	significance	for	human	resilience.96		
Knowledge	of	Reality	as	Knowledge	of	Persons	As	I	have	previously	suggested,	a	worldview	shaped	strictly	by	naturalist	epistemology	is	not	fully	explanatory	of	human	resilience.	I	suggest	an	account	of	knowledge	that	includes,	broadly	speaking,	at	least	two	differing	types:	analytical	knowledge	and	knowledge	of	persons.97	It	is	my	contention	that	knowledge	of	persons	is	often	downplayed	in	modern	Western	understandings	of	knowledge,	with	substantial	implications	for	human	resilience.98	Knowledge	of	reality	as	knowledge	of	persons	is	a	theme	discussed	at	length	by	Eleonore	Stump	(2012:47).	She	typifies	these	two	ways	of	knowing	through	the	
                                                96	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	narrative	identity	has	also	recently	been	suggested	as	useful	for	application	in	Christian	Education	(Lunde-Whitler	2015).	97	In	this	I	will	be	following	Eleonore	Stump	(2012)	and	David	Ford	(1985).	98	E.g.	(Strauss	1992).	
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examples	of	Francis	and	Dominic.	She	gives	priority	to	Francis’	way	of	knowing	and	suggests	that	the	“ultimate	foundation	of	reality	for	Francis	(typologically	understood)	is	thus	also	personal,	and	for	that	reason	knowledge	of	it	will	be	a	knowledge	of	persons”	(2012:46).99		Analytic	knowledge,	which	seeks	to	‘redescribe’	and	analyze,	could	be	construed	as	destructive	knowledge.	Alternatively,	knowledge	of	persons	could	be	understood	as	non-reductive,	exploring	the	person	as	a	whole	(Stump	2012:57).100	In	this	way,	I	would	suggest,	knowledge	of	persons	and	narrative	knowledge	are	alike.101	Thus,	as	opposed	to	analytical	knowledge,	Stump	argues	that	“knowledge	of	the	ultimate	foundation	of	reality,	knowledge	of	morality,	and	knowledge	of	the	good	life	are	all	best	understood	as	knowledge	of	persons”	(2012:47).	As	an	example,	one	may	know	about	a	person	without	knowing	the	person.102			Such	personal	knowledge	transcends	cultural,	societal,	religious,	and	ethnic	divides.	The	ubiquity	of	this	type	of	knowledge	is	especially	significant	when	we	consider	the	experiential	knowledge	of	suffering	and	its	implications	for	resilience.103	Hence,	it	may	be	said	that	suffering	itself	is	best	understood	on	the	basis	of	personal	knowledge	(Stump	2012:61).	What	significance	does	this	distinction	have	for	understanding	resilience?	Resilient	
                                                99	Ricoeur	suggests	that	belonging	is	at	the	heart	of	knowing	and	being	able	to	know	(1991b:264–69).	F.	LeRon	Shults	similarly	contends	that	relationality	is	primary	to	knowledge	of	reality	(2006:494).	100	Both	analytic	and	personal	knowledge	are	necessary	to	describe	the	totality	of	reality.	Here	I	emphasize	personal	knowledge	largely	because	I	believe	it	has	been	downplayed	in	Western	society	to	its	own	detriment.	101	Or,	perhaps,	narrative	is	a	means	of	understanding	personal	knowledge.	I	will	unpack	this	assertion	further	throughout	this	chapter.	102	Stump	suggests	that	“Francis’s	ministry…is	grounded	in	his	personal	response	to	a	personal	call	from	a	suffering	incarnate	deity”	rather	than	an	analytic	decision	(2012:45).	Vanhoozer,	however,	understands	the	agency	of	speech	to	be	fundamental:	it	allowed	him	“to	view	the	person	in	relational	terms	without	collapsing	personhood	into	relations”	(2015:151).	103	Arthur	Kleinman	comments	in	his	book,	What	Really	Matters,	“In	this	book	I	am	making	the	case	for	facing	up	to	our	existential	condition	as	what	really	matters.	Underneath	the	huge	varieties	of	cultural	meanings,	social	experiences,	and	subjectivity,	there	is	a	shared	condition	of	being	human	that	centers	on	experiences	of	loss,	threat,	and	uncertainty.	That	is	ground	zero	in	our	moral	lives”	(2006:231).	
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adaptation	cannot	simply	be	understood	through	‘knowledge	that’	(Stump	2012:49):	a	series	of	propositions,	attributes,	or	characteristics	which	together	may	promote	resilient	outcomes.	Rather,	resilience	is	best	understood	as	being	founded	upon	personal	knowledge—it	is	the	person	as	a	whole	rather	than	an	isolated	‘protective	factor’	who	acts,	in	resilient	and	unresilient	ways,	in	an	environment	primarily	understood	relationally.	What,	then,	can	be	said	about	the	resilient	person,	and	why	ought	we	think	in	terms	of	personhood?			I	suggest	that	knowledge	of	reality	is	knowledge	of	persons	primarily	because	God	has	revealed	Godself	in	the	person	of	Jesus	Christ.104	Christian	theology	holds	that	God	is	a	unity	of	three	persons—the	triune	Godhead.105	Thus,	Christian	theology	contends,	God	is	not	merely	an	idea,	but	is	a	Being	who	relates	to	the	world	and	its	inhabitants—in	particular,	human	beings.	While	this	does	not	do	away	with	the	need	for	knowledge	
about	God,	this	knowledge	serves	a	relational	purpose—drawing	creatures	into	participation	in	God.106	Relationality	is	thus	imminently	tied	up	with	personhood	because	a	relationship	consists	of	interactions	between	persons,	not	merely	analytic	
knowledge.107	Because	God	is	a	Person,	we	too,	as	creatures	made	in	God’s	image,	understand	ourselves	as	persons.108	The	primacy	of	God’s	personhood	thus	also	necessitates	understanding	human	beings	fundamentally	as	persons.	This	will	certainly	
                                                104	See	also	(Lash	2007:142)	on	knowledge	of	God	and	the	world	as	personal	knowledge.	Ricoeur’s	thinking	is	similar.	Note	Barth’s	influence	on	Ricoeur:	“The	kerygma	is	not	first	of	all	the	interpretation	of	a	text;	it	is	the	announcement	of	a	person.	In	this	sense,	the	word	of	God	is,	not	the	Bible,	but	Jesus	Christ”	(Ricoeur	1981b:54).	105	Shults	(2006)	suggests	that	the	Trinity	is	the	basis	for	understanding	the	person	and	also	creates	the	possibility	of	interdisciplinary	dialogue.	For	more	on	the	implications	of	a	Triune	understanding	of	the	Godhead	for	the	relational	nature	of	human	persons	see	(Swinton	2012:158–60)	and	an	alternative	viewpoint	(Kilby	2000,	2005).	While	these	arguments	provide	insight	into	human	being,	in	depth	discussion	of	this	contention	is	beyond	the	purview	of	the	current	project.	106	Loughlin	notes	that	we	cannot	avoid	propositional	knowledge	in	knowing	persons	(1999:180).	In	like	manner,	Francis	Watson	argues	that	“[w]e	cannot	know	God	without	knowing	about	God;	knowing	about	God	is	a	necessary	although	not	sufficient	condition	for	knowing	God”	(1994:388).		107	Swinton	similarly	regards	personhood	as	a	relational	concept	(2012:139).	108	David	Kelsey	notes:	“God	alone,	[Barth]	insists,	is	a	‘person’	in	the	proper	and	unqualified	sense	of	the	term.	However,	men	may	be	called	‘persons’	by	analogical	extension	of	the	term”	(1975:46)	citing	(Barth	1936:272),	Vol.	II,	Pt.	1.	
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include	a	broader	understanding	of	the	human	being	than	a	purely	analytical	understanding,	to	include	a	relational	component.109		The	distinction	between	analytic	and	personal	knowledge,	according	to	Stump,	enables	us	to	move	beyond	foundationalist	epistemologies	(2012:48–49).	Such	a	view	is	helpful	and	presents	a	distinct	possibility	for	escaping	some	critiques	of	modernity.	Yet,	at	some	level,	analytic	knowledge	is	needed	to	gain	knowledge	about	a	person	beyond	simply	relational	experience	(Watson	1994:387–89).	Thus,	Stump	may	not	be	able	to	totally	bypass	critiques	of	foundationalist	epistemologies.110		
Personhood	and	Resilience	I	contend	that	‘personhood’	is	an	important	concept	for	understanding	human	resilience	to	adversity.111	In	order	to	understand	resilience,	I	have	argued,	individuals	need	to	be	considered	not	as	a	set	of	abstractions,	but	rather	as	a	unified	whole.	This	unified	whole	is	what	I	would	like	to	term	a	‘person.’	In	Christian	history,	the	concept	of	‘personhood’	has	significantly	influenced	Western	philosophical	thought	more	broadly.	
Persona	(person)	was	a	significant	term	for	Augustine,	who	linked	the	nature	of	human	personhood	to	a	Trinitarian	understanding	of	God	(Milbank	1990:96).112	However,	despite	a	long	history	of	the	concept,	a	narrative	understanding	of	personhood	is	quite	new	in	the	realm	of	philosophy	as	well	as	in	use	by	modern	psychologists	(Browning	2010:123).113		In	this	project,	I	will	focus	on	narrative	identity,	especially	Paul	Ricoeur’s	conception,	for	its	insight	into	human	resilience.	Ricoeur	is	one	of	several	modern	philosophers	and	
                                                109	Root	declares	that	“reality	is	fundamentally	relational”	(2014:220–21).	Shults	ties	this	reality	to	the	Trinitarian	Godhead	(2006:501).		110	See	also	critiques	of	narrative	theology’s	view	of	the	persons	of	the	Godhead	and	accusations	of	modalism	in	(Murphy	2007:307–8).	111	In	this	regard,	Swinton	differentiates	between	the	designations	‘human	being’	and	‘person’	which,	he	says,	are	not	synonymous	(2012:111).	112	Further	discussion	of	the	use	of	persona	in	early	Christian	doctrine,	especially	pertaining	to	the	relationship	between	members	of	the	Trinity,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	project.	113	See	Swinton’s	very	helpful	short	history	of	modern	understandings	of	‘personhood’	(2012:122–25).	
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theologians	who	construe	human	personhood	and	identity	in	terms	of	narrative.114	For	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	personhood	“resides	in	the	unity	of	a	narrative	which	links	birth	to	life	to	death	as	narrative	beginning	to	middle	to	end”	(Loughlin	1999:212).115	A	narrative	construal	of	personhood	has	many	benefits—one	of	the	most	important	of	which	is	that	it	allows	for	the	role	of	teleology	in	determining	selfhood	(Jensen	2012:9).	Here,	Calvin	Schrag	notes	that	“…the	self	that	has	nothing	to	remember	and	nothing	for	which	to	hope	is	a	self	whose	identity	stands	in	peril”	(1997:37).116	Through	memory	and	hope	the	individual	gains	meaning	for	the	present	(Crites	1971:302).		Narrative	identity	can	be	understood	to	put	the	experience	of	the	present	within	the	broader	context	of	one’s	life	story:	past,	present,	and	future.	Hans	Frei	goes	further,	suggesting	his	understanding	of	narrative	identity	can	be	summed	up	in	his	description	of	Jesus:	“Jesus	is	his	story”	(1993b:42).117	While	this	is	an	extreme,	and	perhaps	problematic	description,	it	does	follow	that	“[n]arrative	identity	is	unsubstitutable;	it	cannot	be	given	to	someone	else.	There	are	no	two	people	of	whom	the	same	narrative	can	be	told”	(Loughlin	1999:73).	Thus,	it	is	possible	to	say	that	a	person	is	uniquely	known	through	his	story.		
Ricoeur	on	Personhood	Ricoeur	most	fully	described	his	philosophical	anthropology	in	Oneself	as	Another	(1992b).	For	Ricoeur,	the	concept	of	the	‘person’	is	a	“primitive	concept,	to	the	extent	that	there	is	no	way	to	go	beyond	it,	without	presupposing	it	in	the	argument	that	would	claim	to	derive	it	from	something	else”	(1992b:31).	As	was	already	highlighted,	philosophical	anthropology	was	the	goal	of	all	Ricoeur’s	work	(Reagan	1996:118;	Vanhoozer	1990:7).	To	this	end,	Ricoeur	is	among	those	who	would	posit	that	“a	
                                                114	Jensen	notes	that,	“In	addition	to	Ricoeur,	thinkers	attracted	to	a	narrative	view	of	identity	include”:	Alasdair	C.	MacIntyre	(1985),	Marya	Schechtman	(1996),	and	Charles	Taylor	(1989)	(Jensen	2012:8).	Additionally,	Don	Browning	also	sees	the	utility	of	narrative	conceptions	of	identity	for	the	integration	of	the	fields	of	psychology	and	theology	(2010:123–25)	and	David	Ford	(1985)	suggests	the	primacy	of	story	in	creating	a	Christian	identity.	115	Here,	Loughlin	cites	(MacIntyre	1985:205).	116	As	quoted	in	(Jensen	2012:8).	117	Murphy	(2007:1)	as	well	as	Watson	(1994:387–88),	I	believe	rightly,	suggest	that	this	is	problematic.	Perhaps	it	is	better	to	say	that	Jesus	is	a	Person	who	has	a	story	and,	as	we	shall	see,	is	also	an	Other	who	can	help	constitute	persons	and	their	stories.	
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person’s	identity	has	a	narrative	form,	that	a	human	‘self’	is	constituted	by	story”	(Loughlin	1999:211).	This	is	because,	in	part,	the	world-disclosive	possibilities	Ricoeur	describes	“can	only	be	gotten	at	through	the	story	of	human	interaction…accessible	through	the	different	perspectives	(‘guesses’)	listeners	bring	to	the	story”	(Capps	1984:93).	Furthermore,	for	Ricoeur,	narrative	is	a	means	of	self-understanding	precisely	because	of	the	potential	found	in	poetic	modes	of	discourse:	“[t]he	adequate	self-understanding	of	man	is	dependent	on	this	third	dimension	of	language	[the	poetic]	as	a	disclosure	of	possibility”	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:490).118	In	Ricoeur’s	thinking,	understanding	of	personhood	is	not	self-apparent	(contra	Descartes),119	and	therefore	he	takes	a	‘detour’	through	hermeneutics	to	achieve	this	insight	(Mudge	and	Ricoeur	1981:13).120	Here	the	model	of	the	text	is	the	means	of	getting	at	a	philosophical	anthropology	that	expresses	the	fullness	of	potentiality	Ricoeur	sees	in	humans.	Thus,	in	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutical	philosophy,	“the	structure	of	text	has	a	revealing	function	toward	the	structure	of	existence	of	the	self”	(Mandry	2004:65).	The	theme	of	human	potential,	what	Richard	Kearney	names	a	“phenomenology	of	being	able”	(2004:167),	is	continued	in	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	personhood.	Ricoeur,	then,	understands	human	beings	primarily	in	terms	of	potentiality.	This	is	being	(Dasein)	oriented	towards	life	rather	than	towards	death	(as	with	Heidegger).	Ricoeur,	also	in	contrast	to	Heidegger,	takes	the	‘long	route’	to	understanding	human	being.	Instead	of	being	(Dasein)	that	is	grasped	directly	through	understanding,	Ricoeur	holds	that	this	knowledge	is	mediated	through	language.121	
                                                118	Ricoeur	is	reticent	to	ascribe	any	particular	ontological	being	to	the	self	(Reagan	2002:26).	119	Ricoeur	notes	that	“there	is	no	self-understanding	that	is	not	mediated	by	signs,	symbols,	and	texts;	in	the	last	resort	understanding	coincides	with	the	interpretation	given	to	these	mediating	terms”	(1991a:15),	further	advocating	an	“indirect	style	of	a	hermeneutics	of	self,	in	stark	contrast	to	the	demand	for	immediacy	belonging	to	the	cogito”	(1992b:17).	120	Jensen	writes,	“For	his	part,	Ricoeur	introduces	his	philosophy	of	the	self	as	means	of	bypassing	the	stand-off	between	the	Cartesian	idea	of	the	posited	cogito	and	its	Nietzschean	(and,	subsequently,	postmodern)	undoing.	In	Thisleton’s	opinion,	Ricoeur’s	achievement	is	‘to	undermine	equally	the	autonomous	self	which	commands	the	centre	of	the	stage	in	high	modernity	and	the	reduced,	de-centred	self	of	postmodernity’”	(2012:7)	citing	(Thiselton	1995:78).	121		Ricoeur	notes	that	“discourse	and	the	work	of	discourse	[are]	the	mediation	of	self-
understanding”	(1991c:76).	
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Discourse	is	primary	to	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology.	The	self	dialogically	engages	with	the	Other	towards	its	own	discovery	and	creation.	This	too	is	based	in	Ricoeur’s	theory	of	language.	Ricoeur	suggests,	“Whereas	language	is	only	the	condition	for	communication…it	is	in	discourse	that	all	messages	are	exchanged.	In	this	sense,	discourse	alone	has	not	only	a	world,	but	an	other—another	person,	an	interlocutor	to	whom	it	is	addressed”	(1973:92).	An	understanding	of	‘personhood,’	reflexively	known,	draws	extensively	from	Ricoeur’s	narrative	philosophy	and	textual	hermeneutics.	Ricoeur	does	not	only	hermeneutically	interpret	texts.	He	also	sees	the	self	as	hermeneutically	understood	through	the	Other—Ricoeur’s	conception	of	a	person	outside	of	the	self.122	Thus,	for	Ricoeur,	even	the	self	must	be	interpreted.	This	suggests	that	the	self	is	understood	mediately	through	language	and	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Other,	thereby	being	reliant	upon	both	for	its	being	(Kearney	2004:33).123	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	personhood	can	provide	a	substantial	corrective	for	many	Western	cultural	conceptions	of	the	person.	For	“it	is	only	by	means	of	the	distancing	of	the	self	from	its	original	ego	that	the	interpreter	can	hope	to	recover	a	new	sense	of	subjectivity:	enlarged,	decentred	and	open	to	novel	possibilities	of	self-interpretation”	(Kearney	2004:32).124			
                                                122	For	Ricoeur,	self-identity	is	“inextricably	bound	up	with	a	concept	of	the	other	and	the	relation	between	the	self	and	the	other”	(Reagan	2002:4).	123	Vanhoozer	helpfully	summarizes:	“Ricoeur’s	philosophy	seeks	to	understand	human	being	(What	is	man?)	and	thereby	to	achieve	self-understanding	(Who	am	I?).	But	the	meaning	of	human	being	is	gained	only	through	interpretation	of	texts	(including	meaningful	action)	which	attest	to	human	existence.	Philosophy	is	henceforth	‘hermeneutic.’	Lego	ut	intelligam	—	‘I	read	in	order	to	understand.’	I	attain	self-understanding	when	I	grasp	the	range	of	my	possibilities.	This	self-understanding	may	be	transformed	when	in	reading	I	confront	the	‘world	of	the	text’	and	apply	to	myself	the	existential	possibility,	the	way	of	living	and	being	in	the	world,	which	a	given	narrative	displays…Ricoeur’s	narrative	theory	thus	stands	at	the	crossroads	of	his	philosophical	anthropology	and	his	hermeneutics”	(1990:17).	124	These	claims	are	strikingly	similar	to	the	statement	of	Jesus	recorded	in	the	Gospel	of	Luke	concerning	the	self:	“For	those	who	want	to	save	their	life	will	lose	it,	and	those	who	lose	their	life	for	my	sake	will	save	it.	What	does	it	profit	them	if	they	gain	the	whole	world,	but	lose	or	forfeit	themselves?”	Luke	9:24-25,	NRSV.	For	more	on	finding	reality	as	an	unexpected	gift	see	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:461).	
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Some	suggest	that	Ricoeur’s	attempt	to	move	beyond	the	self-constituted	person	was	motivated	by	his	Christian	presuppositions—including	Luther's	conception	of	sin	as	cor	
curvum	in	se	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:203;	Lowe	1981:388).125	In	this	Ricoeur	would	be	in	agreement	with	many	other	Christian	thinkers,	such	as	Augustine,	who	similarly	eschewed	“a	view	of	personhood	as	‘selfownership’”	(Milbank	1990:401).126	Additionally,	like	Ricoeur,	Augustine	believed	that	human	beings	know	themselves	through	knowing	others	(Soskice	2004:90–91).	It	is	to	a	fuller	discussion	of	this	reflexive	knowledge	that	we	now	turn.		
Sameness	and	Otherness	Ricoeur	uses	the	Platonic	categories	of	the	‘Same’	and	the	‘Other’	in	both	his	Time	and	
Narrative	(1984b)	and	Oneself	as	Another	(1992b)	as	fundamental	concepts	for	his	philosophical	anthropology	(van	den	Hengel	2004:121).	In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	identity	has	two	meanings	that	are	dialectically	related	and	mediated	by	“permanence	through	time”:	identity	as	sameness	and	identity	as	selfhood	(Reagan	2002:13).127	The	dialectic	is	essentially	between	quantitative	and	qualitative	aspects	of	identity—that	is	to	say,	it	is	a	way	to	establish	“a	form	of	permanence	in	time	that	is	a	reply	to	the	question	‘Who	am	I?’”	(Ricoeur	1992b:118).	Reagan	provides	a	summary	of	Ricoeur’s	thought:	So	the	dialectic	of	sameness	and	selfhood	has	two	poles:	character,	where	sameness	and	permanence	of	dispositions	constitute	selfhood;	and	promising,	where	selfhood	is	maintained	in	spite	of	change,	or	in	the	absence	of	sameness.	Ricoeur	thinks	that	narrative	identity	is	the	mediating	concept	(2002:14–15).		
                                                125	Ricoeur	notes,	“It	was	in	fact	Karl	Barth	who	first	taught	me	that	the	subject	is	not	a	centralizing	master	but	rather	a	disciple	or	auditor	of	a	language	larger	than	itself”	(Ricoeur	and	Valdés	1991:473).	Richard	Kearney	argues,	“In	short,	Ricoeur	praises	narrative	understanding—where	one	represents	oneself	as	another—to	the	extent	that	it	serves	to	liberate	us	from	narcissistic	interests	without	liquidating	our	identity.	In	so	doing,	it	generates	a	basic	act	of	empathy	whereby	the	self	flows	from	itself	toward	the	other	in	a	free	variation	of	imagination”	(2004:174).	126	Annie	Barthélémy	notes	regarding	Ricoeur’s	anthropology:	“Le	self	n’est	ni	narcissique,	ni	autosatisfaction,	ni	repli	sur	ce	qui	serait	le	noyau	intime	de	la	personne,	le	self	est	attestation	de	soi,	une	attestation	fragile	mais	confiante”	(2015:434);	‘The	self	is	neither	narcissistic,	self-satisfied,	nor	withdrawn	into	that	which	would	be	the	intimate	core	of	the	person,	the	self	is	attestation	of	itself,	a	fragile	but	confident	attestation.’		127	Ricoeur	suggests	that	narrative	identity	is	found	“dans	la	dialectique	de	l’ipséité	et	de	la	mêmeté”	(1990:167);	‘in	the	dialectic	between	individual	identity	and	sameness.’	
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For	Ricoeur,	a	person	is	both	dynamic	and	stable	throughout	time.	The	narrative	identity	of	the	individual	holds	together	these	diverse	elements.	Personhood,	then,	is	located	in	the	narrative	dialectic	between	sameness	and	selfhood	as	played	out	over	the	course	of	time	(Reagan	2002:15).128	Metaphor,	as	a	means	of	understanding	narrative	discourse,	also	mediates	the	Same	and	the	Other	and	enables	the	relationality	of	belonging	(van	den	Hengel	2004:127).129	Sameness	and	Otherness	could	be	understood	in	theological	terms	as	related	to	the	loss	of	the	self	and	displacement	by	the	Other	(van	den	Hengel	2004:123).	The	Other	is	not	completely	distinct	from	the	self,	but	rather	is	part	of	what	determines	it.130	Charles	Reagan	proposes	that	for	Ricoeur	“[o]therness	does	not	come	from	outside	selfhood,	but	is	part	of	the	meaning	and	the	ontological	constitution	of	selfhood”	(2002:28).	Thus	meaning	is	given	to	Ricoeur’s	paradoxical	phrase	“oneself	as	another”	(Ricoeur	1992b:327)	because	one’s	self	is	constituted	in	relation	to	the	other.131	Partly	enabling	this	understanding	of	the	self	is	Ricoeur’s	concept	of	‘distanciation.’	Without	distanciation,	human	beings	would	never	be	aware	of	belonging	to	anything	greater	than	themselves,	for	it	is	distanciation	that	creates	the	‘historical	character’	of	consciousness	(Ricoeur	1981c:107).	The	dialectic	inherent	in	distanciation	also	creates	the	possibility	of	social	relations	between	persons	as	well	as	the	differentiation	of	body	and	self.	Thus,	the	self	must	be	understood	as	a	unified	whole,	but	a	whole	individual	
                                                128	For	an	example	of	how	Ricoeur’s	narrative	conception	of	the	self	may	be	useful	in	aiding	individuals	to	heal	in	the	aftermath	of	trauma,	see	Alexandre	Dubuis’	(2015)	research	with	burn	victims.	129	Regarding	poetic	language,	of	which	metaphor	is	a	type,	Ricoeur	suggests,	“My	deepest	conviction	is	that	poetic	language	alone	restores	to	us	that	participation	in	our	belonging-to	an	order	of	things	which	precedes	our	capacity	to	oppose	ourselves	to	things	taken	as	objects	opposed	to	a	subject.	Hence	the	function	of	poetic	discourse	is	to	bring	about	this	emergence	of	a	depth-structure	of	belonging-to	amid	the	ruins	of	descriptive	discourse”	(1981c:101).	Here	Ricoeur	borrows	the	language	of	‘belonging-to’	from	Gadamer	(Ricoeur	1981c:106).	130	Alastair	McFadyen	similarly	suggests	that	both	the	human	person	and	conception	of	the	‘self’	are	founded	upon	social	relations	(1990:70).	McFadyen’s	account	has	much	in	common	with	Ricoeur’s	and	my	own.	131	See	(White	2009:5–6)	for	more	on	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	the	hermeneutic	self	and	similarities	between	the	philosophical	and	theological	anthropologies	of	Barth	and	Ricoeur.	
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whose	being	is	mediated	to	the	outside	world	by	the	body.132	For	Ricoeur,	“the	phenomenological	concept	of	a	‘lived	body’	[is]	the	intermediary	between	action	and	agent”	(Reagan	2002:13).		It	is	to	the	agency	of	the	self	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	that	I	now	turn.	
Agency	and	Victimhood	Integral	to	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology	is	the	belief	that	a	person	is	an	agent	who	fundamentally	has	the	power	to	act	(Reagan	2002:12).133	For	Ricoeur,	narrative	identity	and	action	are	connected	(Reagan	2002:6).	Thus,	an	action	itself	has	to	do	with	the	‘who’—the	person	who	is	able	to	act.134	But	personhood	and	its	concomitant	potentiality	to	act	are	given	from	without	as	“the	gift	of	the	Other”	with	life	thus	is	lived	on	the	basis	of	God’s	gracious	gift	(van	den	Hengel	2004:131–32).135	Ricoeur	argues	that	an	understanding	of	human	being	through	narrative	identity	must	include	“not	just	acting	but	also	suffering,	hence	characters	as	agents	and	as	victims”	(1984b:xi).136	Here	the	importance	of	‘role’	is	clear	for	Ricoeur.	For	him,	narrative	identity	includes	both	agents	and	victims,	both	acting	and	suffering	(Ricoeur	1992b:144–45).137	The	narrative	
                                                132	Hughes’	(2001)	description	of	individuals	as	‘Situated	Embodied	Agents’	is	helpful	here.	133	See	(Ricoeur	1992b:101).	Yet	the	self	cannot	be	identified	with	action	or	equated	with	the	ability	to	act	(Jensen	2012:125).	As	Swinton	rightly	notes,	equating	action	with	personhood	is	problematic	(2012:126–30).	134	Vanhoozer	suggests,	“Ricoeur	uses	the	category	of	narrative	to	speak	of	the	self’s	identity,	which	does	not	belong	to	the	category	of	events	or	facts	but	of	action.	The	self	is	essentially	not	so	much	a	‘what’	as	a	‘who’:	an	agent	with	a	cohesive	history	of	its	speech	and	actions”	(2007:45).	135	For	further	discussion	of	the	dynamic	between	autonomy	and	dependence	in	Ricoeur’s	thought,	see	(Ricoeur	1996).	136	It	is	important	that	Ricoeur	includes	suffering	as	well	as	acting	in	his	account	of	personhood.	He	writes,	“Suffering	is	not	defined	solely	by	physical	pain,	nor	even	by	mental	pain,	but	by	the	reduction,	even	the	destruction,	of	the	capacity	for	acting,	of	being-able-to-act,	experienced	as	a	violation	of	self-integrity”	(1992b:190).	Significantly,	this	demonstrates	a	change	in	Ricoeur’s	terminology.	In	the	middle	of	his	career	Ricoeur	proposed	an	understanding	of	personhood	that	includes	“not	just	acting	but	also	suffering,	hence	characters	as	agents	and	as	victims	[victimes]”	(1984,	p.	xi).	Soon	after,	he	began	instead	using	the	term	patients,	that	Kathleen	Blamey	translates	‘sufferers’	(Ricoeur,	1992,	p.	144).	This	could	be	a	result	of	the	significant	effect	that	the	unexpected	death	of	his	son	in	1986	had	on	Ricoeur,	after	which,	as	evidenced	by	his	change	of	terminology,	he	included	suffering	as	a	vital	aspect	of	personhood	(Reagan,	1996,	p.	64).	137	Cf.	(Reagan	2002:15).	
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praxis	of	sorrow	allows	the	individual	to	empathize	through	the	imaginative	power	of	narrative	(Kearney	2004:173).	Hence,	Kearney	suggests:	What	Ricoeur	claims	is	that	narrative	understanding	provides	us	with	both	a	poetics	and	an	ethics	of	responsibility	in	that	it	propels	us	beyond	self-reference	to	relation	with	others	(via	analogy/empathy/apperception).	This	extension	of	the	circle	of	selfhood	involves	an	‘enlarged	mentality’	capable	of	imagining	the	self	in	the	place	of	the	other	(2004:173).	Thus,	narrative,	for	Ricoeur,	mediates	description	and	prescription	of	action	through	a	type	of	listening	(Ricoeur	1992b:114).138	This	is	listening	not	only	to	the	narrative	of	the	Other,	but	also	a	listening—and	therefore	reception—of	the	gift	of	the	self.	This,	Ricoeur	argues,	is	the	‘summoned	self’	(Ricoeur	1995f).	The	primacy	of	the	Divine	Word	is	evident	in	this	way	of	knowing	the	self	through	its	reception	as	a	gift—a	reception	that	puts	an	end	to	endless	human	searching:	Ricoeur	argues	for	a	change	of	perspective	that	puts	an	end	to	a	pursuit	which	proves	to	be	unsatisfiable…The	only	way	out	of	this	logic	of	reciprocal	exhaustion	is	to	focus	on	the	‘capability	of	receiving	the	gift.’	In	the	‘act	of	receiving…the	giver	is	recognized’	(Junker-Kenny	2004a:168).	As	will	become	apparent,	the	identity	of	the	giver—the	Other—is	critical.	
Memory	and	Self	Because	the	self	is	a	gift	received	in	time,	remembrance	of	how	and	when	this	gift	is	given	becomes	crucial	to	self-understanding.	For	Ricoeur,	“[o]ne’s	very	selfhood	is	not	an	autonomous	construction	but	rather	a	gift	of	language	and	literature”	(Vanhoozer	1990:275).	This	gift	must	be	received,	but	the	act	of	reception	includes	both	reflection	and	interpretation.	Ricoeur	notes:	[R]eflection	must	become	interpretation	because	I	cannot	grasp	the	act	of	existing	except	in	signs	scattered	in	the	world.	That	is	why	a	reflective	philosophy	must	include	the	results,	methods,	and	presuppositions	of	all	the	sciences	that	try	to	decipher	and	interpret	the	signs	of	man	(1970:46).139	Self-understanding	is	a	process	of	gaining	insight	through	the	mediation	of	language	and	the	Other.	This	process	takes	place	in	time	and	therefore	the	self	has	an	integral	temporal	aspect	(Ricoeur	1984b:29).	This	is	particularly	significant	in	what	Ricoeur	
                                                138	Cf.	(Reagan	2002:13).	139	This	hints	at	the	necessity	of	utilizing	a	variety	of	methodologies	in	exploring	human	existence	and	resilience	to	adversity.	
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calls	the	archeology	and	teleology	of	the	self,	or	put	another	way,	human	remembrance	and	hope.140		Thus,	memory	(or	archeology	of	the	self)	is	the	organ	for	providing	the	substance	of	the	narrative	identity	of	the	self.	However,	it	also	creates	the	trajectory	for	the	teleology	(and	thereby	hope)	for	the	individual.	In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	then,	both	history	(memory)	and	poetry	(possibility/hope)	display	human	potentiality	through	archeology	of	the	self—represented	for	Ricoeur	by	Freud—and	teleology	of	the	self—represented	by	Hegel.	These	“stories	and	histories”	inform	the	individual’s	present	reality	and	move	her	toward	the	possibility	of	hope	(Vanhoozer	1990:281).	Maureen	Junker-Kenny	suggests	that	memory	plays	an	important	part	in	creating	self-esteem	because		it	functions	in	reconstructing	the	sense	of	the	unity	and	life	plan	which	forms	a	person’s	vision	of	her	life	as	flourishing.	The	narrative	identity	of	a	life	is	constructed	through	the	selection	of	significant	memories	which	explain	the	present	position	and	guide	future	choices	(2004b:22–23).	Ricoeur’s	work	moves	towards	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	human	being	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	finding	meaning	in	human	existence.		
Anthropology	and	the	Search	for	Meaning	Ricoeur’s	quest	for	a	philosophical	anthropology	“is	at	the	crossroads	between	‘words	and	deeds,’	or	a	‘semantics	of	action	and	desire’”	(Reagan	2002:30)	wherein	the	core	theme	is	a	search	for	human	meaningfulness	(Ricoeur	1974:449).	In	fact,	for	Ricoeur,	the	ability	to	decipher	meaning	in	a	text	is,	at	its	heart,	also	fundamentally	about	finding	meaning	in	human	existence—the	‘surplus	of	meaning’	found	in	poetic	texts,	then	can	lead	to	an	abundance	of	human	meaningfulness	that	is	evidenced	in	hope	(Vanhoozer	1990:279).		Vanhoozer	suggests	that	the	whole	point	of	Ricoeur’s	correlation	of	philosophical	anthropology	and	hermeneutics	is	to	help	us	see	that	the	meaning	of	life	is	a	gift.	Our	self-understanding	is	a	gift	of	language—in	the	beginning	was	the	Word.	Ricoeur	insists	that	the	subject	is	not	its	own	maker	but	receives	and	recovers	itself	thanks	to	the	mediation	of	language…This	is	Ricoeur’s	‘second	Copernican	
                                                140	For	more	on	the	archeology	and	teleology	of	the	self	and	motivation	see	(Ricoeur	1970:420–30,	439–62).	
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revolution’:	we	are	not	self-constituting	but	are	rather	constituted	from	without,	from	the	Word	that	shapes	our	imaginations	and	therefore	our	existence.	What	do	we	have	that	we	have	not	received?	(1990:287).		We	must	ask	how	the	Other	is	known	and	how	the	gift	of	meaning	is	recognized	as	truly	being	from	the	Other.	Peter	Kenny	suggests	that	“[t]here	is	no	easy	way	of	determining	if	the	understanding	that	I	form	from	the	texts	is	a	true	‘Call	from	Another’	and	not	simply	a	response	that	reflects	my	own	need	and	desires”	(2004:107).	Ricoeur,	concludes	the	identity	of	the	Other	is	ultimately	not	able	to	be	determined,	a	situation	he	calls	the	‘aporia	of	the	Other.’141			Ricoeur’s	search	for	meaning,	I	suggest,	cannot	be	fully	realized	apart	from	ultimate	fulfillment	in	God.	From	a	Christian	theological	perspective,	Ricoeur’s	‘aporia	of	the	Other’	is	insufficient.	In	this	‘aporia,’	I	contend	theology	may	be	able	to	say	something	where	philosophy	becomes	silent.	I	propose	an	understanding	of	human	personhood	in	which	the	human	self	is	known	primarily	in	relation	to	God	as	the	Divine	Other.142			
A	Ricoeurian	Theological	Anthropology		
God	as	Divine	Other	Following	Ricoeur,	I	contend	that	personhood	can	be	understood	as	a	narrative	construct.	Rather	than	being	determined	by	the	self	or	even	by	society,	for	the	Christian,	personhood	is	constituted	in	relation	to	God.143	This	notion	is	contrary	to	much	of	
                                                141	Ricoeur	writes,	“Perhaps	the	philosopher	as	philosopher	has	to	admit	that	one	does	not	know	and	cannot	say	whether	this	Other,	the	source	of	the	injunction,	is	another	person	whom	I	can	look	in	the	face	or	who	can	stare	at	me,	or	my	ancestors	for	whom	there	is	no	representation,	to	so	great	an	extent	does	my	debt	to	them	constitute	my	very	self,	or	God—living	God,	absent	God—or	an	empty	place.	With	this	aporia	of	the	Other,	philosophical	discourse	comes	to	an	end”	(1992b:355).	142	This	does	not	discount	the	role	that	other	individuals	play	in	forming	the	community	that	shapes	the	self.	I	am	suggesting,	however,	that	the	person	is	constituted	primarily	in	relation	to	God	as	the	Other.	143	Others,	especially	Michael	DeLashmutt	(2009),	have	suggested	a	similar	theological	anthropology	based	upon	Ricoeur.	Swinton,	drawing	upon	Martin	Buber’s	‘I-Thou’	model	of	relationship,	gives	a	similar	account	of	personhood	being	based	in	the	relation	between	God	and	the	human	being	(2012:139–72).	Likewise,	in	Martyrdom	and	Identity	(2012),	Michael	Jensen	proposes	personal	identity	as	being	given	by	God.	
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modern	Western	thinking—instead	of	personhood	being	self-generated,	it	is	given.144	The	Christian	finds	herself	constituted	(one	might	even	say	‘narrated’)	by	God	in	the	‘world-consuming’	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	This	self	finds	its	being	in	the	Word	that	God	speaks	to	it,	‘summoning’	it,	to	use	Ricoeur’s	term.	The	human	person	is	grounded	then,	not	in	self-understanding,	but	in	Divine	narration.		In	his	later	work,	Ricoeur	came	close	to	what	I	am	suggesting.	In	an	essay	originally	given	as	a	part	of	his	Gifford	Lectures,	he	describes	the	religious	self	as	a	‘summoned	self’	(Ricoeur	1995f).145	This	picks	up	where	Oneself	as	Another	left	off,	utilizing	the	theoretical	structure	of	the	‘summoned	self’	in	the	particular	case	of	the	religious	self	(Mandry	2004:72).		For	Ricoeur,	the	Christian	self	could	be	understood	as	being	summoned	by	God.	This	is,	perhaps,	a	particular	manifestation	of	the	general	principles	Ricoeur	puts	forward	in	
Oneself	as	Another.	Since	the	‘summoned	self’	is	one	who	has	been	called	from	outside	of	one’s	self,	for	the	Christian,	this	call	can	be	understood	to	come	from	the	Divine	Other,	who	thereby	takes	part	in	constituting	the	summoned	self.	This	assertion	is	not	unique.	Michael	Jensen	suggests	that	Aquinas	had	a	similar	conception	of	the	Christian	self:	“as	the	self	promised	to	him	by	God”	(2012:114).146	Thus,	personhood,	for	the	Christian,	has	significant	anchor	points	in	time:	past	acts	of	God,	the	present	work	of	God,	and	an	eschatological	future	in	God.	Hence,	Hans	Urs	von	
                                                144	Mandy	notes,	“From	a	point	of	view	in	the	tradition	of	the	Enlightenment	and	of	modern	morality,	the	religious	self	as	‘summoned	self,’	the	feeling	of	absolute	dependence	that	marks	religious	conscience,	to	belong	to	the	economy	of	the	preceding	gift,	all	this	seems	to	be	the	opposite	claim	for	autonomy.	Ricoeur’s	thesis	is	however	that	an	understanding	of	theonomy	as	‘loving	obedience’	does	not	contradict	autonomy	but,	after	questioning	its	tendency	to	autosufficiency,	sustains	its	effective	realization	of	finite	human	existence”	(2004:74).	145	Ricoeur’s	Oneself	as	Another	is	formed	from	these	Gifford	Lectures,	but,	at	the	time,	Ricoeur	chose	not	to	publish	this	lecture	(along	with	another)	as	a	part	of	Oneself.	See	the	footnote	in	Christof	Mandry’s	essay	(2004:68)	as	well	as	Ricoeur’s	own	comments	(1992b:24)	for	details	about	the	omission	of	these	lectures	in	the	published	volume.	This	may	have	been	due	both	to	concerns	about	the	reception	of	this	portion	and	the	belief	that	this	was	merely	a	particular	example	of	Ricoeur’s	argument	more	generally	(Mandry	2004:72).	146	Here	Jensen	cites	Aquinas,	Summa	Theologiae	II.340-3.	
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Balthasar	can	ask,	”Could	it	be	that	the	Christian	has	the	unprecedented	opportunity	of	giving	form	and	shape	to	his	life	through	an	awareness	or	foreknowledge	of	its	final	shape,	so	that	one	could	know	from	the	very	beginning	who	he	is?”	(1994:136).	I	contend	that	this	knowledge	is	possible	through	knowing	oneself	in	relation	to	the	Divine	Other.147		We	do	not	fully	know	ourselves	in	much	the	same	way	that	we	do	not	fully	know	God.	Human	persons,	“like	God,	are	wholly	mysterious”	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:216).	We	receive	our	personhood	and	are	constituted,	in	large	part,	from	without	rather	than	solely	from	within.	Instead	of	a	Nietzschean	self-assertion,	self-denial	is	the	norm.	Ricoeur	suggests,	“I	am	not	the	master	of	my	own	meaning,	my	own	sense”	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:215).	Could	Ricoeur’s	account	of	personhood	as	understood	in	relation	to	the	Other	be	a	corrective	to	the	cogito	of	modern	Western	individually-defined	identity?148	I	suggest	that	it	could.	This	is	where,	for	me,	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology	becomes	a	theological	anthropology.	Yet,	what	is	the	basis	of	this	theological	anthropology?	Ricoeur	himself	gives	us	a	trajectory	for	discovery	through	an	articulation	of	the	telos	ascribed	to	human	existence.		
God	as	the	Telos	of	Human	Existence	To	tie	together	meaning	and	personhood,	the	two	strands	of	Ricoeur’s	thought	I	have	highlighted	in	this	chapter,	I	turn	to	one	of	Ricoeur’s	early	and	little	known	essays	entitled,	‘Christianity	and	the	Meaning	of	History.’149	In	this	essay,	Ricoeur	suggests	meaning	is	“the	fundamental	source	of	the	courage	to	live	in	history,”	yet	also	is	a	mystery	that	must	be	attended	to	because	“this	meaning	is	hidden;	no	one	can	say	it,	rely	upon	it,	or	draw	an	assurance	from	it	which	would	be	a	counter-assurance	against	the	dangers	of	history.”	(1965:93).	Meaning,	in	this	regard,	is	inextricably	linked	to	faith.	This	leads	Ricoeur	to	ask,		What	authorizes	the	Christian	to	speak	of	meaning	when	he	takes	shelter	in	mystery?	What	authorizes	him	to	transcend	this	schema	of	ambiguity…?...For	the	
                                                147	Other	Christian	thinkers,	such	as	Augustine,	have	held	a	similar	view	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:216).	148	Indeed,	Descartes’	cogito	destroys	the	need	for	community,	including	the	community	of	those	who	have	gone	before—tradition.	149	This	essay	was	earlier	published	in	English	(Ricoeur	1952).	I	quote	from	a	later	edition	because	I	deem	it	to	be	a	better	translation.	
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Christian,	faith	in	the	Lordship	of	God	dominates	his	entire	vision	of	history.	If	God	is	the	Lord	of	individual	lives	he	is	also	Lord	of	history:	God	directs	this	uncertain,	noble,	and	guilty	history	toward	Himself.	To	be	more	precise,	I	think	that	this	Lordship	constitutes	a	‘meaning’	and	not	a	supreme	farce,	a	prodigious	caprice,	or	a	last	‘absurdity,’	because	the	great	events	that	I	recognize	as	Revelation	have	a	certain	pattern,	constitute	a	global	form,	and	are	not	given	as	pure	discontinuity	(1965:93).		For	Ricoeur,	meaning	ultimately	must	be	found	in	relation	to	the	triune	God.	While	knowledge	of	God	is,	in	the	end,	mysterious	and	beyond	full	human	comprehension,	the	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	this	world	is	finally	understandable	and	capable	of	providing	profound	meaning:	Thus,	what	allows	the	Christian	to	go	beyond	the	disconnectedness	of	lived	history	and	to	transcend	the	apparent	ambiguity	of	this	history…is	the	fact	that	this	history	is	imbued	with	another	history	whose	meaning	is	not	inaccessible	to	him	and	which	may	be	understood	(Ricoeur	1965:93–94).		The	Christian	story,	as	understood	through	the	testimony	of	those	who	witness	the	work	of	God,	is	in	itself	a	history	that	has	meaning	beyond	its	immediate	context.	The	basis	of	hope	for	the	Christian	is	the	possibility	of	such	meaning:	Hope	speaks	from	the	depths	of	the	descent	into	the	absurd,	it	takes	hold	of	the	ambiguity	and	manifest	incertitude	of	history	and	says	to	me:	look	for	a	meaning,	try	to	understand!	It	is	here	that	Christianity	branches	off	from	existentialism.	Ambiguity	is	the	last	word	for	existentialism;	for	Christianity	it	is	real,	it	is	lived,	but	it	is	the	next	to	last	word.	This	is	why	the	Christian,	in	the	very	name	of	this	confidence	in	a	hidden	meaning,	is	encouraged	by	his	faith	to	attempt	to	construct	comprehensive	schemata	(Ricoeur	1965:95).		Ricoeur	does	not	wish	to	fall	into	what	he	sees	as	the	perils	of	foundationalism	or	the	despair	of	existential	doubt,	but	he	nonetheless	still	attempts	to	find	a	place	for	the	meaningfulness	of	human	existence	in	the	midst	of	despair.	Here	he	is	caught	in	the	tension	between	the	hiddenness	and	disclosure	of	meaning.	Ricoeur	proposes	that	in	exploring	the	nature	of	reality	one	must	“choose	between	system	or	mystery”	(1965:95).	He	chooses	mystery,	but,	for	him,	it	is	a	mystery	that	may	be	engaged	through	faith	in	a	larger	schema	that	itself	provides	meaning:	Faith	in	meaning,	but	in	a	meaning	hidden	from	history,	is	thus	both	the	courage	to	believe	in	a	profound	significance	of	the	most	tragic	history…and	a	certain	rejection	of	system	and	fanaticism,	a	sense	of	the	open	(Ricoeur	1965:96).		
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Yet	this	faith	does	not	totally	leave	behind	conceptual	schemata.	Instead,	faith	is	suspended	between	mystery	and	certitude—a	place	of	‘ambiguity’	intersected	by	suffering	and	dialectically	“situated	between	the	rational	schema	of	progress	and	the	supra-rational	schema	of	hope”	(Ricoeur	1965:96–97).		The	posture	of	the	Christian,	as	one	who	lives	by	faith,	is	not	one	of	unmitigated	hope,	nor	is	it	one	of	existential	despair.	Ricoeur	has	highlighted	the	‘supra-rational	schema	of	hope’	available	through	his	‘passion	for	the	possible,’	yet	he	rightly	also	suggests	that	this	must	be	tempered	by	the	‘disquieting	aspect	of	history.’	Amidst	the	ambiguity	of	this	tension,	there	is	a	way	forward.	For	one	who	lives	by	the	promise	of	faith,	hope	requires	action.	In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	“religion	is…an	existential	attitude	with	a	fundamentally	dialogic	structure	whose	principle	is	love	and	whose	logic	is	superabundance”	(Mandry	2004:74).150	Thus,	the	outworking	of	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	could	be	expressed	as:	“the	only	thing	that	counts	is	faith	working	through	love”	(Galatians	5:6,	NRSV).	Ricoeur’s	‘existential	attitude’	of	love	is	known	and	appropriated	through	the	act	of	narration.			
Resilience	through	Divine	Narration	How	does	Ricoeur’s	depiction	of	Christian	hope	relate	to	a	narrative	understanding	of	theology	more	generally?	Furthermore,	how	does	it	relate	to	the	concept	of	resilience?	We	can	build	on	Ricoeur’s	suggestion	that	the	Christian	story	provides	the	basis	for	human	meaning.		Many	question	the	possibility	of	gaining	meaning	by	means	of	master	narratives,	especially	ones	rooted	in	future	hope.	In	response	to	“whether	a	society	can	live	without	eschatology,”	Ricoeur	posits:	Perhaps	not,	but	we	are	also	in	a	crisis	of	replacement	eschatologies—Communism,	for	example—which	have	played	this	role	in	the	post-Enlightenment	period.	Perhaps	we	are	fooling	ourselves	by	believing	that	the	end	of	these	grand	narratives	was	the	end	of	all	grand	narratives	(1998:168).		
                                                150	Cf.	“The	Logic	of	Jesus,	the	Logic	of	God”	(Ricoeur	1995e).	
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There	is	a	place,	then,	for	a	grand	narrative.	As	opposed	to	the	many	‘little	stories’	found	in	postmodernism,	Loughlin	suggests:	“perhaps	the	telling	of	many	little	stories	is	itself	dependent	on	a	larger	tale;	one	that	cannot	be	controverted	because	dissembled	as	the	space	in	which	all	the	little	stories	are	told,	as	telling	itself?”	(1999:30).151	In	Loughlin’s	view,	we	could	understand	the	master	story	of	Divine	action	in	the	world	as	the	act	of	narration	by	the	triune	Godhead.	Put	differently,	the	self	is	hermeneutically	formed	in	relation	to	the	Divine	Other	through	the	act	of	narration.	This	move,	as	with	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	the	self,	shifts	the	focus	from	the	self	(and	self-narration)	to	God	(and	Divine	narration).	Again,	this	could	be	a	counter	to	the	modern	(and	postmodern)	reversal	of	religion	noted	by	Hans	Frei	(1974)	wherein	we	exchange	stepping	into	the	narrative	of	God	for	creating	an	apologetic	for	our	own	life.152		What	does	it	mean	to	have	a	life	narrated	by	God?	How	does	one	step	into	the	story	of	God?	In	one	sense,	God	narrates	all	that	happens	in	the	world	since	God	is	the	primary	cause	and	enabler	of	all	action.153	In	another	sense,	human	beings	are	free	to	make	decisions	contrary	to	God’s	direction.	Not	all	human	beings	allow	Divine	input	to	guide	their	thoughts	and	actions.	It	might	be	said	that	narration	by	God	is	putting	oneself	under	the	authority	and	direction	of	God.	This	direction	is	most	fully	understood	through	the	Divine	Word	of	scripture.154	Narration	by	God	situates	an	individual	narrative	in	relation	to	Jesus	Christ,	whose	story	“presents	a	unique	way	of	being-in-time,	of	being-towards-God	and	being-for-others”	(Vanhoozer	1986:304).155		
                                                151	Stephen	Prickett	argues	that	Lyotard’s	distinction	between	‘small’	stories	and	‘meta’	stories	and	subsequent	denial	of	the	possibility	of	any	meta-narrative	is,	in	itself,	a	meta-narrative	tantamount	to	a	fundamentalist	approach	to	the	world.	Cf.	(Prickett	2002:53).	152	Cf.	(Shuman	and	Meador	2002:41–43).	153	This	claim	will	be	taken	up	more	fully	in	the	next	chapter.	154	Ricoeur	notes	that	“scriptural	understanding	is	related	to	the	community’s	‘total	understanding	of	existence	and	reality’”	(Mudge	and	Ricoeur	1981:21).	See	also	(Ricoeur	1981b:52).	Similar	to	Ricoeur’s	focus	on	the	meaning	rather	than	the	ontology	of	reality,	for	Ricoeur	“The	philosopher’s	procedure	is	not	to	confront	the	text	with	the	question	whether	it	bears	testimony	to	‘what	really	happened’	in	the	modern	sense,	but	rather	to	ask	what	the	text	means	by	its	assertion	about	the	testimony	it	bears”	(Mudge	and	Ricoeur	1981:22).	155	For	more	on	the	importance	of	time	in	biblical	narrative	and	the	telos	of	the	Christian	self,	see	(Jensen	2012:112–13).	
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Hence,	the	story	of	Jesus	displays	new	realms	of	possibility	for	the	Christian.156	Yet,	it	is	not	the	story	itself,	but	the	Person	and	the	historical	realities	behind	the	story	that	afford	these	possibilities.	The	story	of	Jesus	is	the	‘meeting	place’	of	human	and	divine	potentialities.157	When	the	narrative	of	God	interprets	the	human	heart,	new	horizons	of	possibility	and	hope	are	created.	Just	as	God	spoke	creation	into	existence	(Genesis	1),	God	speaks	the	being	of	the	Christian	into	existence.	Indeed,	Christ	himself	is	described	in	the	Gospel	of	John	(1:1)	as	the	Logos	(Word).	Here	Loughlin	suggests	that	the	Christian	takes	the	biblical	narratives,	above	all	the	narratives	of	Christ,	as	the	fundamental	story	by	which	all	others	are	to	be	understood,	including	his	or	her	own	story…The	biblically	formed	narratives	of	Christ	and	his	Church	become	the	story	which	literally	makes	the	world	(1999:20).		In	some	sense,	we	are	called	to	put	our	own	stories	in	the	context	of	the	Divine	narrative.	To	use	Auerbach’s	phrase,	the	Bible	‘overcomes	our	reality’	because	“[i]t	is	the	only	true	story	of	the	world,	all	other	stories	being	at	best	partial	renditions	of	the	world	story	disclosed	in	the	Bible…Insofar	as	we	allow	the	biblical	story	to	become	our	story,	it	overcomes	our	reality”	(Loughlin	1999:37).158		The	biblical	story	of	Jesus	has	the	power	to	encompass	our	own	world	and	thereby,	following	Ricoeur,	create	new	realms	of	possibility	and	being-in-the-world.159	Similarly,	Loughlin	suggests	“the	idea	of	selfhood	as	narrative…allows	us	to	better	understand	salvation	as	the	reordering	of	the	subject’s	story	by,	and	finally	within,	the	story	of	Jesus	
                                                156	Alain	Thomasset	suggests,	“Parcourant	le	chemin	qui	est	celui	du	Seigneur	lui-même,	le	retraitant	est	invité,	entre	autres	choses,	à	s’approprier	par	le	regard,	l’ouïe	et	le	cœur,	les	récits	évangéliques	de	sa	vie,	sa	mort	et	sa	résurrection”	(2005:541).		‘Following	the	way	of	the	Lord	himself,	the	contemplative	is	invited,	among	other	things,	to	appropriate	into	oneself	through	sight,	hearing	and	heart,	the	evangelical	narratives	of	his	life,	death	and	resurrection.’	157	Loughlin	suggests,	“Hauerwas	is	concerned	that	narrative	should	not	be	thought	a	general	theological	category	dominating	all	others,	for	‘Jesus	is	prior	to	story’…Hauerwas	continues	his	comment	on	the	priority	of	Jesus	by	noting	that	‘Jesus’	life	and	resurrection	can	be	displayed	only	narratively’.	He	thus	acknowledges	an	intimate	connection	between	person	and	story;	so	intimate	that	it	goes	beyond	prioritising	one	over	the	other.	It	is	the	story	of	Jesus	that	is	prior	to	any	narrative	category	or	other	conceptuality”	(1999:ix–x)	citing	(Hauerwas	1987:190).	158	Thus,	Lindbeck:	“A	scriptural	world	is	thus	able	to	absorb	the	universe”	(1984:117).	For	more	on	this	concept	as	the	cornerstone	of	Yale	theology	see	(Wallace	1990:104).	159	See	(Milbank	1990:381)	on	Christian	theology	as	‘re-narration’	of	the	previous	stories	in	light	of	their	relationship	to	God.	
	 	 	
201	
Christ,	who	is	the	‘what	more	and	what	else’	that	constitutes	the	good	for	human	kind”	(1999:214).160	The	question	remains	whether	or	not	individuals	will	choose	to	step	into	the	divine	narrative,	whose	telos	and	manner	of	being-in-the-world	run	counter	to	self-constructed	personhood.			Because	this	narration	is	the	result	of	a	dialectic	relationship,	it	is	possible	to	see	this	understanding	escaping	the	pitfalls	Ricoeur	associated	with	“an	ultimate	foundation,	characteristic	of	the	cogito	philosophies”	(Ricoeur	1992b:21).161	A	theological	anthropology	based	in	the	alterity	of	God,	far	from	destroying	the	possibility	of	interaction	between	the	human	and	Divine,	actually	preserves	it.	Because	in	Ricoeur’s	thought	‘otherness	is	constitutive	of	selfhood,’	alterity—afforded	by	‘distanciation’—becomes	“the	very	grounds	for	relation	between	human	persons	and	the	divine”	(White	2009:2–3).		Situating	our	theological	anthropology	in	the	Divine	assessment	of	human	being	garners	insight	into	human	existence,	to	include	resilience,	that	is	not	fully	explainable	through	purely	human	means.	This	is	a	place	of	uncertainty	and	faith,	as	Ricoeur	made	clear,	but	is	preferable	to	the	alternatives	of	naïve	foundationalism	and	existential	doubt.162	Jensen	argues	that	Christian	discipleship	is	a	renunciation	of	the	apparent	security	and	pleasure	of…realism	precisely	because	it	denies	that	it	is	an	adequate	description	of	the	human	situation.	According	to	Christian	testimony,	the	human	situation	is	instead	framed	by	the	judgement	and	the	promises	of	God	(2012:46).		
                                                160	Here	Loughlin	is	commenting	on	MacIntyre’s	After	Virtue	(1985).	He	continues	on	to	highlight	the	importance	of	community	for	personhood:	“Milbank’s	stress	on	the	‘repeatability’	of	Jesus	allows	us	to	better	understand	the	idea	that	the	story	of	Jesus	is	the	story	of	each	one	of	us,	because	it	more	forcibly	reminds	us	that	the	story	of	Jesus	is	not	complete	without	the	story	of	the	Church,	and	that	therefore	his	story—his	personhood	or	persona—waits	upon	the	eschaton	for	its	complete	narration.	If	Jesus	is	the	‘source,	goal	and	context	of	all	our	lives’,	we	can	come	to	know	him	fully	only	through	knowledge	of	all	our	lives”	(Loughlin	1999:216).	In	regards	to	resilience,	the	‘evils’	of	adversity,	Ricoeur	suggests,	are	“burdens	to	be	shared”	(1992b:199).	161	Cf.	(Reagan	2002:6).	162	See	Milbank’s	account,	which	is	strikingly	similar	to	Ricoeur’s	at	many	points:	(Milbank	1990:249).	
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I	will	contend	throughout	the	remainder	of	this	project	that	a	conception	of	Christian	personhood	in	relation	to	God	may	be	a	defining	concept	in	the	ability	of	individuals	to	suffer,	sacrifice,	and	be	resilient.163	Jensen	suggests	the	‘passive	action’	of	the	Christian	martyr	is	displayed	in	allowing	God	to	define	the	self	(2012:107),	thereby	opening	up	the	self	to	divine	narration	(2012:129).	She	is	moving	“away	from	the	type	of	assertive	action	that	is	driven	by	idealism	and	self-definition”	and	towards	‘passive	action’	whereby	one’s	personhood	is	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Divine	Other,	God	(2012:131,	195).	This	has	clear	implications	for	human	resilience.		I	suggest	that,	when	allowing	God	to	narrate	his	life,	the	Christian	is	formed	in	relation	to	what	God	has	spoken	about	him.	Thus,	God	defines	the	telos	of	human	being	for	the	Christian.	How	is	this	telos	similar	or	different	from	the	telos	of	‘natural’	resilience	and	how	is	this	telos	known?			I	propose	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	both	projects	the	possibility	inherent	in	human	existence	and	serves	as	a	guard	against	‘wishful	thinking’	(Vanhoozer	1990:9).164			
Conclusions	on	Ricoeur		
Ricoeur	and	Theology	At	some	level,	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	an	attempt	to	express	the	ineffable:	that	which	is	beyond	the	description	of	language	and	thereby	a	gift	that	can	only	be	graciously	received.		He	comes	very	close	to	describing	Christian	understanding	of	the	world	in	a	way	that	has	significant	implications	for	his	philosophical	anthropology.165	Vanhoozer	summarizes	Ricoeur’s	thought	in	this	way:	“Ricoeur’s	philosophy	approximates	in	style	
                                                163	E.g.	(Jensen	2012:3).	164	I	will	assess	the	content	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	through	dialogue	with	a	biblical	text	in	Chapter	6.	165	Ricoeur	notes	that	philosophy	assumes	that	religious	discourse	“is	not	senseless,	that	it	is	worthwhile	to	analyze	it,	because	something	is	said	that	is	not	said	by	other	kinds	of	discourse—ordinary,	scientific,	or	poetic—or,	to	put	it	into	more	positive	terms,	that	it	is	meaningful	at	least	for	the	community	of	faith	that	uses	it	for	the	sake	of	self-understanding	or	for	the	sake	of	communication	with	others	exterior	to	the	faith	community”	(1995d:35).	
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and	content	the	theological	virtues	of	grace,	hope	and	love”	(1990:287).	Vanhoozer	makes	clear	“Ricoeur	is	not	a	theologian”	and	suggests	instead	that	“Ricoeur	is	perhaps	best	viewed	as	an	apologist	for	the	intelligibility	of	the	Christian	kerygma”	(1990:284)	who,	not	unlike	John	the	Baptist,	prepares	the	way	for	the	Gospel	rather	than	preaching	it	himself	(1990:288).166	By	staying	within	the	bounds	of	philosophical	enquiry,	Ricoeur	necessarily	excludes	himself	from	fully	proclaiming	the	Gospel	(Vanhoozer	1990:288).	Yet	Ricoeur’s	own	assessment	of	his	task	in	relation	to	reason	and	theology	is	telling:	If	there	is	only	one	logos,	the	logos	of	Christ	requires	of	me	as	a	philosopher	nothing	else	than	a	more	complete	and	more	perfect	activation	of	reason;	not	more	than	reason,	but	whole	reason.	Let	us	repeat	this	phrase,	whole	reason;	for	it	is	this	problem	of	the	integrality	of	thinking	which	will	prove	to	be	the	core	of	the	whole	problematic	(Ricoeur	1981a:157).167		Some	of	Ricoeur’s	earliest	work	addressed	theological	issues,168	but	for	most	of	his	career	he	believed	his	philosophy	should	be	separate	from	his	religious	commitments	(Reagan	1996:119-120-126;	Ricoeur	1992b:24),	using	the	imagery	of	“an	armistice	rather	than	an	alliance”	(Ricoeur	1994:6).	While	he	readily	contemplated	matters	of	religious	significance	later	in	his	career,169	he	attributed	his	reluctance	to	integrate	philosophy	and	theology	to	a	desire	for	his	philosophy	to	be	taken	seriously	by	the	largely	atheistic	French	academy	(Junker-Kenny	and	Kenny	2004:203;	Kenny	2004:93).		By	his	own	assessment,	Ricoeur	was	more	at	home	with	the	biblical	exegete	than	the	theologian.	He	resisted	claims	to	onto-theological	knowledge	and	instead	preferred	staying	close	to	the	hermeneutical	relation	between	text	and	interpreter.170	“For	Ricoeur,	theology	can	only	be	a	biblical,	textual	hermeneutics.171	Theology	is	through	and	through	a	reflection	on	language”	(van	den	Hengel	2004:124).	Ricoeur	relates,	“I	
                                                166	Cf.	(Ricœur	2007:107).	Against	this	assessment,	Mudge	suggests	that	Ricoeur	is	primarily	not	an	apologist,	but	“[r]ather,	Ricoeur	is	trying	to	be	sure	that	the	gospel	message	everywhere	has	the	same	sense”	(1981:32).	167	Cf.	(Kenny	2004:99).	168	E.g.	(Ricoeur	1952).	169	E.g.	(Ricoeur	2002:285,	2004b,	2004a:457–506).	170	Ricoeur	notes,	“For	the	philosopher,	to	listen	to	Christian	preaching	is	first	of	all	to	let	go	(se	dépouiller)	of	every	form	of	onto-theological	knowledge.	Even—and	especially	when—the	word	of	God	is	involved.	In	this	regard,	the	amalgamation	of	being	and	God	is	the	most	subtle	seduction”	(1995c:223).	Cf.	(Duffy	2009:11–12,	73).	171	Van	den	Hengel	cites	(Ricoeur	1992a:19).	
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have	always	moved	back	and	forth	between	these	two	poles:	a	Biblical	pole	and	a	rational	and	critical	pole,	a	duality	that,	finally,	has	lasted	through	my	entire	life”	(Ricoeur	1998:6).	Thus,	the	theologian	who	would	seek	to	speak	in	speculative	language,	even	using	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	risks	doing	what	Ricoeur	disdained	(Soskice	2004:78).		What,	then,	are	we	to	make	of	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	and	theological	legacy?	Vanhoozer	suggests	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	itself	is	sound,	but	tends	to	favor	the	‘passion	for	the	possible’	provided	by	poetry	to	the	groundedness	of	history	in	its	implementation,	thereby	upsetting	the	balance	needed	for	his	philosophy.	He	proposes	that	“[p]oetic	flights	of	the	imagination	need	to	be	tempered	by	the	earthbound	sobriety	of	the	historian	if	they	are	to	keep	from	degenerating	into	utopian	fantasies”	(Vanhoozer	1990:281).172	Thus,	there	is	a	need	for	grounded	concrete	accounts	of	resilience	that	attest	to	the	possibilities	of	hope.	In	this	regard	John	van	den	Hengel	suggests	using	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	as	a	guide	for	theology	“would	mean	to	give	priority	in	our	theological	enterprise	to	the	praxis	of	faith-life	rather	than	to	theoretical	disclosure	of	meaning”	(2004:132).	The	legacy	of	Ricoeur’s	thought,	then,	is	found	in	the	practical	outworking	of	his	philosophy.	I	suggest	no	better	place	for	this	than	in	gaining	a	better	understanding	of	human	resilience.		
Ricoeur	and	Resilience	Ricoeur’s	dense	thought	has	implications	for	resilience,	but	I	must	make	more	clear	my	particular	reasons	for	engaging	with	Ricoeur.	Of	utmost	significance	is	his	understanding	of	how	narrative	can	shape	not	only	one’s	perspective,	but	also	one’s	very	self.	It	can	display	hope,	suggesting	relevant	praxis	for	human	resilience.		Narrative	and	resilience	have	a	close	relationship	in	Ricoeur’s	thought:	“Ricoeur	was	understandably	fond	of	citing	the	novelist	Isak	Dinesen's	remark	that,	‘All	sorrows	can	be	borne	if	you	can	put	them	into	a	story	or	tell	a	story	about	them’”	(Wolin	2005).	Similarly,	in	a	published	interview	Ricoeur	suggested	narrative	generates	a	capacity	to	
                                                172	Vanhoozer	notes,	“Of	course,	the	historian	cannot	be	the	ultimate	arbiter	of	what	is	humanly	possible,	for	this	would	remove	the	possibility	of	any	new	way	of	being-in-the-world”	(1990:289).	
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endure	suffering	(Kearney	2004:158).	The	connection	between	narrative	and	action	creates	the	possibility	of	the	meaningfulness	of	narrative	and	its	application	to	real	life	situations.	Because	“life	itself	is	in	search	of	narrative,”	human	beings	attempt	to	find	meaning	amongst	the	vicissitudes	and	pain	of	experience.	Furthermore,	because	of	the	ubiquitous	and	overwhelming	experience	of	sorrow	for	humans,	Ricoeur	suggests	mourning	is	an	essential	aspect	of	narrative	(Kearney	2004:159).	Kearney	continues,	Yes,	‘all	sorrows	can	be	borne	if	you	put	them	into	a	story	or	tell	a	story	about	them’.	But	these	narratives	that	are	able	to	make	sorrows	bearable	and	to	make	us	able	to	endure	them	constitute	but	one	element	of	the	work	of	mourning…the	work	of	narrative	constitutes	an	essential	element	of	the	work	of	mourning	understood	as	the	acceptance	of	the	irreparable	(Kearney	2004:160).			Ricoeur	believes	“[t]here	is	something	irreparable	in	human	affairs.”	Thus,	a	person	not	only	acts,	but	also	suffers.	Hence	praxis	must	take	account	for	sorrow,173	yet	not	be	paralyzed	by	it.	The	theological	grace	of	forgiveness	provides	the	possibility	of	joy	by	placing	the	past	“at	the	right	distance	from	the	present:	the	past	as	no	longer	there,	but	as	having	been”	(Ricoeur	2004b:15).	Narrative,	then,	can	play	a	significant	part	in	properly	understanding	the	past,	present,	and	future	in	relation	to	their	true	telos.		In	Ricoeur’s	thought,	we	noted	narrative	mediates	being	and	time	(Vanhoozer	1991:43).	Based	on	this	assessment,	I	suggest	resilience	is	the	out-working	of	being	through	the	temporally-situated	circumstance	of	adversity.174	Personhood,	therefore,	is	at	the	core	of	resilient	adaptation.	Being	is	mediated	through	time,	hence	resilience	is	known	only	through	the	narrative	of	human	existence.	This	narrative,	for	the	Christian,	has	as	its	
telos	union	with	God	and	its	actuation	through	love.	These	have	significance	for	resilience	through	creating	meaning	and	connection,	and	their	import	is	realized	through	the	narration	of	human	existence	in	time.		
                                                173	Significantly,	Ricoeur	added	his	conception	of	the	person	as	one	who	suffers	as	well	as	one	who	acts	following	the	untimely	death	of	his	son,	Olivier	(Reagan	1996:64).	174	This	does	not	mean	that	someone	who	is	a	‘resilient	person’	will	always	be	resilient.	Nor	does	it	mean	that	being	a	‘resilient	person’	encompasses	all	that	is	involved	in	resilient	outcomes	(research	has	shown	the	significant	effect	that	environmental	and	genetic	factors	play	in	resilient	responses	with	the	former	even	exerting	influence	on	the	latter).	This	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	an	individual	has	no	part	to	play	in	resilience.	
	 	 	
206	
Such	an	understanding	coincides	with	narratival	conceptions	of	the	Christian	faith	and	social	science	research	on	ways	in	which	religion	and	spirituality	provide	meaning	to	those	facing	adversity.	In	this	regard,	I	contend,	resilience	is	an	out-working	of	personhood	in	relation	to	God	through	the	mediation	of	time.175	I	have	suggested	resilience	can	best	be	understood	through	attention	to	the	whole	person,	rather	than	solely	in	terms	of	particular	factors	that	contribute	to	resilience.	Because	human	experience	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	sum	total	of	experiences,	nor	human	personality	reduced	merely	to	a	set	of	factors,	I	propose	the	best	way	to	conceive	of	a	resilient	individual	is	in	terms	of	a	‘resilient	person’	who	is	known	through	the	narrative	of	her	story.	The	person	is	multifaceted,	but	addressing	the	person	as	a	unified	narrative	identity	provides	descriptive	clarity	and	deeper	insight	into	human	resilience	to	adversity.176			Ricoeur	suggests	narratives	‘emplot’	distinct	events	within	a	story	that	makes	sense	of	them.	Furthermore,	this	narrative	has	a	telos	towards	which	it	is	moving.	If	these	same	events	are	emplotted	within	a	different	narrative,	with	a	different	telos,	the	meaning	of	these	events	changes	as	well.	For	an	individual	whose	life	events	are	emplotted	in	a	‘secular’	narrative,	a	temporal	understanding	of	resilience	will	predominate.	Events	in	this	narrative	could	take	on	a	very	different	meaning	than	if	they	were	emplotted	within	the	Divine	narrative	with	its	telos	in	the	eternal.		Following	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	the	‘world	shaping’	power	of	narrative,	this	thesis	seeks	to	use	narrative	to	gain	insight	into	human	response	to	adversity	and	resilience.	Ricoeur	suggests	inasmuch	as	our	lives	are	narratives,	story	enables	us	to	be	“better	readers	and	authors	of	our	own	lives”	by	understanding	the	interaction	between	agent	
                                                175	In	keeping	with	the	discussion	above,	I	will	primarily	be	speaking	from	the	vantage	point	of	Christian	theology	and	therefore	will	be	addressing	Christian	personhood.	This	does	not	preclude	some	of	these	insights	from	being	applied	in	other	contexts.	176	In	this	respect,	this	understanding	corresponds	with	the	ecological	systemic	model.	In	this	case,	the	individual	is	seen	as	an	entire	system	rather	than	simply	a	conglomeration	of	distinct	parts.	The	person	must	be	understood	at	multiple	levels	of	analysis	(genetic,	psychological,	social,	spiritual,	etc.).	This	project	primarily	examines	what	I	consider	the	‘core’	spiritual	aspect	of	the	person	that	facilitates	resilient	adaptation.	
	 	 	
207	
and	plot	(Kearney	2004:171).177	According	to	Ricoeur,	an	individual	may	well	discover	a	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	through	the	dynamic	act	of	reading.	In	this	sense,	when	confronted	with	the	world	of	the	text,	a	new	meaning	may	be	configured	from	the	already-existing	events	in	one’s	life.	Hence	‘emplotting’	events	within	a	new	narrative	may	yield	a	crop	of	hope.178	I	suggest	that	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	provides	the	basis	for	believing	resilience	is	possible.	If	an	individual	changes	her	understanding	of	herself	by	placing	her	story	within	the	context	of	the	Divine	narrative,	this	new	‘emplotment’	of	life	events	can	create	meaning	whereby	she	can	have,	and	act	upon,	hope.	This	is	accomplished	through	properly	situating	her	personal	narrative	within	the	Divine	narrative.		Is	it	too	idealistic	to	suggest	a	new	narrative	could	provide	this	kind	of	existential	change?	The	social	science	studies	addressed	earlier	in	this	chapter	posit	narrative	can	aid	the	process	of	healing.	But,	the	life	of	Paul	Ricoeur	itself	is	also	suggestive.	His	philosophical	musings	did	not	originate	from	an	ivory	tower,	but	from	one	who	endured	the	horrors	of	two	world	wars	and	suffered	significant	family	trauma.	His	hope	was	to	create	a	way	for	meaning	to	be	found	in	human	existence	amidst	an	intellectual	climate	that	emphasized	existential	despair.			
Conclusion	Ricoeur	provides	the	foundation	to	say	it	is	possible	for	an	individual’s	‘world’	to	be	re-envisioned	and	suggests	how	it	might	take	place.	The	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	I	propose,	directs	individuals	toward	the	telos	of	human	being—union	with	God—thereby	providing	meaning	and	connection	as	resources	for	facing	adversity	resiliently.		I	have	suggested	that,	for	the	Christian,	human	being	must	be	understood	in	relation	to	God.	Rather	than	a	detached,	abstract	encounter,	this	is	an	intensely	personal	encounter	between	the	triune	God	and	the	individual	whereby	identity	is	formed	in	relation	to	the	
                                                177	See	(Ricoeur	1992b:159).	178	Junker-Kenny	argues	that	“[c]learly,	an	imagination	nourished	by	the	‘economy	of	the	gift’	would	be	more	attentive	to	existential	needs,	symbolic	realizations,	and	structures	of	hope	in	moral	life	than	one	raised	in	the	order	of	strict	equivalence”	(2004a:177).	
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(Divine)	Other.	The	starting	point	for	understanding	Christian	resilience,	therefore,	is	not	human	need,	but	God.	God’s	being-in-action	expresses	itself	in	ways	that	are	significant	and	directly	applicable	to	human	need;	nonetheless	God’s	being	has	primacy	over	human	need:	“It	is	the	possibility	that	follows	from	the	actuality,	and	not	the	other	way	around”	(Loughlin	1999:35).		As	I	have	already	suggested,	‘relational’	knowledge	may	be	even	more	important	to	resilience	than	methods	disclosed	via	other	means.	Narrative	itself	is	especially	insightful	for	understanding	human	lived	experience.	Walter	Benjamin	suggests:	“Every	real	story	.	.	.	contains,	openly	or	covertly,	something	useful…Counsel	woven	into	the	fabric	of	real	life	is	wisdom.”	Further,	“[t]he	art	of	storytelling	is	dying	out	because	the	epic	side	of	truth,	wisdom,	is	dying	out”	(2006:364).	This	project	seeks	to	regain	a	portion	of	the	‘epic	side	of	truth’	of	which	Benjamin	writes	and	relate	it	to	human	resilience.		A	narrative	understanding	of	resilience	allows	each	individual	life	and	situation	to	be	considered	uniquely,	as	a	circumstance	needing	particular	interventions	particular	to	that	person,	time,	and	place.179	Yet,	it	is	clear	there	is	also	a	need	for	generalized	principles	that	can	be	applied	across	various	contexts	and	lives.	I	suggest	this	general	applicability	is	possible	because	human	personhood	is	comprised	in	relation	to	a	constant:	God	as	the	Divine	Other,	a	relationship	to	which	the	Gospel	narrative	attests.	Such	a	claim,	and	the	possibility	of	hope	for	human	resilience,	is	possible	because	of	the	philosophical	foundation	laid	by	Ricoeur,	whose	“philosophy	[is]	marked	by	a	passion	for	existence…[rather	than	a]	stoic	resignation	to	living	in	a	hostile	world.”	In	the	final	evaluation,	“[b]ecause	there	is	more	meaning	than	absurdity,	we	can	risk	loving	the	world	and	those	who	people	it”	(Vanhoozer	1990:288).		To	further	investigate	the	meaningfulness	of	life	and	its	relation	to	resilience,	let	us	turn	to	an	example	of	how	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	might	create	meaning	(through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel)	and	connection	(through	relational	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	God	who	constitutes	the	self),	thereby	influencing	resilient	adaptation.	
                                                179	See	(Capps	1984:7)	for	an	example	of	the	use	of	Ricoeur’s	narrative	philosophy	for	pastoral	care.	
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Chapter	5:	Appropriation	of	the	Gospel	in	History—
Julian	of	Norwich	and	a	Theology	of	Hope	
	
“I	fought	within	myself	to	keep	my	eyes	fixed	on	the	promises	God	had	written	on	my	heart:	
‘Be	strong	and	of	good	courage,	never	be	afraid,	for	the	Lord	your	God	is	with	you	
wherever	you	go’…		
	
Whatever	had	gone	before—all	the	fears,	all	the	burdens,	all	the	feelings	of	being	trapped	
and	toyed	with	by	forces	beyond	our	control—were	wiped	away,	replaced	by	an	overriding	
sense	of	possibility…	
	
For	the	past	few	months…I	had	been	totally	at	peace.	But	now…the	fear	returned.	I	was	
overcome	with	grief…I	wept…and	prayed.	‘Please,	God,	protect	all	your	children	who	are	
suffering.	Free	them	from	fear,	and	give	them	hope	and	peace	that	you	will	come	to	save	
them’”	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	2003:186–87,	192–93,	198–99).	
	
“Alle	shalle	be	wele”	Julian	of	Norwich				
Why	Narrative	Examples?	Using	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	as	a	starting	point,	I	have	discussed	how	narrative	is	able	to	create	a	‘new	world’	of	hope	in	the	lived	experience	of	the	individual.	This	hope	is	closely	linked	to	a	person’s	sense	of	self	and	identity	that	are	formed	in	relation	to	the	Other	rather	than	in	the	isolation	of	the	cogito.	For	the	Christian,	the	self	fundamentally	is	formed	in	relation	to	God	as	the	Divine	Other	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.			Having	laid	down	conceptual	and	theoretical	ideals,	in	the	following	portion	of	this	project	I	now	turn	to	a	concrete	example	of	these	principles.	This	example	not	only	serves	to	display	theoretical	concepts,	but	also	to	further	theological	understanding	of	resilience.	Such	an	example	is	useful	because,	as	Ricoeur	suggests,	testimony	is	best	able	to	disclose	truth	through	the	participatory	action	of	witnessing	(Ricoeur	1981c:105,	111–13).1	Similarly,	Hille	Haker	proposes:	a	person	is	always	‘entangled	in	stories’	which	provide	the	current	action	with	a	temporal	and	cultural	context…Literary	life	stories	present	in	this	connection	a	
                                                1	On	the	ability	of	testimony	to	convey	knowledge	through	the	epistemic	virtue	of	trust,	see	(Stump	2014).	Through	trust,	testimony	can	create	the	hope	that	something	is	not	just	possible,	but	possible	for	me.	
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possible	source	of	those	‘convictions’	which	are	historically	and	contextually	anchored;	they	are	located	at	the	pole	of	ethical	reflection	[that]…(necessarily)…becomes	practical…[T]hey	create	for	us,	the	readers,	the	possibility	of	a	distance	to	existential	living	which	can	grant	us	a	deeper	understanding	of	ourselves.	By	virtue	of	its	narrative	structure,	which	is	also	inherent	in	the	identity	of	a	person,	literature	proves	to	be	ethically	relevant…therefore,	ethical	theory	is	dependent	in	its	reflection	on	the	mediation	of	ethical-moral	orientation	and	the	narration	of	life	(2004:152).		Literary	and	historical	‘snapshots’	of	individuals,	then,	provide	opportunities	for	gaining	insight	into	the	character	and	nature	of	those	so	described	by	enabling	critical	reflection	and	practical	application.	This,	as	Ricoeur	suggests,	is	due	to	the	similar	nature	of	literary	narrative	description	and	narrative	constructions	of	identity.	Viewing	individuals	through	the	framework	of	narrative	identity—in	this	case	the	narrative	identity	provided	by	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel—can	give	substantial	insight	into	the	resilient	adaptation	promoted	by	such	an	identity.	Such	an	approach	will	also	‘thicken’	and	complexify	understandings	of	resilience	in	ways	that	are	explanatory	yet	also	paradoxical.			
Why	Julian	of	Norwich?	I	use	the	example	of	Julian	of	Norwich,	a	14th	century	English	mystic,	not	only	because	of	the	content	of	her	spiritual	experiences	and	the	context	of	her	life,	but	also	because	of	her	theological	reflection	on	hope	and	the	love	of	God.2	Reflection	on	Julian	may	be	especially	appropriate	because,	for	Mitchell	Merback,	“the	religious	consciousness	of	the	late	Middle	Ages”	may	“uncover	the	very	foundation	of	human	community	in	the	shared	realization	that	we	can,	and	do,	all	suffer”	(1999:150).3	In	Rowan	William’s	view,	Julian	of	Norwich	is	“a	theologian	of	extraordinary	intuitive	resource,	
                                                2	Some	may	be	wary	of	the	mystical	nature	of	Julian’s	writing.	In	regard	to	the	epistemological	reliability	of	mysticism,	Steven	Katz	writes:	“mystical	or	more	generally	religious	experience	is	irrelevant	in	establishing	the	truth	or	falsity	of	religion”	(emphasis	mine),	however,	this	is	to	say	nothing	of	the	truth	of	mystical	claims,	which	“no	philosophical	argument	is	capable	of	proving”	(1978:22).	Instead,	Katz	suggests,	it	is	‘reasonable,’	given	the	variety	and	seeming	sensibility	of	those	making	claim	to	mystical	experiences,	to	conclude	that	they	are	not	“solely	the	product	of	interior	states	of	consciousness”	(1978:23).	Similarly,	Donald	MacKinnon	(1978),	reflecting	upon	Julian’s	Revelations,	proposes	a	stance	of	epistemic	humility	regarding	mysticism	since,	as	finite	humans,	our	view	of	the	world	is	incomplete.	3	As	cited	in	(Minore	2014:45).	
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whose…Revelations	of	Divine	Love,	sketches	something	like	a	whole	imaginative	universe	centred	upon	the	cross	of	Christ	as	the	fundamental	form	of	God’s	self-sacrificing	love”	(1990:142).		This	chapter	will	trace	the	context	of	her	life	and	times,	the	content	of	her	revelations	and	subsequent	theological	reflection,	and	then	relate	these	insights	to	themes	drawn	from	Ricoeur.	In	so	doing,	the	unifying	cord	of	phronesis	will	continue	to	tie	together	insights	in	a	manner	that	will	produce	practical	application	pertaining	to	resilience.	Indeed,	this	may	be,	in	part,	what	Julian	has	in	mind	when	she	remarks	that	her	revelations	of	God’s	love	provide	“strength	enough”	for	her	and	all	of	God’s	children	to	face	the	trials	and	temptations	of	life	(LT,	IV:44).4		My	discussion	of	Julian,	her	Revelations	of	Divine	Love,	and	questions	raised	by	her	theology	will	necessarily	be	limited.	I	will	not,	for	instance,	be	able	fully	to	take	up	broader	questions	of	how	human	free-will	and	Divine	providence	are	non-competitive,	or	discussions	about	universal	salvation,	though	some	see	Julian’s	theology	as	addressing	these	issues.	Nor	will	this	chapter	be	primarily	an	overview	of	Julian’s	life,	writings,	and	theology.	There	are	a	number	of	excellent	works	on	these	topics	already.5	Rather,	I	will	explore	how	Julian’s	writings	may	further	a	theological	understanding	of	resilience	and	serve	as	an	example	of	the	resilience	afforded	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	and	a	relational	identity	founded	in	the	Triune	God.		
Julian	of	Norwich:	Her	Life	and	Times	The	woman	who	came	to	be	known	as	Julian	of	Norwich	was	an	anchorite	who	lived	in	the	city	of	Norwich,	England	in	the	14th	century.6	We	know	little	of	her	life	other	than	
                                                4	I	will	refer	to	Revelations	in	abbreviated	form,	referencing	Barry	Windeatt’s	translation	(2015)	in	the	following	manner:	Short	Text	(ST:page);	Long	Text	(LT,	section:page).	Because	of	the	quality	of	this	translation	and	for	ease	of	reading,	I	have	chosen	to	quote	from	it,	only	referencing	the	original	Middle	English	as	needed	for	clarity.	5	See,	for	instance	(Bauerschmidt	1999;	Jantzen	1987;	Turner	2011).	6	It	is	probable	that	even	her	name,	‘Julian,’	is	not	her	baptismal	name,	but	the	name	she	took	after	becoming	an	anchoress	at	St.	Julian’s	Church	in	Norwich	(Bauerschmidt	1999:203).	Interestingly,	at	this	time	Norwich	was	a	very	religious	city,	perhaps	even	“Europe’s	most	religious	city”	(Tanner	2009:59).	
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the	details	that	she,	and	subsequent	early	editors	of	her	work,	provide	in	the	texts.	Though	Julian	intimately	reveals	the	details	of	her	revelations	of	God’s	love,	she	dwells	on	them	only	insomuch	as	they	serve	to	convey	the	substance	of	that	love	to	her	readers,	not	for	their	own	sake.	In	the	same	way,	she	shares	only	those	details	about	herself	that	are	relevant	to	the	disclosure	of	God’s	love,	though	these	details	are	still	insignificant	for	understanding	Julian	and	her	writings	(Jantzen	1987:4–5).	Thus,	because	of	this	juxtaposition	of	intimate	details	and	anonymity,	Grace	Jantzen	notes	that	Julian	is	“one	of	the	figures	of	history	whom	we	feel	that	we	can	come	to	know	very	well,	and	yet	who	simultaneously	remains	an	enigma”	(1987:3).		
Julian’s	Context	Despite	a	level	of	mystery	surrounding	Julian’s	life	circumstances,	I	contend	that	a	better	understanding	of	them	will	provide	valuable	insight	into	Julian’s	writings	and	their	import	for	resilience.	Julian	was	born	in	1342	or	1343,	as	nearly	as	we	can	surmise,7	and	she	is	noted	as	still	being	alive	in	1416	(Bauerschmidt	1999:209).	The	era	of	Julian’s	life	has	been	described	as	particularly	distressing.	Barbara	Tuchman	writes	that	 [t]he	14th	century	suffered	so	many	‘strange	and	great	perils	and	adversities’	(in	the	words	of	a	contemporary)	that	its	disorders	cannot	be	traced	to	any	one	cause…The	four	horsemen	of	St.	John’s	vision…had	now	become	seven—plague,	wars,	taxes,	brigandage,	bad	government,	insurrection,	and	schism	in	the	Church…Simply	summarized	by	the	Swiss	historian	J.	C.	L.	S.	de	Sisimondi,	the	14th	century	was	‘a	bad	time	for	humanity’	(1978:xiii–xiv).8			
A	Time	of	Instability	Some	suggest	that	too	little	has	been	made	of	the	context	of	Julian’s	life	experience	for	understanding	her	writing	(Rolf	2014).	While	this	may	be	the	case,	in	truth	there	is	little	context	that	we	know	with	certainty.	Anything	beyond	what	is	found	in	her	writings	and	in	a	few	external	sources	is	merely	conjecture.	But,	even	this	partial	knowledge	of	the	context	of	Julian’s	life	can	be	beneficial.		
                                                7	This	is	based	upon	Julian’s	assertion	in	Revelations	that	she	was	30	and	a	half	at	the	time	of	receiving	the	visions	in	May	1373	(LT,	II:40).	8	Citing	chapter	38	in	(Sismondi	1840).	The	original	reads	“ne	fut	point	heureuse	pour	
l’humanité.”	
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For	instance,	it	is	insightful	that	the	time	in	which	Julian	lived	was	one	of	great	uncertainty	and	upheaval—a	time	that	was	harried	by	the	tumult	of	war	and	the	devastation	of	the	Black	Plague	as	well	as	the	growth	of	literacy.	The	14th	century	was	a	time	of	change,	with	the	beginnings	of	modernity	beginning	to	surface	(Bauerschmidt	1999:12).	Hers	was	a	time	of	pockets	of	great	spiritual	devotion,	but	also	great	cultural	changes.	Norwich	itself	at	the	time	of	Julian	was	a	thriving	metropolis,	surpassed	in	England	only	by	London	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:39).	It	was	a	flourishing	center	of	religious	life	and	study	(Jantzen	1987:17),	yet	it	was	racked	by	a	number	of	significant	difficulties.		The	effect	of	immense	cultural	and	political	events	upon	the	spiritual	climate	of	Julian’s	day	and	upon	Julian	herself	is	not	immediately	clear,	though	we	might	conjecture	that	these	forces	did	have	an	effect.	The	particulars	of	the	difficulties	during	this	period	are	important	for	understanding	their	effect	at	a	cultural	as	well	as	an	individual	level.	
	
Black	Plague	The	Black	Death	came	to	Norwich	in	January	1349,	when	Julian	was	6	or	7	years	of	age	(Jantzen	1987:7).	This	epidemic	was	so	contagious	that	some	felt	anyone	who	touched	a	diseased	person	would	catch	it	themselves.	Some	believed	that	the	end	of	the	world	had	come,	the	plague	being	a	punishment	from	God		(Horrox	1994:3,	95).	Mass	burials	were	necessary	in	a	tragedy	so	widespread	that	a	third	of	the	population	and	half	of	the	clergy	in	Norwich	died	(Jacob	1961:293–94;	Jantzen	1987:7–8).	Furthermore,	the	psychological	toll	of	this	epidemic,	and	its	subsequent	unpredictable	outbreaks	for	years	to	come,	was	immense	(Jantzen	1987:8).	Significantly,	there	was	a	religious	revival	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Plague,	discernable,	in	part,	by	a	massive	increase	in	mystical	writings,	including	Julian’s	Revelations	(Aberth	2000:173).		
War	The	100	Years	War	with	France	spanned	Julian’s	life	and	had	significant	societal	consequences	throughout	England,	including	economic	and	human	loss	(Jantzen	1987:5–6).9	The	war	created	considerable	stress	upon	individuals	and	the	national	
                                                9	For	commentary	on	this	war,	see	(Harriss	2005:653;	Prestwich	2007:292ff).	
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economy	as	a	whole,	yet	also	solidified	a	national	identity	(Bauerschmidt	1999:14).	War	was	a	constant	societal	influence,	shaping	the	cultural	landscape	and	mindset		(Harriss	2005:175).	Since	Norwich	was	a	large	and	wealthy	city	on	the	southeastern	coast	of	England,	we	can	imagine	that	the	threat	of	invasion	was	felt	keenly.	This	war,	however,	was	merely	the	outgrowth	of	deeper	political	turmoil.		
Political	Upheaval	At	national	as	well	as	local	levels	there	was	significant	upheaval	in	the	14th	century	due	to	a	number	of	factors	including	poor	crop	production,	and	population	and	economic	decline	(Harriss	2005:217–22).	In	addition	to	war,	there	was	political	intrigue	within	the	monarchy	(Jantzen	1987:5)	and	peasant	revolts	throughout	the	country	(Harriss	2005:227–33).	In	Norwich	itself	there	was	significant	political	and	class	discord	and	upheaval	from	the	end	of	the	14th	century	until	at	least	1415.	Continuing	quarrels	between	the	rich	and	the	common	classes	for	the	governance	of	the	city	exacerbated	already	tense	relations	(Jacob	1961:388–91,	399–400).	The	so-called	Peasants’	Revolt	of	1381	was	fueled	by	a	labor	shortage	brought	about	by	devastation	of	the	Black	Plague	(Cantor	2002:24).	The	revolt	led	to	violent	upheaval	around	the	country,	including	looting	and	even	killing;	churches	and	monasteries	were	not	left	unscathed	(Jantzen	1987:8–10).		
Religious	Controversy	The	upheaval	of	society	was	evident	in	the	Church	as	well.	In	1377	the	Great	Schism	saw	two	claimants,	one	in	Avignon	and	one	in	Rome,	vying	for	papal	authority	and	spewing	‘religious’	vitriol	and	excommunications	at	one	another	(Jantzen	1987:9).10	Added	to	this,	in	England	there	were	a	number	of	movements,	including	John	Wycliffe’s	Lollards,	that	were	deemed	heretical	and	persecuted	(Jantzen	1987:10).11	Additionally,	the	
                                                10	Cf.	(Harriss	2005:424–25).	11	The	influence	of	Lollardy	in	East	Anglia	during	the	early	15th	century	was	extensive,	evidenced,	in	part	by	the	prosecution	of	sixty	men	and	women	for	heresy	during	a	three	year	period	(Tanner	1977:1).	This	also	displays	the	serious	stance	that	Church	officials	took	towards	heresy,	with	the	threat	of	death	leveled	against	some	of	those	who	relapsed	(Tanner	1977:6).	Among	these	heretics	there	was	“a	striking	concern	to	bypass	intermediary	persons	[such	as	priests]	and	things	in	order	to	reach	God	directly”	(Tanner	1977:12).	Shortly,	we	will	see	how,	quite	easily,	ecclesiastical	authorities	could	have	been	tempted	to	label	Julian	a	heretic.	
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controversy	regarding	Duns	Scotus	and	the	Pelagianism	of	Ockham	signaled	the	birth	pains	of	the	Protestant	revolution	in	centuries	to	follow	(Jacob	1961:680–82).	Thus,	at	the	time	of	Julian,	heresy	was	seen	as	a	very	real	threat	to	the	Church—one	which	was	addressed	in	the	English	Church	through	encouragement	toward	piety	and	affective	displays	of	religion	(Jacob	1961:298–99).		While	the	extent	to	which	Julian’s	context	impacted	her	and	her	writing	may	be	unclear,	what	is	plain	is	the	magnitude	of	upheaval,	suffering,	and	difficulty	during	this	time.	Within	this	context,	many	turned	to	the	Church,12	which	served	as	a	cultural	bulwark	throughout	England.	For	most,	the	Church	was	significant	in	the	momentous	events	in	life—such	as	a	birth	or	death—but	many,	including	Julian,	chose	to	relate	themselves	to	the	Church	in	a	much	more	life-encompassing	and	radical	way.13		
Religious	Life	in	14th	and	15th	Century	England	
	
Cultural	Devotion	In	15th	century	England	the	affective	faith	and	devotion	of	contemplative	life	was	often	prized	above	the	logic	of	discursive	reasoning	as	a	means	of	knowing	God.	This	is	evidenced	in	a	number	of	mystical	books,	such	as	the	Cloud	of	Unknowing,	and	a	number	of	theologians,	such	as	Hugh	and	Richard	of	St.	Victor,	aimed	at	obtaining	just	this	sort	of	affective	knowledge	(Jacob	1961:685).	Yet	the	widespread	nature	of	the	Christian	religion	was	such	that,	in	many	sections	of	society,	the	secular	and	religious	were	nearly	synonymous	(Jacob	1961:662).14		
                                                12	Here	I	use	‘Church’	in	the	same	way	Julian	uses	‘Holy	Church,’	to	refer	to	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	which,	at	Julian’s	time,	was	understood	to	be	the	sole	orthodox	expression	of	the	Christian	faith	in	the	West.	13	John	Aberth,	for	instance,	proposes	a	causal	link	between	hardship	experienced	during	the	Black	Plague	and	the	attempt	to	find	meaning	through	mystical	encounter	with	God	(2000:175).	14	See	(Prestwich	2007:462–64)	for	more	on	the	importance	of	religion	to	the	common	person.	
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Monastic	and	Anchoritic	Devotion	Still,	some	chose	to	live	a	life	of	even	more	arduous	devotion	to	God.	Through	the	centuries	a	variety	of	ways	to	live	a	life	specially	devoted	to	God	emerged	within	the	Christian	tradition.	Many	joined	themselves	to	a	monastery	or	convent	of	the	Benedictine,	Dominican,	or	Carmelite	variety,	or	alternatively	became	a	part	of	the	then	more	recently	formed	Franciscan	order.	Others,	like	Julian,	chose	to	live	a	solitary	life	as	an	anchorite	or	hermit	where	she	“served	the	community	by	creating	an	enclosed	space	of	order	and	purity	over	and	against	the	chaos	and	pollution	of	the	world”	(Bauerschmidt	1999:77).	This	lifestyle	combined	elements	of	secular	life	and	religious	life,	on	the	margins	between	the	two	(Bauerschmidt	1999:77–78).15		During	the	15th	century,	a	great	regard	for	those	who	undertook	a	life	of	solitary	devotion	to	God	led	to	an	increase	in	the	number	of	individuals	turning	to	this	lifestyle.	This	was	also	true	of	Norwich	where	there	were	several	recluses	besides	Julian	herself	(Jacob	1961:296).	Indeed,	Norwich	during	and	just	after	Julian’s	lifetime	had	the	largest	number	of	anchorites	and	hermits	in	England	(Tanner	1984:169).	But,	during	first	half	of	the	15th	century,	there	began	to	be	a	decline	in	ability	of	vicarages	and	religious	houses	to	sustain	themselves.	Some	were	closed	and	priests	had	difficulty	finding	a	living	wage	(Jacob	1961:279).		Nonetheless,	the	English	Church’s	emphasis	on	the	personal	direction	afforded	by	anchorites	and	others	devoted	to	solitude	was	a	hallmark	that	was	indicative	of	broader	cultural	changes	within	England	during	this	time	(Thornton	1963:167):	The	fifteenth	century	had	a	spiritual	life	of	its	own:	but,	with	certain	exceptions,	it	was	not	the	life	that	flourished	within	the	cloister	as	the	great	days	of	monasticism	understood	it…it	is	rather	a	spirituality	free	from,	and	sometimes	on	the	defensive	against,	a	conventual	life	which	had	become	too	much	tied	to	routine	and	too	much	bound	up	with	secular	government	and	institutions.	Monasticism…had	become	affected	by	what	Professor	Knowles	has	called	‘that	strange	paralysis	and	hardening	of	the	arteries	that	affected	for	a	time	the	intellectual	life	of	northwestern	Europe	and	was	particularly	evident	in	the	England	of	the	fifteenth	century’:	whether	this	was	the	result	of	the	Black	Death	
                                                15	Frederick	Bauerschmidt	suggests	that	Julian’s	status	as	one	who	had	received	Extreme	Unction	after	almost	dying	put	her	further	on	the	margins	as	an	“animated	corpse,”	“a	sacred	intruder	from	the	land	of	the	dead”	(1999:78).	
	 	 	
217	
or	of	the	eclipse	of	the	papacy	in	the	Great	Schism	or	the	strain	of	the	French	wars	we	are	not	likely	to	know	(Jacob	1961:293).16		Despite	the	many	negative	forces	at	work	during	this	time,	one	positive	cultural	trend	is	significant	to	mention:	education	of	the	public.	In	this	era,	as	in	many,	education	was	uniquely	tied	to	the	religious	establishment,	both	because	clergy	and	other	individuals	devoted	to	the	religious	life	were	highly	educated	and	because	these	were	the	persons	who	normally	taught	others	(Jacob	1961:667).	Thus,	the	status	of	education	during	the	time	of	Julian	must	also	be	briefly	addressed,	especially	as	it	relates	to	the	role	of	women	in	society.		
Women	in	14th	and	15th	Century	England	Certainly,	a	significant	difficulty	faced	by	Julian	was	discrimination	because	of	her	gender	(Bauerschmidt	1999:73–76).	This	not	only	affected	her	ability	to	gain	an	education,	but	also	to	relate	her	knowledge	and	experiences	to	others.	Yet,	despite	this	discrimination,	Julian	used	this	‘disadvantage’	to	deepen	her	own	and	others’	theological	insight	into	the	nature	of	God.			
Education	The	England	of	the	late	14th	and	early	15th	centuries	had	a	growing	hunger	for	learning	to	read	and	for	books	(Jacob	1961:667).17	To	be	sure,	many	did	not	have	great	facility	at	reading	or	writing,	but	there	was	an	increasing	number	of	learned	individuals,	almost	all	of	whom	were	male.	E.	F.	Jacob	notes,	War-ridden	England	had	a	considerable	reading	public.	In	an	increasingly	literate	age	not	only	the	ecclesiastics,	but	the	knight,	the	lawyer,	the	merchant,	and	the	trader	were	building	up	small	collections.	The	reading	of	English	was	general,	and	most	of	the	merchant	class	had	some	training	in	Latin	(1961:663).		The	growing,	yet	still	small,	learned	public	provides	important	context	for	Julian’s	
Revelations.	The	genius	of	her	work	is	all	the	more	striking	given	her	cultural	context	and	status	as	a	woman.	Women	in	the	14th	century	did	not	usually	have	the	
                                                16	Citing	(Knowles	and	Hadcock	1953:48).	17	Cf.	(Harriss	2005:154–57;	Tanner	2009:49–51).	
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opportunity	to	learn	to	read	or	write,	either	in	the	vernacular	or	in	the	learned	language	of	the	day,	Latin.18			Despite	having	limited	access	to	education,	Julian	took	advantage	of	the	resources	she	had,	to	pursue	knowing	and	loving	God.	While	being	extraordinary	for	her,	or	any,	era,	Julian’s	spiritual	maturity	as	a	‘spiritual	mother’	was	not	completely	unique.	Other	women	at	this	time	also	experienced	God	in	mystical	ways.		
Women	Mystics	Julian	was	not	alone	in	her	struggles	as	a	religiously	devoted	woman	during	this	time.19	Margery	Kempe	and	Brigit	of	Sweden,	for	example,	were	also	exemplars	of	faith,	receiving	visions	and	revelations	of	Christ’s	Passion	and	God’s	love	(Jacob	1961:685–87).	The	devotion	of	these	women	is	characteristic	of	the	broader	trend	of	the	infiltration	of	religion	into	ordinary	life	in	pre-Reformation	England	(Jacob	1961:687),	an	‘unprecedented’	opportunity	to	engage	in	religious	devotion	(Aberth	2000:173),	and	an	emphasis	that	is	borne	out	in	Julian’s	own	life	and	theological	legacy.		
Julian’s	Life20	We	do	not	know	much	about	Julian’s	life	following	1373	when	she	received	the	revelations	at	the	age	of	thirty-and-a-half	(Bauerschmidt	1999:203),	yet	external	evidence	suggests	that	Julian	was	an	anchoress	in	Norwich	as	late	as	1416.21	One	of	the	most	significant	pieces	of	evidence	regarding	Julian	is	Margery	Kempe’s	record	of	visiting	Julian	near	the	end	of	Julian’s	life	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:35–38;	Windeatt	2015:168–69).	As	an	anchoress,	Julian	would	have	lived	a	life	devoted	to	God	in	a	solitary	manner,	but,	rather	than	being	isolated	from	society	like	a	hermit,	she	would	
                                                18	Most	nuns	were	not	literate	at	this	time.	Julian’s	mystical	experiences	afforded	her	a	unique	opportunity:	“We	cannot	point	to	any	conventual	who	had	a	similar	role	as	spiritual	model	or	mentor”	(Harriss	2005:340).	19	For	a	survey	of	the	impact	of	female	religious	piety	in	Medieval	East	Anglia,	see	(Gilchrist	and	Oliva	1993).	20	Though	the	details	of	Julian’s	life	are	not	well	known,	it	is	certain	that	she	was	affected	by	her	context,	perhaps	significantly	bereaved	by	the	loss	both	she	and	her	community	experienced.	21	These	include	the	wills	of	individuals	who	left	property	to	Dame	Julian	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:33–35).	
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have	taken	up	residence	in	a	small	room	(cell)	attached	to	a	church	from	which	she	would	live	a	contemplative	life	and	provide	wisdom	to	those	who	enquired	of	her	(Bauerschmidt	1999:210).		Some	scholars	suggest	that	at	the	time	of	her	revelations	Julian	was	a	nun	at	the	Benedictine	monastery	at	Carrow.	Others	argue	that	the	text	only	indicates	she	was	living	a	‘vowed	life’	when	this	text	was	written,	not	necessarily	at	the	time	of	the	revelations.	Hence,	it	is	possible	that	Julian	may	have	been	a	widow	or	even	may	have	lost	a	child	as	a	result	of	the	plague	(Bauerschmidt	1999:204).	All	such	thinking	is	conjectural,	but	what	is	clear	is	that	by	the	time	of	writing	the	Short	Text,	Julian	was	familiar	enough	with	‘monastic	hermeneutical	practice’	to	use	it	extensively	in	her	own	theological	reflection	(Turner	2011:11).		Regarding	Julian’s	education,	due	to	the	internal	evidence	of	the	texts	some	scholars	contend	that	Julian	was	able	not	only	to	read	and	write	in	English,	but	quite	probably	in	Latin	as	well	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:44).	Michael	Wright	suggests	that	the	odds	are	slightly	in	favor	of	Julian	having	known	Latin	at	the	time	of	writing	the	Short	Text	due	to	textual	evidence	for	knowledge	of	the	Vulgate	and	similarities	between	her	English	grammar	and	Latin	grammar	(Wright	1993:43).22	This	counter-cultural	learning	may	have	been	possible	given	her	participation	in	a	religious	community	and	the	learning	that	clergy	may	have	passed	on	to	her.	It	also	suggests	that	Julian	could	have	had	some	theological	training,	a	contention	to	which	several	aspects	of	her	writing	may	point	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:43–59).	Yet	other	scholars	note	that	Colledge	and	Walsh’s	take	on	a	full-fledged	medieval	theological	training	may	go	too	far	(Bauerschmidt	1999:205;	Turner	2011:36).		The	claims	of	modern	scholars	at	first	glance	may	seem	to	contradict	Julian’s	own	assessment	of	herself:	“These	revelations	were	shown	to	a	simple,	uneducated	creature”	(LT,	II:40).	Yet	Turner	notes	that	“her	being	‘unlettered’	might	mean	almost	anything	
                                                22	In	particular,	Wright	notes	that	Julian’s	quotation	of	scripture	(in	Middle	English)	follows	readings	in	the	Vulgate,	and	that	Julian	uses	the	ablative	absolute	grammatical	construction,	which	is	awkward	in	English	but	grammatically	appropriate	and	common	in	Latin.	
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and	virtually	nothing.	It	probably	meant	that	she	was	unable	to	read	Latin	off	a	page	unaided”	(Turner	2011:36).23	Julian’s	claim	to	be	unlearned	is	perhaps	more	a	claim	to	theological	solidarity	with	the	weak	than	an	assertion	to	not	having	any	learning	(Wright	1993:38).	But,	such	solidarity	may,	in	fact,	have	made	her	theological	viewpoint	less	appealing	to	those	in	her	own	day.		
Julian’s	Reception	and	Influence	During	her	life	Julian	was	not	overly	well-known	or	influential,	except	perhaps	to	those	in	her	immediate	surroundings.	As	evidenced	by	the	paucity	of	extant	early	manuscripts	of	her	Revelations,	following	her	death	she	was	not	widely	read	for	many	years.	Frederick	Bauerschmidt	suggests	that	Julian’s	unpopularity	in	the	Middle	Ages	was	due,	in	part,	to	the	difficulty	of	enacting	the	kind	of	spirituality	she	encouraged	without	the	possibility	of	being	charged	with	heresy	(1999:193).24	It	was	not	until	approximately	the	last	100	years	that	her	work	has	come	to	be	more	greatly	appreciated.	Now	we	will	turn	to	Julian’s	text	itself.		
Julian	of	Norwich’s	Revelations	of	Divine	Love	Julian’s	Revelations	of	Divine	Love	claims	to	be	a	record	of	Julian’s	experience	of	receiving	revelations	from	God.	Because	of	the	centrality	of	interpretation	in	relating	these	experiences,	Frederick	Bauerschmidt	proposes	that	Julian	should	be	viewed	as	a	theologian	in	her	own	right—one	who	mediated	her	experience	of	Divine	revelations	to	her	readers	(1999:212).	Denys	Turner	also	advocates	viewing	Julian	as	a	theologian	wherein,	“[t]aken	as	a	whole,	her	theology	is	unquestionably	difficult,	morally	demanding,	intellectually	complex,	and	resistant	of	simplistic	solutions	to	dauntingly	intractable	theological	problems”	(2011:17).	Further,	he	describes	Julian’s	Revelations	as	“one	of	the	most	exhilarating,	moving,	disturbing,	and	inspiring	works	of	theology	in	any	age”	(2011:xix).	Julian	likewise	describes	her	revelation	as	“deep	theology	and	great	wisdom”	(LT,	LXXXVI:165).	Julian’s	Revelations,	in	many	ways,	then,	resists	categorization,	simplification,	and	compartmentalization.	Her	status	as	an	‘outsider’	
                                                23	Turner	writes,	“no	scholar	today	doubts	that	Julian	was	formally	literate”	(2011:37).	24	See,	for	instance,	Julian’s	attempt	to	dissuade	such	accusations	by	a	particular	affirmation	of	the	use	of	religious	imagery	(ST:3)	in	contradistinction	to	the	Lollards	(Bauerschmidt	1999:208).	
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from	the	usual	channels	of	religious	piety	and	power	gave	her	a	fresh	perspective,	yet	her	knowledge	of	and	devotion	to	the	Church	and	the	truths	it	stewards	sustains	a	continuity	of	thought	and	spirit	with	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	(LT,	XXXII:81).25	Here	Turner	suggests:	It	is	less	in	matters	of	theological	and	doctrinal	substance,	and	more	in	matters	of	intellectual	disposition,	metaphoric	range,	literary	and	linguistic	style,	and	sheer	fresh	energy	of	thought,	that	the	singularity	of	Julian’s	work	is	to	be	found.	There	is	a	kind	of	radical	theological	naïveté	in	Revelation—sometimes	even	a	
fausse	naïveté—that	speaks	across	the	centuries	to	our	own	times.	And	therein	lies	a	paradox.	This	work	is	in	so	many	ways	a	one-off.	Yet	somehow	it	is	the	work’s	relative	independence	from	all	models	of	theological	writing,	whether	of	her	own	times	or	of	ours,	that	has	made	it	so	accessible	to	us	today—more	so,	it	seems,	than	at	any	other	time	in	the	history	of	its	reception		(2011:17).		It	is	this	‘fresh’	voice,	speaking	its	theological	insight	to	our	own	day	that	makes	
Revelations	especially	appropriate	for	application	in	our	context.	Now	we	must	give	attention	to	the	texts	themselves	which,	in	Ricoeur’s	terms,	provide	the	‘distanciation’	needed	for	the	projection	of	meaning	through	the	‘world’	of	the	text.		
The	Texts	There	are	two	surviving	manuscripts	of	Julian’s	Revelations,	one	that	has	come	to	be	labelled	the	‘Long	Text’	and	the	other,	the	‘Short	Text.’26	Only	one	manuscript	of	the	Short	Text,	from	the	15th	century,	is	known	to	exist	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:1–5),	while	two	textual	traditions	of	the	Long	Text	are	based	upon	two	complete	copies	dating	from	the	seventeenth	century	(Bauerschmidt	1999:207).27	These	texts	were	preserved	by	English	Catholics	exiled	in	France,	groups	already	on	the	‘margins’	(Bauerschmidt	1999:207).		Scholars	are	fairly	certain	that	the	Short	Text	was	written	soon	after	the	revelation,	while	the	Long	Text	incorporates	perhaps	20	years	of	theological	reflection	and	
                                                25	In	fact,	she	“operated	within	a	well-established	[‘psuedo-Dionysian’]	tradition	of	mystical	theology	going	back	to	the	sixth	century	A.D.”	(Aberth	2000:174).	26	For	a	detailed	comparison	of	the	texts,	including	extant	manuscripts,	see		(Glasscoe	1989).	27	A	manuscript	from	approximately	1500,	dubbed	the	‘Westminster	manuscript,’	also	contains	excerpts	from	the	LT	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:9–10;	Cré	2011).	
	 	 	
222	
rumination	by	Julian	(Bauerschmidt	1999:207–8).28	Besides	their	substantial	spiritual	depth,	these	texts	are	important	for	another	reason:	they	were	written	by	a	woman.	In	fact,	the	Short	Text	is	the	first	English	language	work	known	to	have	been	written	by	a	woman	(Turner	2011:x).		In	order	to	understand	what	precipitated	the	writing	of	Revelations,	we	must	first	explore	the	experience	of	the	revelations	themselves.		
The	Experience	of	the	Revelations	Julian’s	Revelations	of	Divine	Love	is	centered	around	a	series	of	revelations29	that	Julian	received	on	May	8,	1373	(LT,	II:40).	These	revelations	began	in	the	early	morning	hours	and	continued	until	after	noon	(LT,	LXV:139),	with	a	final	revelation	on	the	following	evening	(LT,	LXVI:139).30	Further,	Julian	situates	them	within	her	own	account	of	personal	devotion	and	desire	to	know	God	more;	thus,	they	must	be	understood	in	the	context	of	this	lifelong	passion	for	purity	of	heart	and	devotion	to	God	(Jantzen	1987:74).		Beyond	personal	belief	in	the	love	of	Christ	shown	to	her	on	the	cross,	she	longed	more	fully	to	know	and	experience	the	suffering	of	Christ	(ST:3)	so	as	to	gain	deeper	insight	into	Christ’s	Passion	(LT,	II:41).	This	was	accompanied	by	a	desire	for	the	experience	of	bodily	illness	whereby	she	would	be	spurred	no	longer	to	put	her	hope	in	any	worldly	thing,	but	rather	to	trust	fully	in	God	(ST:4)	and	be	purged	to	live	her	life	to	the	glory	of	
                                                28	Indeed,	Julian	relates	that	the	Long	Text	was	recorded	some	twenty	years	following	her	initial	revelations	(LT,	LI:108).	She	writes	that	the	initial	revelations	were	thus	“renewed	by	moments	of	illumination	and	inspiration,	I	hope,	of	the	same	spirit	that	revealed	them	all”	(LT,	LXV:139).	I	will	be	drawing	more	comprehensively	upon	the	Long	Text	due	to	its	significance	in	relating	not	only	the	experience	of	Julian’s	revelations,	but	also	her	theological	reflection	upon	them.		29	Julian’s	Middle	English	term	was	‘schewynge’	(showing)	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:203).	30	There	is	some	discrepancy	in	the	manuscripts	on	this	point,	the	alternative	date	being	given	as	May	13	due	to	scribal-error	variations	of	the	Roman	numerals	(Jantzen	1987:4,	13).		
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God	(LT,	II:41).31	She	presented	these	two	requests	to	God,	with	her	continuing	aim	being	a	purposeful	longing	for	and	drawing	near	to	God	(ST:4).32			By	her	own	testimony,	her	petitions	were	answered	and	Julian	was	taken	ill	(ST:4).	In	fact,	she	was	so	ill	that	she	was	given	last	rites.	It	was	in	this	context	that	Julian	relates	that	she	received	revelations,	which	she	believed	to	have	been	given	to	her	directly	by	Jesus	(LT,	IV:44).	Her	revelations,	primarily	concerning	Christ’s	Passion,	were	given	in	three	ways:	“by	bodily	sight,	and	by	words	formed	in	my	understanding,	and	by	spiritual	vision”	(ST:34).33	She	claims	to	have	related	each	of	these	means	of	communication	as	clearly	as	they	were	given	to	her,	but	also	suggests	that	she	was	unable	to	fully	describe	those	things	revealed	to	her	by	means	of	spiritual	vision	(ST:34).	These	revelations	were	given	plainly,	at	times	“vivid	and	life-like,	and	horrifying	and	awesome,	sweet	and	lovely”	in	their	display	of	Christ’s	Passion	(LT,	VII:49),	but	she	notes	that,	despite	the	clarity	of	the	revelations	themselves,	their	insights	needed	to	be	maintained	by	faith	after	the	revelation	(LT,	VII:50).	She	ultimately	trusts	that	God	will	enable	the	spiritual	reception	of	the	message	of	the	revelations	in	her	readers	even	beyond	her	own	ability	to	relate	the	experiences	(LT,	IX:52).		
                                                31	This	request	may	seem	odd	to	the	modern	mind,	but	such	petitions	were	common	in	Julian’s	time	where	bodily	suffering	was	welcomed	as	having	spiritual	benefit,	even	being	advocated	in	texts	such	as	Ancrene	Wisse,	a	Medieval	guide	for	female	anchorites	(Bauerschmidt	1999:37).	This	was	characteristic	of	a	broader	trend	toward	emphasizing	the	humanity	of	Christ	and	imitating	him	in	his	bodily	suffering	(Bauerschmidt	1999:34–36).	Bauerschmidt	relates,	“Jesus’	humanity	is	significant	for	[Julian]	because	it	entails	bodiliness,	and	thus	the	ability	to	suffer	pain.	Yet	Julian	goes	beyond	the	affective	tendency	to	turn	Christ’s	body	into	an	icon	of	pathos,	a	kind	of	catalyst	for	mediation	on	one’s	sinfulness.	Rather	it	is	Jesus’	crucified	body	that	Julian	‘reads’	as	her	revelatory	text;	what	is	primary	is	not	the	subjective	response	aroused	by	meditation	on	Christ’s	body,	but	the	message	of	love	that	is	revealed	there”	(1999:35–36).		32	Julian	frames	this	last	request	in	terms	of	three	wounds:	“the	wound	of	true	contrition,	the	wound	of	kind	compassion,	and	the	wound	of	purposeful	longing	for	God”	(LT,	II:41).	33	Turner	(2011:28)	argues	that	Julian’s	experience	was	not	“ineffable”	in	the	sense	used	by	William	James.	While	many	explanations	for	Julian’s	revelations	have	been	given	and	their	veracity	questioned,	I	will	take	the	texts	at	their	face	value	as	it	seems	Julian	would	have	intended.	I	see	no	valid	reason	for	discounting	the	prima	facie	evidence	of	the	texts	because	of	presuppositions	external	to	the	texts.	
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The	Content	of	the	Revelations	Julian’s	writings	comprise	a	coherent	and	‘systematic’	theology	(Turner	2011:ix).	But,	Turner	suggests,	Revelations	is	unique	in	theological	style	and	genre,	without	any	equivalent	either	in	Medieval	times	or	today	(2011:16).	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	Julian	was	uninfluenced	by	conventional	methods	of	doing	theology,	nor	that	her	theology	is	somehow	unintelligible.	Her	theology	assumes	the	integration	of	head	and	heart	in	the	task	of	theology—what	might	be	termed	a	‘spiritual	theology’	today.			Each	revelation	is	a	variation	on	the	theme	of	the	first	showing,	reminiscent	of	a	musical	piece	(Turner	2011:xi),	or	perhaps	moving	in	argument	like	a	spiral	rather	than	with	the	sharp	linear	argumentative	precision	of	many	other	theologians	of	her	day	(Turner	2011:4).	This	difference	could	be	attributable	to	her	monastic	context	and	contemplative	spiritual	development	(Turner	2011:6–8),	a	spiritual	upbringing	also	having	substantial	implications	for	the	eschatological	nature	of	her	theology	(Turner	2011:8).		The	content	of	many	of	Julian’s	revelations	was	various	aspects	of	Christ’s	Passion,	which	she	relates	in	detail.34	Yet	the	theme	to	which	Julian	continually	returns	is	the	love	of	God.	This	is	clearly	set	out	from	the	beginning:	“This	is	a	revelation	of	love	which	Jesus	Christ,	our	endless	bliss,	made	in	sixteen	showings	or	special	revelations”	(LT,	I:39).	It	also	closes	out	Julian’s	reflections,	functioning	like	bookends	for	the	text:	And	from	the	time	that	this	was	revealed,	I	often	yearned	to	know	what	our	Lord’s	meaning	was.	And	fifteen	years	and	more	later	I	was	answered	in	my	spiritual	understanding,	and	it	was	said:	‘Do	you	want	to	know	your	Lord’s	meaning	in	this?	Be	well	aware:	love	was	his	meaning.	Who	showed	you	this?	Love.	What	did	he	show	you?	Love.	Why	did	he	show	it?	For	love.	Hold	fast	to	this,	and	you	will	know	and	understand	more	of	the	same;	but	you	will	never	understand	nor	know	anything	else	from	this	for	all	eternity.’…love	was	our	Lord’s	meaning	(LT,	LXXXVI:164).		Love,	then,	beyond	being	the	content	of	the	revelations,	also	is	the	agent	of	the	message	and	the	goal	and	reason	for	its	message.	This	is	evident	in	Julian’s	methodology.			
                                                34	Cf.	(Bauerschmidt	1999:46–47).	
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Methodology	Julian’s	theological	style	was	influenced	by	scholastic,	monastic,	and	anchoritic	traditions	and	practices,	though	was	not	identical	to	any	of	them	(Turner	2011:12).	It	seems	that	she	was	quite	aware	of	scriptural	hermeneutical	practices	in	patristic	and	medieval	traditions,	such	as	the	‘literal’	and	‘spiritual’	senses	of	scripture,	which	she	applied	to	the	experience	of	her	revelations	(Turner	2011:11).35	She	notes	that	she	has	some	knowledge	of	scholarly	opinion	on	theological	matters	(LT,	LXXX:159),	though	she	did	not	seek	to	engage	with	it	but	rather	restricted	her	comments	to	what	was	shown	to	her	in	the	revelations.	Additionally,	she	was	greatly	influenced	by	the	monastic	hermeneutic	practice	of	lectio,	or	disciplined	contemplation	of	scripture,	but,		above	all,	she	closely	follows	Augustine’s	hermeneutical	teaching	in	her	reading	of	her	shewings,	as	did	the	monks:	if	in	doubt,	Augustine	said,	as	to	how	to	read	a	difficult	passage	of	scripture,	the	question	was	to	be	settled	in	favor	of	that	meaning	that	was	most	conducive	to	the	achievement	of	caritas	in	the	Church	(Turner	2011:11).	36		Here,	for	Julian,	love	constituted	the	content	of	her	revelations	but	also	dictated	the	interpretation	and	application	of	these	revelations.	In	contrast	to	monastic	theologians,	who	reflected	primarily	on	the	scriptures	through	methods	informed	by	the	scriptures,	and	scholastic	theologians,	who	reasoned	from	a	particular	theological	statement	(quaestio),	“Julian’s	theological	reflections	are	elicited	through	a	process	of	progressive	intensification	and	complex	elaboration	of	particular	and	personal	experience”	(Turner	2011:x–xi).	This	personal	knowledge	consisted	of	the	transcendent	experience	of	God’s	love.	In	the	end—especially	in	the	Long	Text—Julian’s	experience	of	the	revelations	themselves	cannot	be	divorced	from	her	interpretation	of	them	(Bauerschmidt	1999:50).	Thus,	Julian’s	reflections	upon	her	revelations	are	informed	by	the	traditions	that	shaped	her	spiritual	development,	but	her	experience	of	the	love	of	God	remains	at	the	heart	of	her	writing.	
                                                35	However,	Turner	suggests	that	Julian’s	“Revelation	is	riddled	with	sic	et	non,	with	theological	tensions.	It	is	no	exaggeration	to	say	that	a	major	part	of	the	Long	Text	consists	of	a	single	enormously	extended	‘utrum,’	a	vast,	loosely	composed,	quaestio	
disputata”	(2011:11),	thus	generally	following	the	manner	of	Medieval	theological	method.	36	Citing	(Augustine	1958:30):	“Whoever,	therefore,	thinks	that	he	understands	the	divine	Scriptures	or	any	part	of	them	so	that	it	does	not	build	the	double	love	of	God	and	of	our	neighbour	does	not	understand	it	at	all.”	Cf.	(Fowl	1998:89–96).	
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	Julian	describes	her	epistemology	in	this	way:	Man	depends	on	three	things	in	this	life,	and	by	these	three	things	God	is	glorified	and	we	are	furthered,	protected,	and	saved.	The	first	is	the	use	of	man’s	natural	reason;	the	second	is	the	general	teaching	of	Holy	Church;	the	third	is	the	inner	working	of	grace	through	the	Holy	Spirit;	and	these	three	are	all	from	one	God	(LT,	LXXX:158-9).		Reason,	tradition	(including	scripture),37	and	experience	all	figure	significantly	in	Julian’s	epistemology.	The	way	in	which	these	three	may	be	reconciled,	both	in	general	and	in	the	particularity	of	Julian’s	own	experience,	is	a	subject	to	which	we	will	return.		Turner	suggests	that	the	record	of	Julian’s	experiences	must	be	interpreted	in	light	of	the	wider	milieu	of	her	faith	content	and	the	development	of	that	faith	that	were	nurtured	and	sustained	through	the	everyday	ministrations	of	the	Church	(2011:28–29).	Although	the	occasion	of	her	writing	was	the	experience	of	revelation,	recorded	soon	after	in	the	Short	Text,	and	subsequent	reflection	on	that	experience,	recorded	in	the	Long	Text,	these	reflections	must	be	seen	in	the	broader	context	of	her	Christian	formation	within	the	Church,	generally,	and	within	her	particular	faith	community	specifically	(whether	that	be	understood	as	the	monastic	community	at	Carrow	or	as	the	anchoritic	community	that	formed	around	her).	She	relates,		But	in	everything	I	believe	as	Holy	Church	believes,	preaches,	and	teaches.	For	the	faith	of	Holy	Church	which	I	had	understood	before	and,	as	I	hope,	by	God’s	grace	willingly	observed	and	practised,	remained	constantly	before	me,	and	I	never	wished	or	intended	to	accept	anything	which	might	be	contrary	to	it	(LT,	IX:52).38			Julian	recognizes	the	importance	both	of	the	experiences	of	God’s	love	she	received	through	the	revelations	as	well	as	the	grounding	of	her	faith	in	the	teaching	of	the	Church	(LT,	XLVI:99)	as	founded	in	scripture	(LT,	LXXXVI:165).	In	fact,	she	sees	the	two	
                                                37	Jonathan	Juilfs	(2010)	argues	that,	for	Julian,	scripture	functions	as	a	“seed”	that	instigates	and	shapes	further	theological	reflection—in	this	case	of	a	mystical	nature—rather	than	merely	as	a	proof-text	that	keeps	her	theology	within	the	bounds	of	orthodoxy.	38	Here,	in	the	LT,	Julian	is	more	careful	than	in	the	ST	to	reaffirm	that	and	how	her	revelations	fit	within	the	purview	of	Church	teaching	(LT,	XXXII:81).	She	affirms,	“our	faith	is	founded	on	God’s	word”	(LT,	XXXII:80).	Perhaps	this	is	due	to	objections	that	had	been	raised	in	the	intervening	years.	
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as	unified	both	in	their	message	and	in	their	basis	for	providing	comfort	and	hope	(LT,	LXVI:141),	though	a	dialectical	tension	remains	in	which	the	two	may	appear	to	contradict	at	points.39			
Style	Julian’s	style	of	writing	is	oral	in	nature,	almost	as	if	it	were	dictated	(Turner	2011:37).	The	text	is	written	in	a	plain	and	clear	manner,	similar	to	if	one	were	to	imagine	Julian	having	a	conversation	with	the	reader.40	This,	perhaps,	is	what	she	envisioned:	her	texts	conveying	the	love	of	God	to	every	Christian	in	a	simple	and	straightforward	manner.41	To	this	end	she	writes	that	the	reader	is	not	to	consider	the	‘wretch’	who	received	the	revelations	(LT,	VIII:51),	but	rather	to	be	spurred	toward	love.	She	continues,	“I	am	not	good	because	of	the	revelation	unless	I	love	God	better;	and	in	as	much	as	you	love	God	better,	it	is	meant	more	for	you	than	for	me”	(LT,	IX:51).	This	same	humility	is	continued	throughout	the	text,	highlighting	both	her	manner	of	thinking	and,	in	some	measure,	the	aim	of	her	record	of	the	revelations.		Turner	suggests	that	Julian’s	is	a	‘vernacular’	theology,	addressed	to	every	Christian	and	written	in	the	common	tongue,	Middle	English,	rather	than	scholarly	Latin,42	and	aided	by	her	anchoritic	lifestyle,	physically	attached	and	dedicated	to	the	Church	but	with	no	allegiance	to	any	specific	division	of	the	Church	(Turner	2011:14).	It	is	as	if	Julian	is	between	several	different	‘worlds’—considered	dead	to	the	world	as	an	anchorite	yet	
                                                39	Turner	notes,	“And	though	in	the	end	she	knows,	and	insists,	that	there	is	nothing	shown	to	her	in	her	revelations	that	is	not	contained	in	the	teachings	of	the	Church	and	vice	versa,	she	admits	that	she	cannot	‘see’	the	one	in	the	other	or	the	other	in	the	one:	they	at	least	appear	to	conflict.	Hence,	if	they	appear	to	conflict,	but	could	not	possibly	do	so,	there	is	necessarily	dialectical	work	to	be	done…Julian,	then,	is	often	as	much	puzzled	as	pacified	by	her	revelations”	(2011:12).	Cf.	(LT,	IX:51-52).	Julia	Gatta,	however,	proposes	that	it	is	not	so	much	the	Church’s	teaching	that	is	in	tension	with	Julian’s	mystical	experience	as	it	is	“her	own	deep	sense	of	personal	sinfulness…feelings	wholly	in	accord	with	Church’s	teaching”	(1981:177–78).	Cf.	(Turner	2011:22).	40	Daniel	Pinti	(2006)	suggests	that	Julian’s	writing	is	‘perichoretic’	in	its	reticent	style	that	invites	the	reader	to	shared	construction	of	meaning.	Pinti	likens	this	style	to	Ricoeur’s	hermeneutical	philosophy	(2006:505–6).	41	Julian	writes,	“In	all	this	I	was	much	moved	with	love	towards	my	fellow	Christians,	that	they	might	see	and	know	the	same	as	I	saw;	for	I	wanted	it	to	be	a	comfort	to	them,	for	this	whole	vision	was	shown	for	everyone	in	general”	(LT,	VIII:51).	42	This	fact,	in	itself,	could	have	put	Julian	under	suspicion	for	heresy	(Jantzen	1987:11).	
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still	living	(Turner	2011:15).	Her	theology	and	the	revelations	that	are	integral	to	it	are	all,	in	a	sense,	derived	from	this	‘betweeness’	that	is	itself	characterized	by	a	“resistance	to	easy	answers”	(Turner	2011:21).	This	style,	in	many	respects,	works	in	conjunction	with	what	Turner	calls	Julian’s	‘narratival	logic.’		
Julian’s	Narratival	Logic	
Revelations,	despite	the	centrality	of	a	testimonial	narrative	account	of	the	revelations,	is	not	essentially	narratival	in	form.	Yet	Turner	suggests	that	narrative	reasoning	is	at	the	heart	of	Julian’s	theological	approach:	understanding	Julian’s	behovely	include[s]	some	[components]	that	are	tied	up	less	with	either	logic	or	natural	fact	than	with	matters	of	individual	identity	and	particular	story.	As	we	might	put	it,	they	are	narratival	necessities	and	contingencies	(2011:41).43		Julian	deploys	a	theological	strategy	that	is	distinctly	concrete	and	linked	to	ways	of	understanding	the	world	based	upon	a	narrative	plot.	The	‘story’	that	Julian	tells	of	the	world	and	all	goings-on	within	it	is	one	of	the	world	subsumed	by	the	love	of	God	as	known	through	the	teaching	of	the	Church	and	through	her	revelations.	This	story	claims	priority	over	and	against	Julian’s	(and	our	own)	natural	inclination	toward	the	story	we	tell	ourselves	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	world—a	story	that	does	not	take	God’s	love	seriously	enough.44			Julian’s	narrative	is	a	radically	different	narrative	with	a	different	problem,	solution,	and	plot	altogether.45		
                                                43	Kevin	West	(2011)	similarly	sees	Julian’s	theology	as	narratival,	expressing	this	narrative	in	terms	of	J.R.R.	Tolkien’s	category	of	‘eucatastrophe.’	44	See	Stump’s	assessment	of	how	narrative	can	address	questions	of	suffering	(Stump	2012:372–73,	409).	45	Turner	writes,	“Julian’s	theology	of	sin,	providence,	and	salvation…rests	on	implicit	assumptions	in	philosophical	theology,	importantly	different	from,	and	in	equally	important	respects	at	odds	with,	the	explicit	assumptions	of	the	mass	of	today’s	philosophical	literature	in	that	field”	(2011:35).	I	will	not	be	able,	in	this	short	space,	to	give	a	full	account	of	Julian’s	depth	of	theological	insight.	I	will,	however,	attempt	to	provide	the	contours	of	her	argument	and	their	import	for	a	Christian	theological	understanding	of	resilience.	
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Julian’s	Problem:	Sin	While	Julian	surely	experienced	many	difficulties	in	her	life—including	a	grave	illness	and	the	other	difficulties	we	may	conjecture	based	upon	her	cultural	and	political	context—her	greatest	concern	was	none	of	these,	but	rather	sin	itself,	a	theme	to	which	she	returns	again	and	again	throughout	her	reflections	(Turner	2011:xi).46	Sin,	to	Julian,	was	the	greatest	hindrance	to	God’s	love	and	therefore	the	largest	threat	to	a	hope	grounded	in	the	goodness	and	love	of	God.		At	odds	with	many	modern	accounts	of	suffering,	Julian	identifies	the	genesis	and	locus	of	suffering	in	sin,	as	opposition	to	God.	Sin	itself	is	the	problem	that	concerns	Julian	the	most,	not	the	particularities	of	individual	and	corporate	human	suffering,	which	may	even	have	positive	benefits	(Kilby	2014).47	Thus,	suffering	is	derivative	of	sin,	but	cannot	be	equated	to	it.	Julian	writes,		In	this	unadorned	word	‘sin’,	our	Lord	brought	to	mind	everything	in	general	which	is	not	good,	and	the	shameful	scorn	and	the	uttermost	abnegation	that	he	bore	for	us	in	this	life,	and	his	dying,	and	all	the	pains	and	sufferings	in	body	and	spirit	of	all	his	creatures	(LT,	XXVII:75).		Sin,	for	Julian,	encompasses	all	manner	of	evil	and	suffering	in	the	world.	It	is	“vile”	and	“painful,”	“contrary	to	our	fair	nature”	and	“unnatural”	(LT,	LXIII:135).	So,	by	describing	‘sin’	as	Julian’s	main	concern,	I	am	also	allowing	for	all	of	its	derivative	effects.	Suffering	in	Julian’s	thought,	then,	may	be	treated	analogically	to	evil,	but	also,	in	a	concrete	sense,	as	being	derivative	from	evil.				
                                                46	Indeed,	Julian	equates	sin	and	evil,	presenting	“the	principle	of	evil	firmly	rooted	in	psychological	as	well	as	spiritual	human	reality”	(Peters	1987:197).	47	Julian	writes,	“And	it	seems	to	me,	this	suffering	is	something	that	exists	for	a	while,	because	it	purges	us	and	makes	us	know	ourselves	and	ask	for	mercy,	for	the	Passion	of	our	Lord	is	a	comfort	to	us	against	all	this…he	comforts	us	readily	and	sweetly	meaning	this,	‘It	is	true	that	sin	is	cause	of	all	this	suffering,	but	all	shall	be	well,	and	all	shall	be	well,	and	all	manner	of	things	shall	be	well’”	(LT,	XXVII:75).	Further,	for	Julian,	“pain	is	an	inevitable	part	of	the	human	condition…There	is	therefore	no	way	to	avoid	suffering”	(Minore	2014:61,	63).	Thus,	I	suggest	that	Julian’s	discussion	of	sin	may	analogously	be	applied	to	human	suffering.	
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Sin	as	‘No	Deed’:	Divine	Action	and	the	Non-being	of	Sin	Julian	firmly	believes	that	God	has	made	all	things	and	everything	has	its	being	and	sustaining	through	his	love	(LT,	V:45).	In	fact,	“he	has	made	everything	that	is	made	for	love—and	by	the	same	love	everything	is	sustained”	(LT,	VIII:50).	Furthermore,	for	Julian	God	not	only	sustains	the	world,	but	“he	does	everything	that	is	done”	(LT,	XI:55)	and	“everything	which	is	done	is	well	done,	because	our	Lord	God	does	everything”	(LT,	XI:56).48	Despite	these	claims	Julian	maintains	that	God	does	not	in	any	way	cause	sin	(Turner	2011:62).49			Julian	does	not	seek	to	evade	the	problems	that	such	an	account	presents,	and	has	been	suggested	as	being	one	of	the	only	thinkers	who	allows	the	full	weight	of	the	Augustinian	position	to	be	felt	(Kilby	2014).50	This	Augustinian	account	of	God’s	sovereignty	would	seem	to	be	at	odds	with	Julian’s	robust	account	of	sin.	How	may	everything	be	“well	done”	if,	in	fact,	one	is	faced	with	the	reality	of	sin	and	suffering	in	the	world	that	Julian	describes?	How	can	these	two	seemingly	contradictory	claims	be	made?	Turner	asks,	“would	it	not	seem	that	Julian’s	solution	can	with	consistency	affirm	the	involvement	of	an	omnipotently	good	God	in	our	free	acts	only	at	the	price	of	denying	sin’s	reality?”	(2011:62).			In	answer	one	could	suggest	that	sin	is	merely	a	function	of	human	free	will	and	therefore	God	is	absolved	of	responsibility	for	it.51	This	is	not	the	tack	that	Julian	takes.	Rather,	in	answering	this	conundrum	Julian	draws	upon	Augustine’s	conception	of	sin	
                                                48	Julian	clearly	holds	to	a	strong	doctrine	of	Divine	providence.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	human	history	is	fatalistic	and	determined,	nor	are	human	beings	passive	instruments	(Turner	2011:59).	49	She	writes,	“…this	lack	is	not	in	God,	but	it	is	on	our	part;	for	through	sin	and	wretchedness	we	have	in	us	a	wretched	and	continual	resistance	to	peace	and	to	love”	(LT,	XLVIII:102).	50	Her	familiarity	with	this	theological	account	does	not	of	necessity	mean	that	she	had	firsthand	knowledge	of	Augustine	or	Thomas.	There	are	a	variety	of	other	ways	that	she	could	have	been	exposed	to	their	theology	(Bauerschmidt	1999:206–7).		51		Turner	notes,	“Julian’s	theology	is	entirely	based	on	the	assumption	not	merely	that	there	is	no	contradiction	between	the	divine	providence	and	the	freedom	of	the	human	will,	but	that,	more	positively,	our	human	freedom	is	made	possible	only	within	the	creative	causality	of	God”	(2011:60).	In	fact,	union	with	God	creates	capacity	for	human	free	action	by	enabling	self-competency	instead	of	victimhood	or	fatalism.	Cf.	(Turner	2011:53–60).	
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as	privation	and	claims	that	free	sinful	acts	are,	in	fact,	not	“something	done”(Turner	2011:62).52	Here	sin	is	a	deprivation	of	good	rather	than	an	entity	in	itself:	“But	I	did	not	see	sin,	for	I	believe	it	has	no	kind	of	substance	nor	share	of	being,	nor	could	it	be	recognized	except	by	the	suffering	it	causes”	(LT,	XXVII:75).	Julian	notes,	“I	saw	truly	that	sin	is	no	kind	of	deed,	for	sin	was	not	shown	me	in	all	this”	(LT,	XI:56).	Despite	her	view	of	the	ubiquity	of	the	effects	of	sin,	Julian	clearly	maintains	an	Augustinian	account	of	the	ontological	non-being	of	sin	itself.			Here	“Julian’s	meaning…seems	unambiguous.	And	just	as	plainly,	it	seems	at	odds	with	the	common	experience	of	sin,	not	least	with	her	own”	(Turner	2011:62).	Julian	does	not	deny	the	reality	of	sin	or	the	pain	that	it	causes;53	indeed,	“Adam’s	sin	was	the	greatest	harm	that	was	ever	done,	or	ever	shall	be.”	Yet,	God	tells	her,	“‘Since	I	have	set	right	what	was	the	greatest	harm,	it	is	my	will	that	you	should	know	by	this	that	I	shall	set	right	all	that	is	less	harmful’”	(LT,	XXIX:77).			How	can	this	be?	At	a	metaphysical	level,	from	Julian’s	perspective,	God	certainly	is	the	cause	of	all	actions,	the	sinful	included,	because	he	enables	all	that	is	done.54	Sin,	however,	is	constituted	by	failure	and	therefore	is	not	attributable	to	God,	but	rather	to	the	individual	whose	lack	constitutes	the	privation	characteristic	of	sin.	Sinful	actions	are	real	actions	with	real	consequences,	but	they	are	characterized	by	failure	and	privation,	thereby	having	no	ontological	substance	(Turner	2011:63).55	Julian’s	Augustinian-Thomist	account	of	sin	enables	her	affirm	both	that	God	does	all	things	but	that	he	does	not	sin.		The	key	to	this	is	the	contention	that	‘sinne	is	no	dede,’	but	rather	
                                                52		Julian	writes	bluntly	in	the	Short	Text,	“sin	is	nothing”	(ST:11).	53	She	writes,	“‘Ah,	good	Lord,	how	could	all	be	well,	in	view	of	the	great	harm	which	has	come	upon	your	creatures	through	sin?’”	(LT,	XXIX:77).	54	Here	the	theological	conception	of	concursus	may	be	helpful	for	understanding	how	Divine	and	human	action	are	non-competitive	(Kilby	2014).	Although	much	more	could	be	said	on	this	topic,	my	comments	will	necessarily	be	limited.	For	a	more	comprehensive	discussion,	see	(Tanner	1988).	55	Turner	presents	an	example	of	a	faulty	installation	of	brake	pads	on	his	car.	The	subsequent	failure	of	the	brake	pads	is	a	result	of	his	real	actions,	but	this	action	was	caused	not	by	his	changing	the	brake	pads,	but	by	a	privation	of	skill	at	this	task.	In	the	same	way,	for	Julian,	God	can	be	the	cause	of	an	action	but	not	be	responsible	for	it	due	to	the	nature	of	evil	as	privation	(2011:63).		
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is	a	lack,	a	failing	and	thus	a	lack	of	power,	not	an	ability.	Because	sin	is	a	result	of	a	lack	of	power,	it	is	only	possible	to	attribute	to	humans,	not	to	God	(Turner	2011:64).		Thus,	“[t]o	sin…is	to	attempt	to	write	the	story	of	an	ontological	impossibility.	It	is	the	attempt	to	make	a	meaning	independently	of	God,	a	meaning	for	ourselves”	(Turner	2011:65).56	The	heart	of	human	folly,	in	Julian’s	thinking,	is	seeking	to	create	a	narrative	that	makes	sense	of	the	world	independent	of	God.	This	is	because	sin	“has	no	coherent	narrative.	Sin’s	stories	are	empty.	Necessarily	sin	is	failure.	Sin	has	failure	written	into	its	very	nature	as	sin”	(Turner	2011:65).		In	light	of	this,	we	must	“distinguish	two	narratives	of	sin…the	story	that	love	tells	of	sin,	and	the	story	that	sin	tells	of	itself.”	Each	story	attempts	to	tell	the	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	the	world,	but	each	does	so	in	a	vastly	different	way.	In	the	end,	only	the	story	that	love	tells	of	sin—the	Gospel—can	reconcile	the	narrative:	“They	cannot	both	be	true,	and	yet	both	have	real	force	and	agency	in	the	world	that	human	beings	inhabit”—thus	we	must	choose	to	live	in	the	light	of	the	narrative	that	gives	life	through	the	hope	of	the	reconciliation	of	all	things	(Turner	2011:205–6).		The	account	of	sin	given	by	Julian	can	provide	a	coherent	understanding	of	the	individual	nature	of	suffering	as	well	as	beneficial	insight	into	the	corporate	and	structural	nature	of	suffering.	Sin,	including	understandings	of	its	structural	nature	(McFadyen	2000),	as	opposed	to	just	evil	suffered,	is	a	helpful	category	for	discussing	non-personally	attributable	notions	of	sin	(Kilby	2014)	and	provides	a	coherent	and	systematic	historically-grounded	account	of	the	broadest	spectrum	of	human	ills.		What,	then,	in	Julian’s	narratival	logic,	is	the	solution	to	this	greatest	of	ills,	sin?	It	is	nothing	other	than	the	love	of	God	at	work	in	the	world.		
Julian’s	Solution:	God’s	Love	at	Work	Just	as	Julian’s	narratival	logic	understands	the	problem	of	human	suffering	differently	than	many	accounts,	so	too	Julian	proposes	a	distinctive	solution	to	this	problem.	As	
                                                56	Shortly	we	will	turn	to	the	way	in	which	Julian	sees	ultimate	meaning	being	made:	through	relational	dependence	upon	God.	
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already	discussed,	the	motivation	behind	her	solution,	the	driving	force	of	that	solution,	and	the	means	of	effecting	the	solution	are	one	and	the	same:	love.			
God’s	Love	God’s	love,	for	Julian,	is	not	an	impersonal	force	at	work	in	the	world,	but	an	immensely	intimate	expression	of	God’s	being.	She	describes	God	thusly,	I	saw	that	he	is	to	us	everything	that	is	good	and	comforting	for	our	help.	He	is	our	clothing	that	out	of	love	enwraps	and	enfolds	us,	embraces	us	and	wholly	encloses	us,	surrounding	us	for	tender	love,	so	that	he	can	never	leave	us	(LT,	V:45).		For	Julian,	the	love	of	God	is	fundamental	to	human	life	and	flourishing:	truly	“our	life	is	all	grounded	and	rooted	in	love,	and	without	love	we	cannot	live”	(LT,	XLIX:103).	The	centrality	of	love	to	Julian’s	thinking	is	displayed	in	the	fundamental	role	that	it	takes	in	
Revelations.			The	type	of	love	that	Julian	describes	can	be	seen	through	her	emphasis	on	a	particular	depiction	of	God:	God	as	Mother.57	Julian	believed	that	the	tender	love	of	God	is	reflected	through	motherhood	(LT,	XLVIII:103)	and	indeed	that	Christ	is	“our	true	mother”	(LT,	LVII:126)—the	“ground	of	motherhood”	(LT,	LIX:128).	This	is	not	to	the	exclusion	of	God’s	fatherhood,	for	“[a]s	truly	as	God	is	our	father,	so	truly	is	God	our	mother”	(LT,	LIX:128).	Yet	Julian	sees	a	description	of	Christ	as	our	mother	as	appropriate	because	he	is	closest	to	us,	safeguards	us,	suffered	to	bring	us	into	the	world,	feeds	us	with	himself,	and	chastises	us	to	train	us	in	righteousness	(LT,	LX:130-1).		God’s	love	for	humanity	is	so	great	that	“everything	seems	insignificant	to	him	in	comparison	with	his	love”	(LT,	XXII:69).	For	Julian,	the	fundamental	fact	of	the	love	of	God	changes	everything,	compelling	her	to	view	her	life,	the	world,	and	all	that	happens	in	it	through	the	lens	of	the	greatness	of	this	love	(ST:7).	This	is	love	that	is	expressed	
                                                57	This	means	of	description	is	not	unique	to	Julian.	Other	theologians	such	as	Augustine	(McGinn	1992:222),	and	Richard	Rolle	(Boenig	1984),	and	scripture	itself	(Deut.	32:18;	Ps	131)	describe	God	as	Mother	or	in	motherly	terms.	See	also	St	Anselm’s	‘Prayer	to	St.	Paul’	in	(Ward	1973:153–56).	Cf.	(Bradley	1978;	Dearborn	2002).	
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through	action,	not	content	to	maintain	disinterested	distance	with	a	sin-ravaged	world.	How,	then,	does	the	inexpressible	love	of	God	respond	to	the	brutal	reality	of	sin?	Julian	is	distinctly	interested	in	the	particularity	of	how	Love	works	out	a	solution	in	the	‘here	and	now’	of	human	lived	existence.	In	Julian’s	understanding,	the	solution	that	God	effects	through	love	has	already	been	inaugurated,	but	still	awaits	its	complete	fulfillment.			
Christ’s	Passion	Primarily,	Julian	understands	God	to	be	at	work	in	the	world	through	the	death	of	Jesus	Christ	on	the	Cross.	This	event	takes	a	primary	place	in	her	Revelations	as	it	is	central	in	Julian’s	understanding	of	the	solution	to	sin.		She	records	that	the	first	of	her	revelations	comes	as	she	is	looking	at	a	cross	while	lying	on	her	sickbed.	She	relates	that	“all	grew	dark	around	me…except	for	the	image	of	the	cross	in	which	I	saw	a	light	for	all	mankind…Everything	apart	from	the	cross	was	ugly	to	me…”	(LT,	III:43).	Turner	relates,		[Julian’s]	narrative	detail	contains	a	clear	general	lesson.	The	Cross	is	all.	The	Cross	is	not	only	what	she	sees	in	her	shewings.	The	cross	of	her	deathbed	is	the	condition	of	her	seeing	them.	The	Cross	explains	everything,	insofar	as	we	have	an	explanation	of	anything	(2011:208).		The	cross	of	Christ,	for	Julian,	makes	sense	of	the	world.58	This	is	not	simply	a	man	dying	at	the	hands	of	Roman	executioners,	but	love	personified	acting	to	right	the	ills	of	a	sin-sick	world.	Thus,	the	cross	becomes	not	just	the	expression	of	God’s	love,	but	the	lens	for	seeing	the	world.	Again,	Turner	writes,	[The	Cross]	is	the	embodiment	of	her	theological	epistemology	as	such;	for	Julian	theological	knowledge	itself	is	cruciform,	and	the	tensions	between	love	and	death	that	meet	in	the	Cross	are	exactly	replicated	in	the	conflicted	experience	of	her	evencristen	[Christian	brethren].	It	is	Julian’s	experience	as	a	whole—her	shewings,	the	Church’s	teaching,	and	her	own	human	perceptions	of	how	things	are—that	is	internally	conflicted	in	a	complex,	dialectical	way.	She	knows	by	faith	that	those	conflicts	can	be—indeed,	that	they	already	are—resolved:	“how	
                                                58	Frederick	Bauerschmidt	notes,	“Julian’s	entire	Revelation	is	a	reading	of	that	text	of	Christ’s	cross…”	(1999:61).	Further,	“Julian	chooses	Jesus	as	her	only	heaven	in	this	life,	and	does	not	offer	us	any	infinity	apart	from	that	which	is	imaged	in	the	infinite	suffering,	love,	and	bliss	of	the	cross”	(1999:63).	
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shoulde	any	thing	be	amisse”	she	exclaims.59	But	if	they	are	resolved	as	to	her	faith,	they	are	not	resolved,	they	are	not	performed,	she	says,	as	to	her	sight.60	Julian’s	theology,	then,	is	written,	thought,	lived,	as	by	one	suspended	in	that	epistemological	space	between	the	darkness	of	faith	and	the	light	of	seeing,	as	her	Christ	is	suspended	on	the	Cross	in	the	space	between	life	and	death,	in	faith	praying	to	his	Father	for	a	why	that	explains,	but	dying	without	an	answer.	The	Cross,	then,	is	Julian’s	topos:	but	the	topos	is	the	method,	and	the	method	is	the	topos	(2011:22).		The	Cross	can	make	intelligible	our	fractured	selves	and	unexpectedly	right	the	narrative	of	our	lives	by	beginning	to	make	sense	of	all	that	has	gone	before	and	all	that	will	follow	(Turner	2011:206).	This	‘sense,’	however,	is	only	partial	since	the	Cross	is	a	narrative	fragment—only	one	part	of	a	Story	that	is	as	of	yet	unfinished.	As	a	portion	of	that	narrative,	the	Cross	may	provide	comfort	through	more	clearly	delineating	the	trajectory	of	the	narrative	as	a	whole	and,	perhaps	more	importantly,	revealing	the	character	of	the	Narrator.	In	particular,	the	comfort	that	God	provided	to	Julian	was	twofold—both	based	upon	the	same	reality	of	the	Passion.	The	Cross	reveals	how	God	stooped	to	humankind	and	their	pain,	thereby	redeeming	it.61	Jesus	displays	love,	care,	and	concern	for	us	by	not	only	becoming	like	us	but	also	experiencing	our	pain.	Julian	suggests:	“Here	I	saw	a	great	affinity	between	Christ	and	us,	as	I	understand	it;	for	when	he	was	in	pain,	we	were	in	pain”	(LT,	XVIII:64).62	Thus,	in	some	measure,	the	Passion	of	Christ	may	be	a	comfort	in	distress	by	exhibiting	the	love	of	Jesus	who	suffered	with	humanity.		The	powerful	reality	of	Christ’s	love	displayed	through	the	Passion	also	shows	the	lengths	to	which	God	will	go	because	of	love	for	us.	Julian	writes	that		…our	Lord	Jesus…suffer[ed]	for	love	more	than	all	men	could	suffer.	I	do	not	mean	only	more	pain	than	all	men	could	suffer,	but	also	that	he	suffered	more	pain	than	could	be	expressed	or	fully	imagined	by	all	those	who	are	to	be	saved	who	ever	existed	from	the	very	beginning	until	the	last	day	(LT,	XX:66-7).		
                                                59	Citing	(LT,	XI:57).	60	Citing	(LT,	XXXIII:81-82).	61	Julian	writes,	“[Jesus]	wanted,	for	the	love	and	honour	of	man,	to	make	himself	as	like	man	in	this	mortal	life,	in	our	vileness	and	our	wretchedness,	as	a	man	without	sin	could	be”	(LT,	X:54).	62	Julian,	it	seems,	is	not	bothered	by,	or	perhaps	was	unaware	of	Church	teaching	on	the	impassability	of	God.	
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Despite	the	immensity	of	the	suffering	Christ	experienced	on	the	Cross,	Julian	relates	that	he	would	desire	to	suffer	even	more	for	love	of	her	if	it	were	possible:	“Then	Jesus,	our	kind	Lord,	said,	‘…It	is	a	joy,	a	bliss,	an	endless	delight	to	me	that	I	ever	suffered	my	Passion	for	you;	and	if	I	could	suffer	more,	I	would	suffer	more’”	(LT,	XXII:68).63	The	significance	of	what	she	writes	here	is	hard	to	overstate.	As	Julian	relates,	“love	was	his	meaning”	in	providing	the	revelations	to	her,	yet	the	words	of	Julian’s	written	testament	to	the	revelations,	in	the	end,	are	too	finite	to	relay	the	immensity	of	the	love	of	God.		Because	of	this	love	the	future	is	secure:	all	shall	be	well,	because	the	same	God	who	died	such	a	terrible	death	for	us	will	ensure	that	all	will	be	well,	even	though	how	this	will	be	is	currently	a	mystery	to	us.	For	Julian,	our	response	should	be	to	be	content	with	contemplation	of	Christ’s	passion	and	not	try	to	understand	the	mysteries	that	God	has	not	yet	shown	to	us.		In	Julian’s	narratival	logic,	the	Cross	of	Christ	begins	to	right	the	ills	of	sin	in	the	world,	yet	it	is	not	the	culmination	of	God’s	solution.	The	love	of	God	at	work	in	the	world	has	not	yet	set	all	things	right.	Julian	writes:	“So	was	our	Lord	Jesus	set	at	nought	for	us,	and	we	all	remain	in	this	way	as	if	set	at	nought	with	him,	and	shall	do	until	we	come	to	his	bliss”	(LT,	XVIII:65).	Though	the	resurrection	of	Christ	inaugurated	a	new	age	in	the	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	the	world,	the	full	resolution	awaits	a	final	Great	Deed	that	will	usher	in	the	beatific	vision.		
The	Great	Deed	Julian	relates	that	God	will	do	a	‘deed’	on	the	last	day	through	which	“he	will	make	all	things	well”	(LT,	XXXII:80).	The	exact	circumstances	of	this	deed	are	a	mystery,	but	not	the	certainty	of	its	occurrence:	“For	just	as	the	blessed	Trinity	made	all	things	from	nothing,	so	the	same	blessed	Trinity	will	make	all	well	that	is	not	well”	(LT,	XXXII:80).	More	specifically,	we	will	know	“why	he	allowed	sin	to	come	about”	(LT,	XXVII:75)	and	
                                                63	She	continues,	“For	if	he	said	that,	for	love	of	me,	he	would	make	new	heavens	and	a	new	earth,	that	would	only	be	small	in	comparison…But	to	die	for	love	of	me	so	often	that	the	number	passes	human	understanding,	that	is	the	noblest	offer	that	our	Lord	God	could	make	to	man’s	soul,	as	I	see	it”	(LT,	XXII:69).	
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At	this	time	we	shall	truly	see	the	cause	of	all	that	he	has	done;	and	for	ever	more	we	shall	see	the	cause	of	all	that	he	has	permitted…marvelling	at	the	greatness	of	God	the	maker,	and	at	the	littleness	of	all	that	is	made	(LT,	LXXV:152).		This	Great	Deed	will	make	all	things	right,	ensuring	that	‘all	shall	be	well’	because	of	it.	In	narrative	terms,	this	Deed	will	put	all	that	has	happened	in	the	world	in	its	proper	context.	Through	this	deed	it	will	be	shown	how	sin	is	‘behovely,’	or	fitting,	despite	humankind’s	current	understanding	of	this	as	not	being	the	case.			
Sin	as	‘Behovely’	Julian	herself	did	not	understand	why	the	all-loving	omnipotent	God	allowed	sin	in	the	world,	for	it	seemed	to	her	(as	she	states,	“in	my	folly”)	that	“all	would	have	been	well”	if	sin	had	been	prevented	(LT,	XXVII:74).	In	her	revelation	she	received	a	response:	“But	Jesus,	who	in	this	vision	informed	me	of	everything	needful	to	me,	answered	with	these	words	and	said,	‘Sin	is	befitting,	but	all	shall	be	well,	and	all	shall	be	well,	and	all	manner	of	things	shall	be	well’”	(LT,	XXVII:74).	Interestingly,	Julian	remarks	that	Jesus	“informed	me	of	everything	needful	to	me,”	perhaps	in	response	to	doubts	about	the	suitability	or	completeness	of	the	answer.	The	answer	she	receives	is	‘[s]in	is	befitting,’	or	in	Middle	English,	“Synne	is	behouely”	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978b:405).	The	import	of	this	answer	is	significant.	Turner	explains,	we	can	understand	much	of	the	logical,	epistemological,	and	theological	force	of	Julian’s	Middle	English	word	if	we	take	it	to	bear	the	meanings	of	the	Latin	word	
conveniens,	which	Julian	would	have	understood	had	she	been	literate	in	the	Latin	authorities	of	her	time.	In	short,	behovely	means	to	Julian	much	the	same	as	what	conveniens	means	to	theologians	of	the	high	medieval	schools.	When,	therefore,	Julian	says	that	‘sinne	is	behovely,’	what	she	means	is	that	sin	is	conveniens,	and	she	means	it	in	the	sense	that	Anselm,	Hugh	of	St.	Victor,	Thomas	Aquinas,	and	Bonaventure	would	have	understood	it,	which	is,	as	I	shall	explain,	roughly	this—that	it	‘fits,’	it	is	‘just	so,’	and	that	there	is	something	with	which	it	fits	(2011:37–38).64		
                                                64	Turner	continues,	“Since	the	time	of	Anselm	at	least,	the	much-debated	medieval	question	‘Cur	Deus	homo?’	(‘Why	did	God	become	man?’)	raised	another	meta-question,	‘Was	God’s	becoming	man—for	whatever	reason—necessary,	or	was	it	contingent?’	And	to	the	meta-question,	the	answer	was	seen	to	be	‘neither.’	It	was	conveniens	that	it	should	be	so.	The	Incarnation	was	neither	a	necessity	imposed	upon	God,	nor	just	a	divine	whim.	It	was	meet	and	just,	conveniens—or,	had	you	been	writing	in	Julian’s	Middle	English,	behovely”	(Turner	2011:40–41).	Cf.	Aquinas,	Summa	theologiae,	3a	q1	a1.	
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Turner	suggests	that	Julian’s	claim	that	human	existence	is	‘behovely’	is	rooted	“less	[in]	either	logic	or	natural	fact	than	[in]	matters	of	individual	identity	and	particular	story.	As	we	might	put	it,	they	are	narratival	necessities	and	contingencies”	(2011:41).	Thus,	the	solution	to	Julian’s	conundrum	regarding	sin	is	not	found	in	broad,	sweeping	generalities,	but	in	the	particularities	of	individual	lives.65	This	is	because	the	object	of	God’s	love,	and	therefore	the	story	of	God’s	love,	is	not	humanity	in	the	abstract,	but	individual	humans.	Each	human	being’s	existence	and	the	story	of	that	existence	is	“neither	necessary	nor	arbitrarily	contingent”	yet	gains	its	meaningfulness	from	the	fact	that	her	existence	is	‘behovely’	in	the	larger	narrative	of	God’s	loving	providence.	Thus,	“behovely	gets	its	meaning	only	from	within	a	narrative.	The	logic	of	the	behovely	is	narratival”	(Turner	2011:42–43).			This	narratival	logic	is	not	to	be	equated	with	scientific	certainty	or	argumentation	based	upon	analytic	logic.	Rather,	“[w]hat	generates	the	expectation	that	the	conveniens	meets	and	fulfils	is	a	particular	story,	the	exigencies	of	a	plot	that	just	happens	to	have	turned	out	in	this	way	or	that	thus	far	and,	so	far	as	it	has	got,	makes	sense	of	what	happens	next”	(Turner	2011:43–44).	Further,	explanations	built	upon	scientific	and	narratival	logic,	beyond	being	based	alternatively	in	universal	rules	and	the	particularity	of	time,	differ	in	their	power	of	prediction	(Turner	2011:44).	Science	aims	towards	understanding	of	natural	laws	with	a	view	towards	generating	predictive	power	in	the	natural	realm.	Narrative,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	create	such	certitude	since	one	does	not	know	how	events—past,	present,	or	future—may	fit	within	the	plot.66	Indeed,	in	most	narratives	“it	is	only	in	the	end	that	you	understand.	It	is	only	then…that	you	see	that	what	happened	was	not	at	all	as	you	thought	it	was	at	the	time,	but	that	how	what	happened	‘fits’”	(Turner	2011:45).		The	claim	that	existence	is	‘behovely’	rests	upon	the	logic	of	the	narrative	within	which	it	is	placed.	In	Julian’s	estimation,	the	only	narrative	that	makes	sense	of	the	world	as	it	
                                                65	In	this	regard,	Turner	notes	that	“narratives	are	always	particular,	individuated”	(2011:43).	66	Certainly,	some	narratives	are	so	straightforward	(such	as	in	a	badly	written	movie)	that	the	trajectory	of	the	plot	is	assumed.	Most	would	agree	that	such	simplified	narrative	logic	is	not	what	is	at	work	in	the	grand	narrative	of	the	world,	though	some	would	not	acknowledge	the	possibility	of	any	metanarrative	at	all.	
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is,	including	sin,	is	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	of	God’s	love.	Here	it	is	“Julian’s	case	for	her	substantive	claim	that	sin	is	behovely,	the	claim	that	the	narrative	within	which	sin	fits	is	a	good	one,	a	narrative	of	love	and	compassion	within	human	history”	(Turner	2011:52)	that	makes	all	the	difference.	Though	the	claim	may	be	made	that	the	grand	narrative	of	the	world	centers	upon	God’s	love,	this	does	not	necessarily	explain	how	sin,	in	particular	or	in	general,	is	behovely.	Turner	notes:	Even	if	you	have	reason	to	be	confident	that	a	particular	event	within	the	narrative	is	behovely,	you	may	not	be	able	to	see	how	it	is	so	until	the	end.	But	in	the	theological	case,	there	is	no	standpoint	at	the	end.	For	at	the	end	is	not	theology,	but	the	beatific	vision.	And	there	is	theology	only	because	we	are	not	at	the	end	(2011:46).		Julian’s	narratival	logic	suggests	that	the	question	of	the	problem	of	sin	will	not	be	answered	on	a	broad,	sweeping	scale,	but	in	the	particularities	of	each	person’s	life	story	as	it	is	understood	at	its	resolution.	This	is	why	Julian	does	not	definitively	answer	
how	all	shall	be	made	well,	only	that	fact	that	it	will.	The	specifics	of	how	this	shall	be	the	case	are	known	to	God.	All	shall	be	well,	but	this	will	be	a	relational,	I-Thou,	resolution.67	It	is	not	a	resolution	in	the	abstract	sense	of	a	blanket	pronouncement,	but	rather	God	individually,	relationally	making	well	the	good	and	ill,	love	and	sin	in	the	particularity	of	each	person’s	narrative.		This,	Karen	Kilby	suggests,	is	a	mystery	(2017).	She	argues	that	the	proper	mode	of	belief	in	this	eschatological	hope	is	an	attitude	of	paradoxically	humble	confidence.	This	means	holding	to	the	belief	that	all	will	be	made	well,	but	not	applying	it	to	particular	situations—holding	it	unresolved.	This	is	the	tension	found	both	in	Julian	and	in	the	‘already	but	not	yet’	Kingdom	of	God.	This	tension	must	be	synthesized	in	the	person	herself,	not	explained	away	in	general.	It	denotes	an	eschatological	apophaticism,	not	about	God,	but	about	our	suffering.	These	represent	two	mysteries,	the	mystery	of	God	and	the	mystery	of	suffering,	and	cannot	be	collapsed	into	one	(Kilby	2017).		The	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	the	world	will	ultimately	reveal	that	sin	is	behovely,	but	this	will	only	fully	be	comprehended	at	the	end	of	history.	In	the	meantime,	we	only	
                                                67	Here	Stump’s	description	of	2nd	person	relational	knowledge	is	helpful.	Cf.	(Stump	2012:77–80).	
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possess	a	fragment	of	the	narrative,	the	Passion	(Turner	2011:22).	As	such,	we	must	interpret	our	experiences	through	the	lens	of	the	Cross,	with	confident	hope	in	the	Person	who	bled	and	died	for	humanity	and	who	will	bring	the	story	to	its	proper	completion.	We	know	by	faith	“that	all	of	it	is	brought	about	by	a	God	who	in	doing	so	devises	a	‘plot’	whose	sole	meaning	is	‘love’”68	where	our	free	sinful	actions	are	overcome	by	this	love	and	where	these	actions	“bear	a	meaning	that	no	free	choice	of	ours	could	ever	give	them”	(Turner	2011:60).	For	Julian,	then,	human	action	has	meaning	beyond	the	intent	of	the	actor	because	these	actions	are	a	part	of	a	story	that	is	not	his	own	and	whose	ending	is	not	ultimately	in	human	control.69		Turner	summarizes,	[The]	mystery	of	the	Cross	is	all	Julian	is	ever	told	about	the	meaning	of	sin.	If	sin’s	being	behovely	is	made	sense	of	by	the	narrative	within	which	it	occurs,	and	if	the	only	narrative	we	are	given	within	which	the	existence	of	sin	makes	sense	is	the	Cross,	then	it	follows	that	in	one	sense	nothing	is	resolved:	for	the	Cross	is	on	the	one	hand	the	‘great	deed’	that	the	Trinity	does,	the	deed	that	finally	defeats	sin;	but	on	the	other	hand,	the	Cross	is	paradox—it	is	but	a	narrative	fragment.	That	narrative	fragment	contains	the	whole	meaning	of	the	Godhead,	the	whole	meaning	of	Creation,	the	whole	meaning	of	the	Fall	and	of	Redemption,	wrapped	up	in	a	single	paradoxical	historically	dated	event,	the	meaning	of	which	is	beyond	us…Then,	when	that	last	great	deed	is	‘performed,’	we	will	see—then	we	will	possess	vision.	For	now	we	may	live,	and	Julian	may	write,	only	a	text	that	‘is	not	yet	performed’:	we	may	live,	and	she	may	write,	only	as	Jesus	died,	without	a	why	(2011:26–27).70		In	Julian’s	thought,	humanity	has	hope	because	of	the	person	and	promise	of	God.	The	sure	outcome	is	not	simply	eternal	bliss	in	God’s	loving	presence,	which	perhaps	could	be	seen	merely	as	escapism,	but	also	that	all	that	has	happened	in	the	world	will	be	well.	The	narrative	that	she	tells—but	first	was	told	to	her	by	God—is	that	all	things,	sin	included,	are	fitting	and	‘behovely’	for	the	plot	that	God	is	orchestrating	throughout	all	of	human	history.	It	is	the	ultimate	plot	twist	by	the	omnipotent	playwright,	yet	Julian	is	not	shown	how	this	will	be,	only	that	it	will	be.		
                                                68	Cf.	(LT,	LXXXVI:164).	69	The	parallels	with	Ricoeur’s	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	human	text	and	action	being	primarily	externally	given	is	striking.	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1981c:100).	70	Cf.	(LT,	XXXVI:85-86).	
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If	it	is	the	case	that	‘all	shall	be	well,’	what	then	is	to	be	our	response	in	the	‘here	and	now’	of	human	lived	experience?	For	Julian,	two	particular	actions	are	appropriate	in	light	of	God’s	love	revealed	through	Christ’s	death	and	the	coming	Great	Deed:	re-envisioning	and	patience.		
Julian’s	Responses:	Re-envisioning	and	Patience	Julian’s	theology	does	not	seek	to	discount	or	discredit	the	awfulness	of	sin	and	evil	in	order	to	create	hope.71	Rather,	Julian	looks	this	full	in	the	face—taking	seriously	the	devastation	of	sin—yet	also	sees	the	awe-inspiring	truth	of	the	love	of	God	for	humanity	in	Christ.			Julian’s	theology,	then,	emphasizes	the	overwhelming	love	and	hope	found	in	God	while	not	diminishing	the	experience	of	evil.	In	her	context	there	was	no	need	to	reaffirm	the	reality	of	sin	and	suffering—this	was	the	everyday	reality	of	most	individuals.	What	Julian	had	to	offer,	then	was	a	voice	of	hope—of	God	with	us	in	the	midst	of	suffering,	that	‘all	shall	be	well’	despite	the	circumstances	they	experienced.72	She	believed	Christ	Himself	revealed	this	message	to	her,	but	that	it	was	a	message	addressed	to	all	Christians	(LT,	VIII:51).		In	response	to	the	current	human	situation	of	living	between	the	two	major	moments	of	God’s	action	in	the	world,	Julian	advocates	two	courses	of	action:	(1)	a	re-envisioning	of	the	world	and	(2)	an	attitude	and	corresponding	‘action’	of	patience.73	These	have	
                                                71	Turner	suggests,	“…she,	as	we	do,	acknowledges	that	‘ther	be	many	dedes	evil	done	in	oure	sight	and	so	gret	harmes	take	that	it	semeth	to	us	that	it	were	unpossible	that	ever	it	shuld	come	to	a	good	end.’	Nor	again	does	her	conviction	that,	in	the	outcome,	‘alle	shalle	be	wele’	reduce	in	any	measure	the	freedom	of	the	acts	with	which	we	resist	or	submit	to	evil	as	the	case	may	be”	(2011:60).	Cf.	(LT,	XXXII:80).	72	Aberth	contends	that,	for	Julian,	suffering	reminds	us,	through	reflection	on	Christ’s	suffering,	that	we	are	not	alone	in	our	suffering,	and	also	provides	“the	opportunity	for	personal	redemption”	through	the	love	of	God	(2000:176).	In	this	way,	Julian’s	response	is	to	turn	“suffering	into	a	message	of	hope,”	thereby	highlighting	“the	resilience	and	recovery	of	the	human	spirit”	(2000:177).	He	concludes:	“No	doubt	for	those	who	lived	through	the	horrible	year	of	1349,	and	other	plague	years	thereafter,	a	faith	that	‘alle	shalle	be	wele’	in	God’s	plan	for	the	world	gave	them	the	mental	and	physical	strength	to	carry	on	no	matter	how	much	pain	and	misery	the	Black	Death	wrought”	(2000:177).	73	These	responses	are	derivative,	in	part,	from	Julian’s	clearly	articulated	encouragements	toward	repentance	and	prayer.	Cf.	(Maynard	2006:154–55).	
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substantial	implications	for	understanding	resilience	and	correspond	to	the	two	themes	that	we	have	drawn	from	Ricoeur:	(1)	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	can	transform	vision	of	the	world	and	(2)	human	identity	is	constituted	in	relation	to	God.	I	will	trace	each	of	these	themes	further,	utilizing	the	narratival	logic	Julian	displays	in	Revelations.		
Re-envisioning	A	‘re-envisioning’74	of	the	world	is	necessary	because,	for	Julian,	sin	and	suffering	can	only	be	made	sense	of—be	seen	as	behovely—in	the	narrative	plot	of	the	Gospel—the	story	that	Love	tells	of	the	world.	This	re-envisioning	creates	hope	as	one	sees	the	events	of	one’s	life	through	the	lens	of	the	transformational	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	that	is,	through	the	God	who	is	Truth	(LT,	LXXXII:161).75	As	Jane	Maynard	suggests,	“loss	is	
transfigured	when	the	presence	of	God	is	revealed	within	it”	(2006:191).		For	Julian,	humans	need	to	‘re-see’	the	world	in	order	to	gain	a	‘heavenly’	perspective:	“And	in	spite	of	all	our	feelings,	our	sorrow	or	our	joy,	God	wants	us	to	understand	and	believe	that	we	are	more	truly	in	heaven	than	on	earth”	(LT,	LV:121).	Indeed,	God	“wants	us	to	hold	to	this	trustingly:	that	we	may	be	as	certain	in	our	hope	of	the	bliss	of	heaven	while	we	are	here,	as	we	shall	be	in	certitude	when	we	are	there”	(LT,	LXV:138).	God	desires	this	for	us	because	it	is	“of	the	greatest	advantage	to	us”	(LT,	LXVIII:142).	Though	we	receive	comfort	through	experience	of	transcendence	(LT,	LXIV:137),	the	truths	of	these	experiences	are	held	by	faith	and	may	be	subject	to	doubt.	Julian	writes,	“If,	on	account	of	our	weakness,	we	fall	back	again	into	our	depression	and	spiritual	blindness	and	feeling	of	spiritual	and	bodily	pains,	it	is	God’s	will	that	we	know	that	he	has	not	forgotten	us”	(LT,	LXIV:137).	Thus,	we	may	have	hope	despite	the	sin	and	weakness	that	causes	not	only	our	suffering	but	also	our	doubt	of	God’s	love.		The	ability	to	re-envision	one’s	perspective	is,	in	effect,	an	imaginative	transformation.76	The	Gospel	narrative’s	ability	to	transform	lived	experience	is,	in	essence,	“imagination	
                                                74	Drawing	upon	Ricoeur,	this	could	also	be	termed	‘narrative	re-emplotment.’	75	MacKinnon	posits	that	Julian	views	the	world	through	“a	new	dimension	of	temporality”	in	which	“[o]ne	is	tempted	to	say	that	she	wrote	as	if	the	future	had	already	happened”	(1978:138).	76	The	practice	of	imaginative	mediation	was	an	encouraged	part	of	the	contemplative	life	(Jantzen	1987:56–57).	Other	theologians	regard	the	imagination	as	locus	of	
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in	service	of	Christian	hope”	(Kilby	2017).	Thus,	Kilby	suggests	that	our	present	experience	of	the	grace	of	God	in	Christ	ought	to	orient	us	to	the	future	hope	we	are	assured	despite	present	struggles.	This	is	the	struggle	of	all	attempts	to	speak	of	God	and	his	works	in	the	world:	the	juxtaposition	of	confident	assertions	regarding	the	fragments	of	the	Divine	narrative	that	we	know,	on	the	one	hand,	and	humble	belief	about	what	we	do	not	know,	on	the	other.	Hence,		[f]or	Julian…the	business	of	theology	is	to	know	what	we	can	know	in	the	light	of	what	we	know	we	cannot	know,	and	to	do	what	we	can	do	without	fully	comprehending	its	meaning.	For	its	meaning	is	something	that	only	God,	and	not	ourselves,	can	give	it	(Turner	2011:67).		Human	meaningfulness,	ultimately,	then	must	be	bestowed	by	God.	As	much	as	it	is	possible	in	the	distention	of	current	human	experience,	it	is	accomplished	through	the	iconoclastic	vision	of	the	narrative	of	God’s	love.		
The	Transformational	Narrative	of	the	Gospel	If	Julian	suggests	a	reframing	of	our	understanding	is	needed,	what	is	the	content	of	this	new	vision?	I	suggest	that	the	narrative	of	God’s	love,	for	Julian,	affirms	that	God	creates,	sustains,	and	does	all	things	in	love	but	that	even	sin	is	‘behovely’	in	the	logic	of	this	narrative	because	‘all	shall	be	well.’77		Sin	would	seem	to	be	the	main	obstacle	to	a	positive	resolution	in	this	narrative.	For	some,	Julian’s	claim	that	sin	is	‘nothing’	would	appear	to	devalue	claims	of	substantive	experiences	of	evil.	To	be	clear,	what	she	argues	for	is	the	ontological	nonbeing	of	evil,	not	the	phenomenological	experience	of	evil	as	nothingness.	If	an	understanding	of	Julian’s	life	and	times	shows	us	nothing	else,	it	displays	that	Julian	was	no	stranger	to	suffering	and	the	very	real	effects	of	sin.	She	does	not	deny	or	dismiss	her	own	or	others’	suffering,	but	comes	to	see	them	in	a	different	light.	In	fact,	she	comes	to	see	all	of	the	world	as	nothing	in	comparison	with	the	love	of	Christ.78	Her	focus	is	turned	from	
                                                interaction	with	God.	Cf.	Garrett	Green	(1998:149)	and	Paul	Avis	(1999:3).	Anna	Minore	also	suggests	this	as	an	aspect	of	Julian’s	theology	(2014:68).	77	Anna	Minore	suggests	that	for	Julian	“one	should	strive	for	an	alignment	in	perception	between	oneself	and	the	peaceful	goodness	of	God.	This	alignment	will	result	in	less	pain”	(2014:60).	78	See,	for	instance,	Julian’s	vision	of	the	world	as	small	as	a	hazelnut,	but	sustained	by	God’s	love	(LT,	V:45-46).	
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her	own	experience	to	the	sufferings	of	Christ	and	his	love	displayed	through	them—a	change	in	perspective	with	very	real	effects.	This	perspectival	change	is	due	not	only	to	seeing	that	all	shall	be	made	well	by	the	love	of	God,	but	also	how	it	can	be	made	well:	by	Christ	joining	himself	to	the	sufferings	of	humanity.79		In	Julian’s	thought,	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	can	be	condensed	into	one	word:	love.	Moreover,	love	is	not	merely	the	content	of	the	narrative,	but	also	the	methodology	and	agency	of	the	telling	of	that	narrative.	Christ’s	suffering	brings	comfort,	in	part	because	the	suffering	of	Christ	puts	our	suffering	in	perspective.	Our	adversity	pales	in	comparison	to	God’s	love	in	that	sin,	and	its	derivative	suffering,	will	be	redeemed	by	God	(LT,	LXV:138-39).	In	fact,	the	Passion	of	Christ	as	told	in	the	Gospel	narrative	opens	up	the	possible	perspective	that	suffering	and	Divine	love	can	be	coterminous.			 	This	‘re-envisioning’	remains	paradoxical	because,	though	the	action	itself	can	create	beneficial	outcomes,	the	full	fruition	of	its	promise	is	hidden	until	the	Great	Deed.	Because	of	this,	we	need	patience	in	traversing	through	lived	human	experience.		
Patience	The	revelation	of	how	all	will	be	made	well	awaits	the	end;	thus,	patience	is	necessary.80	The	world	is	a	place	of	tension—an	abode	of	faith,	not	certainty,	but	nonetheless	filled	with	potentiality	that	is	recognized	by	faith	(Ricoeur	1952:243).81		The	need	for	patience	and	faith	is	clearly	displayed	in	Julian’s	own	experience	of	receiving	the	revelations.	She	relates	that,	following	the	initial	revelations,	her	bodily	sickness	and	sense	of	lack	of	spiritual	comfort	returned,	leaving	her	much	the	same	as	before	and	even	leading	to	her	denouncing	the	revelations	as	delirium	(LT,	LXX:140,	
                                                79	E.g.	“For	as	long	as	he	was	liable	to	suffer,	he	suffered	for	us	and	sorrowed	for	us;	and	now	he	is	risen	again	and	no	longer	liable	to	suffering,	he	still	suffers	with	us”	(LT,	XX:67).	80	There	are	significant	parallels	here	with	the	Christian	understanding	of	‘Holy	Saturday,’	the	day	between	Christ’s	crucifixion	and	Resurrection.	81	Julian	writes,	“We	are	to	rejoice	in	God	and	what	he	has	revealed	to	us	of	his	love,	not	worrying	about	those	things	he	has	chosen,	in	his	wisdom,	not	to	reveal	at	this	time”	(LT,	XXX:78-9).	
	 	 	
245	
145).	Yet	she	soon	realized	the	‘foolishness’	of	not	clinging	to	the	truths	of	her	revelations	and	lapsing	into	ingratitude	(LT,	LXVI:140).		Thus,	following	the	last	revelation,	she	relates,	“I	fixed	my	bodily	eyes	on	the	same	cross	which	had	comforted	me	before,	and	set	my	tongue	to	speaking	of	Christ’s	Passion	and	rehearsing	the	faith	of	Holy	Church,	and	set	my	heart	on	God	with	all	the	trust	and	strength	that	was	in	me”	(LT,	LXIX:144).	For	the	Cross	shows	the	way	of	patience	amidst	suffering	as	the	path	of	true	well-being	in	this	life:	And	our	Lord	very	humbly	revealed	what	is	most	helpful	for	this:	the	patience	that	he	had	in	his	cruel	Passion,	and	also	the	joy	and	the	delight	that	he	has	in	that	Passion	because	of	love.	And	this	was	shown	by	way	of	an	example	that	we	should	bear	our	sufferings	gladly	and	wisely,	for	that	is	greatly	pleasing	to	him	and	endless	benefit	to	us.	And	the	reason	why	we	are	troubled	by	them	is	because	of	our	failure	to	recognize	love	(LT,	LXXIII:149).		Significantly,	Julian	notes	that	a	lack	of	recognition	of	God’s	love	at	work	in	suffering	is	at	the	root	of	spiritual	difficulty.	Love	is	the	hermeneutical	key	to	suffering	wherein	a	re-envisioning	of	circumstances	in	light	of	love	can	bring	about	peace	and	patience.		Julian’s	disposition	of	patience	is	reflected	in	the	very	act	and	style	of	her	writing.	Near	the	end	of	the	Long	Text	she	writes,	“[t]his	book	was	begun	by	God’s	gift	and	his	grace,	but	it	is	not	yet	completed”	(LT,	LXXXVI:164).	Julian’s	theology	hovers	between	the	affirmation	of	known	theological	truths	and	apophaticism	regarding	the	incomprehensible	God.	Precisely	because	of	this	tension	she	places	herself	in	a	position	of	patient	waiting:		Julian…systematically	refuses	to	finish,	because	she	intends	theological	incompleteness.	And	she	intends	theological	incompleteness	on	grounds	that	are	themselves	theological…because	she	knows	that	what	alone	completes	the	theological	is	also	what	transcends	its	powers,	namely,	the	beatific	vision.	The	theologian,	in	short,	is	forced	to	raise	more	questions	than	she	can	answer,	for	the	questions	that	perforce	arise	within	the	limits	of	theology	of	necessity	can	be	answered	for	now	only	inaccessibly	beyond	it.	Of	theological	necessity,	then,	is	her	‘boke	not	yet	performed’	(Turner	2011:xii).		Thus,	“Julian’s	Revelation	does	not	finish	at	some	point	where	theology	is	supposed	to	end.	The	unending	begins	where	all	theology	starts:	with	the	divine	love.	That	is	mystery	enough	for	her,	and	it	is	the	whole	of	her	theology”	(Turner	2011:xii–xiii).	The	fulfillment	of	hope,	for	Julian,	lies	in	the	future,	in	the	Great	Deed	which	is	not	an	action	
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in	the	abstract,	but	fundamentally	a	revealing	of	God,	the	beatific	vision	itself.82	Human	identity	and	the	‘behovely’	nature	of	each	human	story	will	only	be	completely	known	when	God	is	fully	revealed.	Thus,	patience	awaits	a	more	complete	revelation	of	God.		
Human	Identity	Found	in	Relation	to	God	Patience	is	lived	out	in	the	relationally-defined	space	of	dependence	upon	God.	Relational	identity	is	not	received	in	the	abstract	or	passively	appropriated;	rather,	it	is	actively	received	through	relational	dependence	and	an	attitude	of	childlike	dependence	and	trust.	Thus,	Julian	does	not	advocate	patience	for	its	own	sake,	nor	does	she	put	her	hope	in	a	specific	outcome,	except	as	that	outcome	is	relationally-defined.	Instead,	her	hope	is	in	a	Person;	she	writes	of	God,	“you	are	my	heaven”	(LT,	XIX:65).		Julian’s	confidence	and	identity	were	founded	in	the	God	who	became	incarnate	in	Jesus	Christ,	not	in	an	abstraction	or	a	vague	hope	that	good	would	happen.	Thus,	hers	was	a	hope	in	a	Person,	not	a	hope	in	an	outcome.83	It	is	a	relational	hope,	a	second-person	experience	(Stump	2012:77)	grounded	in	the	character	and	nature	of	the	Person.	This	is	why	Julian	is	happy	to	leave	the	‘Great	Deed,’	whereby	all	things	will	be	made	well,	rather	vague	and	undefined—her	hope	is	not	in	the	details	of	the	outcome	itself	but	in	the	God	who	will	enact	that	outcome.	The	nature	of	God	determines	the	nature	of	the	outcome,	and,	for	Julian,	the	nature	of	God	already	had	been	made	immensely	clear	through	the	‘narrative	fragment’	of	the	Passion	of	Christ.84			
                                                82	See,	for	instance,	“Now	I	know	only	in	part;	then	I	will	know	fully,	even	as	I	have	been	fully	known”	(1	Cor.	13:12,	NRSV).	Cf.	(LT,	XLIII:96).	83	Nancy	Sherman	(2016)	maintains	that	a	significant	difference	exists	between	hope	in	an	outcome	and	hope	in	a	person.	84	Furthermore,	right	relationship	to	God	and	God’s	community	is	integral	to	seeing	the	world	correctly	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	The	importance	of	community	undergirds	Julian’s	theology.	She	writes,	“And	he	wants	us	to	hold	fast	to	the	faith	of	Holy	Church	and	find	there	our	dearest	mother	in	the	consolation	of	true	understanding,	along	with	all	the	blessed	communion	of	saints;	for	a	single	individual	may	often	feel	broken,	as	it	seems	to	him,	but	the	whole	body	of	Holy	Church	was	never	broken	nor	ever	shall	be,	without	end”	(LT,	LXI:133).	
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At	a	fundamental	level,	Julian	believes	that	we	will	never	be	fulfilled	or	at	rest	as	human	beings	until	we	surrender	to	God’s	love.85	This	view	sees	reliance	upon	human	strength	and	pride	as	keeping	us	from	true	rest,86	as	opposed	to	the	fullness	of	strength	found	in	God	(LT,	VI:47).	For	Julian,	God	meets	individuals	at	their	point	of	need,	sustains	life,	and	encourages	growth	through	his	goodness	(LT,	VI:47).	This	is	precisely	because	nothing	less	than	God	can	truly	fulfill	human	need.87	Conversely,	the	absence	of	God’s	presence	constitutes	suffering	in	and	of	itself.88		In	Julian’s	thought,	patience	can	only	be	rightly	borne	if	one	is	in	right	relation	to	the	God	who	satisfies	the	human	heart.89	This	is	in	keeping	with	Julian’s	theological	anthropology	and	epistemology	more	generally.	Julian	suggests	that	there	are	differing	kinds	of	knowledge	of	God	and	the	self,	all	of	which	are	relational	in	nature	and	require	relational	dependence:	It	is	for	us	to	have	three	kinds	of	knowledge:	the	first	is	to	know	our	Lord	God;	the	second	is	to	know	ourselves,	what	we	are	through	him	in	nature	and	grace;	the	third	is	humbly	to	know	ourselves	with	regard	to	our	sin	and	weakness.	And,	as	I	understand	it,	the	whole	revelation	was	made	for	these	three	(LT,	LXXII:148).		Knowledge	of	God	and	of	ourselves,	being	the	aim	of	Julian’s	revelation,	is	foundational	to	her	theology	and	rests	upon	a	proper	relationship	between	the	two	types	of	knowledge.90	Indeed,	the	contemplative	soul	“makes	itself	like	the	one	that	is	
                                                85	Julian	suggests,	“For	until	I	am	of	one	substance	with	him	I	can	never	have	complete	rest	nor	true	happiness…he	is	true	rest”	(LT,	V:45).	86	Similarly,	“When	a	soul	has	willingly	made	itself	as	nothing	for	love,	in	order	to	have	him	who	is	all,	then	he	is	able	to	receive	spiritual	rest”	(LT,	V:46).	87	Julian	writes,	“‘God,	of	your	goodness,	give	me	yourself;	for	you	are	enough	for	me,	and	I	cannot	ask	for	anything	less	that	would	fully	honour	you.	And	if	I	do	ask	for	anything	less,	I	shall	always	be	in	want,	but	in	you	alone	I	have	everything’”	(LT,	V:46).	88	She	relates,	“even	if	there	had	been	no	pain	in	this	life	except	the	absence	of	our	Lord,	it	seemed	to	me	sometimes	more	than	I	could	bear”	(LT,	LXIV:136).		89	The	love	of	God	is	able	to	create	a	unity	between	the	lover	and	the	beloved	(LT,	LXV:138-39).	Yet,	for	Julian,	sin	is	at	the	core	of	our	alienation	from	God.	Turner	writes	concerning	Julian:	“Sin	splits	our	sensual—that	is,	human,	time-bound—experience	away	from	the	place	within	us	where	that	continuity	with	God	remains	unbroken.	Sin	fractures	our	being	and	our	perception	into	discontinuity,	with	the	result	that	we	misperceive	both	God	and	ourselves	and	set	them—God	and	our	free	agency—disjunctively	in	opposition”	(2011:29).	90	Cf.	(Stump	2012:51–53,	77–81).	
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contemplated	and	unites	itself	in	rest	and	peace	through	his	grace”	(LT,	LXVIII:142-43).	Thus,	the	second-person	experience	of	‘I	and	Thou’	between	God	and	self	is	constitutive	of	the	identity	and	worldview	of	the	individual.	The	individual’s	appropriated	identity	in	relation	to	God	thereby	becomes	the	primary	means	of	understanding	the	self	and	the	world.	This	relationship	empowers	the	individual	through	a	new	relational	identity	as	the	beloved	of	God.			Suffering	has	a	unique	role	in	this	relationship	because	it	provides	the	opportunity	for	God	to	interact	with	humanity	in	an	intimate,	relational	second-person	manner	(Stump	2012:61).	Thus,	for	Stump,	suffering	is	not	about	soul-making	or	creating	virtue,	but	rather	about	relationship	with	God	(2012:256,	408).91	One	of	the	most	crucial	aspects	of	Julian’s	understanding	of	the	nature	of	God	in	Christ	is	that	God	is	not	far	off,	but	identifies	with	humans	in	their	suffering	and	is	personally	present	in	the	midst	of	the	experience	of	suffering.	It	is	in	suffering	that	one	is	put	in	a	position	to	surrender	one’s	will	to	the	Other	in	relational	dependence.	It	is	vulnerability	that	is	the	hallmark	of	love	and	the	antithesis	of	sin;	through	succumbing	to	a	vulnerable	death	on	the	Cross	love	triumphs	through	the	Resurrection	(Turner	2011:21).92		In	Julian’s	estimation,	one’s	relationship	with	God	is	one	of	dependence	on	the	part	of	the	human	person.	We	are	to	“behave	like	a	submissive	child”	running	to	our	mother	when	injured	or	distressed:	“he	wants	us	to	take	on	the	characteristics	of	a	child,	who	always	naturally	trusts	in	its	mother’s	love,	whether	in	joy	or	sorrow”	(LT,	LXI:133).93	Thus,	childlike	dependence	is	the	pinnacle	of	spiritual	maturity:	in	this	life	we	never	reach	any	higher	state	than	childhood,	in	our	weakness	and	deficiency	of	strength	and	understanding,	until	the	time	when	our	gracious	mother	has	brought	us	up	into	our	Father’s	bliss.	And	then	it	will	truly	be	made	known	to	us	what	he	means	in	those	sweet	words	where	he	says,	‘All	shall	be	well;	and	you	shall	see	for	yourself	that	all	manner	of	things	shall	be	well’	(LT,	LXIII:136).		
                                                91	This	is	where	Stump’s	reading	of	Aquinas	vastly	differs	from	Titus’.	92	Turner	calls	this	Julian’s	central	theological	insight.	93	This	emphasis	is	highlighted	even	more	in	the	Westminster	manuscript	(Larsen	2011:53).	
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This	type	of	trust	is	founded	upon	the	love	of	God	wherein	relational	identity	does	not	subsume	or	displace	the	individual’s	sense	of	self,	but	rather	the	individual	becomes	more	truly	herself	through	surrender	of	the	‘right’	to	self-determination	and	autonomy.94	This	dialectic	between	belonging	and	distanciation	lies	at	the	heart	of	both	knowledge	of	the	self	and	knowledge	of	the	world	(Ricoeur	1991b:266–67).	Further,	this	dialectic	is	primarily	worked	out	in	the	everyday	praxis	of	the	individual.		
Phronesis	Praxis	is	at	the	heart	of	Julian’s	theology.	In	fact,	Bauerschmidt	argues	that	Julian’s	
Revelation	is	only	coherent	when	seen	as	a	‘script’	that	is	performed	by	the	people	of	God,	individually	and	corporately	(1999:192).	This	is	because	the	love	of	God	that	is	at	the	heart	of	Julian’s	Revelation	is	not	merely	consolation	for	the	individual,	but	is	the	“social	bond”	that	grounds	the	life	of	the	community	of	God	(Bauerschmidt	1999:36).	We	see	in	Julian	similar	strands	of	thought	as	we	found	in	Ricoeur.	In	particular,	Julian	displays	the	importance	of	reinterpretation	of	lived	experience	as	a	means	of	creating	meaning,	detailing	how	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	creates	hope.	Likewise,	Julian’s	theological	anthropology	centers	around	the	self	being	known	only	through	relational	dependence	upon	God.	The	childlike	trust	indicative	of	this	relationship	is	integral	to	the	patience	required	for	living	in	a	world	that	awaits	the	Great	Deed	that	will	complete	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	Keeping	in	mind	phronesis	as	a	unifying	principle,	we	see	that	these	insights	have	very	practical	import	for	resilience.	Yet	the	very	real	effects	of	appropriating	Julian’s	worldview	are	perhaps	more	difficult	to	measure	directly,	both	in	Julian’s	own	life	and	in	the	lives	of	her	readers.95		We	have	very	few	descriptions	of	Julian	herself	(aside	from	Margery	Kempe’s	brief	encounter),	so	it	is	challenging	to	assess,	apart	from	her	own	testimony,	how	Julian’s	experience	of	God’s	love	impacted	her	life.	Her	own	reflections,	found	especially	in	the	Long	Text,	suggest	an	attitude	of	hope.	Margery	Kempe’s	description	of	Julian—as	well	as	the	later	addenda	provided	by	the	editor	of	Julian’s	manuscript	and	the	several	
                                                94	Cf.	(Ricoeur	1996).	95	Julian’s	theology	has	been	used	as	a	system	of	transcendent	meaning	for	ministry	to	AIDS	survivors	(Maynard	2006)	but	has	not	been	evaluated	for	effectiveness	in	clinical	settings.	
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patrons	who	remembered	Julian	in	their	wills—suggest	a	wise	and	spiritually	mature	woman	who	was	looked	up	to	by	those	in	the	community	and	was	sought	out	by	those	from	far	outside	of	her	locale.		In	Julian	we	find	a	strong	emphasis	on	maintaining	the	unity	of	head	and	heart	in	the	everyday	practice	of	prayer	and	worship	that	characterized	English	Christianity	more	generally	(Thornton	1963:49).	This	suggests	that	the	scope	of	Revelations	is	not	merely	for	an	intellectual	answer	to	theodical	questions	but	rather	for	the	practical	import	of	how	the	love	of	God,	so	construed,	makes	a	difference	in	the	daily	lived	experience	of	the	reader.96	Catherine	Garrett	(2001)	suggests	that	Julian	may	serve	as	an	example	of	the	way	in	which	mystical	experience	can	bring	healing	to	experiences	of	suffering	that	are	beyond	the	reach	of	the	social	sciences.		The	significance	of	Julian’s	theology,	then,	is	to	suggest	a	way	for	hope	amidst	great	evil	because	of	the	love	of	God	displayed	through	Christ.	The	narrative	of	the	Gospel—displayed	for	Julian	through	word,	vision,	and	spiritual	sense	and	worked	out	through	theological	reflection—forms	an	identity	in	relation	to	God	as	one	who	is	the	Beloved	of	God.	This	identity	expresses	itself	through	a	re-interpreted	perspective	of	hope	and	an	attitude	of	dependence	upon	the	God	from	whom	one	derives	one’s	very	existence.		While	sin	is	the	focus	of	Julian’s	theodicy,	her	solutions	to	the	problems	afforded	by	the	presence	of	sin	in	the	world	may	analogously	be	applied	to	situations	that	are	themselves	derivative	of	sin.	In	this	regard,	Julian’s	approach	to	sin	and	her	affirmation	that	sin	is	‘behovely’	are	significant	for	resilience.	Here	is	a	‘normalization’	of	the	experience	of	suffering	and	difficulty	in	this	world,	but,	at	the	same	time,	an	assertion	that	this	experience	is	‘behovely’	in	the	grand	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	the	world.	Hearkening	back	to	Rutter’s	‘steeling	effects’	of	adversity	(Rutter	1999),	this	is	a	declaration	that	it	is	fitting,	and	even	beneficial	in	some	way,	for	sin	and	its	concomitant	suffering	to	be	present	in	this	world.	Titus	(2006)	suggests	as	much	in	detailing	how	Aquinas’	virtue	of	fortitude	may	relate	to	resilience.	Julian’s	theology	is	significant	for	understanding	resilience,	not	because	she	provides	a	final	answer	regarding	how	the	
                                                96	This,	by	Julian’s	own	account	as	well.	Cf.	(LT,	IX:51).	
	 	 	
251	
current	corrupt	world	can	exist	in	conjunction	with	a	God	who	is	infinitely	loving	and	powerful,	but	rather	because	she	holds	in	tension	an	affirmation	of	God’s	loving	involvement	in	the	world	with	an	acknowledgment	of	the	unknowability	of	how	this	may	be.	In	fact,	this	paradoxical	embracing	of	aporia	is	itself	a	clear	demonstration	of	the	heart	of	Christian	resilient	adaptation—faith	without	sight;	hope	without	certainty.	In	this	way,	emphasis	is	laid	upon	the	personal	relational	trust	inherent	in	the	dependence	upon	God	that	undergirds	Christian	resilience	rather	than	upon	a	coherent	rational	explanation	for	events	that	happen	in	the	world,	which	may	or	may	not	always	be	possible	or	beneficial.	Julian,	then,	can	serve	as	a	model	for	resilient	adaptation,	not	only	through	the	content	of	her	theological	insight,	but	also	through	her	method	of	doing	theology.			
Cautions	Some	would	protest	against	drawing	any	conclusions	that	are	applicable	to	the	modern	world	from	a	woman	who	lived	in	such	a	different	context—especially	a	woman	who	claims	to	have	experienced	visions	from	God.	It	is	sensible	to	have	a	degree	of	skepticism	regarding	the	applicability	of	Julian’s	vision	of	the	world	for	today.	Several	points	lead	me	to	the	conclusion	that	such	application	is	possible,	however.			As	we	have	seen,	Julian’s	Revelation	was	written	for	the	audience	of	the	“evynn	cristene”	(Colledge	and	Walsh	1978a:219)—as	if	the	revelations	were	given	to	each	one	(ST:9)—and	so	has	such	application	implicit	within	it.	Beyond	this,	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	paves	the	way	to	suggest	that,	authorial	intention	aside,	the	text	as	it	is	for	the	reader	can	convey	a	surplus	of	meaning	and	possibility	through	the	revelatory	power	of	language.	Thus,	a	document	that	claims	to	be	an	account	of	God’s	revelations	of	love	to	a	woman	named	Julian,	as	such	can	exert	influence	upon	modern	readers	on	the	basis	of	the	externality	of	the	text	and	the	narrative	it	relates.			Further,	some	might	argue	that	Julian	does	not	give	adequate	attention	to—perhaps	even	glosses	over—the	reality	of	suffering	and	evil	in	the	world.	How	does	one	deal	with	what	Marilyn	McChord	Adams	(1999)	calls	‘horrendous	evils’?		To	some	extent,	Julian’s	attitude	may	be	a	reflection	of	the	time	in	which	she	lived.	The	stark	realities	of	suffering	and	deprivation	were	the	norm	rather	than	the	exception.	War,	sickness,	
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famine,	plague,	and	strife	were	present	everyday	realities	that	intimately	affected	the	lives	of	those	in	14th	century	England.	These	were	not	only	assumed	by	Julian	and	her	audience,	they	were	daily	lived	actualities.	In	the	midst	of	this	Julian	sought	to	provide	a	voice	of	hope	based	in	her	experience	of	the	love	of	God.	This	is	a	tension	in	Julian,	to	be	sure,	but	also	a	tension	in	our	lived	experience.	Significantly,	Julian	does	not	sweep	the	horrendous	nature	of	evil	‘under	a	rug’;	instead	she	looks	it	full	in	the	face	and	believes	despite	it	all,	that	it	will	be	made	well.	She	does	not	attempt	a	wholesale	answer	for	how	this	will	be	the	case,	but	preserves	the	mysterious	dichotomy	of	both	the	general	assertion	that	all	will	be	made	well	and	the	aporia	of	how	this	will	be.	It	seems	that	we	would	do	well	to	maintain	a	similar	agnosticism	in	the	face	of	evil—both	affirming	that	it	does	not	have	the	final	word	and	that	we	do	not	as	yet	know	how	this	will	be.	This	affirms	both	the	horrendous	nature	of	particular	experiences	of	suffering	and	the	hope	that	these	will	somehow	be	redeemed	in	the	narrative	of	God’s	love.		
Conclusion	While	Julian	has	been	used	as	an	example	of	positive	psychology’s	emphasis	on	flourishing	and	well-being	(Scheib	2015),	such	a	conclusion	may	be	short-sighted.	The	emphasis	upon	flourishing	as	a	result	of	God’s	superabundant	love	is	well	deserved,	but	a	lack	of	acknowledgement	that,	for	Julian	as	well	as	for	us,	this	well-being	may	be	coterminous	with	very	real	experiences	of	suffering	renders	the	final	conclusion	a	bit	vacuous.	Others,	such	as	Molly	Field	James	(2013),	have	used	Julian	productively	to	understand	suffering	through	the	lens	of	Christian	theology,	suggesting	a	pastorally-sensitive	“nuanced	acceptance”	of	suffering	(2013:192)	that	joyfully	meets	the	challenge	of	adversity	through	faith	while	still	resisting	sin	and	the	structures	that	support	it.97	Similarly,	Jane	Maynard	(2006)	suggests	Julian’s	Revelations	as	a	model	of	healing	from	trauma	through	transcendent	experience.		While	one	could	argue	that	Julian's	assessment	of	how	‘all	shall	be	well’	is	trite,	unrealistic,	and	utopian,	it	would	be	incoherent	to	argue	that	she	was	out	of	touch	with	the	reality	of	suffering.	Given	what	we	know	of	Julian's	life	and	circumstances,	suffering	
                                                97	Similarly,	Gatta	(1981)	proposes	that	Julian’s	theology,	especially	her	approach	to	sin,	arises	out	of	her	experience	as	a	spiritual	director	and	is	aimed	primarily	toward	pastoral	concerns.	
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was	the	rule	rather	than	the	exception.	She	wrote	as	a	disempowered	woman	rather	than	from	an	ivory	tower	of	privilege,	yet	she	wrote	as	one	who	claimed	to	have	had	her	life	transformed	by	the	love	of	God.	Through	the	new	relational	identity	she	assumed,	this	experience	empowered	her	to	write	and	share	the	love	she	had	come	to	know.	One	should	at	least	be	prepared	to	entertain	the	possibility	of	the	depth	of	love	that	Julian	claimed	to	know	in	Christ.	While	not	plausible	in	one	sense,	perhaps	it	is	just	such	an	absurd	and	recklessly	over-the-top	love	that	must	counteract	the	absurdity	and	nonsensical	nature	of	much	of	the	evil	experienced	in	this	world	and	the	incoherent	‘nothingness’	of	the	sin	that	causes	it.	Julian	suggests	that	God’s	love	can	provide	purpose,	joy,	fulfilment,	peace,	and	wholeness.	It	may	not	be	too	far	astray	to	claim	that	resilience	could	be	a	possible	outcome	of	this	new	way	of	being-in-the-world.	Turner	concludes,	This	woman—Julian—got	more	than	she	bargained	for,	as	those	commonly	do	who	unwittingly	pray	for	what	is	beyond	their	powers	of	coping.	Perhaps	when	Julian	prayed	for	“mind	of	the	passion”	she	thought	her	request	to	embody	no	more	than	the	desire	for	an	increase	in	that	devotional	empathy	with	the	suffering	Christ	that	was	so	much	the	goal	of	late	medieval	meditation	practice.	But	what	she	got	in	answer	to	her	prayer	was	more	a	theological	predicament	than	a	mere	intensification	of	devotion.	For	in	these	visions	was	contained	nothing	but	paradox,	a	cacophonous	discordance,	that	both	demanded	and	resisted	harmonic	resolution.	For	Julian	saw	therein	at	once	a	revelation	of	an	omnipotent	and	utterly	reckless	love	and	its	apparent	defeat	by	sin.	In	Christ	on	the	Cross	she	saw	hope,	rational	and	theological,	apparently	in	ruins.	On	the	one	hand,	then,	the	Cross	is	her	predicament.	On	the	other,	she	is	told	that	all	the	answer	to	her	predicament,	the	only	one	she	is	to	be	given,	is	contained	in	that	same	bodily	sight—the	solution	is	in	the	problem.	There	are	no	further	resources	for	an	explanation,	there	is	no	place	else	to	go	other	than	where	the	problem	is,	in	the	Cross	of	Christ	(2011:xiii).		Julian’s	hope	is	that	the	story,	as	God	is	telling	it,	will	be	better	as	a	result	of	the	twists	and	turns	inserted	by	sin	than	if	it	had	not	included	them.98	Julian	believes	that,	in	the	end,	the	love	of	God	will	triumph	over	all	and	right	all	wrongs.	In	the	‘here	and	now,’	however,	we	continue	to	journey	in	hope—resiliently,	you	might	say—toward	the	completion	of	the	story.	Julian	nonetheless	had	to	bring	her	book	to	completion	in	the	midst	of	her	journey	of	life.	She	encouraged	her	fellow	travelers	by	giving	attention	to	
                                                98	Julian	suggests:	“And	this	blessedness	is	ours	through	mercy	and	grace—a	kind	of	blessedness	we	might	never	have	had	nor	known	if	that	quality	of	goodness	which	is	in	God	had	not	been	opposed,	for	through	that	we	have	this	blessedness”	(LT,	LIX:128).	
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the	manner	of	our	travel	through	this	distended	world:	“Thus	ends	the	revelation	of	love	of	the	blessed	Trinity	shown	by	our	Saviour,	Christ	Jesu,	for	our	endless	comfort	and	delight,	and	also	for	us	to	rejoice	in	him	in	the	transitory	journey	of	this	life”	(LT,	LXXXVI:165).	Such	journeying	is	possible	because	“He…turns	everything	to	his	glory	and	to	our	joy	without	end”	(LT,	LXII:134).		And	so,	despite	what	may	look	like	terribly	dire	circumstances,	“this	is	what	he	intends:	he	does	not	want	us	to	be	too	cast	down	on	account	of	the	sorrows	and	upheavals	that	befall	us;	for	it	has	always	been	so	before	the	coming	of	a	miracle”	(LT,	XXXVI:86).	The	‘coming	of	a	miracle’	belies	Julian’s	hope	in	the	Author	of	the	narrative	of	love,	who	will	ensure	that	‘all	shall	be	well’	despite	all	appearances	to	the	contrary.	It	is	to	this	end	that	God	encourages	her	in	the	final	words	of	her	revelation:		And	these	words,	‘You	shall	not	be	overcome’,	were	said	very	distinctly	and	very	powerfully	for	assurance	and	comfort	against	all	the	tribulations	that	may	come.	He	did	not	say,	‘You	shall	not	be	perturbed,	you	shall	not	be	troubled,	you	shall	not	be	distressed’,	but	he	said,	‘You	shall	not	be	overcome.’	God	wants	us	to	pay	attention	to	these	words	and	always	to	be	trusting	strongly	and	surely	in	good	times	and	bad;	for	he	loves	us	and	is	pleased	with	us,	and	so	he	wishes	us	to	love	him,	and	be	pleased	with	him,	and	strongly	trust	in	him;	and	all	shall	be	well.	And	soon	afterwards	everything	was	at	a	close,	and	I	saw	no	more”	(LT,	LXVIII:143).		Julian	of	Norwich’s	Revelations	of	Divine	Love	provides	a	prism	through	which	the	many-hued	possibilities	of	Ricoeur’s	conception	of	the	power	of	narrative	and	the	reflexive	self	can	be	displayed	concretely	and	further	explicated.	For	Julian,	this	power	is	displayed	through	the	narrative	of	God’s	love.	The	historical	nature	of	this	text	lends	itself	to	reflection	upon	the	contextual	influences	implicated	in	writing	the	it.	Yet	the	text’s	concreteness	allows	the	insights	contained	to	move	beyond	the	bounds	of	time	to	provide	insights	to	the	reader	in	the	present.	The	hope	that	Julian	was	given	through	God’s	love	can	thus	become	our	hope.	The	horizon	of	her	text	can	become	the	horizon	of	our	lives,	with	the	subsequent	disclosure	and	creation	of	meaning	for	the	reader	today.		As	Julian’s	revelations	enabled	a	‘re-envisioning’	of	her	existence	in	light	of	the	Gospel,	so	too	may	our	human	existence	take	on	new	meaning	in	relation	to	the	God	of	whose	love	Julian	testifies.	The	story	she	tells	is	not	a	different	narrative	than	the	Gospel,	but	a	
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‘renewed’	Gospel	narrative,	made	particular	to	her	and	her	circumstances,	though	enacted	with	‘world-projecting	power’	for	her	readers.		I	will	now	further	assess	implications	of	a	theological	understanding	of	human	resilience	to	adversity	through	constructively	drawing	together	the	various	strands	of	thought	explored	thus	far.		 	
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Chapter	6:	Implications	for	Resilience	
	
“One	morning	I	woke	up	and	didn’t	feel	angry	anymore…I	no	longer	blamed	God.	The	
outward	circumstances	in	my	life	hadn’t	changed…But	those	things	no	longer	seemed	so	
important.	What	was	important	was	my	relationship	with	God…By	now,	I	had	seen	God’s	
miracles	so	often	in	our	lives…that	I	was	growing	accustomed	to	putting	things	before	him	
with	a	sense	of	expectancy,	just	as	I	had	as	a	child	in	Saigon.	Day	by	day,	I…opened	myself	
up	‘as	a	child’	to	the	exhilarating	mysteries	of	faith”	(Sawyer	and	Proctor	2003:245–47,	
256).			I	began	this	project	by	contemplating	the	majestic	redwood	trees	of	California.	How	did	these	trees	survive	through	millennia?	Several	arguments	are	possible.	Certainly,	their	environment	is	conducive	to	their	massive	growth.	The	genetics	that	predispose	these	trees	to	grow	for	so	long	also	are	significant.	Similar	argument	could	be	made	for	human	resilience.		Many	factors	could	be	explanatory	for	the	fact	of	human	resilience	displayed	by	countless	individuals	each	day	(Windle	2011:153).	In	our	journey	thus	far,	we	have	assessed	resilience	through	a	variety	of	disciplinary	and	methodological	means.	This	has	included	perspectives	from	the	sciences—including	psychodynamic,	genetic,	and	sociological	insights—as	well	as	from	the	humanities—most	notably	from	philosophy	and	theology.	Such	multi-disciplinary	engagement	is	necessary	to	apprehend	the	complexity	of	human	resilience.	Our	study	has	focused	on	the	meaning	and	connection	furnished	by	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	that	support	resilient	adaptation.	We	gained	recognition	of	this	possibility	through	reflection	upon	the	philosophy	of	Paul	Ricoeur	as	a	framework	for	a	renewed	understanding	of	resilience.	This	study	thus	provides	a	unique	contribution	to	understanding	resilience	through	assessing	the	construct	from	a	narrative	theological	basis.1	While	not	downplaying	scientific	accounts	of	human	resilience,	I	sought	to	clarify	and	deepen	these	through	engagement	with	theological	
                                                1	By	focusing	upon	this	particular	approach,	I	have	necessarily	limited	the	scope	of	my	assessment	of	resilience.	I	do	not	believe	that	a	narrative	approach	is	fully	explanatory	or	without	difficulties.	I	have	not,	for	instance,	been	able	to	explore	fully	what	it	means	to	flourish	as	a	human	being,	something	Titus	addresses	at	length	(2006:98).	Thus,	many	other	profitable	avenues	are	available	to	assess	human	resilience,	such	as	utilizing	virtue	theory	(Titus	2006)	and	Stoic	philosophy	(Greitens	2015).	These	may	be	seen	as	complementary	rather	than	in	opposition	to	this	project.	
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sources	that	question	some	assumptions	underlying	resilience.	Now,	the	implications	of	this	suggestion	must	be	further	explored.		
Drawing	Together	Strands	Some	researchers	describe	resilience	purely	in	terms	of	science:	genetics	and	environment.	While	the	relationship	of	human	biology	(including	genetics)	to	human	resilience	is	becoming	clearer,	more	than	the	empiricism	of	science	is	needed	to	assess	resilience.	I	contend,	as	much	research	suggests,	that	religion	can	exert	a	substantial	impact	upon	resilience	outcomes.		For	the	Christian,	resilience	gains	a	new	telos	that	puts	the	construct	in	a	new	light.	Rather	than	being	primarily	concerned	with	biological	survival,	the	Christian	views	resilience	through	the	lens	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	in	which	Jesus	overcomes	death	by	going	through	it	rather	than	attempting	to	escape	it.	By	participating	in	the	death	of	Christ	through	faith,	the	believer	is	united	with	Christ	in	his	resurrection.	This	radically	alters	the	Christian’s	vision	of	the	world,	through	no	longer	seeing	death—the	ultimate	expression	of	suffering	and	evil—as	having	the	final	word,	but	rather	by	having	hope	that	the	God	who	raised	Jesus	from	the	dead	will	also	make	well	all	other	expressions	of	sin.	Julian	of	Norwich	attempted	to	portray,	to	the	best	of	her	ability,	the	unmeasurable	‘surplus	of	meaning’	she	found	in	the	Gospel	of	God’s	love,	the	fullness	of	which	will	only	be	known	in	the	future.	The	patience	required	in	the	‘in-between’	time	is	one	of	the	hallmarks	of	resilience	that,	paradoxically,	is	strengthened	through	an	acceptance	of	the	finite	and	broken	nature	of	human	lived	experience.	Resilience	in	the	midst	of	distended	human	experience	is	reinforced	through	the	meaning	and	relational	connection	afforded	by	the	love	of	God	and	received	through	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	This	argument	has	been	strengthened	through	attention	to	insights	from	a	variety	of	disciplines	and	methodological	approaches,	each	considered	on	their	own	terms.	Now	we	focus	on	the	two	major	themes	that	we	have	traced	through	this	project.		
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Constructs	Supporting	Resilient	Adaptation	While	researchers	have	identified	numerous	factors	potentially	significant	for	resilient	adaptation	(Mancini	and	Bonanno	2009:1819),	I	chose	to	focus	on	a	limited	number	of	constructs	in	order	to	develop	greater	understanding	of	the	theological	underpinnings	of	resilience.2	In	addition	to	addressing	the	philosophical	grounding	of	conceptions	of	resilience	more	generally,	I	concentrated	upon	particular	narrative	theological	understandings	of	relational	connection	and	meaning.3		
Connection	Research	suggests	that	resilient	adaptation	may	be	supported	through	relational	connection.	This	is	true	for	interpersonal	relationships	inasmuch	as	it	is	for	relationship	with	the	Transcendent.	Further,	through	Ricoeur’s	philosophical	anthropology,	the	importance	of	relationality	for	the	constitution	of	the	self	has	become	evident.	Individuals	need	others,	then,	for	their	very	being.4		Relational	connection	is	fundamentally	of	a	personal	nature	and	is	reliant	upon	the	supremacy	of	love.	The	personal	nature	of	this	interaction	is	significant	for	resilience.	As	Eleonore	Stump	notes,	“suffering	can	be	redeemed	for	the	sufferer	in	personal	relationship…heartbreak	can	be	woven	into	joy	through	the	reciprocity	of	love”	(2012:xix).	Connection	enables	an	individual	to	live	within	the	tension	of	a	distended	world	because	that	world	has	become	a	place	of	intimate	union	despite,	or	perhaps	even	through,	the	experience	of	adversity.5		Resilience	ultimately	fails	if	it	is	focused	solely	on	the	individual—it	must	be	Other	and	God-centric.	A	lack	of	resilience,	in	some	sense,	could	be	understood	as	connected	to	the	
                                                2	There	are	many	other	constructs	and	emphases	that	I	could	have	highlighted;	these	represent	what	I	believe	are	the	most	pertinent.	Pargament	and	Cummings	(2010)	also	suggest	the	significance	of	meaning,	relational	connection,	and	cognitive	reframing	for	resilience.	3	These	areas	of	focus	correspond	to	the	emphasis	given	to	“appraisal	processes”	and	“social	resources”	in	Anthony	Mancini	and	George	Bonanno’s	person-centric	model	of	resilience	(2009:1805).	4	See	(White	Forthcoming)	for	further	discussion	of	this	point.	5	McGilchrist	suggests	that	we	need	relationship	as	much	as	we	need	purpose	(in	relation	to	our	ultimate	telos)	(2010:174).	
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preoccupation	with	self	in	modern	Western	culture.	There	is	a	distinct	lack	of	wonder,	sense	of	awe,	and	otherness.6	Part	of	modernity	is	an	inherent	self-referentialism	(Song	2007:403–4)	that	is	founded	upon	the	cultural	shift	during	the	Enlightenment	away	from	corporate	identity	to	an	individual	focus	(Heitink	1999:29).	Robert	Song	suggests	that	this	narcissism	may	be	because	of	disconnect	from	Transcendent	(2007:405).7	This	disconnect	has	significant	implications	for	the	ability	of	individuals	to	face	adversity.	Song	notes:	“The	early	utilitarians	in	the	eighteenth	century…bequeath[ed]	to	modern	culture	the	ideal	of	the	relief	of	suffering,	while	the	deist	expulsion	of	God	from	the	inner	workings	of	the	universe	removed	any	point	in	interpreting	suffering	in	terms	of	divine	providence”	(2007:408).	The	Modern	individual,	then,	could	be	said	to	desire	relief	from	suffering,	but	through	isolation	is	without	the	connection,	to	God	and	others,	that	might	aid	in	resilience.	This	is	the	paradox	of	resilience:	a	focus	upon	decreasing	suffering	and	adversity	in	Western	culture	may	be	having	the	opposite	effect.	In	fact,	at	the	heart	of	this	understanding	is	an	assumption	that	an	easy,	flourishing	and	fulfilled	life	is	regarded	as	normal	human	experience.	This	has	significant—I	argue,	degrading—implications	for	the	promotion	of	resilience.	Individuals	in	modern	society	want	to	do	away	with	struggle;	we	want	life	fast	and	easy.	Yet,	in	an	effort	to	avoid	suffering,	while	at	the	same	time	seeking	self-actualization,	we	are	cutting	at	the	root	of	human	flourishing.		Against	this,	the	Christian	views	the	world	as	in	the	grip	of	sin	and	human	lived	experience	in	the	world	as	a	struggle	which	one	day	will	end	through	God’s	redemption	of	the	world.8	Thus,	Christianity	provides	a	counter-narrative	to	the	Modern	understanding	of	the	world	as	revolving	around	the	self.	In	particular,	a	narrative	of	social	identity	provides	a	counter-narrative	in	which	the	individual	is	known	and	
                                                6	See	(Song	2007).		7	Song	qualifies	this	assessment,	however:	“In	recognizing	that	much	of	modern	self-identity	is	an	entirely	understandable	reaction	to	finding	oneself	in	a	post-traditional	social	order,	[Giddens]	avoids	a	certain	kind	of	moralistic	response	that	he	detects	in	notions	of	narcissism.	By	refusing	to	see	people	as	merely	passive	in	the	face	of	overwhelming	pressures,	he	can	pay	attention	to	the	manifold	ways	in	which	they	resist,	negotiate,	and	survive	their	circumstances”	(2007:406).	8	Kearney	notes	that	towards	the	end	of	his	life	Ricoeur’s	focus	was	increasingly	upon	“God	for	others	and	self	for	others”	(2011:221).		
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constituted	in	relation	to	the	community	(in	this	case,	the	Church).	The	theological	anthropology	of	God	as	Divine	Other	further	decenters	the	centrality	of	the	isolated	self	by	placing	the	very	constitution	of	the	self	in	terms	of	relational	connection.		
Meaning-Making	The	creation	of	meaning	is	also	important	for	resilient	adaptation.	As	detailed	in	Chapters	1	and	2,	research	indicates	that	the	process	of	meaning-making	is	associated	with	purpose,	hope,	and	positive	mental	well-being.9	Further,	religious	understandings	of	the	world,	in	particular	sacred	narratives,	can	be	important	in	the	creation	and	sustainment	of	meaning.	I	utilized	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	to	describe	the	ability	of	narrative	to	project	a	new	‘world’	of	hope	and	furthered	this	understanding	through	the	example	of	Julian	of	Norwich.	For	her	and	for	many	others	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	as	attested	to	in	scripture,	figures	prominently	in	the	creation	of	meaning.	One’s	experience	of	the	present	may	be	re-emplotted	in	light	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.10		For	the	Christian,	biblical	narratives	are	“the	fundamental	story	by	which	all	others	are	to	be	understood,	including	his	or	her	own	story…The	biblically	formed	narratives	of	Christ	and	his	Church	become	the	story	which	literally	makes	the	world;	it	goes	all	the	way	down”	(Loughlin	1999:20).	Such	a	totalizing	worldview	affects	all	human	experiences,	providing	perspective	and	meaning	in	the	midst	of	life’s	joys	and	sorrows.		Ricoeur	himself	suggested	the	necessity	of	such	a	voice	in	today’s	world.	He	notes:	“It	remains	a	poor,	disarmed	word,	which	has	no	force	other	than	its	capacity	to	be	said	and	heard.	It	rests	on	a	sort	of	wager:	are	there	still	enough	people	who	will	hear	this	word?”	Indeed,	in	the	midst	of		the	indefinite	multiplication	of	signs	in	circulation	in	our	societies,…[t]he	small	voice	of	Biblical	writings	is	lost	in	the	incredible	clamor	of	all	the	signals	exchanged.	But	the	fate	of	the	Biblical	word	is	that	of	all	poetic	voices.	Will	they	
                                                9	In	particular,	interpretation	of	human	experience,	including	pain,	significantly	affects	health	outcomes	(Büssing	et	al.	2010;	Cook	2013b:147;	Nygaard	and	Heir	2012).	10	Relating	Ricoeur	to	Augustine,	DeLashmutt	similarly	claims:	“Augustine	exemplifies	how	confessional	re-narration,	by	providing	an	overarching	story	of	the	self,	resiliently	accommodates	change	and	can	aid	in	giving	meaning	to	the	discordant	and	episodic	nature	of	life”	(2009:603).	
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be	heard	at	the	level	of	public	discourse?	My	hope	is	that	there	will	always	be	poets	and	ears	to	listen	to	them	(1998:169).		The	tension	in	this	account	lies	in	the	role	of	the	hearer.	The	word	of	meaning—a	narrative	projection	of	a	new	way	of	being-in-the-world—exists,	but	will	it	be	heard	and	appropriated?11			Through	attention	to	the	content	of	this	‘word’	as	it	relates	to	resilience,	I	will	draw	together	more	fully	the	threads	of	argument	in	ways	that	are	suggestive	of	possible	implications	for	resilience.	This	will	involve,	broadly,	highlighting	these	two	themes	once	again,	but	utilizing	a	different	framework.	I	turn	once	again	to	a	narrative	understanding,	first	assessing	the	content	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	in	relation	to	a	scriptural	passage,	then	developing	a	narrative	plot	based	upon	the	implications	of	Ricoeur’s	thought	for	resilience.		
The	Narrative	of	the	Gospel		An	individual	may	gain	resilience	by	the	participatory	relation	of	the	narrative	of	her	life	to	the	Divine	narrative	of	the	Gospel	(τὸ	εὐαγγέλιον).	Further,	this	Divine	narrative	gives	human	existence	a	new	telos.	But	what	constitutes	the	substance	of	this	Divine	narrative?		Christians	look	to	scriptures	as	witness	to	God’s	work	throughout	history—through	the	stories	of	the	people	of	Israel,	the	life	of	Jesus	Christ,	and	the	Church	founded	by	Christ.	At	the	heart	of	this	story	is	the	good	news	(Gospel)	of	Jesus’	life,	death,	and	resurrection.		While	too	large	a	topic	to	fully	address	here,	I	will	briefly	assess	how	one	portion	of	the	Bible	portrays	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	My	focus	will	be	primarily	upon	the	Apostle	Paul’s	letter	to	the	Philippians,	proposing	that	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	involves	participation	in	the	transformative	life	of	Christ.12	Michael	Gorman	describes	Paul’s	thrust	toward	‘narrative	spirituality’	as	“a	spirituality	that	tells	a	story,	
                                                11	Cf.	(Prickett	2002:262).	12	Michael	Gorman	notes:	“As	a	fundamental	category	for	understanding	Paul,	‘participation’—meaning	participation	in	Christ,	his	crucifixion	and	resurrection,	his	story,	and/or	his	present	life—is	now	quite	widely	accepted”	(2009:3).	
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a	dynamic	life	with	God	that	corresponds	in	some	way	to	the	divine	‘story’”	(2001:4).13	Further,	Karl	Plank	draws	upon	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	in	his	description	of	Paul’s	assessment	of	suffering:		Paul	draws	upon	a	language	of	affliction	in	virtually	all	his	letters	to	interpret	human	life	and	the	gospel	he	understands	to	empower	that	life.	With	this	language	he	creates	a	textual	world	in	which	suffering	persists	and	weakness	characterizes	the	human	lot	(1987:3–4).	Paul’s	theological	reflection,	then,	provides	a	beneficial	avenue	for	studying	resilience.14	There	are	many	genres	within	the	corpus	of	scripture;	narrative	being	one	of	the	most	primary.		Though	Paul’s	letters	are	not	explicitly	narratival	in	genre,	there	is	a	growing	consensus	that	Paul	utilizes	narrative	elements	in	his	theology	(Hays	2004:48).	Paul’s	“gospel	was	a	narrative	in	continuity	with	Israel’s	story”	in	the	Old	Testament	(Gorman	2009:105),	wherein	he	uses	the	tool	of	narrative	to	tell	the	climax	of	the	story—Christ’s	death	on	the	cross—in	a	way	that	gives	it	special	significance	(Gorman	2001:75).	“Paul’s	story	of	the	cross,	then,	is	a	story	of	faith,	love,	power,	and	hope”	(Gorman	2001:94).	While	much	could	be	written	on	what	constitutes	the	core	of	the	Gospel	message,	Philippians	2:5-11	offers	an	encapsulation	of	the	key	aspects	of	the	Gospel:		
5	Let	the	same	mind	be	in	you	that	was	in	Christ	Jesus,	
6	who,	though	he	was	in	the	form	of	God,					did	not	regard	equality	with	God					as	something	to	be	exploited,	
7	but	emptied	himself,					taking	the	form	of	a	slave,					being	born	in	human	likeness.	And	being	found	in	human	form,	
8	he	humbled	himself					and	became	obedient	to	the	point	of	death—					even	death	on	a	cross.	
9	Therefore	God	also	highly	exalted	him					and	gave	him	the	name					that	is	above	every	name,	
10	so	that	at	the	name	of	Jesus	
                                                13	For	Gorman,	“[c]ruciformity	is	[at	the	center	of]…Paul’s	oddly	inviting,	even	compelling,	narrative	spirituality”	(2001:5).	14	Plank	contends	that	“Paul’s	language	of	affliction	takes	us	close	to	his	deepest	convictions,	those	truths	which	he	assumes	to	be	self-evident	and	which	shape	his	perception	and	understanding	of	human	life”	(1987:4).	
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				every	knee	should	bend,					in	heaven	and	on	earth	and	under	the	earth,	
11	and	every	tongue	should	confess					that	Jesus	Christ	is	Lord,					to	the	glory	of	God	the	Father.15		
Philippians	2:6-11	as	Paul’s	‘Master	Story’	Gordon	Fee	suggests:	“Theology	in	Philippians	first	of	all	takes	the	form	of	story”	where	the	story	of	the	Gospel	“is	one	of	the	primary	theological	contributions	of	the	letter!”	(1995:47).	Indeed,	“the	ultimate	urgency	of	this	letter	is	the	gospel”	clearly	expressed	in	2:6-11	that	lays	the	theological	foundation	for	the	letter	as	a	whole	by	portraying	Christ	as	paradigmatic	(Fee	1995:228).	Gorman	believes	Philippians	2:6-11	operates	as	Paul’s	“master	story,”	influencing	his	entire	view	of	the	world	and	saturating	his	thought	(2001:88–92,	164–72,	278–80,	316–19,	357–58).16	Similarly,	Stephen	Fowl	suggests	this	passage	as	“the	crucial	climactic	element	of	[the]	drama	of	redemption”	(2005:88).	This	text	“reveals	the	narrative	identity	of	the	Messiah	Jesus”	wherein	“Christ’s	divinity,	and	thus	divinity	itself,	is	being	narratively	defined	as	kenotic	and	cruciform	in	character”	(Gorman	2009:25).17	Significantly,	Gorman	engages	this	text	in	narrative	terms—as	displaying	Christ’s	‘narrative	identity’	that	can	be	‘narratively	defined.’18	Paul’s	spirituality	is	both	cruciform	and	narratival,	and	“derives	from	the	story	of	Christ	narrated	in	Phil	2:6-8”	(Gorman	2009:157)	which	is	“the	‘integrative	narrative	experience’	of	his	life	and	thought,”	permeating	and	defining	all	that	Paul	is	and	does	(2001:371).	
                                                15	NRSV.	16	Although	the	particular	kenotic	(‘self-emptying’)	content	of	this	passage	provides	ample	opportunity	for	reflection	on	the	topic	of	resilience—and,	indeed,	has	many	resonances	with	other	themes	I	highlight—an	in-depth	exposition	of	this	passage	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	project.	17	In	this	project,	my	reading	of	Philippians	coheres	to	a	broadly	Ricoeurian	strategy	of	interpretation	that	is	more	concerned	with	the	interaction	of	the	text	and	reader	than	the	text’s	process	of	development.	I	do	not	wish	to	completely	side-step	issues	of	textual	criticism,	but,	given	the	constraints	of	the	current	project,	see	these	as	secondary	to	the	meaning	projected	by	the	text.	Cf.	(Fowl	1998:30).	Here,	and	throughout	this	project,	I	assume	the	perspicuity	and	intelligibility	of	Christian	scripture	from	a	canonical	perspective.	While	many	(including	Ricoeur)	have	suggested	that	such	a	way	of	reading	can	present	certain	problems	(which	I	am	willing	to	concede),	Ricoeur’s	own	example	(e.g.	(LaCocque	and	Ricoeur	1998))	suggests	that	it	is	possible.	18	This	understanding	is	in	concert	with	Ricoeur’s	thought	regarding	human	identity.	
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Fee	helpfully	proposes:	The	fact	that	the	future	has	already	begun	with	the	coming	of	God	himself…means	two	crucial	things	for	Paul:	that	the	consummation	is	absolutely	guaranteed,	and	that	present	existence	is	therefore	altogether	determined	by	this	reality…[Christians]	live	the	life	of	the	future	in	the	present,	determined	by	its	values	and	perspective,	no	matter	what	their	present	circumstances…what	is	theologically	at	stake	in	Philippians	is	the	twin	reality	of	the	Philippians’	present	suffering	and	of	the	(apparent)	diminution	of	their	clear	vision	of	the	sure	future	that	awaits	(1995:50–51).	The	narrative	of	God’s	work	in	the	world	through	Christ,	then,	puts	believers’	lives	in	proper	perspective.	“Paul’s	conviction	that	his	life	mirrors	the	experiences	of	Christ,	especially	in	terms	of	suffering”	further	highlights	that	“vindication	follows	suffering”	(Bloomquist	1993:195).	It	accomplishes	this	through	an	expressly	narrative	means	that	is	broken	into	two	parts,	verses	6-8	and	9-11	(Fee	1995:193–96).19	The	entire	narrative	of	2:6-11	is	focused	upon	Christ,	showing	Paul’s	understanding	of	the	centrality	of	Christ	as	the	fullest	revelation	of	God’s	nature	(Fee	1995:226–28).	Paul	narrates	the	outcome	of	this	master	story	in	Philippians	2:9-11,	“God’s	vindication	of	the	story	of	Christ	as	the	story	of	true	humanity	and	true	divinity”	(Gorman	2009:32).	Thus,	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	participation	through	faith	in	the	crucifixion	of	Christ	ensures	participation	in	the	resurrection	of	Christ,	resulting	in	renewed	life	in	the	present	and	in	the	eschaton	(Gorman	2009:85).	The	process	of	becoming	like	Christ	is	ongoing,	necessitating	hope	for	the	future,	but,	paradoxically,	this	hope	is	founded	in	“a	participation	in	his	cruciform	narrative	identity	and	a	transformation	into	his	cruciform	image”	(Gorman	2009:91–92).	Hence,	“[i]f	we	know	God	in	the	cross,	then	we	should	also	know	that	God’s	majesty	is	one	of	power-in-weakness”	(Gorman	2009:34).20	Christ’s	exaltation	at	the	conclusion	of	Philippians	2:9-11	finishes	this	narrative,	not	by	diminishing	the	cross,	but	rather	by	understanding	it	as	the	necessary	and	essential	
                                                19	Fee	is	especially	adamant	to	note	this	passage’s	‘narrative	character’	rather	than	merely	designating	it,	like	many	other	scholars,	a	poetic	hymn	(1995:193–94).	Fowl	makes	a	similar	claim	(2005:119).	20	Plank	suggests	that	Paul	depiction	of	“weakness”	is	an	instance	of	Ricoeur’s	‘surplus	of	meaning’	embodied	in	the	symbolic	representation	of	the	text	(1987:86–87).	This	is	accomplished,	in	part,	through	a	“paradoxical	irony”	of	the	juxtaposition	of	‘strength’	and	‘weakness’	that	provides	an	“enlargement	of	the	meaning”	of	the	terms	(Plank	1987:62)	
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precursor	to	Christ’s	resurrection	and	exaltation.	These	narrative	elements	are	indivisible,	though	the	cross,	for	Paul,	most	clearly	displays	the	character	of	God	(Gorman	2001:87).	Thus,	“Paul’s	chief	way	of	‘expounding’	his	theology	of	Christ	crucified	was	to	show	the	correspondence	between	Christ’s	death	and	the	believing	community’s	life”	(Gorman	2001:76).	This	connection	flows	out	in	praxis	through	participation	in	Christ.	
Participation	as	Phronesis	Philippians,	which	uses	the	Greek	word	φρονεῖν/phronein	ten	times	(Fowl	2005:6),21	has	a	“rather	persistent	emphasis	on	the	formation	of	a	Christ-focused	phronēsis	or	practical	reasoning”	(Fowl	2005:123).	φρονεῖν	is	sometimes	rendered	as	‘think,’	but	Fowl	suggests	its	meaning	is	much	broader,	to	encompass	a	“comprehensive	pattern	of	thinking,	feeling	and	acting”	(2005:6).	Paul	uses	the	imperative	form	of	this	verb	in	Phil	2:5,	exhorting	his	readers	to	utilize	the	phronesis	that	“involves	a	common	perspective	on	their	situation	and	how	it	fits	into	the	divine	economy	and	the	practical	implications	of	that	perspective”	(Fowl	2005:89–90).	22	Thus,	“the	letter’s	most	comprehensive	purpose	is	the	shaping	of	a	Christian	phronēsis,	a	practical	moral	reasoning	that	is	‘conformed	to	[Christ’s]	death’	in	hope	of	his	resurrection”	(Meeks	1991:333).	Participation	in	Christ	through	faith,	then,	is	enabled	through	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	This	is	not	merely	understanding	or	mental	assent	to	the	content	of	the	narrative,	but	rather	relational	connection	with	God	and	with	others	in	faith	community.23	This	participatory	engagement	with	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	is	clearly	evidenced	in	Philippians	2	where	Christ’s	death	and	resurrection	are	portrayed	as	having	immanent	application	in	the	lives	of	believers.	This	is	a	“living	exegesis”	of	the	text	in	the	life	of	the	faith	community	(Gorman	2009:104)	because,	“[f]or	Paul,	to	be	in	
Christ	is	to	be	a	living	exegesis	of	this	narrative	of	Christ	[found	in	Phil.	2:6-11],	a	new	
performance	of	the	original	drama	of	exaltation	following	humiliation...”	(Gorman	2001:92).	Indeed,	Christ	can	serve	as	an	exemplar	for	Christians,	whose	story	provides	
                                                21	This	is	almost	half	of	the	occurrences	of	the	word	in	the	Pauline	corpus	(Fowl	2005:6).	22	Cf.	(Thomasset	2005:541).	23	It	is	significant	that	this	text	projects	relational	possibilities.	Fowl	suggests	the	Phil.	2:6-11	“sets	out	a	concise	and	authoritative	account	of	God’s	character	and	of	the	sort	of	friendship	God	desires	for	us	and	with	us”	(2005:209).	
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a	framework	for	interpreting	situations	in	their	own	lives	(Fowl	2005:106).	Individual	and	communal	acts	of	reading	the	Gospel	can	be	transformational,	and,	in	this	case,	could	be	transformative	of	suffering.	Because	Christ’s	death	and	resurrection	are	central	to	the	Gospel,	participation	in	the	Gospel,	in	some	sense,	invites	a	participation	in	these	very	realities:	“Justification	is	participatory	and	transformative,	accomplished	by	co-crucifixion	with	Christ	and	embodied	as	holiness”	(Gorman	2009:161).24	Gorman	claims	that	“an	experience	of	the	cross,	a	spirituality	of	the	cross,	is	also	an	experience	and	a	spirituality	of	God”	(2009:1).	Cruciformity,	then,	is	theoformity—“conformity	to	Christ,	or	holiness,	understood	as	participation	in	the	very	life	of	God—inhabiting	the	cruciform	God”	(Gorman	2009:1–2).25	For	Gorman,	“the	telos	of	human	existence…[is]	union	with	God”	(2009:5).		Paul’s	letter	to	the	Philippians	provides	an	especially	powerful	example	of	engaging	with	suffering	since	it	was	most	probably	written	during	his	imprisonment	(Bloomquist	1993:193;	Fee	1995:30,	34;	Fowl	2005:9–10).	In	fact,	“suffering	is	the	occasion	of	the	letter”	and	it	“is	primarily	used	by	Paul	as	the	occasion	for	his	extended,	eschatological	confession	of	faith	in	God’s	grace	manifested	to	servants”	(Bloomquist	1993:196).	The	content	of	this	eschatological	hope	is	that	“suffering	is	not	meaningless”	because	Christ	has	been	victorious.	For	the	believer,	“as	in	the	case	of	Christ,	suffering	prefaces	the	inevitable	vindication	of	the	one	suffering”	(Bloomquist	1993:195).	Hence,	“in	Philippians…suffering	points	beyond	itself	to	vindication”	(Bloomquist	1993:196).26	L.	Gregory	Bloomquist	suggests,	in	Philippians,	Christ	is	“the	cipher	in	whom	the	experience	of	all	God’s	servants	is	most	clearly	reflected”	(1993:195).	In	fact,	“there	is	no	genuine	life	in	Christ	that	is	not	at	the	same	time…being	regularly	transformed	into	the	likeness	of	Christ”	(Fee	1995:227).	Thus,	through	participation	in	Christ,	“[s]uffering	
                                                24	Care	must	be	taken,	however,	not	to	fall	into	the	trap	of	identifying	oneself	with	Christ	in	every	way—only	Jesus	Christ	is	the	Savior;	we	are	not	called	upon	to	sacrifice	ourselves	on	behalf	of	the	world.	I	will	address	this	danger	more	fully	in	the	final	chapter.		25	Gorman	suggests	that	for	the	Christian	“justification	is	by	co-crucifixion:	it	is	a	participation	in	the	covenantal	and	cruciform	narrative	identity	of	Christ”	(2009:2).	26	See	also	(Fee	1995:30).	
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evidences	the	ontological	union	of	believers	with	their	Lord”	(Bloomquist	1993:191).27	Yet,	because	Christ’s	suffering	and	death	did	not	end	in	ultimate	defeat,	the	Christian’s	adversity	does	not	have	to	have	the	final	word:		For	Paul…suffering	is	intimately	connected	to	hope…both	the	inevitability	of	suffering	and	the	certainty	of	future	glory	are	for	him	theological	and	spiritual	
necessities.	For	Paul,	hope	is	fundamentally	the	certainty	that	the	ultimate	fate	of	the	humiliated,	crucified	Messiah	will	also	be	the	ultimate	fate	of	himself	and	of	all	others	who	are	co-crucified	with	Christ…—the	completion	of	the	process	of	conformity	to	the	narrative	pattern	of	the	Messiah	(Gorman	2001:305).28	Thus,	“[f]or	Paul,	hope…is	the	conviction,	based	on	the	past	narrative	of	Christ	and	the	present	narrative	of	believers’	experience,	that	the	future	of	cruciformity	is	glory”	(Gorman	2001:332).	Suffering	is	not	the	focus	of	Paul’s	theology	nor	of	the	Gospel	narrative;	rather,	the	hope	of	Christ’s	return,	the	parousia,	is	its	center	(Gorman	2001:334).		Participation	in	Christ,	including	in	his	suffering,	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	justification	of	the	experience	of	suffering.	In	Gorman’s	thinking,	“Christ’s	death	
represents	not	God’s	justification	for	suffering	but	God’s	identification	with	those	who	
suffer”	(2001:376).	Love,	then,	is	central	to	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel—both	in	its	content	and	in	its	interpretation.	Gorman	suggests:	“Cruciform	love,	in	a	word,	continues	the	story	of	the	cross	in	new	times	and	places”	(2001:267),	narrating	God’s	love	in	places	of	adversity	as	well	as	plenty.	Cruciform	love	characterizes	the	reciprocal	relationship	of	God	and	the	believer	as	well	as	the	believer’s	relationship	with	others.	It	involves	a	humility	that	“has	to	do	with	a	proper	estimation	of	oneself,	the	stance	of	the	creature	before	the	Creator,	utterly	dependent	and	trusting”	(Fee	1995:188).	Thus,	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	provides	a	‘framework’	for	Christians	to	make	their	suffering	“intelligible	to	each	other”	(Fowl	
                                                27	Gorman	notes:	“The	story	of	Christ…unfolds	in	two	major	stages:	humiliation	and	exaltation,	death	and	resurrection,	suffering	and	glory.	To	participate	in	that	story,	or,	better,	to	participate	in	the	One	whose	narrative	identity	is	disclosed	in	that	story,	is	to	embody	a	similar	two-stage	pattern”	(2009:167).	28	I	would	disagree	with	Gorman’s	characterization	of	suffering	as	a	necessity.	It	is	problematic	to	affirm	suffering	as	necessary.	Rather,	a	better	understanding	would	place	suffering	and	redemption	as	contingent	narratival	necessities	given	the	current	state	of	the	fallen	world,	though	not	necessary	in	themselves.	
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2005:227).29	This	has	communal	implications:	“the	church’s	life	story	embodies	and	thereby	proclaims	the	narrative	identity	and	gracious	saving	power	of	the	triune	God	whom	Paul	encountered	and	preached”	(Gorman	2009:172).	Hence,		a	community	that	lives	‘in	Christ’	(Phil	2:1-5)	will	be	shaped	like	the	story	of	Christ	narrated	in	2:6-8.	Such	a	community	does	not	simply	remember	and	imitate	a	story;	rather,	it	experiences	the	present	activity	of	Father,	Son,	and	Spirit	mentioned	in	2:1-13,	which	is	formation	into	the	eternal,	unchanging	image	of	the	eternal	Son	of	God	(cf.	Rom	8:29;	2	Cor	3:18),	an	image	manifested	in	the	story	of	2:6-8	(Gorman	2009:32).	For	these	reasons,	I	suggest	this	passage	provides	insight	into	the	Gospel	message	and	its	implications	for	resilience.	The	narrative	of	the	Gospel	has	very	real	and	practical	implications	for	the	life	of	the	Christian—implications	concretely	displayed	in	the	example	provided	by	Julian	of	Norwich.	I	contend	that	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	is	also	significant	for	a	theological	understanding	of	resilience	and,	following	his	proposal	for	the	text	as	hermeneutical	model,	can	be	expressed	in	a	narrative	framework.			
A	Narrative	Structure	of	Resilience	I	argued	that	Paul	Ricoeur’s	philosophy	can	provide	insight	human	resilience.	Here	I	more	fully	develop	this	argument	through	depicting	resilience	in	narrative	terms.	I	suggest	that	resilience	can	best	be	understood	narratively	in	relation	to	components	of	the	‘plot’	of	resilience.		
The	Problem:	Distended	Experience	Any	good	story	has	a	problem	at	its	center—a	discordance	that	is	sought	to	be	overcome.	I	suggest	that,	from	the	standpoint	of	Christian	theology,	this	central	problem	is	the	distension	axiomatic	of	human	existence	in	the	world	because	of	sin.30	Ricoeur	upholds	this	view.		
                                                29	Indeed,	Fowl	argues	that	“one	of	the	primary	practices	of	Christian	friendship	is	helping	each	other	fit	our	lives	into	the	drama	of	God’s	economy	of	salvation”	(2005:228).	30	See,	for	instance,	Ricoeur’s	essay,	“Evil:	A	Challenge	to	Philosophy	and	Theology”	(Ricoeur	1995a)	for	further	assessment	of	this	point.	
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For	Ricoeur,	‘limit-situations’	of	discordance—“those	situations—including	solitude…suffering,	and	death—where	misery	and	the	grandeur	of	human	beings	confront	each	other”	(Ricoeur	1981c:85–86)—are	central	to	human	experience.	Human	life,	then,	must	be	understood	not	only	in	light	of	possible	renewed	meaning	but	also	in	view	of	possible	continued	discordance.	This,	in	literary	terms,	is	the	contingency	of	a	tragic	plot	as	opposed	to	the	trajectory	towards	the	happy	ending	of	a	comedy	(Loughlin	1999:161).	Human	capability	includes	not	only	the	ability	to	act,	but,	in	a	meaningful	sense,	is	countered	by	the	fundamental	inevitability	of	suffering.	There	is	no	guarantee	of	a	good	outcome	in	the	journey	of	life.	Ricoeur	notes	that	“[t]he	function	of	the	tragic	is	to	question	self-assurance,	self-certitude,	one’s	critical	pretensions…[Thus]	tragic	symbols…speak	of	a	‘mystery	of	iniquity’	that	man	cannot	entirely	handle…”	(1962:213–14).	Ricoeur	concludes	that	“tragic	anthropology	is	inseparable…from	tragic	theology;	and	this	latter	is	at	bottom	unutterable”	(1962:213).	Ricoeur	is	right	to	acknowledge	the	mystery	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	understanding	evil—a	mystery	that	cannot	be	explained	away,	only	narrated	within	the	narrative	and	telos	of	the	Gospel.		In	an	important	sense	discordance	provides	an	opportunity	for	the	creation	of	meaning,	thereby	having	constructive	utility:	“Destruction…is	a	moment	in	every	new	foundation.	The	‘destruction’	of	hidden	worlds	is	a	positive	task”	(Ricoeur	1974:148).	This	is	part	of	what	Donald	Capps	calls	Ricoeur’s	“pattern	of	orientation	to	disorientation	to	reorientation”	(1984:44).	Metaphor	serves	as	a	helpful	tool	in	this	process	since	it	depends	upon	a	correspondence	between	the	known	the	world	and	the	world	that	it	projects,	while	at	the	same	time	also	disorienting	the	known	world	by	disclosing	a	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	(Capps	1984:108).	This,	in	essence,	is	a	narrative	pattern.	For	Ricoeur,	then,	narrative—in	particular	its	use	of	symbol	(Ricoeur	1962)—is	a	helpful	avenue	for	understanding	evil	(Kearney	2004:91–97).		Some	philosophers	have	equated	Ricoeur’s	emphasis	on	radical	evil	as	the	normal	state	of	human	being	with	a	Christian	worldview,	suggesting	this	as	a	fault	of	his	philosophy.31	Others,	like	Francesca	Murphy,	critique	narrative	theology	more	generally	
                                                31	Cf.	(Kenny	2004:101).	
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without	specifically	addressing	Ricoeur	and	his	dialectic	between	Idealism	and	Realism.32			The	distention	of	human	existence	culminates	in	the	central	encapsulation	of	sin	in	history:	Jesus	on	the	cross.	Here	the	wickedness	of	humankind	reaches	its	climax	by	killing	the	self-giving	God;	here	the	sin	of	the	world	is	put	upon	Christ.	This	is	the	fulcrum	of	history,	the	turning	point	of	the	narrative	plot	of	the	Gospel.			
The	Plot:	Paradoxical	Reconfiguration	The	plot	of	the	narrative	of	resilience,	I	contend,	is	paradoxical	and	based	upon	an	unexpected	turn—the	same	pivot	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	While	one	would	expect	the	problem	of	sin,	suffering,	and	death	to	be	rectified	through	either	head-on	confrontation	or	total	avoidance,	the	‘emplotment’	of	this	narrative	involves	neither.	To	be	sure,	an	individual	could	gain	a	measure	of	resilience	through	these	strategies—a	‘pulling	your	boots	up	by	your	own	bootstraps’	mentality	or	avoidance	of	difficulty—but,	in	the	end,	each	affords	only	limited	resilience	gains.				
Problematic	Stories	These	limited	gains	are	because	each	is	built	upon	faulty	assumptions	regarding	the	world;	in	particular,	faulty	assumptions	pertaining	to	the	nature	of	the	human	self.	Following	Ricoeur,	an	understanding	of	the	self	as	being	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Other	suggests	the	limited	capabilities	of	the	isolated	self.	A	‘bootstraps’	mentality	gives	too	much	credence	to	the	powers	of	the	self—Ricoeur’s	notion	of	the	self	as	one	who	acts	and	suffers	is	helpful	here—and	too	little	credence	to	the	concrete	realities	of	sin	and	evil.	To	suggest	that	one	can	overcome	any	difficulty	is	perhaps	naïve	in	the	face	of	real	experiences	of	evil.		Furthermore,	the	avoidance	of	suffering	as	a	goal	suggests	that	such	a	telos	is	both	achievable	and	desirable.	From	the	standpoint	of	resilience	research,	the	total	avoidance	of	suffering	is	not	beneficial	(Seery	et	al.	2013).	Similarly,	the	Christian	faith	
                                                32	Interestingly,	Murphy	suggests	that	one	of	non-realism’s	flaws	is	“an	unwillingness	to	
suffer	reality”	or	view	that	suffering	“is	a	part	of	the	way	things	are”		(2007:307).	
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contends	that	sin	is	not	the	fundamental	characteristic	of	the	world,	but	nonetheless	extends	to	all	aspects	of	it,	only	being	made	right	through	Christ’s	re-making	of	the	world	in	the	eschaton.	Thus,	seeking	to	avoid	this	reality	may	be	an	exercise	in	futility.		
Paradoxical	Reversal	In	contrast	to	these	faulty	attempts	to	resolve	the	problem	at	the	heart	of	the	narrative	of	resilience	stands	a	different	narrative.	The	plot	of	the	Gospel	narrative	resolves	the	problem	not	by	brute	force	nor	by	avoidance,	but	rather	through	participating	in,	and	thereby	transforming	death	and	suffering.33	This	paradoxical	overturning	of	narratival	plot	elements	culminates	in	the	unexpected	reversal	of	fates	through	Divine	Life.		This	‘re-emplotment’	of	the	narrative	of	resilience	places	the	construct	in	a	novel	framework.	A	narrative	reappraisal	of	the	world	through	the	Gospel	and	the	constitution	of	the	self	in	relation	to	God	as	the	Divine	Other	provide	the	courage	to	live	in	the	world	of	discordance,	thereby	enabling	resilient	adaptation.		Both	strategies	are	narratival	at	the	core.	This	is	in	keeping	with	the	strength	of	narrative	to	affirm	and	hold	in	tension	the	irreducible	‘unbearable	contradictions’	of	lived	experience	(Coakley	2016).		
The	Resolution:	Awaited	Redemption	Christ’s	death	is	solely	one	aspect	of	the	Gospel	narrative—one	that	is	only	fully	understood	in	light	of	the	resurrection	of	Christ.	The	two	narrative	elements	are	not	understood	apart	from	each	other.	For	Ricoeur,	discordance	is	dialectically	countered	by	the	ability	of	emplotment	to	create	concordance.	He	writes,	“The	tragic	model	is	not	purely	a	model	of	concordance,	but	rather	of	discordant	concordance.	This	is	where	it	offers	a	counterpart	to	the	distentio	animi”	(1984b:42).34	Loughlin	writes:	
                                                33	Cf.	2	Cor.	5:21:	“For	our	sake	he	made	him	to	be	sin	who	knew	no	sin,	so	that	in	him	we	might	become	the	righteousness	of	God”	(NRSV).	34	Ricoeur	continues,	“if	reversal	is	essential	to	every	story	or	history	where	meaninglessness	threatens	the	meaningful,	does	not	the	conjunction	of	reversal	and	recognition	preserve	a	universality	that	goes	beyond	the	case	of	tragedy?...is	not	our	perplexity	greatest	where	reversals	of	fortune	were	most	unexpected?...Does	not	every	narrated	story	finally	have	to	do	with	reversals	of	fortune,	whether	for	better	or	
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the	condition	of	this	happy	ending	is	the	agony	of	Jesus	on	the	cross…His	suffering	is	not	undone	by	his	resurrection;	it	remains,	like	all	suffering,	for	all	time…That	disconnection	precedes	reconnection,	and	that	tragedy	precedes	comedy,	as	the	very	condition	of	the	latter’s	possibility,	is	perhaps	sufficient	reason	to	describe	the	gospel	story	as	a	comedy	(1999:163).35		Yet	Christ’s	resurrection	is	not	the	end	of	the	Gospel	hope;	the	resurrection	of	Christ	is	the	first	fruits	of	the	promised	resurrection	and	renewal	of	all	things	in	the	eschaton.	This	hope	is	based	upon	faith	and	awaits	its	final	fulfillment.	Patience,	then,	is	the	corollary	of	Christian	hope	and	necessary	for	resilience.		This	is	integral	to	the	biblical	vision	of	the	world.	Ricoeur	notes	that	in	“biblical	redemption…[w]hat	is	noteworthy…is	that	the	meaning	proceeds	from	the	end	to	the	beginning,	from	the	future	to	the	past”	(1962:214).	He	continues,	the	movement	which	in	symbolic	thought	goes	from	the	beginning	of	evil	to	its	end	seems	indeed	to	suppose	the	idea	that	all	this	finally	has	a	meaning,	that	a	meaningful	figure	imperiously	takes	form	through	the	contingency	of	evil—in	short,	that	evil	belongs	to	a	certain	totality	of	the	real…but	not	just	any	necessity,	not	just	any	totality…the	necessity	appears	only	afterwards,	viewed	from	the	end,	and	‘in	spite	of’	the	contingency	of	evil	(1962:215).		Meaning,	then,	follows	from	eschatology;	hope	from	the	object	of	anticipation.	In	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	meaning	and	connection	derive	their	significance	from	the	promised	return	of	Christ	and	the	redemption	of	all	things	in	the	eschaton.	Significant	for	this	expectation,	the	“law	of	superabundance	[‘how	much	more’	(πολλῷ	μᾶλλον)]…is	the	miracle	of	the	Logos;	from	Him	proceeds	the	retrograde	movement	of	the	true;	from	wonder	is	born	the	necessity	that	retroactively	places	evil	in	the	light	of	being”	(Ricoeur	1962:218).	Thus,	the	love	of	God,	whose	fullness	will	be	known	in	the	future,	is	present	now,	giving	perspective	to	all	that	occurs.		For	Ricoeur,	suffering	can	be	made	sense	of	through	phronesis.	Wisdom		
                                                worse?...It	is	these	discordant	incidents	the	plot	tends	to	make	necessary	and	probable.	And	in	so	doing,	it	purifies	them,	or,	better,	purges	them”	(1984b:44).	35	Similarly,	McFadyen	writes,	“Joy	that	has	gone	through	the	cross	must	allow	the	crosses	of	the	world	to	stand,	just	as	the	resurrection	allowed	Jesus’	cross	to	stand,	worked	through	and	with	the	pathological	dynamics	to	reorient	them	and	to	draw	the	damage	into	relation	to	the	abundance	and	fullness	of	God.	God	defines	sin	in	the	act	of	drawing	it	into	the	dynamics	of	salvation,	by	taking	the	damage	of	sin,	including	its	resistance	to	healing,	into	Godself”	(2000:211).	
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joins	ethos	and	cosmos	at	the	very	point	of	their	discordance:	in	suffering…Wisdom	does	not	teach	us	how	to	avoid	suffering,	or	how	magically	to	deny	it,	or	how	to	dissimulate	it	under	an	illusion.	It	teaches	us	how	to	endure,	how	to	suffer	suffering.	It	places	suffering	into	a	meaningful	context	by	producing	the	active	quality	of	suffering	(Ricoeur	1981c:86).		The	self	can	transform	suffering	through	the	praxis	of	phronesis.	Ricoeur	suggests	the	purpose	of	the	scriptural	book	of	Job	is	to	project	such	a	view	of	suffering:		could	we	not	say	that	revelation,	following	the	line	of	wisdom,	is	the	intending	of	that	horizon	of	meaning	where	a	conception	of	the	world	and	a	conception	of	action	merge	into	a	new	and	active	quality	of	suffering?	The	Eternal	does	not	tell	Job	what	order	of	reality	justifies	his	suffering,	nor	what	type	of	courage	might	vanquish	it…[However]	one	indivisible	prescriptive	and	descriptive	order…can	conjoin	cosmos	and	ethos	because	it	produces	the	pathos	of	actively	assumed	suffering	(1981c:86).		Further,		Job	presupposes	an	unsuspected	meaning	which	cannot	be	transcribed	by	speech	or	logos	a	human	being	may	have	at	his	disposal…What	is	revealed	is	the	possibility	of	hope	in	spite	of….This	possibility	may	still	be	expressed	in	the	terms	of	a	design,	but	of	an	unassignable	design,	a	design	which	is	God’s	secret	(1981c:87).36		What	Ricoeur	calls	‘the	pathos	of	actively	assumed	suffering’	often	characterizes	the	life	of	the	Christian.	Engagement	with	Christ	who	died	and	was	resurrected,	necessitates	participation	in	these	realities	as	well.	Rowan	Williams	notes:	Christian	experience	[is]	growth	in	direct	encounter	with	God,	growth,	therefore,	in	obscurity,	pain	and	struggle…the	roots	of	theology	lie	in	such	experience…Christian	speculation	is	properly	inseparable	from	engagement	of	a	personal	and	demanding	kind	with	the	paradoxes	of	cross	and	resurrection	(1990:139).		Participation	in	‘the	paradoxes	of	cross	and	resurrection’	can	lead	to	the	ability	to	live	resiliently,	patiently	waiting	with	a	hope	characterized	by	the	‘discordant	concordance’	of	distended	human	experience	intersected	by	the	God	of	superabundant	self-giving	love.		
                                                36	For	an	in-depth	exegesis	of	the	book	of	Job	utilizing	serious	biblical	scholarship	coupled	with	Ricoeur’s	philosophy,	see	(Dailey	1994).	
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Applications	More	than	being	merely	an	esoteric	philosophical	concept,	resilience	has	very	real-world	practical	implications.	All	human	beings	face	difficulty,	pain,	and	sorrow.	Sickness,	suffering,	and	death	are	realities	of	the	world	that	we	inhabit	and	therefore	are	realities	that	we	must	face.			But,	does	R/S	support	resilient	adaptation?	The	answer	is	both	‘Yes’	and	‘No,’	depending	on	how	‘resilience’	is	understood.	A	Christian	theological	understanding	of	resilience	is	not	a	‘silver	bullet’	for	creating	resilient	individuals.	In	fact,	from	a	certain	perspective,	the	telos	of	the	Gospel	narrative	creates	outcomes	that	could	certainly	be	understood	as	‘un-resilient.’37	This	caution	does	not	preclude	the	possibility	that	the	connection	and	meaning	found	through	participation	in	God	can	create	positive	resilience	outcomes.	At	the	same	time,	the	practical	wisdom	of	phronesis	enables	such	understandings	to	be	coupled	with	insights	from	other	disciplines,	thereby	gaining	greater	insight	into	human	flourishing.			
Theory	Behind	Practice	This	project	is	not	aimed	toward	particular	treatment	protocols,	but	rather	seeks	to	reassess	assumptions	undergirding	resilience,	thereby	providing	new	understandings	and	applications.		Still,	any	Christian	theological	response	to	suffering	is	a	practical	one;	the	experience	of	adversity	is	a	call	to	action,	not	merely	an	exercise	in	metaphysical	thought	(Castelo	2012:94–95).	This	praxis	can	take	many	forms.	I	focus	briefly	on	just	two	possible	applications:	communal	support	and	virtue	formation.		
Community	The	support	of	community	is	especially	important	in	resilient	adaptation,	since	the	self	is	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Other.	For	Ricoeur,	evil	constitutes	a	threat	to	
                                                37	Jesus	Christ,	for	instance,	from	a	purely	secular	materialist	perspective	would	be	considered	supremely	un-resilient—what	is	more	lacking	in	resilience	than	surrendering	to	physical	death?	See	Chapter	3.	
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community	well-being,	evidenced	by	survival	of	the	individual	at	any	cost:	“The	word	
survival	is	very	selfish,”	he	notes	(Changeux	and	Ricoeur	2002:280–81).		The	individual’s	survival,	in	Ricoeur’s	mind,	can	become	a	means	of	self-focus.	Alternatively,	suffering	can	bind	individuals	together	in	what	Ricoeur,	reflecting	on	his	own	experiences	of	loss,	calls	the	“silent	fraternity	that	is	born	out	of	equality	in	suffering”	(1998:91).	With	the	recent	deaths	of	his	son	and	his	friend	Mircea	Eliade	in	mind,	Ricoeur	suggests	that	the	“memory	of	God”	is	altogether	different	than	the	“too	human	contrast”	of	what	is	done	or	not	done	in	the	world.	This	human	activity	(or	inactivity),	in	the	end	alike	succumbs	to	the	“merciful	equalization	of	death	and	suffering”	(Ricoeur	1998:91).		Community,	especially	among	those	bonded	by	suffering,	can	strengthen	individuals	to	respond	resiliently	to	adversity.	The	formation	of	community	may	aid	resilience	by	fostering	hope	and	creating	meaning	through	relational	connection	(Holton	2011).		
Virtue	Formation	Also	significant	for	resilience	is	virtue	theory	and	the	formative	practices	that	create	and	sustain	resilience.	This	was	the	topic	of	Craig	Steven	Titus’	book	on	resilience	and	theology,	Resilience	and	the	Virtue	of	Fortitude:	Aquinas	is	Dialogue	with	the	Psychosocial	
Sciences	(2006).	Titus	proposes	Aquinas’	virtue	theory	and	the	virtue	of	fortitude	as	a	basis	for	understanding	spiritual	resilience.	As	Titus	has	extensively	explored	this	topic,	I	will	only	address	it	tangentially.		Titus	categorizes	virtues	into	two	groups:	virtues	of	constructive	resilience	(Aquinas’	virtues	of	initiative)	and	virtues	of	resistant	resilience	(Aquinas’	virtues	of	endurance).	Included	in	the	virtues	of	constructive	resilience	are	courage,	magnanimity,	and	magnificence;	the	virtues	of	resistant	resilience	are	patience	and	perseverance.	Titus	expansively	addresses	Aquinas’	account	of	each	virtue	and	the	development	of	the	virtues	in	an	individual.			Resilience	itself	is	not	a	virtue,	but	rather	a	description	of	the	particular	outcome	of	an	action—a	performance	virtue.	Resilience	does	not	involve	valuation	in	itself,	rather	its	
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telos	determines	its	moral	value.	Indeed,	resilience	is	a	necessary	quality	in	all	virtue	(Titus	2006:148).		The	possibilities	inherent	in	applications	of	resilience,	however,	does	not	mean	that	the	concept	is	without	problems.		
Critiques	and	Limitations	I	have	already	highlighted	several	limitations	of	the	resilience	concept	throughout	this	work.	Now,	however,	I	will	address	more	specifically	several	of	the	most	substantial	criticisms:	narratival	discordance	and	disempowerment.	These	critiques,	deriving	from	both	theological	and	social	science	frameworks,	will	serve	to	clarify	a	Christian	understanding	of	resilience.		
Discordance		
Problem:	Narratival	Discordance	Though	an	individual	may	desire	to	re-envision	his	life	in	light	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	what	happens	when	he	cannot	narrate	his	experience	in	a	‘resurrection’	narrative?	It	is	easy	to	imagine	such	situations	of	discordance	between	distended	human	experience	and	a	proposed	narrative	of	hope.		Julian	of	Norwich	narrated	a	conception	of	human	existence	that	views	the	eschatological	fact	of	redemption	as	both	immanent	and	distant.	Her	sincere	hope	in	the	defeat	of	sin	is	accompanied	by	the	need	for	patience	because	of	the	future	and	mysterious	nature	of	the	resolution.	The	full	expression	of	redemption	attested	to	by	the	resurrection	is	an	exception	in	this	life;	at	most	we	catch	glimpses	of	God’s	grace	in	places	of	restoration.							
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Solution:	Patience	Because	the	resolution	of	the	Gospel	narrative	awaits	a	future	fulfillment,	patience	is	necessary.38	A	narrative	understanding	better	enables	living	with	the	distention	of	being	unable	to	make	tidy	the	splintered	pieces	of	our	existence.	Julian,	like	Ricoeur,	believed	that	God’s	love	ensured	the	resolution	of	discordance,	though	no	attempt	is	made	to	explain	definitively	how	this	will	be.		The	tension	of	the	world	in	which	we	live	ensures	it	is	a	place	of	faith,	not	certainty,	yet	it	is	also	a	place	of	potentiality	recognized	through	faith.	Though	the	death	of	Christ	provides	the	content	of	our	knowledge	of	God’s	character;	his	resurrection	demonstrates	the	promise	that	all	things	will	be	made	well	(Julian’s	‘Great	Deed’).	Present	experience	is	often	characterized	by	what	one	theologian	called	“God’s	far-nearness”	(Shooter	2012:134).	In	this	experience,	however,	the	relational	knowledge	of	who	God	is	(connection)	and	the	hope	that	all	will	be	made	right	(meaning)	encourage	us.	Consequently,	participation	in	the	narrative	of	Christ’s	death	and	resurrection	supports	resilience	in	the	‘in-between’	period	of	waiting	in	which	we	find	ourselves.		While	Christ’s	resurrection	is	the	first	fruits	of	promised	restoration,	ours	is	still	to	come.	We	look	to	it	in	faith,	exhibiting	hope	that	is	facilitated	by	seeing	the	events	of	the	past	and	present	in	light	of	the	certainty	of	the	future.	This	perspective	unlocks	the	potentiality	of	the	present,	allowing	individuals	to	wait	expectantly	for	the	fulfillment	of	this	hope.	Viewing	resilience	through	the	lens	of	narrative	fosters	patience—in	the	process	of	becoming—or,	what	some	scholars	have	termed	the	‘unfinished’	narrative	of	resilience	(Aranda	et	al.	2012).	Narrative	identity	keeps	in	tension	the	person	who	is	and	the	person	who	will	be,	allowing	the	potentiality	of	the	present	to	become	the	reality	of	the	future	through	appropriation	by	disciplined	endurance.		Rather	than	seeing	resilience	as	an	abstract	set	of	characteristics	one	must	appropriate,	we	should	view	it	through	the	lens	of	narrative	identity.	I	suggest	that	a	resilient	person	can	see	alternative	ways	of	being-in-the-world	through	stepping	into	the	narrative	of	
                                                38	This	is	not	unlike	Shelly	Rambo’s	conception	of	the	present	as	a	Holy	Saturday	of	sorts,	awaiting	the	coming	Resurrection	in	the	midst	of	the	trauma	of	existence	(Rambo	2010a).	
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the	Gospel	and	appropriating	this	new	way	of	being-in-the-world	through	disciplined	practice.	We	become	the	type	of	people	(humble,	servant	of	all,	dependent)	who	can	see	beyond—to	see	where	God	is	at	work—by	becoming	like	God	because	He	is	at	work	in	the	same	ways.	In	the	journey	of	being	conformed	to	God’s	image,	perhaps	we	can	only	understand	goodness	and	evil	by	patiently	living	alongside	them	over	the	course	of	life.39			
Disempowerment		
Problem:	Reinforcement	of	Deficit	Thinking	Some	social	science	researchers	posit	that	Modern	conceptions	of	resilience	have	the	potential	to	support	disempowerment	through	reinforcing	a	status	quo	of	failure.	This	is	most	clear	in	the	blaming	of	victims	wherein	resilience	is	wielded	as	a	virtue	that	is	either	possessed	or	lacking	(Luthar	and	Zelazo	2003:513).40			As	human	beings,	we	want	to	narrate	a	happy	ending	to	others’	suffering—even	trying	to	absolve	ourselves	of	responsibility	to	help	others	by	suggesting	their	lack	of	resilience	as	their	own	failing,	not,	perhaps	in	part,	our	own.	By	accepting	that	individuals	will	have	to	deal	with	their	own	problems	rather	than	addressing	systems	implicated	in	the	promotion	of	evil,	we	are	lowering	societal	expectation	to	the	most	vulnerable.41		Two	political	theorists,	Brad	Evans	and	Julian	Reid,	are	especially	pronounced	in	their	reservations	regarding	aspects	of	resilience.42	They	highlight	“the	hidden	depth	of	its	nihilism,	[and]	the	pernicious	forms	of	subjugation	it	burdens	people	with”	as	well	as	“the	lack	of	imagination	the	resiliently	minded	possess	in	terms	of	transforming	the	world	for	the	better.”	They	suggest	that	they	“have	become	exhausted	by	its	ubiquitous	weight	and	the	chains	it	places	around	all	our	necks”	(2015:154).	
                                                39	See	(Halik	2009).	I	am	indebted	to	Martin	Westerholm	for	his	insights	into	this	topic.	40	This	is	in	contrast	to	others	who	see	resilience	“as	a	counter-narrative	to	discourses	of	vulnerability	and	social	suffering”	(Panter-Brick	2014:439).		41	I	am	grateful	for	Karen	Kilby’s	insight	on	this	matter.	42	I	will	quote	from	their	critique	at	length.	
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	Further,	they	suggest	that	resilience	“has	become	the	new	social	morphology	for	our	societies	that	are	defined	by	inescapable	crises	of	catastrophe”	(2015:156).43	Despite	its	relatively	localized	beginnings	in	particular	fields	of	study,	resilience,	they	argue,	has	become	a	new	way	of	reasoning	that	is	focused	upon	“producing	new	modes	of	subjectivity	attuned	to	the	age	of	catastrophe”	(2015:156).	They	sarcastically	remark,	“We	are	all	asked	to	think	in	terms	of	resilience.	None	of	us	can	be	exempt	from	the	benevolence	of	its	claims	or	the	scope	of	its	reasoning.”		This	is	a	type	of	thinking	that	entreats	“the	universal	survivor	in	all	of	us,”	yet	by	wrapping	themselves	in	a	scientific	mantra	that	appeals	to	the	‘common	sense’	of	our	shared	perception	of	endangerment,	what	we	used	to	call	positivism	has	been	displaced	by	the	appropriation	of	once	critically	supposed	ontologies	of	vulnerability	to	leave	us	dangerously	exposed	and	accepting	of	our	insecure	predicament	(2015:156).		Resilience,	for	Evans	and	Reid,	is	the	‘buzzword’	of	‘ontologies	of	vulnerability.’	The	“philosophical	stakes”	regarding	resilience	are	high	because	“[b]eneath	the	veneer	of	concern…lurks	a	deeply	nihilistic	way	of	thinking	about	the	very	nature	of	what	it	is	to	live.”	Indeed,	they	argue,	“Resilience	has	created	an	image	of	a	world	in	which	the	very	phenomena	of	violence	and	insecurity	are	assumed	as	natural	and	incontestable.	All	things	are	insecure	by	design”	(2015:156).		This	reinforcement	of	an	epistemology	of	insecurity	is	evident	in	what	they	suggest	is	one	of	the	greatest	threats	of	resilience:	the	way	it	“demands	a	certain	exposure	to	the	threat	before	its	occurrence	so	that	we	can	be	better	prepared.”	This	is	a	type	of	immunization	in	which	we	“become	active	participants”	(2015:156).44	Yet,	in	this	vision	of	the	world,	our	participation	does	not	change	the	ultimate	fate	of	the	world:	“setting	
                                                43	From	a	Christian	theological	point	of	view,	this	could	be	understood	as	the	danger	of	improperly	assessing	the	fallen	nature	of	the	world	and	one’s	role	in	it:	repeatedly	offering	oneself	on	the	altar	of	self-sacrifice	by	mistakenly	seeing	oneself	in	the	place	of	Christ,	who	alone	is	the	Redeemer	of	the	world.		44	Inherent	to	resilience,	Evans	and	Reid	argue,	is	that	it	“exposes	the	self	to	a	dose	of	lethality	to	stave	off	something	altogether	more	terminal…What	does	not	kill	you	only	makes	you	stronger,	providing	of	course	you	are	trained	in	the	art	of	survival”	(2015:157).	
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aside	any	utopian	vision	of	a	promissory	world	that	may	be	conceived	otherwise,	resilience	looks	to	the	future	as	an	endemic	terrain	of	catastrophe	that	is	already	populated	by	the	ruins	of	the	present”	(2015:156–57).		Most	significantly,	their	argument	extends	to	anthropology:		resilience	now	authenticates	who	we	are	as	people.	Adaptability	in	the	face	of	crisis	emphasises	our	resourcefulness,	our	abilities	to	thrive	in	times	of	risk	and	our	life-affirming	qualities	that	refuse	to	surrender	to	all	forms	of	endangerment…It	is	precisely	through	the	promotion	of	ontologies	of	vulnerability	instead	of	ontologies	of	oppression	that	we	learn	to	accept	that	things	are	simply	crises	ridden	and	ultimately	catastrophically	fated	(2015:157).45		Evans	and	Reid	contend	that	“liberal	modernity[‘s]…claims	to	improve	and	enrich	human	existence	have	proved	to	be	unfounded”	and,	though	the	resilience	concept	is	nearly	“ubiquitous,”	its	power	for	“emancipating”	is	nonexistent	(2015:157).	This	is	part	of	liberalism’s	crisis	more	generally—a	system	“that	breeds	anxiety	and	insecurity	as	the	new	normality	for	human	cohabitation”	(2015:158).	For	Evans	and	Reid,	resilience	“suspends	life	in	a	system	of	temporal	purgatory	–	catastrophically	fated	unto	the	end”	and	therefore	we	must	develop	new	ways	of	viewing	the	world	(2015:157).	This	includes,	significantly,	an	“imagination	that	allows	us	to	be	liberated	from	the	entrapments	of	this	tragically	fated	and	subjugating	condition”	but	also	the	opportunity	“to	rethink	what	a	meaningful	existence	might	entail”	using	“a	poetic	art	form	that	enables	us	to	critically	expose	the	nihilism	of	the	present	and	imagine	better	worlds	to	come”	(2015:158).		This	“demands	a	return	to	the	original	philosophical	rupture	–	the	poetic	–	to	speak	of	a	new	imaginary”	to	re-envision	liberalism’s	“fundamental	ontology	of	vulnerability,	which	is	most	purposefully	expressed	in	the	context	of	resilience.”	This	means	“living	dangerously…disavowing	narratives	of	survivability	and	endangerment”	and	instead		seeking	“love	[which	is]	essential	to	a	new	consciousness	for	human	togetherness”	(Evans	and	Reid	2015:158).	
                                                45	They	continue,	“Such	reasoning	we	maintained	is	fully	compatible	with	neoliberalism	and	its	promotion	of	risk,	along	with	its	private	commitment	to	the	care	for	the	self”	(2015:157).	
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Solution:	Gospel	Narrative	as	Framework	The	picture	that	Evans	and	Reid	paint	of	resilience	is	bleak:	it	is	a	construct	that	reinforces	the	destabilized	nature	of	the	world	and	disempowers	individuals.	While	I	find	many	of	their	critiques	are	helpful,46	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	the	Christian	Gospel,	their	account	of	a	fundamentally	unstable	world	goes	too	far.	Yes,	the	world	is	broken,	but	it	is	also	redeemable.	To	the	extent	that	resilience	disavows	individuals	of	this	viewpoint,	it	should	be	corrected	or	discarded.		We	must	move	beyond	a	limited	viewpoint	of	resilience	to	understand	it	as	an	adaptive	process,	supported	by	connection	and	meaning.	I	believe	that	Evans	and	Reid	correctly	assess	the	futility	of	liberalism	(or	of	any	political	creed,	for	that	matter)	to	address	the	ills	of	the	world.	In	many	ways,	their	critiques	are	valid	and	helpful.	What	they	fail	to	include,	however,	is	an	account	of	God’s	activity	in	the	world	which,	for	the	Christian,	changes	everything.	Their	proposed	solution	points	in	a	hopeful	direction	but	does	not	fulfill	this	vision.	Instead	of	the	potentially	disempowering	narrative	of	secular	resilience,	a	Christian	theological	vision	embraces	a	view	of	the	individual	as	one	whose	identity	is	constituted	in	relation	to	God.	As	such,	the	individual	is	empowered	and	given	a	new	vision	of	the	world,	not	through	self-sufficiency,	but	through	relational	dependence	upon	God	and	others.			A	Christian	view	of	resilience,	as	portrayed	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	paradoxically	proclaims	that	one	gains	strength	through	dependence	and	vulnerability.	This	narrative	encapsulates	both	the	immanence	and	transcendence	of	God	as	the	One	revealed	to	Julian	in	the	suffering	Christ	on	the	cross	as	well	as	in	the	triumphant	doer	of	the	‘Great	Deed.’	God’s	narration	overcomes	our	reality,	evading	our	attempts	to	categorize	and	figure	God	out	(Graham	et	al.	2005:76).	It	is	this	story	that	informs	our	human	existence,	potentially	building	capacity	for	temporal	resilience.		
                                                46	In	fact,	much	of	Evans	and	Reid’s	argument	is	closely	resonant	with	my	own.	
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Dénouement	Thus,	it	may	be	that	we	were	asking	the	wrong	question	from	the	outset.	Rather	than,	‘How	can	individuals	be	more	resilient	through	adversity?’	perhaps	we	should	have	asked,	‘What	does	it	mean	to	be	human	given	the	broken	nature	of	the	world?’	The	latter	clarifies	the	former;	the	general	informs	the	specific.	But,	in	an	important	sense,	attention	to	the	particularity	of	resilience	can	provide	insight	into	human	existence.		A	theological	assessment	of	the	world	re-envisions	resilience	by	attesting	to	the	God	who	provides	abundant	Life.	Paradoxically,	in	forsaking	the	right	to	self-narration,	a	person	may	gain	meaning	and	connection	through	Divine	narration.	This	story	most	likely	will	include	loss	and	sorrow	due	to	the	distended	nature	of	the	world,	but	the	new	‘emplotment’	afforded	by	God’s	love	supports	resilient	adaptation	by	ensuring	that,	in	the	end,	‘alle	shalle	be	wele.’			Human	flourishing	is	about	much	more	than	resilience—flourishing	may	be	a	particular	expression	of	well-being	in	a	context	of	adversity,	but	does	not	define	it.	Because	the	
telos	of	human	existence	finds	meaning	in	relational	participation	in	God,	knowing	and	being	known	by	the	God	who	is	Love	constitutes	the	fulfillment	of	human	being.	Participation	in	Divine	life	certainly	has	implications	for	resilient	adaptation	to	adversity,	but	these	outcomes	are	tangential	rather	than	primary.	Against	the	view	of	many	scientific	materialists,	the	primary	function	of	the	human	being	is	not	to	continue	biological	life—surely	an	impoverished	view	of	existence—but	rather	is	to	be	united	to	God	in	love.	Such	a	telos	transcends	earthly	contingent	existence,	thereby,	paradoxically,	making	way	for	the	possibility	of	a	greater	capacity	for	resilience	in	this	life.	If	we	understand	‘natural’	resilience	as	‘survival	at	any	cost,’	seeking	foremost	the	survival	of	the	individual,	we	could	term	‘Christian’	resilience	‘love	at	any	cost,’	seeking	foremost	the	well-being	of	the	Other.	Paradoxically,	this	may	also	produce	significant	positive	resilience	outcomes	for	the	individual.		The	paradox	of	losing	to	gain,	dying	to	live	is	at	the	heart	of	the	Gospel.	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar	suggests	that	“to	die	for	love	of	the	One	who	died	for	me	in	divine	darkness:	this	face-to-face	encounter	is	one	of	a	kind,	and	it	characterizes…the	uniqueness	of	Christian	truth	and	existence”	(1994:143–44).	The	principle	of	self-giving	love	is	central	
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to	Christian	discipleship	as	“divine	life…blossoms	in	the	individual	Christian”	expressing	itself	in	a	life	of	service	(von	Balthasar	1994:133–34).	Thus,	the	Christian	“lives	as	one	who	has	died	and	been	resurrected,	because	his	whole	existence	is	an	attempt	to	make	a	loving	and	thankful	response	to	God	‘by	faith	in	the	Son	of	God,	who	loved	me	and	gave	himself	for	me’	(Gal	2:20)”	(von	Balthasar	1994:141).		This	means,	however,	that	living	a	life	re-envisioned	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	does	not	guarantee	positive	resilient	adaptation,	as	understood	in	secular	terms.	Certainly,	the	meaning	and	connection	an	individual	gains	through	participating	in	God’s	love	may	increase	the	likelihood	of	resilience,	but	they	may	also	create	outcomes	that	look	distinctly	un-resilient.	This	paradox,	a	part	of	the	mystery	of	the	Christian	faith,	cannot	be	explained	away	(von	Balthasar	1994:126–27).		The	narrative	of	the	Gospel	is	not	yet	complete;	mystery	remains.	Here	there	is	no	firm	conclusion,	but	rather	a	continuing	story	unfolding	in	the	praxis	of	everyday	life.	So,	too	the	enigmatic	‘resilient	individual‘	is	yet	to	be	located—or,	rather	he	is	an	illusion—for	no	solitary	‘resilient	individual’	is	guaranteed	positive	adaptation.	Rather,	each	individual	must	face	the	present	moment	with	the	resources	at	hand,	hopeful	of	a	positive	outcome	and	expectantly	awaiting	the	promised	future.			 	
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Conclusion		
	“‘He	will	give	his	angels	charge	of	you	to	guard	you	in	all	your	ways,’	the	psalmist	wrote,	
and	I	had	experienced	this	promise	as	an	extraordinary	reality.	
	
I	had	been	guarded.	Protected.	It	was	a	reason	to	rejoice.	But	still,	I	couldn’t	help	feeling	
sad…I	had	lost	some	of	my	innocence	and	naiveté.	But	I	never	lost	my	song.	Since	that	day,	
the	little	songbird	hasn’t	stopped	singing,	because	I	know	the	power	of	God’s	all-
encompassing	love,	which	writes	a	new	song	in	my	heart	with	each	new	day”	(Sawyer	and	
Proctor	2003:211).			
The	Resilience	Landscape	Where	I	grew	up	in	the	plains	of	the	Midwestern	United	States,	the	sky	seems	to	go	on	forever.	When	one	looks	at	the	horizon	it	appears	endless,	stretching	into	oblivion	on	every	side	as	far	as	the	eye	can	see.	It	can	be	a	daunting	task	to	navigate,	having	few,	if	any,	landmarks	to	guide	the	way	or	mark	the	passage	of	distance.	In	the	journey	of	life,	one	may	similarly	feel	cast	adrift	in	the	wilderness.		The	dearth	of	trees	in	this	landscape	is	one	of	the	main	difficulties	in	orienting	oneself.	In	the	introduction,	I	suggested	the	giant	redwood	tree	as	an	example	of	resilience.	In	the	same	way	that	the	rings	of	the	tree	tell	the	story	of	the	tree’s	survival,	I	argued,	the	contours	of	a	human	life	may	be	unfolded	through	narrative.	But	what	if,	like	the	fields	of	the	Midwestern	United	States,	there	are	few	way-markers	to	point	the	direction?	The	vast,	barren	landscape	of	secular	Western	culture,	I	suggest,	provides	few	guideposts	for	a	way	forward	towards	resilience.			In	this	project,	however,	I	have	traced	the	contours	of	resilient	adaptation	through	attention	to	particular	‘way-markers’:	the	science	of	adaptation,	the	philosophical	and	theological	underpinnings	of	resilience,	and	an	example	of	resilient	adaptation.	This	example,	in	particular,	could	be	seen	as	a	marker—like	a	giant	redwood	whose	rings	we	explore	in	the	hope	of	gaining	insight	into	its	adaptation.	Similarly,	Julian	of	Norwich	may	serve	as	a	tree	within	a	barren	landscape,	whose	narrative	may	enable	a	clearer	perspective	on	the	terrain	of	existence.		
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We	have	understood	resilience	as	the	process	of	patiently	enduring	adversity	through	reinterpretation	of	circumstances	in	light	of	the	Gospel	that	creates	meaning	and	through	relational	connection	with	the	God	revealed	in	Jesus	Christ.	We	complexified	the	cultural	narrative	on	resilience:	no	longer	can	we	see	resilience	simply	as	a	good	in	itself	or	an	amalgamation	of	characteristics	that	sustain	human	well-being	through	adversity.	Rather,	the	narrative	of	resilience	is	significantly	more	complex,	further	understood	through	a	theological	anthropology	that	understands	the	human	person	as	constituted	in	relation	to	the	Other.	While	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	extends	meaning	to	human	existence,	the	day-to-day	adversity	of	life	in	this	broken	world	can	be	mollified	through	relational	connection	with	the	God	who	is	described	in	the	Gospel,	and	with	the	community	created	by	the	Gospel.	Viewed	in	light	of	the	Gospel	narrative,	both	the	utter	depravity	of	evil	and	the	possibility	that	it	might	be	redeemed	become	apparent.			
Conclusions	on	Resilience	I	have	suggested	that	resilience,	like	human	life,	is	best	understood	through	narration.	In	the	final	chapter	I	laid	out	a	possible	narration	of	human	resilience	from	the	standpoint	of	Christian	theology.	This	narration	is	built	upon	the	preceding	chapters,	each	of	which	depicts	human	existence	and	resilience	to	adversity	from	a	slightly	different	angle.	This	analysis	led	to	several	important	implications.		
Outcomes	In	the	introduction	I	noted	that	the	Oxford	Thesaurus	of	English	suggests	as	synonyms	for	resilience:	“1…	durability,	ability	to	last,	strength,	sturdiness,	toughness…2…toughness,	hardiness…”	(Waite,	Maurice	2004:805).	And,	as	the	opposite	of	resilience:	“1…rigidity;	fragility…2…vulnerability,	weakness”	(Waite,	Maurice	2004:805).	Following	our	venture	into	understanding	of	resilience,	I	contend	that,	in	terms	of	human	resilience,	some	of	these	emphases	may	be	misplaced.	In	particular,	while	resilience	is	certainly	reliant	upon	strength,	this	is	not	necessarily	individual	strength,	but	can	be	a	strength	received	from	outside	the	self.	As	such,	resilience	need	not	be	considered	the	opposite	of	‘vulnerability’	or	‘weakness,’	but	rather	can	be	a	type	of	strength	re-imagined	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	to	a	conception	of	strength	
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that	includes	vulnerability.	In	this	view,	the	self	is	re-imagined	in	terms	of	relationality,	and	therefore	the	vulnerability	of	love.1	The	self-giving	love	of	God	in	Christ	serves	as	an	example	of	a	renewed	conception	of	strength—one	that	goes	through	the	suffering	of	death	only	to	rise	to	a	new	kind	of	life.	The	Christian	may	partake	in	this	life	through	the	participation	of	faith	that	enables	the	re-imagination	of	the	self.		Christian	theology,	then,	can	shed	light	on	human	resilience	as	a	function	of	human	personhood	and	well-being.2	Human	existence	is	re-imagined	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	as	being	relationally	dependent	and	meaningful	through	participation	in	the	love	of	God.	This	picture	is	at	odds	with	many	modern	Western	conceptions	of	resilience	and	human	flourishing.	I	suggest	that,	despite	a	desire	for	human	flourishing	(understood	as	happiness),	the	ability	of	humans	to	be	resilient	through	adversity	stands	in	contrast	to	many	current	accounts	of	flourishing.	I	propose	that	a	modern	Western	vision	of	flourishing	as	ease	is	opposed	to	the	reality	of	resilient	adaptation.	The	modern	vision	of	flourishing	suggests	that	the	well-being	characteristic	of	the	eschaton	should	be	humanity’s	current	reality;	Christian	hope	contends	that	this	world	is	broken	and	that	humanity’s	true	destiny	lies	in	the	eschaton	to	come.	Paradoxically,	this	perspective	may	enable	greater	temporal	flourishing	because	it	is	more	in	accord	with	the	reality	of	distended	human	existence.		
Resilience	Re-Envisioned		Parul	Sehgal	(2015)	suggests	that	resilience	is	“not	just	the	strength	to	stay	the	course	but	to	question	it.”	Thus,	he	suggests,	one	may	ask,	“Why	rise	from	the	ashes	without	asking	why	you	had	to	burn?”	Akin	to	this	questioning,	I	also	have	not	been	content	to	accept	the	construct	of	resilience	wholesale.	Rather	than	merely	attempting	to	carve	out	novel	applications	to	promote	resilience,3	I	sought	to	assess	the	underlying	framework	of	the	concept	itself.	Religious	belief,	at	times	in	both	explanatory	and	complexifying	
                                                1	A	similar	thesis	is	put	forward	by	Elizabeth	O’Donnell	Gandolfo	in	The	Power	and	
Vulnerability	of	Love:	A	Theological	Anthropology	(2015).	2	As	Tournier	noted,	“‘man	[sic]	in	crisis	situations’…reveals	what	he	is”	(1982:38).	3	There	are,	as	I	have	noted,	many	beneficial	studies	of	a	very	‘practical’	nature	with	emphases	as	diverse	as	creating	community	that	supports	resilient	adaptation,	for	instance,	or	strategies	for	religious	coping.	
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ways,4	may	be	able	to	elucidate	the	processes	underlying	resilient	adaptation,	but	also	suggests	specific	concrete	applications:	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	can	reshape	experience	of	the	world	and	thereby	create	hope;	the	individual	truly	knows	herself	most	fully	through	relation	to	the	Other.	Indeed,	through	participation	in	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel,	the	love	of	God	can	engender	human	resilience	by	creating	meaning	and	connection	in	an	environment	of	eschatological	hope.	These	applications	are	immensely	practical,	and	involve,	more	broadly,	accounting	for	the	nature	of	human	existence	in	the	world.		The	reality	of	evil	and	suffering	in	the	world	is	undeniable.	In	the	post-Holocaust	era,	this	pervasive	reality	has	confronted	the	thinking	of	many	scholars,	both	religious	and	secular.	Significantly,	a	Christian	conception	of	resilience	does	not	have	to	downplay	the	experience	or	reality	of	evil.	Evil	can	be	comprehended	for	what	it	is,	while	still	affirming	that	the	love	of	God	will	overcome	all	expressions	of	evil.	This,	in	particular,	was	Julian	of	Norwich’s	claim:	God	is	at	work	in	the	world,	disclosing	love,	and	sustaining	hope	through	meaning	and	connection.	Yet,	the	fulfillment	of	this	work	awaits	a	future	day,	necessitating	resilient	adaptation	in	the	present.		
Which	Resilience?	Some	individuals	can	thrive	in	adversity,	poverty,	and	oppression,	while	others	atrophy	in	apparent	health,	comfortable	lifestyles,	and	relative	well-being.	It	would	seem	that	advocates	of	‘secular’	resilience	would	favor	the	second	camp	to	the	first,	but	is	it	preferable?	What	does	this	say	about	the	nature	of	resilience,	the	nature	of	the	human	experience,	and	the	nature	of	the	world?	Could	it	be	that	adversity	is,	as	Julian	contends,	somehow	‘behovely’?	Our	journey	has	taken	us	perhaps	to	an	unexpected	and	paradoxical	ending	in	which	the	goal	we	thought	we	were	seeking	has	been	re-described	through	the	narrative	of	the	crucified	and	resurrected	Christ.5	There	is	no	easy,	clear-cut	answer	here,	only	the	narrative	fragment	of	the	cross	and	belief	in	the	resolution	of	all	things	that	is	prefigured	in	the	resurrection.	This	enables	human	beings	
                                                4	And,	perhaps,	this	is	a	mutually	symbiotic	relationship.	5	Perhaps,	rather	than	viewing	resilience	from	a	place	of	relative	ease,	health,	and	well-being,	the	testimony	of	those	undergoing	adversity	should	be	given	preeminence	in	understanding	resilience.	
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bound	in	the	constraints	of	time	to	be	resilient—patiently,	actively,	and	relationally	engaged	in	furthering	the	Kingdom	of	God.			In	one	sense	this	may	look	like	the	resilience	of	the	secular	world,	but	in	a	very	different	sense,	a	Christian	conception	of	resilience	can	look	completely	and	paradoxically	un-resilient.	The	Christian	exemplar	is	none	other	than	Jesus	Christ	who,	through	dying	destroyed	death.6	And	so	it	will	be	for	his	followers,	who	through	seeming	un-resilience	become	resilient—through	the	vulnerability	of	love.		
Resilience:	When?	In	the	journey	of	life,	as	in	Julian's	assessment	of	waiting	for	the	'great	deed'	by	which	all	things	will	be	made	right,	patience	is	required.	The	Kingdom	of	God	is	already	present	in	the	world	but	not	yet	fully	triumphant.	This	calls	for	resilience	for	the	time-being—resilience	that,	for	the	Christian,	is	based	upon	a	re-envisioning	the	world	through	the	Gospel,	thereby	creating	meaning	and	identity	in	relation	to	God.		At	times	this	is	a	fleeting	resilience—a	fumbling	and	disjointed	affair—but	it	is	sustained	nonetheless	by	God.	This	resilience	is	sustained,	not	on	human	effort,	but	by	God.		
Resilience:	How?	Ricoeur	proposes	that	scientific	and	religious	knowledge	are	best	integrated	through	attention	to	“experience,”	not	merely	through	theoretical	means	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi).	The	lived	experience	of	each	human	being	is	situated,	particular,	and	ultimately	mysterious.	I	contend	that	the	depth	of	human	life,	especially	in	adversity,	can	best	be	plumbed	through	narrative	rather	than	through	merely	abstracted	scientific	enquiry.	Our	foray	into	understanding	resilience	brings	not	only	greater	clarity	to	how	and	why	individuals	can	be	resilient,	but	also	greater	clarity	to	what	it	means	to	be	human.	In	this	quest,	it	is	my	hope	that	we	have	achieved	“the	convergence	of	diverse	perspectives…on	being	in	the	world	which	give	rise	to	a	genuine	interconnection	of	science	and	religion,	on	the	edge	of	mystery”	(Ricoeur	1984a:xi).	Truly,	because	of	the	mysterious	nature	of	the	
                                                6	Cf.	Hebrews	2:14.	
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human	person,	only	an	approach	that	takes	seriously	paradox	can	provide	clearest	insight	and,	in	the	end,	the	most	helpful	praxis.			The	Christian	Gospel	does	not	attempt	to	do	away	with	the	irenic	nature	of	human	existence,	caught	between	the	extremes	of	distention	and	hope.	Rather,	it	enables	a	purposive	and	substantial	mode	of	existence	in	the	‘in-betweenness’	of	human	experience.	Through	the	hope	provided	by	the	narrative	re-emplotment	of	the	Gospel	and	the	identity	found	in	relational	dependence	upon	God,	the	resilient	individual	is	enabled	to	live	her	life	with	patient	hope.		
The	Limits	of	Resilience	A	narrative	‘re-emplotment’	of	the	events	of	one’s	life	may	indeed	sustain	resilience,	but	is	it	also	possible	that	a	new	emplotment	does	not	clarify,	but	rather	intensifies	the	ambiguity	and	despair	of	suffering?	Must	all	elements	of	a	life	narrative	make	sense	and	come	to	a	satisfying	conclusion?		Perhaps	the	answer	is	both	paradoxical	and	unsatisfying	in	the	end.	Julian	suggests	that	an	ultimate	consummation	of	our	experience	will,	in	some	mysterious	way,	bring	healing.	This	hope	can	foster	resilient	adaptation	in	the	midst	of	life’s	adversities.	It	also	calls	for	patience	and	acceptance—for	the	time	being—of	ambiguity	and	incomplete	explanations.	Such	patient	endurance	may	also	foster	resilience	through	learning	to	adapt	and	accept	the	tension	inherent	in	human	existence.		Narrative	reappraisal	has	its	limits	however.	No	amount	of	reinterpretation	can	change	the	fact	of	the	terrible	reality	of	pain	and	suffering	in	the	lived	experience	of	many	individuals.	Rather	than	denying	this	reality,	the	Christian	is	called	to	acknowledge	it,	while	appraising	it	in	light	of	the	greater	perspective	afforded	by	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.			
A	Final	Example:	The	Road	to	Emmaus	I	conclude	with	a	final	example	of	the	possibilities	of	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel	for	resilience:	The	Scriptural	story	of	the	disciples	on	the	road	to	Emmaus.	I	contend	that	
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these	disciples	serve	as	an	example	of	resilient	adaptation	fostered	by	the	love	of	God	and	portrayed	through	the	Gospel.7	Though	they	had	just	undergone	the	trauma	of	seeing	their	Teacher,	Jesus,	betrayed	and	killed,	they	received	new	perspective	when	they	met	the	risen	Christ	on	the	road.	They	thought	that	their	hope	had	been	misplaced,	but	it	merely	awaited	the	vindication	of	Christ’s	Resurrection	(Fowl	2005:227).	He	told	them	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel—Salvation	History—in	a	fresh	way,	enabling	them	to	see	not	only	this	story,	but	also	themselves	and	their	circumstances,	in	a	new	light.	This	was	resilience	through	difficulty	rather	than	around	it—a	narrative	with	both	tragic	and	comedic	elements	(Loughlin	1999:161–64):	the	disciples	on	the	road	to	Emmaus		do	not	learn	that	what	had	happened	in	Jerusalem	[to	Jesus]	had	not,	but	rather	the	meaning	of	what	had	happened…They	learn	that	one	ending	is	the	condition	of	the	other;	no	happy	ending	without	an	unhappy	one;	no	comedy	without	tragedy	(Loughlin	1999:163).		In	the	same	way	that	the	disciples	on	the	road	to	Emmaus	gained	resilience	through	encountering	Christ,	so	too	we	may	gain	strength	to	face	adversity	resiliently	by	participating	in	the	love	of	God	through	faith.	This	does	not	mean	that	all	experiences	in	this	life	will	go	the	way	we	wish—usually	quite	the	opposite—but	this	discordance	is	the	condition	of	resilience.	The	way	forward	is	through	the	sorrows	of	the	world,	knowing	that	in	the	end	“alle	shalle	be	wele”—not	because	we	can	escape	the	experience	of	suffering	but	because	God	is	redeeming	the	world,	including	our	experiences	of	evil,	through	Christ’s	suffering.	This	is,	Ricoeur	notes,	a	“theology	of	paradox,	which	calls	for	hope	in	the	very	depths	of	distress”	(LaCocque	and	Ricoeur	1998:225).		In	the	conclusion	to	her	magisterial	Mysticism,	Evelyn	Underhill	writes,	It	was	said	of	the	disciples	at	Emmaus,	‘Mensam	igitur	ponunt,	panes	cibosque	offerunt,	et	Deum,	quem	in	Scripturae	sacrae	expositione	non	cognoverant,	in	panis	fractione	cognoscunt.’8	So	too	for	us	the	Transcendent	Life	for	which	we	crave	is	revealed,	and	our	living	within	it,	not	on	some	remote	and	arid	plane	of	being,	in	the	cunning	explanations	of	philosophy;	but	in	the	normal	acts	of	our	diurnal	experience	suddenly	made	significant	for	us.	Not	in	the	backwaters	of	existence,	not	amongst	subtle	arguments…but	in	all	those	places	where	the	
                                                7	This	story	can	be	found	in	Luke	24:13-35.	8	‘Therefore	they	ponder	the	table,	offering	bread	and	meat,	and	God,	whom	they	had	not	known	in	the	exposition	of	sacred	Scriptures,	they	know	in	broken	bread.’	Here	Underhill	is	quoting	the	Breviarium	Romanum	(Anon	1843:322).	
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direct	and	simple	life	of	earth	goes	on…This	fact	of	experience	is	our	link	with	the	mystics…our	‘lovely	forerunners’	on	the	path	towards	the	Real…Like	the	story	of	the	Cross,	so	too	the	story	of	man’s	spirit	ends	in	a	garden…Divine	fecundity	is	its	secret:	existence,	not	for	its	own	sake,	but	for	the	sake	of	a	more	abundant	life…The	mystics	witness	to	this	story	(1912:537–38).		Though	this	project	has	included	a	fair	amount	of	what	could	be	understood	as	“explanations	of	philosophy,”	the	substance	of	what	I	have	argued	lies	not	in	the	strength	of	explanatory	power,	but	in	the	lived	experience	of	those	who	participate	in	the	immanent	love	of	God	disclosed	through	the	narrative	of	the	Gospel.	Its	fulfillment	is	in	phronesis.		Near	the	end	of	his	life,	Ricoeur	proposed	that	God’s	power	must	be	conceived	of	as	connected	with	“the	all-weakness	of	a	love	that	surrenders	to	death”	(Changeux	and	Ricoeur	2002:271).	Elsewhere	he	writes:	“For	all	God’s	power,	God	only	gives	Christians	the	sign	of	divine	weakness,	which	is	the	sign	of	God’s	love”	(Ricoeur	1995h:288).	In	the	same	way,	I	have	suggested,	we	should	understand	resilience	as	a	function	of	human	existence	that	is	dependent	upon	what	is	external	to	the	self.	Meaning,	connection,	and	the	temporal	resilience	that	they	support,	are	comprehensible	in	light	of	“the	all-weakness	of	a	love	that	surrenders	to	death”	and	the	God	who	embodies	this	type	of	power.	As	Ricoeur	professed	on	a	scrap	of	paper	found	following	his	death:	Survivant	en	sursis,	je	suis.	Mais	non	[?],	sans	[exemption].	Je	remets	mon	esprit	à	Dieu	pour	les	autres.	Ce	lien,	cette	transmission	a	son	sens	au-delà	de	moi	et	un	sens	y	est	caché	auquel	Dieu	peut-être	m'associera	d'une	façon	que	je	ne	peux	imaginer	(Ricœur	2007:129–30).9		This	is	the	truest	perception	of	resilience:	the	weakness	of	vulnerable	love	overcomes	the	strength	of	isolation;	the	meaning	furnished	through	participation	in	the	self-sacrificing	God	outweighs	the	satisfaction	of	buttressed	comfort.	Such	resilience	is	founded	upon	participation	in	the	God	who	bestows	hope	through	the	narrative	that	attests	to	Love.	
	 	
                                                9	‘I	am	a	survivor	on	borrowed	time.	But	not	wholly.	I	present	my	spirit	to	God	for	
others.	This	bond,	this	giving	has	its	meaning	beyond	me	and	a	sense	hidden	there	to	which	God	may	make	me	a	partner	in	a	way	that	I	cannot	imagine’	(my	translation).	
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